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Abstract 
 
 This dissertation research analyzes the vernacular cosmopolitan praxis of Muslim 
women in transnational cyberspaces related to topical and collective action networks, in 
an effort to detangle cosmopolitanism from its Western biases and to move away from 
studies of online Muslim populations based on geographical locations or homogenous 
networks, linking individuals through their religious practices or consumption of 
religious knowledge. Through highlighting praxes rather than contexts, this dissertation 
disrupts the East/West binary and challenges stereotypes ascribed to Muslim women. One 
of the research questions related to the cosmopolitan praxis of Muslim women is the 
following: in what ways do Muslim women engage with “others” online and contribute to 
bridging dissimilar people? Findings suggest that the social media use of Muslim women 
contributes to their subtle resistance against communal norms and, although it can serve 
as an extension to their voices, some of their voices are more readily mediated than others.   
 I employ a connective content analysis methodology to put various datasets 
associated with topics and collective actions related to Muslim women into conversation. 
The methodology not only highlights consistencies in the qualitative themes that were 
iteratively developed through the analyses of the datasets, but also more tangible 
connections related to social media users, topics, and content. Consequently, this thesis is 
as much concerned with recasting Western-oriented conceptualizations of 
cosmopolitanism as it is with how networks dynamics foster and constrain cosmopolitan 
praxis because digital networks have the extraordinary capacity to link dissimilar people 
beyond any other type of medium. One of the research questions related to the 
methodology is: how do network dynamics facilitate and constrain cosmopolitan praxis? 
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 The substantive chapters related to the datasets discuss various forms of 
cosmopolitan praxis that were identified in the analysis: social media use by Muslim 
women that expands the connective memory, which could contribute to dispelling 
stereotypes ascribed to them; activism that addresses universal concerns related to 
women’s rights regardless of context; dialogically devising basic standards of social 
conduct and gender relations; and expressions of tolerance toward divergent views, 
including alternative interpretations of Islamic beliefs and practices.  
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Introduction 
 
I've never told this story before. My first recollection of being sexually harassed was when I was 
10 or 11 years old. I was at the beach, swimming, when a strange man I had never seen before, put 
his hand inside my swimsuit and repeatedly pinched my vagina, while he smiled at me. 
I was confused, didn't know how to understand what he did. I thought he must be a friend of my 
parents, but when I swam to the shore and told them, my dad went in and beat the guy, almost 
drowning him. It was the only time I saw my dad beat a man.1 (Menna) 
 
“Menna” offered this narrative on the HarassMap Facebook page in conjunction with the 
online “End Sexual Harassment” campaign, which resulted in hundreds of blog postings, 
Facebook entries, and Tweets from Egyptian, Lebanese, Syrian, and Sudanese social 
media users.2 A campaign of this magnitude not only demonstrates the pervasiveness of 
the issue but also that it would be difficult to accomplish offline, particularly the 
transnational aspect of the campaign. Social media provide Muslim women spaces to 
share their voices and to collectivize around issues that affect women everywhere. 
“Menna” uses the opportunity to share a story that she has kept to herself perhaps due to 
embarrassment or because social norms make the subject taboo. Cyberspaces allow 
women to collectively share their experiences and, as the title of this dissertation suggests, 
I am interested in ways that Muslim women engage online as individuals, groups and 
networks, and as women.  
Background of Problem 
 The participation of the women in the 2011 Arab Revolts as well as the growing 
influence of female Muslim scholarship and activism have made it increasingly difficult 
to maintain the well-rehearsed stereotype of the submissive Muslim woman, or cooke’s 
(2007) Muslimwoman (see Chapter 1). Although the opinions of Muslim women 
                                                      
1https://www.facebook.com/HarassMapEgypt/posts/349748891763757?comment_id=2892388&offset=0&t
2 http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/14618.aspx 
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continue to be underrepresented in political, religious, and media discourses and in 
association with how they situate their allegiances to local and global communities, 
which are sometimes rendered as mutually exclusive, Muslim women’s use of social 
media has contributed to dispelling various widely held beliefs about Muslim women and 
their enduring status as victims (cooke, 2000), including what is perceived as self-
imposed victimization through their affiliation with Islam. Prior to the advent of social 
media, when Muslim women were not being stereotyped in conventional media they 
were largely ignored due to their conspicuous absence in existing power structures. This 
dissertation research attempts to situate topics and collective actions related to Muslim 
women, particularly those that frame universal issues related to women’s rights, to 
determine the extent to which they convey cosmopolitanism.  
 The term cosmopolitanism is associated with the processes of global 
interconnectedness and with the propagation of universal norms (Beck, 2004; 2011; Beck 
& Sznaider, 2006). Cosmopolitanism not only addresses the possibility of universal 
standards but it is also considered an enviable identity trait among Westerners and 
academics, alluding to sophistication, affluence, and worldliness (Hannerz, 1996). Since 
Muslim women appear to be addressing universal issues affecting women’s right, like 
sexual harassment, their social media use veers toward a form of cosmopolitanism; 
however, despite the broad range of conceptualizations of cosmopolitanism, there is little 
mention of Muslim women, Arabs, and Muslims in associated literature.  
Statement of Problem 
 Cosmopolitanism implies movements toward universality, so it has the potential 
to be an important guiding principle in the highly interconnected current era. Yet, despite 
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this potential, cosmopolitanism has historically and contemporarily been tied Western 
consciousness and values, compromising the universalism of the cosmos in favor of 
conformity to Western social, political, and economic ontologies and cultural colonialism. 
Muslim women lack access to the affiliation because, due to the aforementioned 
stereotype of the Muslimwoman (cooke, 2007), they are often perceived as the antithesis 
of liberated Westerners and ambivalent to Western values. Their exclusion from the ranks 
of cosmopolitans may not only be associated with Eurocentricism of the term, 
particularly within Western academic circles, but also related to how Muslim populations 
are examined in scholarship, especially online populations, which are of central interest 
to this dissertation.  
 Studies of Muslims in online spaces tend to reify a singular unified Muslim 
community, a theoretical position that I refute throughout this dissertation but particularly 
in Chapter 5, perhaps because they focus on specific homogenous groups (“homophilic 
networks”) that subscribe to traditional Islamic authority and Qur’anic hermeneutics (see 
Bunt, 2004). This is not simply related to the preference of Muslims for traditional 
perspectives on Islam but because scholars tend to study popular websites and, since 
network dynamics tend to favor websites that have a longer history on the internet and 
those that are linked to the most, these websites may be popular because many people are 
linking to them in support of and in opposition to the articulated claims therein. Further, 
scholars may fall prey to the assumptions outlined, for example, in Huntington’s (1993) 
“Clash of Civilizations” and highlight the incompatibility between Islamic and Western 
worldviews in their analyses based on these homogeneous networks. Thus the less 
authoritative voices of Muslims, especially Muslim women, on personal blogs, who do 
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not claim the title of mufti, as well as discussions between Muslims and between 
Muslims and non-Muslims in transnational cyberspaces are often ignored in academic 
research. To move away from the focus on Western cosmopolitanism based on 
geography and identities and studies of Muslim populations in homogenous online 
networks, I propose the study of vernacular cosmopolitan praxis among Muslim women 
in transnational cyberspaces.          
Literature Review 
 In ancient times, cosmopolitanism was framed as commitment to both one’s local 
community and the “cosmos,” or humanity as a whole (Kleingeld, 2006). Although the 
origins of the idea of cosmopolitanism denoted an ethical consideration for humankind, it 
was co-opted by leaders during early Christianity and, later when it became a fashionable 
theoretical framework among Enlightenment philosophers, to advance Christianity and 
Western ideals and superiority under European colonialism. In contemporary literature, 
the word cosmopolitan is often linked to the identity of certain people who are tolerant of 
multiculturalism or the multi-ethnic configuration places (Calhoun, 2008). 
Cosmopolitanism is also theorized as processes and issues that connect the “cosmos” 
(Beck, 2004; 2011), or all people from different places and cultures around the world. 
Literature related to cosmopolitanism also questions the viability of supranational 
structures of global governance, reviving Kant’s affinity for this type of cosmopolitan 
project (Dallmayr, 2012; Beck, 2004). Contemporary conceptualizations have attempted 
to reposition cosmopolitanism as universalism, rather than Eurocentricism, but the 
absence of certain groups of people in studies related cosmopolitanism perhaps 
unwittingly implies that the epicenter of the ideal continues to reside in Western locales 
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or among people who have adopted Western consciousness and/or identities. Under 
contemporary globalization shaped by the Washington Consensus,3 global culture has 
moved toward greater homogeneity to the extent that societies (and individuals by 
association) that deviate from hegemonic norms must constantly justify their motivations 
for non-compliance.  
 Scholarship perhaps continues to reflect the us/them dynamic in regard to 
cosmopolitanism, particularly because cosmopolitanism is often linked to (Western) 
identity. Most populations described as cosmopolitan are either Westerners or non-
Westerners living in the West. In contrast, Muslims and Arabs are not often rendered as 
cosmopolitans due the stereotypes ascribed to them and, when they are mentioned in 
literature, they are typically marked as “anti-cosmopolitans” (Beck & Sznaider, 2006), 
like those responsible for the September 11 and July 7 attacks, because religious, political, 
and national identities that counter Western norms are all forms of guilt by association, 
particularly in the age of global terror. While some scholars point out that anti-
cosmopolitanism can also exist in the West among Westerners (Blaagaard, 2010), the 
lack of studies that locate cosmopolitanism outside of the West suggests that Arabs and 
Muslims are guilty of anti-cosmopolitanism by association because Western rhetoric 
related to Islam often perceives it in monolithic terms and emphasizes the inherent 
violence of the religious culture. Rendered in these terms, cosmopolitanism simply 
becomes another form of othering to mark the binary cosmopolitan/anti-cosmopolitan, 
which appears counterintuitive to the general aim of cosmopolitanism—different people 
respecting each other through a shared sense of humanity.   
                                                      
3 The Washington Consensus promotes the American/European model of societal-governmental relations, 
including individualism, democracy, secularity, and free market capitalism.  
 xv	  
 As mentioned above, some of the discussions and forms of activism in my data 
suggest that Muslim and Arab Muslim women are exhibiting cosmopolitanism, related to 
the ancient conceptualization rather than the Eurocentric Christian colonialist version, in 
their social media use. The efforts of Muslim women, enabled through social media, 
bridge cultures, iteratively devise basic standards of comportment, engage universal 
issues related to women’s rights, and encourage local-global dialogue and change. I 
frame these actions and interactions as vernacular cosmopolitan praxis; in other words, 
behaviors that demonstrates dedication to local and global communities, similar to glocal 
or global-local activism (Beck, 2002). Rather than defining cosmopolitanism as an 
identity, which generally only applies to affluent Westerners (Werbner, 1999) and 
typically lacks nuanced perspectives on race, gender, and class (Cook, 2012), 
interrogating narratives, conversations, and activism offers a more inclusive form of 
cosmopolitanism and a more useful analytical tool.  
 Through my engagement with literature to theoretically situate my dissertation, I 
have found that there is an abundance of abstract engagement with cosmopolitanism with 
relatively little empirical backing. Furthermore, much of the theoretical literature links 
cosmopolitanism with identity without questioning who is left out of this framework. The 
heuristic complements to literature related to cosmopolitanism have focused on non-
Western diaspora living in Western countries (Cook, 2012; Christensen, 2011; Werbner, 
1999) or nation-based studies of cosmopolitanism in the West (Mau et al., 2008; 
Gustafson, 2009), which seems counterintuitive in approaching a transnational, 
transcultural aesthetic. Moreover, Cook (2012) notes, in her article published a few years 
ago, there continues to be a paucity of qualitative research on cosmopolitan attitudes, 
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although there have been a few quantitative studies of populations in the West. This 
dissertation will attempt to address some of these gaps in the literature. 
 This thesis also aims to contribute to literature on the social media use of Muslims 
because studies of the online engagements of Muslims have often been narrowly focused 
on Islamic-oriented sites or websites dedicated to specific groups of Muslims based on 
nationality or geographical subgroupings. Etling et al. (2009) published a comprehensive 
study of the “Arab Blogospheres,” blogospheres of the Middle East and North Africa, but 
it focused on linguistic, political, religious, and geographical boundaries. This study said 
little about how social media users in the “Arab Blogosphere” interact with non-Arabs. 
Other studies, most notably those attributed to Gary Bunt (2004), have attempted to 
describe “cyber Islamic environments” through analyzing the websites of influential 
Islamic scholars and Arab resistance groups, such as Hezbollah and Hamas; however, 
while these websites might be prominent, they might also exclude Muslims who do not 
consume religious materials through these types of websites, those who do not use the 
internet to discuss religion, and those who do not support these resistance groups. 
 Websites related to Islamic knowledge that attempt to position Muslim lifestyles 
and religious authority in the modern era typically cater to Muslims in the West (Sisler, 
2007). I did not focus on these websites because I wanted to preserve the inherent 
variance of Muslimness being that it is an affiliation that is embraced by nearly a quarter 
of the world’s population. By analyzing the topics of interest to and collective actions of 
Muslim women through transnational cyberspaces, scholars can avoid Islamic-oriented 
websites that tend toward conformity, or “homophily,” as network theorists call it, and 
 xvii	  
the overrepresentation of Muslim men in these online spaces.4 Furthermore, one is most 
likely to encounter cosmopolitan praxis in transnational cyberspaces rather than Muslim-
oriented website because these spaces draw people from different cultural and religious 
backgrounds, not always into civil conversations (Jansson, 2013; Blaagaard, 2010), but 
engagements with “others” nonetheless. This thesis focuses on a particular form of 
cosmopolitan praxis: the vernacular variety. Vernacular cosmopolitan praxes take various 
forms, which will be outlined in the subsequent chapters, but a few of their 
commonalities include commitment to tolerance of divergent beliefs and dedication to 
humanity at the local and global level. 
Research Questions 
 To gain insight into whether or not cosmopolitanism can appropriately frame the 
social media use of Muslim women, my research was initially guided by the following 
research questions: How do Muslim women frame issues related to women’s rights? Do 
their framings of women’s rights address local and/or global concerns and/or a continuum 
of local and global issues? Through my engagement with literature on cosmopolitanism, 
which led to the conceptualization of the meta-theory “vernacular cosmopolitan praxis” 
in transnational cyberspace, I added some additional questions, including the following: 
In what ways do Muslim women use social media to amply and multiply their voices? To 
what extent are offline constraints related to interacting with others and promoting 
solidarity mirrored online? How do social media and networks facilitate and/or frustrate 
the attempts of Muslim women to engage with “others” online? To what extent do social 
                                                      
4 I mention the overrepresentation of Muslim men for two reasons: first, some Muslims do not believe that 
it is appropriate for men and women to interact online so some women may not participate on some of 
these sites to uphold online gender segregation; and, second, the beliefs of Muslim women sometimes lay 
in stark contrast to how issues are framed by religious authorities and Muslim men (see Chapter 4).  
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media counter or reinforce stereotyping and othering? To what extent do the perspectives 
of Muslim women in transnational cyberspaces counter dominant religious, political, and 
media discourses related to women’s rights? To what extent do Muslim women express 
tolerance for divergent interpretations of Islamic beliefs and practices? What are some of 
the impediments to the collectivization of Muslim women? To what extent does the 
“digital ummah network”5 mediate issues related to the rights of Muslim women and 
women in general? How do women frame their (multiple) allegiances in social media? I 
also included the following research questions related to methodological concerns: how 
could vernacular cosmopolitan praxis be operationalized (in other words, what types of 
praxis can be identified as cosmopolitan?)? Are the narratives and conversations of 
Muslim women qualitatively different in transnational online spaces that are not oriented 
specifically to Muslims or Muslim women? 
Research Contributions 
 This dissertation attempts to contribute to literature related to cosmopolitanism in 
the following ways: by locating cosmopolitanism beyond the West; through focusing on 
praxis rather identity, which is also crucial to the first goal of determining if non-Western 
populations are exhibiting cosmopolitan behaviors in their online interactions with others; 
supplementing the paucity of studies related to cosmopolitanism among women in 
particular; by contributing to the slight representation of empirical studies on 
cosmopolitanism in general and qualitative studies in particular; and through analyzing 
                                                      
5 As I will discuss in Chapter 5, the “digital ummah network” is a network comprised of various nodes and 
bridges that link Muslims around the world in relation to certain topics of interest when the mediated issue 
reaches a sufficient density of these nodes and bridges, or a “critical mass.” Whether or not a topic is 
mediated within bridges and nodes—in other words, reaches a critical mass—has to do with several factors, 
such as mediation, which I will discuss in Chapter 3.       
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the extent to which cyberspaces and digital networks facilitate and/or impede 
cosmopolitanism. My dissertation research also attempts to address the lack of studies of 
online populations, in this case Muslim populations, which examine heterogeneous 
networks and cross-cultural dialogues. This gap in the literature is perhaps related to how 
academics study populations of Muslims, centering on specific populations, typologies 
(liberal or traditional), or authoritative website but rarely how they interact with other/ed 
Muslims and non-Muslims. My research also disrupts the East/West binary by focusing 
on topics and collective actions related to Muslim women rather than focusing on 
identities or geographical locations. There is also very little literature that examines 
transnational networks of Muslim women without first reorienting the studies to 
particular countries, regions, or typologies or to specific transnational organizations, like 
Muslim Women Living Under Islamic Law. Following from disruptions of the East/West 
binary, this research contributes to literature that counters stereotypes of Muslim women, 
particularly the Arab Muslimwoman, by demonstrating how Muslim women are speaking 
out about injustices and highlighting parallels between the lived experiences of these 
women regardless of context.   
Limitations of Research 
 This section will highlight some of the limitations of this research because in any 
study I believe that it is important to consider who is left out and what is emphasized 
through the methodology. Starting with who is left out, many of the social media users in 
the data likely emanate from the middle or middle upper class so people from other 
socioeconomic backgrounds are likely underrepresented because they may lack financial 
resources or sufficient leisure time to engage in online discussions. Furthermore, since 
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the data I collected was principally in English, even those who have sufficient resources 
and time to participate in online discussions may lack the requisite English skills to 
interact in the “digital ummah network” in which English is the lingua franca. Although 
many Muslim interlocutors among the largest Muslim populations in South and Southeast 
Asia may have the sufficient resources and English skills to participate in the digital 
ummah network, I have focused on topics and collective actions related to Muslim 
women in the West and the Arab world for several reasons: I have studied the Arab world 
for over a decade so I am more familiar with the history and politics of this region; 
Western stereotypes of Muslims often focus on Arab Muslims and, although Arabs are 
not always considered people of color, the religious identity of Arab Muslims has become 
politicized and racialized through hegemonic geo-political interests in the region; and 
simply as a means of qualifying the immense amount of data available in social media 
networks. 
Structure of Dissertation 
 Before moving to the outline of the chapters, I should make a brief note of the 
structure of the chapters to follow. After the two chapters related to methodology, 
Chapter 1, which provides a literature review of cosmopolitanism and how I situate this 
study in the literature, and Chapter 2, which describes connective content analysis and the 
data collection for the topics and collective actions included in this research, Chapter 3 
through 5, begin with brief discussions of how social media and network dynamics 
impact the social media use of Muslim women and then the chapters broach data from 
multiple datasets before offering theoretical discussions grounded in related literature. 
Chapter 6 offers three separate but interrelated case studies of collective actions related to 
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and/or initiated by Muslim women and their relative success based on the network 
underpinnings and the framing and mediation of the issues. On a final note, the 
hyperlinks footnoted throughout the dissertation are links from the datasets, while the 
scholarly sources are denoted through in-text citations.      
Mapping the Chapters  
 Chapter 1 presents a literature review on cosmopolitanism. Since 
cosmopolitanism has become entangled with colonialism, elitism, and Eurocentricism 
(Werbner, 2006), I suggest recovering its ancient meaning—dedication to humanity—
through distancing cosmopolitanism from the entrenchments of Christianity, empire 
building, Western values, and colonialism, which developed through the Enlightenment 
philosophers’ revival of the term. Some theorists have proposed “vernacular 
cosmopolitanism” (Werbner, 2006) or “rooted cosmopolitanism” (Appiah, 1998) as terms 
that reference dedication both to one’s local community and to the global cosmos, which 
are consistent with how the word was originally imagined in ancient times. These are the 
theoretical positions that inform this thesis. Since I am also interested in moving beyond 
theory and contributing to empirical literature on cosmopolitanism, I will attempt to 
highlight “vernacular cosmopolitan praxis” that I operationalize as the following: 
dialogue and network linkages that encourage interaction between dissimilar people 
(even among Muslims with dissimilar beliefs); dialogue that encourages inclusivity and 
civility; and the articulation of basic levels of comportment online and off, iteratively 
developed through discussions.   
 Chapter 2, “Getting Lost in Networks,” describes the methodology involved in 
this research, using what I have come to classify as a “connective content analysis.” 
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Starting with one topic (artificial hymen) and a node of a transnational network 
(American hijabi fashion blogging) that I discovered through following larger 
transnational and national groups of female Muslim bloggers, I discovered so many 
interesting topics and collective actions that I got lost in the overlapping networks that 
shared content, topics, qualitative themes, and social media users in common. These 
commonalities contributed to my inclination to put the datasets into conversation, which 
is why I conceptualize the methodology as connective. This chapter will provide a 
timeline of each dataset, both of the data collection and of the major online media events 
associated with the datasets, as well as a description of the iterative process through 
which the data was collected for each of the connective components of the methodology, 
highlighting the overlaps between the disparate but interconnected datasets.  
 Chapter 3, “Conversations in Cyberspace,” discusses the digital self-expression of 
Muslim women and how it could expand the “connective” or “networked” memory 
(Hoskins, 2011).6 Several Muslim women have used social media platforms to highlight 
cases of women who have been killed or have taken their own lives—“martyred 
women”—to impress upon the expanses of cyberspaces the need for continuing serious 
conversations about women’s rights, locally and transnationally. Their voices move 
beyond the perspectives of the Muslim women who have become spokespeople for the 
“safe,” pro-Western form of Islam promoted in Western media, the “native informant 
spokespeople,” following Chow (1993; also see Khan, 2005). I argue that Muslim women 
                                                      
6 The connective memory is similar to the nationally based collective memories, which is situated in the 
media artifacts of nation-states, but connective memories are comprised of digital archives. In Chapter 3, I 
discuss the dominant transnational connective memory, which includes the authority of search engine 
results based on the popular preferences, and “localized” or “alternative” connective memories that are 
based on the preferences of subgroupings within transnational networks. 
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demonstrate a cosmopolitan aesthetic through expanding the connective memory to 
balance the co-opted version of Islam advanced by the “safe” Muslims but their digital 
self-expressions are not equally mediated into the “transnational dominant connective 
memory.”7 
 Chapter 4, “Women’s Agency and Muslim Marriage,” highlights the variation 
among those who consider themselves Muslims by analyzing how different social actors 
frame the issue of the high proportions of unmarried women in various Muslim-majority 
nations and in Muslim communities in the West. In contrast to dominant discourses 
related to the issue, some Muslim women see spinsterhood as an empowered choice, 
particularly in the contexts of the lack of suitable prospective grooms. I point out issues 
in various datasets that may contribute to women deciding to remain single, including the 
following: the inability of women to “prove” their virginity, gender-based norms of 
segregation that constrain the normalization of relations between men and women, 
gendered double standards, and the high incidences of sexual violence in some Muslim 
communities that precludes the possibility of women wanting to develop relationships 
with men. The concluding section renders the dialectic between marriage and the agency 
of Muslim women as cosmopolitan aesthetics related to women demanding a basic 
standard of comportment from men before they agree to marry, which I characterize as 
“subtle resistance.”  
                                                      
7 The dominant transnational connective memory is related to the most linked to search engine results for 
Google keyword searches, for example. It also denotes the differences between localized networks, for 
example, using Google France, and transnational networks, for example, using Google without 
geographical qualifiers. The dominant network tends to be heavily influenced by Western, especially 
American, results and links preferences.  
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 Chapter 5 frames typologies of Muslims, such as “liberal” and “traditional.” I 
analyze the hijabi fashion and Muslim lesbian networks to understand how Muslims 
situate their beliefs and practices as well as how different practices create ruptures within 
the larger “ummah,” or the tropes associated with an existing transnational Muslim 
community (singular). Many hijabis opine that veiling is obligatory and they feel 
ostracized from Muslim women who do not wear the hijab but, instead of treating this 
disagreement as a matter of divergent hermeneutics, they tend to believe that unveiled 
women are not practicing Islam correctly. In the case of queer Muslims, both some 
“liberal” and “traditional” Muslims dismiss the efforts of queer Muslims to use ijtihad to 
render themselves as both queer and Muslim. Both these cases demonstrate the dialectic 
between presenting Islam as a unified front through conformity with the beliefs of larger 
(“traditional”) ummah and the ability of Muslims to practice their own interpretations of 
the faith through personal, critical reflections on the Qur’an (ijtihad).  
 Chapter 6 highlights a few case studies of activism initiated by or related to 
Muslim women, which have met varying degrees of success locally and transnationally. 
The hijab discrimination case study mainly examines the reactions of mainstream non-
Muslim Americans and those of the hijabi fashion network to two discriminatory work-
related incidents involving hijabis, Boudlal v. Disney and Khan v. A&F, which illustrate 
rifts within the American hijabi community based on socioeconomics. The case study of 
Pink Hijab Day (PHD), which began as a movement to spread awareness about why 
women wear the hijab and about breast cancer, reveals that the initiative took root in 
several Muslim-minority countries but did not catch on in Muslim-majority countries 
because of pervasive social taboos related to cancer and due to the proactive measures of 
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many governments in the Arab world to promote breast cancer awareness. I also discuss 
how the weak hub of the PHD network failed to successfully mediate the campaign into 
other countries. The SlutWalk Morocco case study demonstrates apprehension of 
women’s rights movements among some Moroccan commenters, especially campaigns 
that are affiliated with Western feminism. Despite this opposition, SlutWalk Morocco 
refuses to situate itself as either a secularist or an Islamic movement, which contributed 
to its simultaneously local and transnational appeal. 
 The Conclusion recapitulates the vernacular cosmopolitan praxis that I 
highlighted in the chapters of this thesis. It summarizes the theoretical, methodological, 
and empirical contributions of this dissertation and offers some prescriptions for future 
research, including the acknowledgement that Western cosmopolitanism, rather than 
cosmopolitanism, is the starting point of most studies that interrogate the concept. 
Transnational interactions and dedication to humanity among non-Westerners are cast as 
qualified of versions of cosmopolitanism due to their circumvention of the West. Until 
the invisible Western components of cosmopolitanism and universalism are explicitly 
articulated in associated literature, there is little hope of developing more inclusive 
imaginings of these concepts.
 1	  
Chapter 1 
Cosmopolitan Muslim Women in Cyberspace 
 
“In regards to SOME men Arab bloggers, they are so misguided, they think because they are on the internet 
they have no boundaries or respect for other people (male or female) My rule is, if I am sitting down having 
a conversation with someone face to face lets say about religion, I am not going to call them stupid and yell 
in their face and call them names or whatever, so why would I do it online? Or the sense of entitlement 
some people have (male or female) , they say, you publish that means you want our input, well yes input is 
welcome if you don’t forget to bring your manners with you” (Asoom).  
 
“I agree, but still think that since bloggers are generally more open-minded, I feel like I could discuss 
subjects that I wouldn’t with strangers in reality. That being said, I wouldn’t divulge details of my personal 
life, not only because I feel I could be judged, but also because I feel that people would stop taking what 
you say on other matters seriously. Whether we admit it or not, we all have this preconception of who the 
person behind the keyboard is. I contribute in another not so serious blog, but even there I didn’t feel I 
could openly discuss personal dilemmas that anonymously I probably would” (Farah). 
 
“that is the misconception that bloggers are open minded. Maybe the bloggers you read or most of those 
who read you are but don’t forget your blog is open to millions of people that could be VERY close minded. 
Or they portray themselves to be open minded, but trust me Farah that the majority is not. You would be 
surprised. I know a lot of bloggers (not personally) who regret exposing their identity, male and female. 
Unfortunately sometimes anon bloggers are not taken seriously. It’s a catch 22, you have to expose your 
identity to be taken seriously but you can’t say everything if you do” (7aki Fadi). 
 
“freedom = ability to wear a miniskirt/ability…? and talk about drunken parties? if that is freedom, i don’t 
want it. is that really how we want our younger generations to understand what freedom means?  
I agree completely that minorities (women, gay, brown folk) get marginalized in all aspects of life: on blogs, 
in the media, in the workplace. but the enemy here is liberalism. western liberalism that flattens all 
differences, makes everyone ‘equal,’ but only equal if you are a white, european, christian, male. in modern 
city life, society is based on individualism. generally in rural areas it is a more collective system. here in the 
middle east, the collective triumphs over the individual. collective and individual systems have pros and 
cons; neither is perfect” (ramsey).8 
 
The quotes above are the opinions of some Lebanese, Palestinian, and Syrian women in 
regard to the freedoms associated with social media use. The posting, initiated by “7aki 
Fadi,” discussed how women in the Middle East have to be careful about what they write 
on their blogs because they are judged by every word that they write and publically 
shamed if a reader believes that they have breached what is considered appropriate for 
women to discuss. Some say social media offer more freedom but others say that online 
                                                      
8 http://7akifadi.com/2009/08/06/the-difference-between-men-and-women-in-the-middle-eastern-arab-
blogsphere/ 
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environments simply reflect the oppression, policing, and double standards of their 
societies offline. Some of the women advance the importance of politeness in online 
spaces, while others point out that trolling is a mechanism of reinforcing offline norms. 
Some imply that social media allow them to discuss topics that they would not introduce 
into offline spaces, while others reflect on the types of freedoms that should be enjoyed in 
anonymous online environments. I highlight this conversation here to initiate a discussion 
of the extent to which cosmopolitanism can be found in online spaces and, if it can be 
discovered, is it prevalent only among users from certain geographical locations? Do 
social media allow spaces for people to demonstrate tolerance, respect difference, and 
come to agreements on certain basic standards of social behavior online and offline? Are 
the opportunities qualitatively different from opportunities they might have to offline?     
 This chapter will position my dissertation research theoretically in contemporary 
and historical literature on cosmopolitanism. As the world has become intensely 
interconnected through information and capital, globalization has encouraged cultural 
uniformity based on the American and European models. This does not signify that 
alternative modern cultural forms are irrelevant, but the overwhelming influence of the 
hegemonic culture insists that alternative social, political, and economic configurations 
continuously justify their lack of compliance with hegemonic standards. Since Islam has 
come to replace Communism as the most virile threat to secularity, liberalism, democracy, 
and capitalism (Cole, 2011), according to those who promulgate the Washington 
Consensus, Muslims are often only discussed in Western media in association with 
fanaticism, human rights violations, corruption, and terrorism. Islamophobia is employed 
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as a political tool to reinforce a binary of possibilities: with or against the Washington 
Consensus.  
 Western norms are constructed as natural and superior particularly when 
juxtaposed to Eastern social and political ontologies. This dynamic presents an important 
paradox in conceptualizing cosmopolitanism. If only those societies that agree with the 
hegemonic political, economic, and social culture are labeled as cosmopolitan, it becomes 
a vacuous term and suggests the impossibility of promoting a shared sense of humanity 
and establishing agreements on basic global standards. Being that Western mainstream 
media and culture typically only reference Muslims to demonstrate the enduring 
incompatibility of Western and Eastern ideologies, social media networks provide 
platforms for digital self-expression where Muslims can share their own opinions and 
offer countersentences regarding how Westerners perceive them and their beliefs. This is 
particularly important for Muslim woman because they are often underrepresented in 
positions of power and rendered through stereotype in media. 
 Being that over 20% of the world population is Muslim and Islam is practiced in 
divergent forms in numerous nations around the world, there is a great potential to find 
cosmopolitan discussions among Muslim social media users in cyberspaces that are 
principally inhabited by Muslims and in those that are not. Cosmopolitanism has been 
framed in many ways but it is generally connected to either identity or tolerant attitudes. 
In scholarly literature related to cosmopolitan identity, it has typically been theorized as 
an elitist, Western positionality and, since Muslims are often framed as the antithesis of 
this persona, the typical conclusion is that Muslims cannot be considered cosmopolitans. 
This is a very limited view of cosmopolitanism, which reduces a potentially important 
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principle to localities and bank accounts. I argue that cosmopolitanism, typically an 
abstract ideal, could more effectively be conveyed through praxis that, for example, 
encourages universal standards of rights and conduct that are developed through local-
global iterations (Benhabib, 2004) and/or behaviors that promote intercultural dialogue 
and tolerance (Chen, 2012; Shuter, 2012), although intercultural could be extended 
beyond “cultural” to include other political, economic, and/or religious practices and 
beliefs.  
 Cosmopolitanism, often associated with Western social ontologies, could be 
advanced in a post-imperialist sense through examining the praxis of cultural others, in 
this case, Muslim women in the West and the Arab world, through their social media 
interactions. When the concept was originally developed, it advanced dedication to both 
the local community and the cosmos but the ideal was co-opted by political leaders in the 
early Christian era to substantiate empire building. The cooptation persisted when 
cosmopolitanism became en vogue during the Enlightenment era and political and 
religious leaders used it to underpin the superiority of Western values to validate their 
colonialist objectives toward the rest of the world. Contemporary literature continues to 
implicitly center cosmopolitanism in the West due to the lack of studies focusing on 
cosmopolitan propensities among non-Western populations. Postcolonial theorists, such 
as Bhabha (1994), have advanced the term vernacular cosmopolitanism to reintroduce the 
local component of the concept as it was originally imagined, which is the theoretical 
framework that informs this thesis. To decenter cosmopolitanism from a minute focus on 
the West, I have analyzed non-Westerners and Westerners in transnational online spaces. 
I will also discuss how these spaces can both facilitate and constrain cosmopolitan praxis. 
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The next section as well as the last will outline literature that has discussed 
cosmopolitanism in conjunction with Muslim populations. The next section will highlight 
the theoretical contribution of cooke (2007) to discussions of Muslim women and 
cosmopolitanism and a few critiques of her theoretical framework, Muslimwoman.  
Muslim Woman and Muslimwoman	  
 Before moving forward, I must acknowledge the efforts of miriam cooke (2007) 
to illuminate discussions of both Muslim women and cosmopolitanism through her 
“Muslimwoman” framework. Since I use the term “Muslim women” extensively 
throughout this dissertation, her work is an important starting point. cooke (2007) says,  
The Muslimwoman identification may be disabling or empowering. Some women reject this 
reduction to stereotype while others embrace it. Its uniformity across gulfs of difference intensifies 
an awareness of a global community in which they participate, a cosmopolitan consciousness that 
connects strangers who recognize an unprecedented commonality in terms of religion and 
gender…that enables a negotiation of the outsider/insider boundary…[in contrast] some Muslim 
women are strategically deploying the Muslimwoman identification (p. 141). 
 
For cooke (2007), “Muslimwoman” can be simultaneously empowering, due to its 
potential to unite women under the same label, and disempowering, due to the associated 
stereotypes. She claims that in some cases social media have allowed for the development 
of the “cosmopolitan Muslimwoman” religious figure and, in other cases, they have 
enable the Muslimwoman to challenge stereotypes in non-religious ways. cooke (2007) 
posits that the more diversity that manifests among Muslim women, the more some 
Muslims attempt to “cage” this plurality, of which the veil is an important indicator 
whether it is banned or mandated. As I will discuss in the chapters that follow, the veil is 
worn in some contexts to prevent sexual harassment, while it is employed in others to 
show pride and solidarity; it is also used as a symbol of activism and resistance, including 
one used gain entry to the male public sphere. Thus the reasons that Muslim women 
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articulate for veiling may significantly differ from the objectives of other Muslims whom 
encourage the practice. 
 cooke (2007) identifies the different angles from which Muslim women have 
harnessed their voices to speak out both in favor and against the Muslimwoman, 
including the following: “Sharia activism,” (2007, p. 146), social media use, legal reform, 
art/literature, “insider stories” (2007, p. 145) (what I call “native informant spokespeople” 
in Chapter 3), “Hejab Fashion,” and so forth. The resulting diversity is cosmopolitan 
ontologies of “multiple belongings”:  
They negotiate borders as places to erase but also to mark and inhabit. This ambivalent location 
intensifies awareness of multiple belongings and of cultural hybridity, while making their voices 
possible…Muslimwoman cosmopolitanism works across borders to weave a hybrid cultural 
system that disturbs the hegemony and desired homogeneity in others of both neo-Orientalists and 
religious extremists…When the attempt to interpellate the Muslimwoman fails, when she refuses 
to be constituted as a subject by those who hail her, she undermines their control and the 
reproduction of their ideology (cooke, 2007, p. 152-153). 
 
 cooke (2007) is suggesting that neither the “religious” nor the “secular” Muslimwoman 
are easily compartmentalized and their failure to conform to either extreme, preferring 
instead to inhabit a hybrid state of “multiple belongings,” is an act of resistance. Like 
cooke (2007), my work attempts to emphasize the plurality of Muslim women, so I stress 
the plural “Muslim women,” but I am unable to distance myself from this categorization 
because the term is often self-ascribed and it is also employed with qualifiers as a 
discursive device within Muslim communities to assess authenticity and in Western 
rhetoric to mark the incompatibility of Muslim women with dominant Western cultures. 
Likewise, “hijabi” and “unveiled” and “Moroccan” and “Arab” and “American revert” 
and “British South Asian” are all employed to render diversity in beliefs and practices 
within Muslim communities as well as to cast Muslim women as incongruous with 
Western norms and values.  
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 Useful critiques of this article also underpin some of what I attempt to highlight in 
the subsequent chapters. As Zine (2008) aptly remarks,  
[cooke’s] cosmopolitanism remains an elitist project. It needs to be qualified that only some 
privileged women benefit from this kind of cosmopolitanism or inhabit it as a form of identity. 
The millions of Muslim women in the global south who live as refugees or internally displaced 
peoples, without electricity and access to basic needs including health care and education, cannot 
partake of this cosmopolitanism utopia (p. 115, her emphasis). 
 
I would add that this is not simply an interplay between the North and South, as Zine 
(2008) suggests, although it is through these fault lines that one may encounter the 
starkest differences between cooke’s (2007) digitally savvy, cosmopolitan Muslimwoman 
and the displaced Muslim woman who lacks basic human rights to healthcare and 
education, let alone access to the internet. However, these exclusionary divides also exist 
within Muslim communities within the same societies in both the North and the South. 
The ideological disconnections between more affluent Moroccan social media users, for 
example, and the larger population has been noted elsewhere (Robinson and Parmentier, 
forthcoming) and the case study on hijab discrimination in Chapter 6 will demonstrate 
that manifestations of socioeconomic exclusions through the digital divide not only exist 
between societies but also within them.      
 Furthermore, while cooke (2007) reveals the empowerment of Muslimwoman 
through either her “Sharia activism,” which some scholars might classify as “Islamic 
feminism,” or through what some might call more “secular” ventures, including legal 
reform and literary contributions, others suggest that this disjuncture continues to impede 
solidarity among Muslim women plural. As Zine (2008) points out, “we remain internally 
divided along lines of secular or religious orientation, which also inhibits our ability to 
join forces to combat common sources and sites of oppression irrespective of our 
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ideological positions” (p. 115). I agree with Zine that this is a possibility in some cases. 
SlutWalk Morocco in Chapter 6, for example, which may be compartmentalized as 
secularist activism, faced a fair amount of derision for not explicitly articulating its 
Islamic credentials. Though it would be incorrect to assume that “Sharia activism” is a 
unitary commitment as a discussion of polygyny in Chapter 4 demonstrates. Some 
interlocutors used to the Qur’an to argue both in favor and against the practice of 
polygyny and others used cyberspaces not to argue against it but to advance basic 
standards related to the practice.  
 Returning to the secular/religious binary, some hijabi fashion bloggers (Chapter 
5), a network that cooke (2007) classifies as an expression of the cosmopolitan 
Muslimwoman, tend to accept or have internalized the hierarchy of piety based on 
modesty, which necessarily casts unveiled women at the nadir of Muslimwomanness, 
leading to their exclusion among the ranks of “good” Muslim women (Badran, 2008, p. 
104; Zine, 2008, p. 112). In other words, the veiled, religious Muslimwoman is “good” 
and the unveil, secular Muslimwoman is “bad.” Nevertheless, the veil in the United 
States may be more related to solidarity than to the interplay between the secular and the 
religious Muslimwoman, which may render the hijabi fashion blogger more appropriately 
as a “moderate Muslim woman” that Badran (2008) discusses (p. 105). Badran claims 
that cooke’s (2007) nomenclature is not appropriately applied in some of the latter’s 
examples and that “moderate Muslim woman” might fit better than cooke’s (2007) 
cosmopolitan Muslimwoman in some instances. Says Badran (2008),  
The moderate Muslim is ideally quiescent and conformist. The Muslimwoman slides nicely into 
the moderate Muslim woman. The moderate Muslim woman does not function as the antithesis of 
the female extremist (still rare) but as the antithesis of the gender-radical sharia activist women or 
Islamic feminists (not to be confused with conservative sharia-ist women) (p. 105). 
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In Badran’s (2008) reply, however, she does not address cooke’s (2007) premise that 
Muslimwoman can be used to simultaneously claim and object to the ascription. Some of 
the hijabi fashion bloggers, for example, might be considered “moderate,” while others 
might be perceived as “Sharia activists” for and against veiling so some of these Muslim 
women do not necessarily fit into the category of Badran’s (2008) “moderate.” Yet 
Badran's emphasis on the “quiescent and conformist” nature of moderateness perhaps 
undermines the empowering potential of the Muslimwoman project for those who do fall 
into the moderate category.  
 The separate categories that cooke (2007) employs to ontologically render the 
Muslimwoman also require acknowledgement of epistemological issues related to 
women’s rights. What is often called “secularist” in discussions of women right’s is the 
belief that Muslim women need to reclaim their rights through their efforts toward legal 
reform and greater political representation. Nevertheless, these secular activities do not 
contradict “religious” epistemologies of women’s rights, grounded in the liberatory 
Weltanschauung of the Qur’an, to use Amina Wadud’s (1999) term (p. 3); in fact, they 
complement each other but the complaints of activists may be directed at different, 
though overlapping, entities and institutions. Since politics are often reinforced by 
religion and they work together to determine the status of women in any given society, 
even in those that ostensibly operate under the virtues of secularism (Norris & Inglehart, 
2011), one might say that “secular” and “religious” efforts are addressing both, but the 
targets and framings of the activism differ. I prefer to conceptualize these forms of 
activism as addressing distinct but overlapping institutions rather than through applying 
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binary labels but, since this binary was a common theme in the datasets, which I will 
discuss it in more detail in Chapters 4 and 6, it warrants a bit more discussion here. 
 Social media users could make important contributions to both “secular” and 
“religious” efforts, as cooke (2007) rightly points out. Some Muslim women believe that 
the state should take the lead in ensuring their rights, while others posit that Shari’ah, 
which governs personal and family law in some Muslim-majority countries, would have 
to be addressed first so they focus their efforts on changing the mindsets of communities 
and religious authorities through advancing liberatory hermeneutics of the Qur’an. Social 
media offer spaces where people may address grievances regarding what they believe to 
be misinterpretations of the Qur’an. Moreover, social media users have been playing an 
important role in addressing the Islamic religious sphere for the last few decades as the 
internet has the capacity to contribute to the decentralization of already decentralized 
religious authority based on popular support (Turner, 2007), which I will discuss more in 
Chapter 5. The “secular” activists could find supporters through social media in 
communities in which the term secularism is still considered a dirty word and, if the 
networks that carry their messages grow sufficiently large, their activism has the potential 
to influence politics and social norms. Thus social media are employed toward both 
secular and religious forms of activism and both address larger Muslim communities. 
Within Muslim communities, social norms constrain and promote women’s right so 
Muslim women who address secular targets and those who promote religious reform have 
been addressing Muslim communities through social media in an effort to encourage 
activism against unjust laws, undermine stereotypes of women, and promote 
reexaminations of widely held religious interpretations that underpin the inferiority and 
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policing of women, which contribute to gender biased laws. My point is that there is 
evident complementarity in these activist persuasions and how social media could 
facilitate them.  
 I now turn to another critique related to the Muslimwoman: the cosmopolitan 
Muslimwoman identity. Some scholars have critiqued cooke’s (2007) theoretical 
framework for grounding it in cosmopolitanism. Zine (2008), for instance, claims,     
We must address how bland constructions of liberal cosmopolitanism or a "feel-good" 
cosmopolitan discourse can obscure the politics of inequality and structures of power and 
subordination wrought through the related processes of globalization, in the way that 
"multiculturalism" has created the same illusory smoke screen hiding the hierarchies of racial 
power and privilege (p. 116). 
 
While cooke’s (2007) framing of cosmopolitanism is more complex than Zine’s (2008) 
characterization of it, Zine (2008) offers an important caveat to consider. In this 
dissertation, I am not attempting to advance whom a cosmopolitan Muslimwoman or 
Muslim woman is, but what she does, especially through her uses of social media; in 
other words, I am interested in her praxis. Framing cosmopolitanism through identities 
will often result in the type of critique that Zine (2008) puts forth because the concept has 
a complicated legacy that has been connected to Western superiority and colonialist 
objectives. Toward examining cosmopolitanism as praxis rather than identity, some 
Muslim women engage in dialogue that encourages tolerance and acceptance of divergent 
opinions, which is particularly difficult in relation to deeply held religious beliefs. 
Another form of cosmopolitan praxis that I take up in the subsequent chapters is non-
alienating activism that forms bridges between distinct groups, such as between 
supposedly distinct secular and religious activists and/or between non-Western and 
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Western groups. This is the form of cosmopolitanism—actions rather than people—that 
is central to this thesis. 
 This section has discussed cooke’s (2007) theoretical framework of 
Muslimwoman and some critiques of it, including distinctive affinities toward religiosity 
and secularity and boundaries of exclusion among Muslims based on socioeconomic 
factors. I will argue that some of the issues highlighted in the critiques can be avoided by 
analyzing the interactions of Muslim women online rather than focusing on their 
identities. In subsequent chapters, I will posit that neither secular nor religious online 
activism necessarily promotes more tolerance or inclusivity among social media users but 
certain forms of collective action could be advanced as less alienating. The next section 
will offer a broad historical overview of cosmopolitanism, which is a lofty ideal that was 
introduced before both Christianity and Islam but, through philosophical engagements 
with the concept, particularly during the Enlightenment period, it came to be tied to 
Western civilization and empire building.  
Historical and Contemporary Overviews of Cosmopolitanism 	   	  
 The conceptualization of cosmopolitanism can be traced to ancient Greek 
philosophers who believed that all people are connected through their shared humanity 
regardless of their divergent political and religious beliefs and cultural affiliations. Cynic 
Diogenes was the first to use the term in the 4th century BCE in his assertion that he was a 
“citizen of the cosmos.” His application of the term suggested nonconformity to the 
provincial norm that maintained that one’s first responsibility was to the local polity 
because Cynic Diogenes argued that he did not owe any special service to the 
advancement of the Sinopeans (Kleingeld, 2006). A century later, the Stoics also 
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expressed affinity toward cosmopolitanism but their characterization of it included both 
dedications to the “cosmos” and to the local polity, which included moving away from 
one’s home to serve the world-citizenry (Kleingeld, 2006). In Rome, Stoic influences on 
the ideal of cosmopolitanism linked responsibility to the world with obligations to the 
homeland. During early Christianity, Roman cosmopolitanism became associated with 
the development of humanity through empire and a common religion, notably through 
Augustine who used affiliation with Christianity to underpin his perceptions of superior 
and inferior forms of humanity (Kleingeld, 2006); hence, the notion of “barbarian” and 
“civilized” came about. Although not all benefitted equally from this imperial form of 
cosmopolitanism, the tropes related to it continued to suggest obligations to the whole of 
humanity but, during the Roman period, this obligation took on the concrete form of 
engaging humanity through spreading the “universal” religion.  
 Despite its impressive legacy, contemporary scholars tend to historicize the 
foundations of cosmopolitanism in the Enlightenment period beginning with Immanuel 
Kant. Kant is often cited as one of the philosophers who integrated the concept into the 
era along with others, including Adam Smith, Alexis de Toqueville, Goethe, Herder, 
Humboldt, Nietzsche, Marx, and Simmel (Beck & Szaider, 2006; Beck, 2004). Dallmayr 
(2012) adds Jean Paul, Lessing, and Schiller to the list. In the early 18th century, Kant 
related cosmopolitanism to neighborly kindness among dissimilar people, or a “universal 
cosmopolitan condition”: for “a peaceful…and universal community of all people on 
earth who can come into active relations with one another…[and share] the right of 
common possession of the surface of the earth…they must ultimately tolerate one another 
as neighbors” (Kant, 2006 as cited in Popke, 2007, p. 509). Kant and Marx, and to a 
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certain extent Simmel and Smith, argued that the shift from closed societies to market 
expansion and the dissemination republican principles, the “cosmopolitan vision,” 
required the “dissolution of small territorial communities and the spread of universal 
social and economic interdependence” (Beck & Szaider, 2006, p. 9). Part of what this 
cosmopolitan vision entailed in Kantian imaginings was the configuration of 
supranational governing structures, not necessarily related to markets, to foster the 
“interrelation between states and people” (Dallmayr, 2012, p. 176), which Benhabib 
(2004) refers to as “cosmopolitan federalism” (p. 2). 
 It was also during the Enlightenment period that cosmopolitanism became 
disassociated with the actions of socio-political systems, as was typical of earlier periods, 
and came to be considered as an individual (European) attribute. In other words, 
cosmopolitanism became detangled from the empire building of leaders and polities, as it 
was during the imperial conquests of the Christian empire, and was recast as identity or 
characteristics of certain people. This cosmopolitan persona was not only European but 
also an affluent European. As Beck (2011) says, “Cosmopolitanism in Immanuel Kant’s 
philosophical sense means something active, a task, a conscious and voluntary choice, 
clearly the affair of an elite” (p. 1348). However, the elites were not the targets of anti-
cosmopolitan scorn, which was a popular response to the promotion of nationalism in 
conjunction with the development of nation-states.  
 Being that the mixing of cultures was a requisite aspect of empire, nationalism 
played an important role in demarcating otherness during the colonial period (Kofman, 
2005). In the 18th century, cosmopolitanism faced derision as the antithesis of nationalism 
but Kofman (2005), following Lasch (1995), suggests that anti-cosmopolitan rhetoric was 
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aimed more at migrants, whose loyalties were suspect, than at the cosmopolitan elite who 
were perceived to disregard their nationalistic affiliations. According to Kofman (2005), 
“Nationalists described not themselves but others, especially internal others, as 
cosmopolitans. Jews, in particular, represented rootless and unstable ubiquity; they were 
perceived as a corrupting element, foreign to the people and the nation” (p. 89). The 
tension between nationalism and cosmopolitanism continued for centuries, culminating, 
as Fine and Cohen (2002) suggest, with the backlash of the extreme anti-
cosmopolitanism of the nationalistic Nazis against the cosmopolitan Jews (Kofman, 2005, 
p. 89). Thus cosmopolitanism promoted othering through universalism modeled on 
Western civilization, highlighted in the racist, xenophobic remarks advanced by Western 
societies and Enlightenment philosophers, including Kant (Harvey 2000a).  
 However, the rebirth of cosmopolitanism in the Enlightenment era followed a 
similar trajectory to the Roman version of cosmopolitan excursions. van der Veer (2002), 
for instance, says,  
[Cosmopolitanism] has a clear genealogy in the European Enlightenment and in its development 
into a liberal, progressive ideal in the nineteenth century it connects nationalism with 
imperialism…in nineteenth-century Europe it was always complemented by a Christian 
cosmopolitanism of both the Catholic and the Protestant kind. Missionary movements in 
nineteenth-century Britain, for example, created a public awareness of…an imperial duty towards 
the rest of the world. Liberal cosmopolitanism and evangelical cosmopolitanism developed side by 
side in the colonial era. Their commonality was well expressed in the phrase ‘the white man’s 
burden’ (p. 104). 
 
As a concept that developed in Europe under racism and colonialism, and previously 
under Roman empire building, it is not difficult to understand why the underlying 
meaning of cosmopolitanism is suspect. Although the spread of Islam is often perceived 
as anti-cosmopolitan, a virile threat to Western civilization until the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire that has been reinvented in the age of global terrorism, the proponents of 
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Christianity were engaging in “cosmopolitan” excursions centuries before the Islamic 
faith was established. The point is that, while Islam is often connected to spreading 
religion through violence and, contemporarily, to anti-Western sentiments, Christian 
Europeans have a longer history of engaging in religious “cosmopolitan” conquests. 
 Although cosmopolitanism was often advanced through religious universalism, it 
was also used to describe elitist consumption of divergent cultures, while simultaneously 
depreciating them. Appiah (2010) uses the example of Sir Richard Francis Burton to 
illustrate the contradictory perspectives of European cosmopolitans during the colonial 
period. Burton was well travelled and an excellent linguist, which he used to translate 
non-Western text and to make the mysterious Orient visible to Europeans; he, for 
example, translated Kama Sutra and Thousand and One Nights that laid the foundation 
for the stereotype of the perverse sexuality of Oriental cultures. Says Appiah (2010), “He 
was the least Victorian of men, and the most. Certainly he had many of the standard 
racial prejudices of his society. Africans he ranked below Arabs and Indians, both of 
whom were below civilized Europeans” (p. 6-7). He goes on to say that, although Burton 
had some appreciation for non-Western literary and artistic forms, what Appiah 
characterizes as the second strand of cosmopolitanism, similar to banal cosmopolitanism 
that I will discuss below, there was little evidence to suggest that he embraced the “first 
strand of cosmopolitanism: the recognition of our responsibility for every human being” 
(p. 7). Burton’s consumption of other cultures was used as a tool to reinforce European 
superiority rather than to advance shared humanity through the appreciation of difference.   
 More recently, following from the European legacies of the “white man’s burden” 
and the affluent traveller, cosmopolitanism has been linked to disposable income 
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(Calhoun, 2008). Calhoun (2008) calls these “cosmopolitans” the “multinational 
cosmopolitan elite” (p. 443) who are able brush off “parochial” ethnic allegiances 
through their sense of belonging to this elite transnational group. This group is similar to 
what Sassen (1998) and Castells (1996) refer to as the “transnational elite.” Castells 
(1996) discusses the nuances of this group in finite detail, from their fitness activity of 
choice (jogging) to their likelihood of ordering udon and sashimi in restaurants to their 
preference of paint in their living rooms (also see Bell, 2007). Passages about this 
globetrotting, unrooted group suggests that there are more similarities between the 
transnational elites of Thai origin, for example, and those of North American origin than 
there are between the Thai elites and the poorer Thai people. However, it should not 
necessarily follow that the transnational elite are more impervious to ethnocentricism 
than their poorer compatriots, despite their ready consumption of ethnic-chic marketed 
throughout the world. Thus, this transnational group slightly detangles cosmopolitanism 
from the Western worldview, if we can actually characterize it as cosmopolitan, which, I 
would argue, places cosmopolitanism on shaking ground.  
 Polson (2011), on the other hand, distinguishes another group, the transnational 
middle class, who are more appropriately rendered as cosmopolitans than the elites 
mentioned above. Since national development, especially in free market economies, is 
strongly tied to the idea of the upward mobility of the middle class (Polson, 2011), 
middle class professionals who prefer to interact with groups of their counterparts from 
all over the world are more aptly situated as cosmopolitans because they have chosen 
their ties based on common attachments rather than patriotism or consumerism. In 
contrast, elite “cosmopolitans,” who are typically described as rootless, “have a home 
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underpinned by traditional gender relations of trailing wives and/or rely on the global 
redistribution of social reproduction…provided by migrant labour” (Kofman, 2005, p. 85; 
also see Beaverstock 2002). This group of transnational middle class is less receptive to 
social capital as Bourdieu (1985) conceptualizes it, which relates to “preserving and 
transmitting the cultural capital of the elite” (Onxy et al., 2011, p. 59), but instead has 
developed its own form of social capital based on its “international outlook in terms 
of…career, place of residence, and social networks…[and members have] accepted a 
period abroad as a step toward advancement back home” (Fechter, 2007 as cited in 
Polson, 2011, p. 147-148). This is the group from which many of the interlocutors in my 
datasets emanate; they are marked by their simultaneous inward and outward approaches 
and more likely than the transnational elites to question status quo and perceptions of 
social capital. In selecting its affiliation among others of the same stripes, the 
transnational middle class is disrupting several of the following commonly accepted 
factors related to the historical legacy of cosmopolitanism, which were articulated during 
the Enlightenment and colonialist periods: cosmopolitans lack rootedness and patriotism; 
they are an elite group that consume other cultures, while advancing the superiority of 
their own (or the superiority of the transnational elites); cosmopolitanism is only possible 
among Westerners because they are the only groups that are sufficiently tolerant to 
respect other cultures; cosmopolitans are Westerns who pride individualism but not 
cultural difference; and cosmopolitanism can be encouraged through conformity to 
Western values, including the dominant religion, because they are the most universal.   
 This section has framed various historical perspectives on cosmopolitanism, an 
affiliation that originally denoted simultaneous attachments for the local and universal 
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through a shared sense of humanity but, as time progressed, evolved into the imperialistic 
aims of uniting people under the dominant Western religion and civilization rather than 
promoting a shared sense of humanity despite divergent beliefs. These trends are also 
reflected in contemporary scholarly studies related to cosmopolitan subjectivities. In 
contemporary parlance, cosmopolitanism is linked to consumer culture but remains a 
privileged positionality of affluent, well-traveled Western elites and their counterparts 
throughout the world, but particularly to the “elite white man” (Cook, 2012, p. 6), which 
has been criticized in several works (see Matthew & Sidhu, 2005; Sklair, 2001; Turner, 
2002; Venn, 2002). The next several subsections will discuss the myriad of ways that 
cosmopolitanism has been conceptualized in contemporary literature. I will principally 
focus on several works by Ulrich Beck (2004; 2011; Beck & Sznaider, 2006) because he 
has been cited in nearly every piece of literature related to cosmopolitanism in the last 
decade and a critique of his conceptualization advanced by Calhoun, which is 
representative of one of the most enduring theoretical debates related to 
cosmopolitanism: the strain between nationalism and cosmopolitanism and the feasibility 
of cosmopolitanism on a global scale. These subsections will also discuss of elements of 
cosmopolitanism that are often absent in framings of the concept—the shared sense of 
humanity and simultaneously situating one’s dedication to both the local and the cosmos.  
 Toward a Definition of Cosmopolitanism	   	  
 This subsection will describe various uses of the terms cosmopolitanism and 
cosmopolitans, which will indicate that there is little agreement among scholars either in 
relation to the systemic configurations that would complement cosmopolitanism or the 
type of person who could be considered cosmopolitan. Beck (2004), for example, 
 20	  
references a handful of different forms of cosmopolitanism and similar 
conceptualizations with different names, which clearly complicates matters for anyone 
who is interested in applying the terms to empirical phenomena. Roudometof (2005) also 
highlights various conceptual attachments to cosmopolitanism: “cosmopolitan nation,” 
“cosmopolitan democracy,” “cosmopolitan citizenship,” or “cosmopolitan society” (p. 
116; also see Mau et al., 2008, p. 4). Likewise, in his book, Anyone: The Subject of 
Cosmopolitan Anthropology, Rapport (2012) lists the various labels that have been 
applied to studies related to cosmopolitanism, including the following, just to name a 
few: ““plural discrepant cosmopolitanisms” (Clifford 1998)…“pre-modern/modern 
cosmopolitans” (Stade 2006)…“upper-class cosmopolitan Cairene youth” (Peterson 
2011)…“heretical cosmopolitan Muslim intellectuals” (Kersten 2011)…“working-class 
Pakistani cosmopolitan migrants” (Werbner 1999)” (p. 1). Rapport’s (2012) complaint 
regarding studies of cosmopolitanism is clear: cosmopolitans are anyone and everyone.  
 Some scholars attempt to advance conceptual clarity by qualifying the term 
cosmopolitanism. Roudometof (2005) offers an example by articulating the distinctions 
between “thin cosmopolitanism” and “thick [or rooted] cosmopolitanism” (p. 113; also 
Beck, 2011). Thick cosmopolitanism maintains, “all moral principles must be justified by 
showing that they give equal weight to the claims of everyone” (Miller, 1998 as cited in 
Held, 2005, p. 17). Thin cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, holds that “we may owe 
certain kinds of treatment to all other human beings regardless of any relationship in 
which we stand to them, while there are other kinds of treatment that we owe only to 
those to whom we are related in certain way” (Miller, 1998 as cited in Held, 2005, p. 17). 
Calhoun (2008), in contrast, discussed the various ways that cosmopolitanism has been 
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conceptualized with or without qualifiers, to demonstrate the diversity in usages of the 
term. First, he says, cosmopolitanism has been employed to illustrate the tendency of 
“focusing on the world as a whole rather than on a particular locality or group” (Calhoun, 
2008, p. 428). Second, the term has been used to describe the relative diversity of a given 
city: for example, “New York [is] more cosmopolitan than Cleveland” (Calhoun, 2008, p. 
428). Third, Calhoun states that cosmopolitanism is used to describe the 
interconnectedness of the world, which Beck (2004; 2011) conceptualizes as 
“cosmopolitanization.” Scholars who advance a unitary conceptualization are sometimes 
criticized for whom they leave out. For instance, Hannerz (1990) claims that 
cosmopolitanism is “an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness towards divergent 
cultural experiences” (as cited in Roudometof, 2005, p. 114) but Hannerz has been 
critiqued because his version of cosmopolitanism is perceived as too elitist and 
exclusionary in nature (Cook, 2012, p. 6).  
 Conceptual disagreements are exacerbated in attempting to locate cosmopolitan 
subjectivities, especially among those who are not typically categorized as such. Several 
studies have attempted to dispute tacit implication that cosmopolitanism is either an elitist 
category or a Western one. Werbner (1999), for example, claims that even working class 
people could be classified as cosmopolitans. Cook (2012) enlightens this impasse by 
suggesting that people could be concurrently oriented toward the local and the global (p. 
6; also see Lawrence, 2010 as cited in Hoestery, 2012, p. 41), fleshing out this form of 
subjectivity in her study of Canadian development workers from Pakistani expatriate 
communities. Christensen (2011) identifies a similar dynamic among Turkish diaspora 
living in Sweden. Says Christensen (2011), “their capacity to sustain both in-group 
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commonality and individual difference in their identities, and the nature and boundaries 
of their social networks and communicative patterns are clearly constitutive of 
cosmopolitan life-worlds” (p. 890). However, as I pointed out above, there continues to 
be a significant lack of studies of cosmopolitan subjectivities among non-Westerners 
living in non-Western countries, which reinforces the scholarly bias that non-Westerners 
who have not come into contact with Western lifestyles, do not have the requisite 
tolerance or attachments to “universal” (Western) values to merit the status of 
cosmopolitan.  
 Even when theorists agree on what the concept evokes, they differ on if or how 
cosmopolitanism could play out heuristically in the contemporary global society. 
According to Sen (2009), the Rawlsian approach to cosmopolitanism, which the latter 
theorized in the Law of Peoples (2001), would be to establish global institutions to ensure 
that the rights of people were respected. While this perspective is consistent with Kant’s 
imagining of the cosmopolitan project, others, including Sen (2009) himself, find the 
promotion of global institutions problematic. Some scholars believe that cosmopolitanism 
can only be accomplished on a national scale—“cosmopolitan nationalism” (Nussbaum, 
1994; Nielsen, 1999). Others, like Smith (2001), claim that the nation is becoming 
obsolete (Mau et al., 2008, p. 2) so cosmopolitanism could still hold currency in the 
modern international post-structural system. Vertovec and Cohen (2002) tend to lean 
toward “cosmopolitan nationalism” but they include a diasporic from of consciousness in 
their engagement with the concept: “the capacity to engage with cultural multiplicity and 
presenting new ways of belonging, forms of identity and citizenship” (as cited in Kofman, 
2005, p. 83). The theoretical positions discussed in this subsection highlight that the 
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tension between nationalism and cosmopolitanism, which were prevalent during the 18th 
century, still hold true today. Some theorists also suggest that, despite the potential 
importance of the concept in the current era that is extensively interconnected through 
politics, trade, shared risks, communications, and so forth, cosmopolitanism remains a 
utopia ideal. 
 This subsection has briefly discussed the conceptual disjunctures underpinning 
debates about cosmopolitanism that tend to stall any progression beyond this phase in 
relation to operationalizing the concept. The next two subsections frame the debate 
related to the realistic scope in which cosmopolitanism could be advanced, either at the 
national or transnational level.    
 Beck’s Cosmopolitanization  
 In various pieces, Beck (2004; 2011) and his colleague (Beck & Sznaider, 2006) 
suggest that the issues underpinning scholarly debates related to cosmopolitanism are as 
much methodological as they are conceptual. For example, Beck & Sznaider (2006) 
claim, “Cosmopolitanism is, of course, a contested term…The boundaries separating it 
from competitive terms like globalization, transnationalism, universalism, glocalization 
etc. are not distinct and internally it is traversed by all kind of fault lines” (p. 2). They 
claim that, although scholars recognize cosmopolitanism has to be situated within the 
context of globalization, many theoretical engagements with the term continue to rely on 
what they call “methodological nationalism” (Beck & Sznaider, 2006, p. 2-3; Beck 2004; 
2011). In other words, theorists often advance their own national values as “universal,” 
either implicitly or explicitly.  
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 In terms of conceptualization, Beck (2004) attempts to mitigate the confusion 
related to the conceptualization of cosmopolitanism by classifying related studies as 
“normative-political” (or “normative” or “philosophical” as he calls it earlier in the piece) 
and “analytical-empirical,” which he also calls “cosmopolitan perspectives” and 
“descriptive-analytical” (p. 132, 139). He claims the appeal of the latter approach is that 
it could remain “value-free” (Beck, 2004, p. 139), whereas the former runs the risk of 
“fusing the ideal with the real…[because what] cosmopolitanism is cannot ultimately be 
separated from what cosmopolitanism should be” (Beck & Sznaider, 2006, p. 4, their 
emphasis). As discussed above, due to the historical tendency to equate cosmopolitanism 
with universalism and universalism with national (Western) social norms, such as 
Christianity among Europeans in the 18th century, cosmopolitanism has faced a crisis of 
legitimacy in speaking to non-Western ontological and epistemological 
conceptualizations of universal norms. He says, “The normative and political meanings 
of cosmopolitanism have wandered through world history completely entangled in the 
enemy image drawn up by its national opponents” (Beck, 2004, p. 133). He emphasized 
“national opponent” to later draw distinctions between “actual existing 
cosmopolitanization” (Beck, 2004, p. 133) and other nationalistic forms of 
cosmopolitanism, like “unconscious,” “passive,” or “banal” (p. 134, his emphasis).  
 Beck (2004; 2011; Beck & Sznaider, 2006) argues that “actually existing 
cosmopolitanization” could not only be studied empirically but it could also avoid 
normative claims based on “methodological nationalism.” Beck (2004; 2011; Beck & 
Sznaider, 2006) states that cosmopolitanization and globalization are similar processes 
but scholars tend to mistakenly limit the term globalization to economic processes and 
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global financial crises. He claims that some scholars use the word globalization as 
synonymous with globalism, which he conceptualizes as the promotion neoliberal 
economic policies, such as open markets and the unchecked flows of capital (Beck, 2004, 
p. 136; Dallmayr, 2012, p. 173), while the former actually denotes the growing 
interconnectedness of social actors who are exposed to universal risks. The distinction 
between globalization and cosmopolitanization that Beck & Sznaider (2006) propose is 
rather vague: the former takes place “out there,” while the latter “from within” (p. 9). 
Cosmopolitanization occurring from within is related to social actors, social movements, 
media, governments, global institutions, and so forth coming together to deliberate about 
universal risks, including AIDS, GMOs, BSE, nuclear disasters, global terror, water 
resources, financial crises, computer viruses, immigration issues, climate change, and 
environmental holocaust (Beck, 2004). In other words, cosmopolitanization is the 
acknowledgement of globalization and the dialogues and collaborations it has enabled to 
address the inherent consequences of this interconnectedness.  
 Beck (2004) claims that the process of cosmopolitanization involves not only the 
actors and institutions that promote neoliberal economic policies worldwide but also the 
actors who protest neoliberalism and advance other forms of globalism (economic 
globalization). This contention contributes to what he called “institutionalize 
cosmopolitanism,” or the development of supranational organizations, like the UN 
Security Council, which, he opines, people believe is “speaking for humanity as a whole” 
(Beck, 2004, p. 136). I would venture to say that as many people, if not more, would say 
that the UN General Assembly is attempting to speak for humanity as a whole and the 
UN Security Council is more concerned with maintaining its privilege in global 
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governance. Beck (2004) appears receptive to Kant’s idea that the progression of 
cosmopolitanism would be the eventual establishment of a system of global governance, 
while ignoring the empirical reality that some voices within these supranational 
organizations are more privileged than others and are able to speak over those 
representing differentiated, adverse experiences under globalism. At this point, one 
recalls imperial dynamics that have historically played out under the auspices of 
cosmopolitanism. 
 Beck (2004) attempts to distinguish “a cosmopolitan perspective” from the 
current processes unfolding, “(latent) cosmopolitanization of reality,” which he identifies 
as general reactions to the “(forced) mixing of cultures” (p. 137, his emphasis) that has 
occurred throughout history, including the following examples:  
rule through all the plunder and conquests, the migrations, slave trade and colonization, the ethnic 
cleansing, settlements and expulsions. From its very beginnings, the world market required this 
global mixing and – as the opening of Japan and China in the nineteenth century shows – imposed 
it when necessary by violent means (Beck, 2004, p. 137).  
 
One example of the mixing of cultures in the contemporary global society is what he calls 
“banal cosmopolitanism,” which involves the “cultural consumption” of ethnically 
distinctive food and/or music, for example (Beck, 2004, p. 133). According to Dallmayr 
(2012), Fish (1997) cites a similar dynamic to Beck’s (2004) banal cosmopolitanism that 
the former calls “boutique multiculturalism,” in which the “glitter of cultural difference 
sells well,” like the consumption of ““black music”…‘black culture, styles, and creativity 
are sold here to a public that knows no borders’” (as cited in Dallmayr, 2012, p. 174). 
Similarly, Roudometof (2005) suggests, “artefacts and commercial establishments that 
bring other cultures into close proximity to their own…[is] a process referred to in 
contemporary debates as “McDonaldization” or “Americanization” or, more broadly, as 
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“cultural imperialism”” (p. 121). I mention this because banal cosmopolitanism is part of 
the contemporary elitist form of cosmopolitanism related to consumer culture, which has 
historic roots in the colonial period as well. However, Beck’s (2004) theorization 
emphasizes intentional forms of cosmopolitanism, ‘cosmopolitan intent,’ which he marks 
as distinct from cosmopolitanism as an “unforeseen side effect” (p. 132, his emphasis) of 
systems that function under globalization, including mixed cultural consumerism or banal 
cosmopolitanism.  
 While I acknowledge that shared risks may unite people from all over the world, 
what about issues that are not perceived to result in eminent disaster, especially by those 
who hold a privileged relationship vis-à-vis the groups of people most at risk? Beck 
(2004) discusses poverty but he does so simply to demonstrate that it is made “invisible” 
in studies based on “methodological nationalism” (p. 148-149) but he does not discuss 
how women are more vulnerable to poverty and to other abuses related to globalization 
(exploitation in sweatshops and sex trafficking). Women are conspicuously absent from 
his discussion of cosmopolitanization, although they are deeply connected to the risk 
society, not only because they are often some of the most vulnerable populations, but also 
because they continue to face social constraints to participating in dialogues related to 
these risk, including poverty, lack of access to ICT, and impediments to involvement in 
public sphere, such as less disposable time due to their disproportionate share of 
household responsibilities. Should a concern for the whole of humanity not necessarily 
encompass the perspectives of those most vulnerable to abuses in the globalized world?  
 Another issue is his characterization of “global” risks—AIDS, GMOs, BSE, 
nuclear disasters, global terror, water resources, financial crises, computer viruses, 
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immigration issues, climate change, and environmental holocaust (Beck, 2004). The risks 
he cites beg the question of whether these risks are not more relevant to certain 
populations. For example, are the world’s rural poor likely to be targeted in a terrorist 
attack? Some of these global “terrorists” may believe that they are standing up for the 
rights of people who have been disenfranchised by Beck’s (2004; 2011; Beck & Sznaider, 
2006) “neoliberal globalism” and for people who have been displaced by the nation-state 
system. Furthermore, some activists, like those involved in Occupy movements, see 
“neoliberal globalism” as an instrument of domination by the West and as the principal 
contributor to global financial crises, which they view as the most virulent risk of 
“cosmopolitanization” (Hosseini, 2013). Do Occupy movements have an equal voice to 
transnational corporations and banks that profit from “neoliberal globalism?” 
Furthermore, Beck's (2004) discussion of global institutions gives me pause. If he thinks 
that the UN Security Council speaks for “humanity as a whole,” is he not denying the 
privileged positions of certain countries within supranational organizations like the 
United Nations? To have a productive conversation about “intentional” 
cosmopolitanization, one cannot leave out the people most negatively affected by 
globalization or it becomes a hollow theory about spreading Western values, even if it is 
through “global” risks, some of which are more pertinent to Western countries, like BSE 
and terrorism, rather than geography or identity. While Beck (2004) claims that 
engagement with global risks demonstrates “actually existing cosmopolitanism” and 
“moral responsibility for everyone” (Calhoun, 2008, p. 429), he has fails to acknowledge 
that some people are in greater peril and these same people may have fainter voices in 
deliberations concerning these risks. 
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 This subsection has discussed Beck’s (2004, 2011; Beck & Sznaider 2006) 
attempts to move away from normative, philosophical discussions of cosmopolitanism 
toward a heuristic theory of how cosmopolitanization can be studied through reactions to 
global risks at various societal and transnational levels. The next subsection will discuss 
Calhoun’s (2008) critique of Beck’s cosmopolitanization (2004, 2011; Beck & Sznaider 
2006) and why he believes that attempts to promote cosmopolitanism can only 
realistically be accomplished at the societal or national level.  
 Calhoun’s “Methodological Nationalism” 	  
 Calhoun (2008) calls for more systematic uses of the term cosmopolitanism, 
noting the etymological basis of “cosmos refers to the whole” (p. 428). He claims that 
using the term as an adjective, to categorize a person or place, often obscures the 
underlying “extraordinary growth of connection among human beings and variously 
organized social groups” (Calhoun, 2008, p. 428-429), what Beck refers to as 
cosmopolitanization. Calhoun (2008) uses the term to discuss collective identity politics 
within nations rather than individual identity formation, which sets his work apart from 
other theories of cosmopolitanism that presume it to be an individual (Western) 
characteristic. He thus sees it as a national political project rather than an international 
one because he emphasizes that “others” within the same cultural groups in the same 
nation have not even come to terms with their shared identity (humanity) so, he argues, 
how could cosmopolitanism be possible on a global scale? However, could this not be 
more appropriately categorized as a theory related to critical cultural studies, since he is 
ignoring his own advice by approaching the cosmos as a nation (locality) rather than as a 
“whole”?  
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 He claims that cosmopolitanism should be perceived more as an “escape from the 
constraints of cultural prejudice than a production of cultural capacity for interaction and 
integration” (Calhoun, 2008, p. 441). While I agree that this is important, I would argue 
that his conceptualization is similar to positive and negative rights, which denote that 
people within cultures should be free from ethnic prejudice (negative right) but what 
about the more global perspectives of people who believe that common values and a 
shared sense of humanity (positive rights) are possible across transnational boundaries? 
Furthermore, if everyone agreed that “shared humanity” is an important starting point, 
this could perhaps address the issue of “cultural prejudice” within and between national 
contexts. His characterization also limits reluctant cosmopolitans, those with the capacity 
to refrain from bigotry, to multicultural societies, which reinforces the proposition that 
cosmopolitanism is only possible in Western countries. Calhoun (2008) acknowledges 
that part of the problem within contexts is the “general orientation to difference” (p. 445), 
which could be a result of the spread of the Western conceptualization of difference as 
deficiency as well as dominant cultures pushing back against their perceived loss of 
privilege in “multicultural” societies. I am not saying that other cultures do not also 
display xenophobia, racism, and ethnocentricism but Western civilization has been built 
upon the hierarchical conceptualization of difference based on Western superiority. 
Calhoun (2008) also distinguishes between cosmopolitans and a particular group of 
“multinational cosmopolitan elite” (Calhoun, 2008, p. 443), which he claims is critical to 
reproducing national identity in poor and post-colonial nations. Calhoun’s (2008) 
reference to these elites substantiates my claim that much of the scholarly commitment to 
cosmopolitanism has not progressed far from its Enlightenment roots in affluence, 
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Eurocentricism, and imperialism, which established a foundation for the more recent 
connections to cultural colonialism and social capital modeled by and enabled through 
the transnational elite class.  
 The scholarly preoccupation with tolerance is perhaps related to the dominant 
Western conceptualization of difference, which frames it as a problem to be overcome 
rather than an aspect of human social configurations and identities to be celebrated. 
Barlas (2002) has noted the Western conceptualization of difference in regard to gender 
relations, which she characterized as “A and non-A,” rather than “A and B” (p. 136), but 
this dynamic could also be applied to differences in race, sexual orientation, religion, and 
so forth. In this equation A is the dominant cultural figure (male, white, heterosexual, 
able-bodied, and middle class) and everyone else in the category of “non-A” is perceived 
not as dissimilar but as deficient. Mills (2007) also suggests that this perception of 
difference creates a hierarchy based on difference vis-à-vis the “A” prototype in which, at 
least in the context of the United States, white women are below white men but above 
non-white males and women of color are at the bottom of this hierarchy due to their 
gendered and racial “deficiencies” (p. 173). Consequently, I disagree with Calhoun 
(2008) that cosmopolitanism should be linked to identity politics or national-based 
projects related to greater multicultural tolerance because, while it could promote 
tolerance for one’s neighbor, it may not contribute to one seeing her neighbor as an equal 
member of humanity, which I believe is at the heart of cosmopolitanism. His project to 
reimagine difference is admirable but it ignores the larger expanses of the cosmos. It also 
tends to localize cosmopolitanism as an issue for multicultural (Western) states and, 
again, sidesteps the important distinction between cosmopolitanism and racial ethnic 
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tolerance: the sense of shared humanity. Furthermore, according to Putnam (2007), since 
more diverse communities actually demonstrate higher levels of racial intolerance (Onxy 
et al., 2011, p. 62), his piece presents yet another failed attempt to locate 
cosmopolitanism and begs the question of, if tolerance cannot be achieved on a localized 
scale in Western nations, how is it possible on a grander one? Perhaps the distinction lies 
in promoting common humanity rather than tolerating difference.     
 This subsection demonstrates that the contentiousness between nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism has not progressed much in the several centuries that it has been 
debated by scholars. Western scholars have typically concluded that the lack of tolerance 
for “others” within national contexts precludes any possibility of cosmopolitanism being 
projected onto the cosmos (the global). The next subsection will discuss what some 
scholars have neglected in their studies of globalization processes and/or national projects 
toward greater tolerance of difference—the simultaneous localness and globalness of 
cosmopolitanism, which was part of its philosophical underpinnings when the term was 
originally introduced as a universal form of consciousness, that has been conceptualized 
in contemporary literature as “vernacular cosmopolitanism.”  
 Vernacular Cosmopolitanism 
 Werbner (2006) claims that vernacular cosmopolitanism does not contradict the 
less rooted forms of Western cosmopolitanism that are often the focus of studies related 
to the concept (also see Tomlinson, 1999; Pollock et al., 2000; Szerszynski and Urry, 
2002). She claims, “vernacular ethnic rootedness does not negate openness to cultural 
difference or the fostering of a universalist civic consciousness and a sense of moral 
responsibility beyond the local” (Werbner, 2006, p. 497). For example, many of the rights 
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that people called for during the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions are not distinct from 
those noted by Appiah (1998): “equal dignity…and the rule of law” (Werbner, 2006, p. 
497). These are not abstract Western concepts but basic human needs with which most 
people can agree despite their divergent political, religious, cultural, racial, gender, 
socioeconomic, and other positionalities. As Cook (2012) says, vernacular 
cosmopolitanism is related to people’s simultaneous dedication to the local and the 
global; thus people in Tunisia and Egypt fought for basic political rights within their local 
community, rights that they believed to be human rights to which all of humanity should 
be entitled.  
 Kymlicka and Walker (2012) promote a similar concept know as  “rooted 
cosmopolitanism,” which “attempts to maintain the commitment to moral 
cosmopolitanism, while revisiting earlier commitment to a world state or a common 
global culture, and affirming the enduring reality and value of cultural diversity and local 
or national self-government” (p. 3). Relatedly, Cohen (1992) states that rooted 
cosmopolitans “accept a multiplicity of roots and branches…that rests on the legitimacy 
of plural loyalties, of standing in many circles, but with common ground” (Tarrow, 2005, 
p. 7). These forms of cosmopolitanism suggest that there are certain aspects of existence 
that humanity as a whole shares in common. It is in working out the particulars, like 
religious and economic rights, that projects are abandoned as untenable. For example, the 
universalism project generally falls apart when people begin discussing positive 
economic right—housing, education, and work—which is perhaps the result of dedication 
to Western individualism that has enshrined basic (negative) political rights but also the 
right to die in poverty. Basu (2000) notes this in conjunction with transnational feminist 
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discussions in which feminists from the North typically prioritized “civil and political 
rights” at the top of their agenda, while Southern feminists rank  “poverty, inequality, and 
basic needs” (p. 70) among the most crucial issues facing women. Yet there are certain 
issues on which feminists from everywhere can agree, such as eradicating gender-based 
violence, which are important purchases upon which interlocutors could build larger 
connections, discussions, and possibly consensus on some issues.    
 I highlighted these offshoots of cosmopolitanism in this section, vernacular 
cosmopolitanism and rooted cosmopolitanism, because they more appropriately convey 
how the term was conceptualized in ancient times and they inform how I frame 
cosmopolitanism in this thesis. In my opinion, any discussion of cosmopolitanism is 
futile if one cannot establish a common ground or starting point. I would suggest that all 
people have some affinity for self-governing and supporting the dignity of all people. The 
respect for difference is also a key factor in reestablishing the deteriorated common 
ground of humanity, which, I would posit, could be promoted through civil dialogue in 
non-threatening spaces. The next section will present tangible ways this type of dialogue 
can occur among dissimilar people in cyberspaces through what I call cosmopolitan 
praxis, or more specifically vernacular cosmopolitan praxis.   
Cosmopolitan Praxis    
 Like Cook (2012), I am concerned with the lack of attention to class, gender, and 
sexuality in literature related to cosmopolitanism. Studies related to Muslim 
cosmopolitanism, which typically locate it as an affinity among Muslim communities in 
the West, reinforce the idea that it is a Western propensity, inaccessible to non-
Westerners unless they come into contact with Western values and lifestyles. The lack of 
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studies focusing on cosmopolitanism among non-Western populations encouraged me to 
examine the discussions of Muslim women in social media to discover whether or not 
they exhibit cosmopolitan tendencies. Studying these women in online spaces also 
addresses the paucity of studies related to gender, although not simply gender, but 
stigmatized, racialized groups of women. Scholarly literature on cosmopolitanism also 
largely remains theoretical thus, following Cook (2012), Roudometof (2005), and Mau et 
al. (2008), I recognize the importance of contributing to empirical studies, especially 
qualitative examinations, of cosmopolitanism. With the exceptions of the qualitative 
studies conducted by Cook (2012), Christensen (2011), and Werbner (1999), the 
empirical studies I have encountered are based on large-scale national surveys of Western 
populations, one of which I will discuss below. 
 In the survey data that Mau et al. (2008) use to measure the cosmopolitanism of 
thousands of Germans, they hypothesize that “transnational experiences” will contribute 
to the “proliferation of cosmopolitan attitudes” (Mau et al., 2008, p. 3). They state,  
Cosmopolitanism…is conceived as a particular worldview characterized by the capacity to 
mediate between different cultures, the recognition of increasing interconnectedness of political 
communities and…we apply the concepts of transnationalism and cosmopolitanism at the micro-
level and ask whether people’s cross-border linkages and activities have an impact on their 
attitudinal stances (Mau et al., 2008, p. 2).  
 
Their interest in cosmopolitanism, following Robbins (1998), is related to “actual 
existing cosmopolitanism” (Mau et al., 2008, p. 4), which they perceive “arises through 
the interrelated processes of increased connectivity and cultural contact” (Kwok-Bun, 
2002 as cited in Mau et al., 2008, p. 5). Some of the survey questions tend to limit 
cosmopolitanism to multicultural tolerance and their shifts between “transnationalism” 
and “cosmopolitanism” suggest that they view the terms as somewhat analogous, 
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although Beck (2004) might argue these terms mark the important difference between 
“actually existing” and “reluctant” cosmopolitanism. 
 My hesitation with the approach of the Mau et al. (2008) study is less conceptual, 
apart from their conflation of cosmopolitanism and transnationalism, than it is 
methodological. Although I agree will how they define cosmopolitanism—“the capacity 
to mediate between different cultures,” for example—and their desire to empirically 
study these propensities, the details of the methodology, including the interview schedule, 
are vague. For example, in asking Germans about their connections and/or stays “abroad,” 
it is unclear if this includes travel and contacts within the European Union, which could 
be a short trip away, similar to Americans travelling between states. I also do not think 
that telephone interviews are conducive to people openly discussing sensitive topics but, 
at the same time, I am not certain that the interview questions are sensitive enough to 
encourage reactionary responses. Since cultural openness and tolerant attitudes are 
considered positive propensities, Germans would be unlikely to express intolerance 
through phone interviews (see Hadaway et al., 1993), particularly due to the xenophobia 
and racism that was attached to the culture during World War II, but perhaps Germans 
might express lower levels of tolerance through anonymous mail surveys. Furthermore, if 
the interviewers had asked them about specific subgroups in Germany, like the Turks, for 
example, they may have articulated less tolerant attitudes. Likewise, the French would 
probably express tolerance for other cultures but, if an interviewer asked some of them 
about the right of Muslim women to wear hijab or niqab, particularly through anonymous 
surveys, their answers may denote less tolerance, as was the case in online responses to 
the NiqaBitch protest in which people had the freedom to offer their opinions 
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anonymously. In some cases, globalization and the associated migration between nations 
contribute to reactionary nationalist movements, as have been the case throughout Europe 
(Kaldor, 2004; Mau et al., 2008; Blaagaard, 2010), and heightened racism and 
xenophobia. Mau et al. (2008) also note that “virtual travel” through ICTs could 
contribute to cosmopolitan attitudes (also see Szerszynski and Urry 2006) but it was not 
included in their study. This thesis takes the position that online discussions and “virtual 
travel” could be important indicators of cosmopolitan attitudes as was the case in regard 
to the NiqaBitch protest. 
 In another article, Roudometof (2005) operationalizes cosmopolitanism in a 
distinctive way from the methodology of the Mau et al. (2008) study, but his engagement 
with the concept remains theoretical despite his similar effort to unveil “actually existing 
cosmopolitanism.” Roudometof (2005) renders cosmopolitanism empirically through a 
continuum of attachments to the local and the transnational, which he advances as a 
better way to conceptualize cosmopolitanism than through the binary of 
cosmopolitan/local. Roudometof (2005) states, “individuals can adopt an open, 
encompassing attitude or a closed, defensive posture” (p. 121), which he says that 
Hannerz (1990) labeled as cosmopolitan and local, respectively. He rejects this binary, 
offering the example of people who are patriots without being ethnocentric and suggests 
yet another qualifier to bypass the local/cosmopolitan dichotomy: “glocalized 
cosmopolitanism” (Roudometof, 2005, p. 121; also see Szerszynski and Urry, 2002), 
which has also been called “rooted,” “situated,” and “vernacular.” Roudometof (2005) 
states that the term “glocalized cosmopolitanism” could be operationalized by “degrees 
of attachment” plotted on a “global-local continuum” (p. 124). While his empirical 
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approach to the study of cosmopolitanism is admirable, the factors that he uses to 
operationalize the continuum are suspect: for instance, different degrees of attachment to 
locality, state, local culture, and economic/cultural protectionism. These measures do not 
reveal who would be counted within the ranks of glocalized cosmopolitanism. Are the 
people who fall in the middle quasi-glocalized cosmopolitans? According to Cook (2012), 
who uses Roudometof’s (2005) model to map the continuum among Pakistani expatriate 
development workers in Canada through her analysis employing in-depth interviews,  
Whether or not it is…useful in studying the cosmopolitan realities of differently classed groups is 
a topic for further research. In this case the continuum enables me to map the complex repertoire 
of local and cosmopolitan allegiances that characterize a culture of cosmopolitanism, while 
demonstrating an overarching cosmopolitan orientation (p. 14). 
 
Roudometof’s (2005) measures led me to consider Libertarians who may be strongly 
against local governmental interference and market protectionism but fervently 
patriotic—thus would they fall into the quasi-glocalized category, despite their rejections 
of governmental and economic interventions being closely linked to their patriotism 
rather than their concern for others within and outside of their local and national 
communities? 
 Although I take issue with the way Mau et al. (2008) and Roudometof (2005) 
operationalized cosmopolitanism, the project of examining cosmopolitanism empirically, 
what I call vernacular cosmopolitan praxis, should not be abandoned. Scholars have 
begun to empirically examine various communities and subgroups to determine the 
extent of their cosmopolitan affiliations but there continues to be relatively few studies 
and the problems with devising appropriate measures remain, especially due to the range 
of theories that underpin cosmopolitanism. Like Roudometof (2005) and Mau et al. 
(2008), I do not perceive cosmopolitanism as an abstract normative (Western) concept or 
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an identity, but as an ideal that can be empirically studied, in this case, through online 
interactions.  
 I generally use two terms to situate dialogues that reflect vernacular cosmopolitan 
praxis: cosmopolitan opportunities, which are related to dialogue that has the potential to 
bridge distinctive groups; and cosmopolitan aesthetics, which is related to universalizing 
conduct among (dissimilar) people online and offline through online discussions and 
activism and through expressing commitment to one’s own values but acceptance of 
others’ views. When I refer to a person as cosmopolitan, I am referring to someone who 
has exhibited one or more of these tendencies through her praxis: remaining true to her 
own beliefs yet accepting the divergent beliefs of others; expanding the transnational 
connective memory to include the voices of Muslim women; offering countersentences to 
dominant political and religious discourses; connecting dissimilar people (or creating 
cosmopolitan opportunities); engaging in civil dialogue with dissimilar people; and 
promoting a certain level of comportment among people online and/or offline and/or 
mapping basic standards of behavior that could be universally agreed upon among 
dissimilar people. In reference to dissimilar people, they could be cultural “others” but, 
since religion comprises an important part of otherness, they could also be religious 
others within the same religion. These forms of praxis are consistent with the way Molz 
(2006) discusses cosmopolitanism and perhaps how vernacular cosmopolitan praxis can 
be operationalized: “cosmopolitan claims to world citizenship are imagined through a 
cultural or aesthetic disposition toward difference – a sense of tolerance, flexibility and 
openness toward otherness that characterizes an ethics of social relations in an 
interconnected world” (p. 2).   
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 This research will address several gaps in the literature related to 
cosmopolitanism. Returning to the ancient roots of the term rather than the theoretical 
engagements with cosmopolitanism during and after the Enlightenment period that are 
drenched in colonialism and Eurocentrism (Werbner, 1999, p. 17), there is no impasse 
regarding attachments to both local and global societies (Cook, 2012; Lawrence, 2010). It 
does involve resistance to the Euro-American conceptualization of difference, which 
tends toward hierarchies (Mills, 2007). This study will attempt to address the lack of 
adequate engagement with gender in literature related to cosmopolitanism, although most 
of the dialogue analyzed here stems from people within a specific socioeconomic group, 
which Polson (2011) frames in her study of the new transnational middle (in some cases, 
perhaps upper middle) class. The geographical limitations of many of the studies and 
theories related to cosmopolitanism imply that non-Westerners were driven toward non-
local spaces because they were sufficiently non-local not to want to live “locally” or that 
their cosmopolitan perspectives were a product of having been exposed to “tolerant” 
multicultural Western spaces (see Notar 2008). My study will decenter cosmopolitan 
potential from a minute focus on Western people and communities of non-Westerners in 
the West to the possibility of locating cosmopolitan dialogue in transnational cyberspaces 
among non-Westerners living in non-Western countries.  
 This section has described cosmopolitan praxis (as well as opportunities and 
aesthetics), which I have encountered in dialogue among gendered, non-elitist non-
Westerners living in non-Western contexts. I have explained attempts to empirically 
examine cosmopolitanism and ways that my study will address some of the gaps in this 
literature, especially the Eurocentricism that tends to inform theoretical engagement with 
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cosmopolitanism and the lack of qualitative empirical studies. The next section will 
address whether or not transnational cyberspaces are appropriate places for studying 
vernacular cosmopolitan praxis and whether or not these spaces and the underlying 
networks contribute to vernacular cosmopolitan praxis.  
Cosmopolitan Potential of Social Media	  
 People in general are not remiss to reflect on spaces as cosmopolitan: 
cosmopolitan New York, for example. How has this cosmopolitan space materialized? It 
is a megacity that people from throughout the world inhabit but they often live in clusters 
with others like them, sometimes by choice and other times due to local cultural 
constraints. Some would call themselves “New Yorkers,” despite their divergent ethnic 
roots, and some might call themselves “Iranian New Yorkers” or “Iranian Americans.” 
These are ways to situate one’s self through multiple allegiances or consciousnesses, not 
just to New York and/or Iran but also to other “Iranian New Yorkers.” She is claiming 
her ethnic roots and her new home as equal affiliations as well as her connections to a 
subculture within the United States. This may also be true of a Palestinian living in 
Amman who might call herself a Palestinian Jordanian. She is invoking multiple places 
and a plurality of allegiances. It is not uncommon for people in and outside of the West to 
claim multiple allegiances but somehow many of the studies of cosmopolitanism do not 
stray geographically from the Northwest section of the globe. In this section I will discuss 
other important spaces for studying cosmopolitanism: transnational cyberspaces.     
 I will posit that people who participate in social media production and 
consumption are to some extent connecting with others, although some do limit their 
connections to localized groups. As such, to employ Beck’s (2004; 2011; Beck & 
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Sznaider 2006) terms, they are engaging in cosmopolitanization (globalization) but they 
are not necessarily engaging in “intentional cosmopolitanization.” On the other hand, 
some people, who Wise (2009) calls “traversal enablers” (Onyx et al., 2011, p. 52), make 
a concerted effort to reach out to “others.” It is possible that the connections of traversal 
enablers to unintentional cosmopolitan producers and consumers may lead to 
introspection and change within networks and result in the farther-reaching evolution of 
larger networks, which I discuss more in Chapter 5.  
 There are several features of social media that make them rich environments for 
studying cosmopolitanism, including its entanglements with Eurocentricism and elitism. 
Benedikter and Fitz (2011) highlight the “equal opportunity” (p. 62) that social media 
provide as well as their potential to decentralize information through offering alternative 
channels to conventional, politically-embedded media. They also offer cautionary tales 
related to social media being harnessed as a “hegemonic tool of the elite” (Benedikter & 
Fitz, 2011, p. 63), although they claims that current trends suggest, “new media is [sic] 
shifting focus from the external to some sense of interiority not just of an individual, but 
also between individuals. Media permeates the human brain-mind-self and the social 
realm, thus evolving into a “trans-” or even “meta-social” concept” (Benedikter & Fitz, 
2011, p. 64). They highlight forms of introspection at both individual and collective 
levels, which relate to how people view their belongings to local and global communities 
and how they imagine these communities should/could be. Benedikter and Fitz (2011) 
also point out, quoting Keohane and Nye (1998), that the decentralization of information 
contributes to “new electronic feudalism with overlapping communities and jurisdictions 
laying claim to multiple layers of citizens’ identities and loyalties” (p. 65), which is how I 
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envision the theater of vernacular cosmopolitanism. Perhaps this feudalism could also 
suggest diasporic consciousness but the same dynamic is present among those who have 
never left their homelands: for example, among the Muslim women in the Arab world 
who advance universal basic standards of women’s rights, sometimes grounded in 
religious rights, through activism toward reforming laws and bolstering civil rights. 
 Benedikter and Fitz (2011) also note the importance of social media in the 
promotion of  “soft power,” or convincing individuals to agree to social norms related to 
comportment. This is what Foucault (1977) refers to as the creation of docile bodies that, 
as time progresses, no longer require the threat of state violence to ensure their 
compliance because social institutions and networks reinforce the strictures of behaviors, 
which were initially imposed through state surveillance and spectacles of violence. 
Nonetheless, Foucault (1967/2009) also recognized spaces outside of the strictures of 
socially-imposed norms, which he refers to as heterotopia spaces, such as mental 
hospitals and prisons (as cited in Jansson, 2009). Social media, as part of the “space-
communication nexus” (Jansson, 2009), could also create heterotopian spaces. Some 
people use these spaces to troll (Jansson, 2013), while in face-to-face encounters they 
would be unlikely, for example, to call someone a fascist to her face (see Chapter 4) 
despite her position on sensitive topics. This dynamic has to do with the at times 
pervasive lack of social inhibitions (and politeness) in anonymous environments. People 
also use these spaces to draw attention to injustices where it is taboo to speak out against 
them in public spaces even when the abuses are in plain sight. Heterotopian spaces can 
also challenge information control by advancing knowledge as a social construct 
(Benedikter & Fitz, 2011). In the same vein, one could see social media as an affront to 
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state and corporate power over information disseminated through conventional media, 
which are more susceptible to corporate-political control (Tremayne, 2007; O’Neil, 2009), 
especially due to the role of social media serving as watchdogs over conventional media. 
As I will discuss promptly, people have also used social media to challenge or subvert 
religious authority (Anderson, 2003; Kofman, 2005), misinterpretations of the Qur'an, 
political discourse, and social norms.  
 Although social media can serve as heterotopian spaces to challenge social and 
state surveillance and control, this potential should not be uncritically lauded (Dartnell, 
2003; Atton, 2004). Social media have clearly decentered media consumption, “fixtures,” 
as Jansson (2013) calls them, or “gathering places” (Adams, 1992), “within the everyday 
communicative fabric” (Jansson, 2013, p. 288, his emphasis). Jansson (2013) offers the 
comparison between social media and the television when it was first introduced, which 
provided people with a common meeting place despite it being located in each 
household’s living room, to illustrate the distinctions between televised meeting places 
and what is currently available through the internet. However, Jansson (2013) suggests 
that social media could also be used as spaces for social surveillance, including constant 
“checking in” and the imperative to divulge personal information to participate in online 
spaces (May, 2002). In regard to cosmopolitanism in cyberspaces, Jansson (2013) claims 
that various aspects of the social media networks discourage people from circulating 
within unknown online environments, such as the “negation of hospitality,” what I call 
trolling, and “connection strategies,” which rarely entail social media users visiting 
cyberspaces to meet strangers (p. 290). According to Jansson (2013), quoting Tomlinson 
(1999), “mobile, networked media function not so much as technologies of cosmos, but 
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rather as technologies of the hearth, involving high degrees of peer-to-peer monitoring” 
(p. 290, his emphasis), employing the example of Swedish social media users as the basis 
of his empirical work. 
 Aside from the obstacles mentioned above, Jansson (2013) claims there are two 
main obstacles to cosmopolitanism within social media environments: social actors must 
be willing to not only show interest in “others” but also to exhibit hospitality in their 
interactions, which he already acknowledged was lacking; and the fragmentation of the 
“post-/late modern subjectivity,” as well as that which is created by neoliberal globalism, 
I would suggest, “provide a reactionary moment to social de-differentiation and 
reembedding” (p. 292-293). Reembedding is a pervasive reaction but some people and 
activists are equally likely to employ their multiple attachments to grow their network 
base. Hosseini (2013), for example, discusses the “transversalist” claims associated with 
the Occupy movement to illustrate that some people see the context of globalization as a 
moment to advance different but complementary grievances against global hegemonic 
forces. He defines transversalism as “a conscious effort to lessen disparities, achieve 
equity, avoid violence, and enhance autonomy and democracy by creatively crossing (or 
redrawing) boundaries that mark politicized divisions” (Hosseini, 2013, p. 428). Hosseini 
(2013) also states that some Occupy movements use symbols from the Arab Revolts to 
express their solidarity with politically oppressed people in other parts of the world, 
which demonstrates the cosmopolitan praxis of the Occupy platform. 
 In contrast to the cosmopolitanism of the Occupy platform, Blaagaard (2010) 
notes the increase in right-wing and populist insurgency groups that have accompanied 
the expansion and globalization of ICTs.  Although her prognosis in regard to social 
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media contributing to cosmopolitan praxis is sanguine, analyzing social media use in 
Denmark and the Netherlands as the foci of her study, her version of cosmopolitanism 
appears to focus on local societies rather than global ones, relating cosmopolitan praxis to 
the potential of citizen journalism. In framing “citizen journalism,” she claims that it 
involves the “right to speak but also the obligation to listen…and understand others in 
order to live convivially in a common society” (Blaagaard, 2010, p. 5) Within the 
category of citizen journalism, she includes citizens who share their “knowledge and 
experiences…during times of crises,” “political and issue-based” blogs, and “online 
opinion and visual expression [that] may take the much looser form of viral life and 
develop in rhizomatic structures” (Blaagaard, 2010, p. 5), most of which I will take up in 
the subsequent chapters. Similar to what Benedikter and Fitz (2011) say about social 
media challenging the control of information through advancing knowledge as a social 
construction, Blaagaard (2010) claims that, since journalism is central to the 
“construction of cultural citizenship,” citizen journalism is able to challenge the 
“selective amnesia” (p. 5) of conventional media that bolsters exclusionary citizenship. 
Although she emphasizes that social media are embedded “in histories and practices of 
commercialisation, market, and regulatory control…[and therefore] have ways of 
controlling and gate-keeping the content,” these gate-keeping mechanisms have little 
control over “viral cultural representations…based on the interests of the viewers, the 
number of ‘clicks’… and the viewers’ decisions to pass on the word” (Blaagaard, 2010, p. 
6). Due to the extraneous factors related to the popular mediation of internet memes that 
are part of the dynamic of social media networks and contribute to “multiplicity in 
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societies,” Blaagaard (2010) advances, following Gilroy (2004), the possibility of 
“cosmopolitanism from below” (p. 6).    
   Although social media use could result in reactionary responses to uncertainty and 
fragmentation, it is also likely that people who engage in online cosmopolitan praxis 
could contribute to gradual changes in their immediate networks, which are compounded 
through network bridging and could lead to more dramatic results over time. Onyx et al. 
(2011) view cosmopolitanism as the natural progression of “everyday” social media use 
by linking it to complexity theory, which elucidates the extraneous factors mentioned 
above that undermine elitist/corporatist gatekeeping, such as the viral capacity of social 
media networks. Although the form of cosmopolitanism to which they are referring is 
more akin to the national-level version that Calhoun (2008) discusses, tolerating 
difference within multicultural communities, they demonstrate how non-politicized 
environments can foster interactions between cultural others through everyday encounters, 
which Pratt (1992) calls “contact zones,” such as exchanging recipes or home-grown 
fruits and vegetables (Onyx et al., 2011, p. 51). They state,  
complexity theory…can help explain how small, seemingly random, events can coalesce into 
emergent patterns without a central controller. When talking about human action this refers to the 
emergence of new networks and collective action formed from the myriad interpersonal 
encounters independent of any external authority (Onyx et al., 2011, p. 52). 
 
They posit that two factors are of principal importance in explaining how everyday 
interactions could lead to greater intercultural understanding: emergence, which relates to 
“how system-level order spontaneously arises from the action and repeated interaction of 
lower level system components” (Chiles et al., 2004 as cited in Onxy et al., 2011, p. 54); 
and self-organization, which explains “how information exchanged between individuals 
within micropublics houses the potential for a process of adaptation to the environmental 
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conditions and an adaptive self-organisation structure” (Onxy et al., 2011, p. 54). In other 
words, “a small divergence in initial conditions leads to significant difference in the 
evolution of the entire systems, which is evolutionary and unpredictable” (Onxy et al., 
2011, p. 55) through bottom-up pressures (emergence), which affect alignments in these 
self-organizing, non-linear systems. However, in addressing the immense expanses of 
transnational cyberspaces, ripples on the periphery of localized networks will take some 
time to reach dominant central clusters. 
 This section has discussed how there are both opportunities and constraints to 
vernacular cosmopolitan praxis within social media networks. Some of the dynamics, like 
social surveillance and trolling, discourage engagements with cultural others online, 
while other factors, like the neutrality of the environments and the ease of access to 
everyday interactions, encourage these interplays. Network dynamics, such as emergence 
and the potential of content to go viral, encourage far-reaching effects so many of the 
constraints on the potential of social media to enhance cosmopolitan praxis are often 
individually or socially imposed, such as the reembedding of users into nationalistic 
reactionary allegiances. The next section will discuss a few pieces of literature directly 
related to Muslims and cosmopolitanism, or perhaps “Muslim cosmopolitanism,” and 
how social media may facilitate these forms of cosmopolitanism.   
Globally Networked Muslims and Cosmopolitanism 	  
 The digital networks related to Islam and Muslims will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 5, but I will briefly discuss them here, particularly literature related to 
non-Western Muslim cosmopolitanisms. As mentioned previously, studies of 
“cosmopolitan Muslims,” based on the myriad of conceptualizations of the term 
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discussed above, generally locate them within diasporic communities in the West. 
Tellingly, when I searched Google Scholar for “Arab cosmopolitans” the query did not 
yield any results but, when I changed the search to “cosmopolitan Arabs,” I got 12 results 
in February of 2014 (a simple search for cosmopolitan results in 22,500 links); again, 
demonstrating the continued pervasiveness of Ameri/Eurocentricism in theoretical 
frameworks related to cosmopolitanism. This is not only true of Arabs. Most other non-
Western populations are unlikely to be labeled as cosmopolitans unless they form 
communities in Western countries and even then there is no guarantee that they would be 
considered as such. Like Werbner (1999), who attempts to wrestle cosmopolitanism from 
its elitist underpinnings by labeling working-class Pakistani expatriates as cosmopolitans, 
I am attempting to non-Westernize the concept, although the conversations of some 
Western Muslims will also be examined in the chapters to follow.   
 Leonard (2009), as well as Christensen (2011), Cook (2012) and Werbner (1999), 
is among the scholars who have studied cosmopolitanism among Muslim expatriates and 
diasporic communities in the West. I will discuss Leonard’s (2009) work briefly because 
she not only describes Muslim cosmopolitanism but also how social media has 
encouraged it in certain cases. Leonard (2009) argues,  
Islam and Muslims have long constituted a “world system”…modern nations actually work 
against transnationalism by producing tensions…that weaken…transnational connections…[thus] 
transnational forms of Islam are inevitably engaged in losing struggles, particularly in North 
America and Europe…[however] American forms of Islam can be discerned as the forms of Islam 
in the West become strongly cosmopolitan rather than transnational (p. 176).  
 
She starts by analyzing two Muslim sects, Ahmadiyya and Nizari, which she selected 
because they “are designed to be cosmopolitan” (Leonard, 2009, p. 178), noting that they 
principally operate in the West and in English. However, in regard to the Nizari, she 
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claims that the “uniqueness that allowed the Nizari Ismailis to adapt many aspects of 
Western culture…kept them apart from other Muslims” (Leonard, 2009, p. 183). While 
she claims that the successes of the two minority sects are tenuous, she is enthusiastic 
about the prospects of dynamic groups of Muslim scholars who challenge traditional 
Islamic hermeneutics in an attempt to advance the liberatory intent of the Qur’an, 
including the Muslims for Progressive Values movement (also see Chapter 5). Among 
these important Islamic scholars, she recognizes the vital contributions of Amina Wadud 
and Kecia Ali. Although she suggests that some strands of American Islam are signs of 
the evolution of the religion in Western contexts, it is unclear how much of their 
messages are disseminated abroad, especially into the Arab world, which I would argue is 
an important indicator of whether or not these contributions are reaching a significant 
level of cosmopolitanism.     
 I did find one piece by Hoesterey (2012) that examined the cosmopolitanism of 
Muslims outside of the West, an analysis of “Muslim trainers and self-help gurus in 
Indonesia” who promote “prophetic cosmopolitanism” (p. 40) among their followers. The 
leaders of these movements frame the Prophet Mohammad as an exemplary figure to 
emulate for success in the modern world, particularly due to his hardships as an orphan 
and his entrepreneurial spirit. For them, Mohammad epitomizes “rags to riches” stories 
(Hoesterey, 2012, p. 46). Hoesterey (2012) claims that these groups do not fit into the 
category of “counter-cosmopolitans” but he describes their praxis as “tolerance without 
universalism” (p. 55). He also refers to the movements as an “alternative global discourse” 
of cosmopolitanism that reflects local beliefs but, since they are offered to publics as 
commodities, perhaps they fall into the category of banal cosmopolitanism. Many 
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Muslims throughout the world might agree with some of the messages of these groups so, 
while they are not what Hoesterey (2012) calls universal (although the narratives of the 
Prophet could perhaps be universal in less Islamophobic contexts, particularly those that 
reference his entrepreneurialism), they do contribute a version of “Muslim 
cosmopolitanism” that mixes psychology and self-help doctrines, which are used in the 
West in self-healing and assertiveness training, with religious teachings to advance civic 
duties. These movements appear to promote cosmopolitan praxis through merging 
multiple ethnic strains and religious doctrine but the cosmopolitan praxis of the messages 
is undermined by its commodification. I will discuss these movements further, especially 
why Hoestery (2012) does not consider them “universal,” in the Conclusion. 
 A few pieces of literature discuss transnational, loosely connected, cosmopolitan 
Muslim networks, which are particularly pertinent to the subsequent chapters. Both 
Turner (2007) and Anderson (2003) discuss the contributions of diasporic Muslims who 
have complemented the “internet galaxy” (Turner, 2007, p. 407; Castells, 2001) with 
cosmopolitanism and/or Muslim cosmopolitanism (or not in some cases), while Benhabib 
discusses the Women Living Under Muslim Law network, which highlights cases of 
women’s rights abuses in an effort to mobilize support. Turner (2007) mainly discusses 
how economic globalization and Islamophobia have contributed to reactionary 
movements among Muslims who promote the “re-sacralization” of modern societies (p. 
412) but he says that this tendency is common among all of the world religions. Anderson 
(2003), on the other hand, discusses how a transnational group of pious, middle class 
Muslims are seeking “piety in new channels” in an effort to understand “Muslim life” in 
the modern world and challenging the traditional religious authority of the ulama in the 
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process through offering their own contributions to Islamic knowledge (p. 889). These 
Muslim diaspora, who he calls the “technological adepts” (Anderson, 2003, p. 896) and 
the “internal diaspora” (Anderson, 2003, p. 899), often Arabs living in other Arab nations, 
are revolutionizing access to and consumption of religious knowledge. Finally, Benhabib 
(2010) discusses the successful efforts of the WLUML in thwarting attempts to institute 
religious arbitration courts in Canada to illustrate how “multilateral convenantalism” may 
bolster “democratic iterations.”  
 This section has discussed various manifestations of Muslim cosmopolitanism in 
scholarly literature. The array of positionalities and cosmopolitan praxes may suggest 
multiple forms of cosmopolitanism, some that speak more to other Muslims around the 
world, which I will discuss more in the Conclusion. Although Muslim networks are not 
often considered in literature related to cosmopolitanism, I would argue that some of 
them exhibit cosmopolitan praxis despite their circumvention of Western values, places, 
and identities.  
Conclusion	  
 In this chapter, I have discussed the evolution of cosmopolitanism from 
simultaneous dedication to the local and the cosmos to tropes related to the superiority of 
Western civilization and subjectivities in connection with Christian and Western empire 
building. Enlightenment scholars theoretically engaged in rhetoric about the cosmos, 
while they simultaneously disparaged cultural others. Contemporary Western scholarship 
continues to advance Western spaces as the localities within which cosmopolitans can be 
encountered, meanwhile the theoretical underpinnings of rooted and vernacular 
cosmopolitanism have attempted to excavate the ancient significance of the concept—
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attachment to both the local and the global through a shared sense of humanity. 
Advancing from vernacular cosmopolitanism and to address some of the limitations of 
contemporary scholarly engagement with cosmopolitanism, I propose the study of the 
vernacular cosmopolitan praxis of Muslim women online from both Western and Arab 
societies, which will be developed in the chapters to follow.  
 In the subsequent chapters I will highlight various forms of vernacular 
cosmopolitan praxes. Chapter 3 will discuss how Muslim women are using their digitally 
enhanced voices to expand the transnational connective memory, which, as cooke (2007) 
suggests, allows spaces for Muslim women to embrace the Muslimwoman identity and 
unite in solidarity with other Muslim women but also spaces to reject this identity 
through debunking stereotypes ascribed to them. Some of the cosmopolitan Muslim 
women in Chapter 3 are able to address both of these tasks concurrently; they are able to 
take up the identity while undermining stereotypes related to it, which is illustrated by 
niqabis who demonstrate that they are true to their own interpretations of Islam but also 
accepting of divergent Muslim practices and beliefs. Chapter 4 will demonstrate how 
Muslim women use online spaces to discuss issues that universally affect the lived 
experiences of women—the stigma of spinsterhood and street harassment—using the 
narratives of their everyday lives. They are able to address transnational issues through 
their local experiences and, through sharing their perspectives and narratives online, they 
are able to counter dominant political and religious discourses with their digital 
countersentences. Chapter 5 demonstrates how certain networks are more 
accommodating of various beliefs and practices of Islam. In transnational topical 
networks, one could study more divergent opinions that disrupt the simply binary of 
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liberal/traditional (extreme/moderate) that is ascribed to Muslims. The comments that are 
difficult to compartmentalize within this binary are often the most cosmopolitan 
perspectives, exhibiting dedication to the commenters’ own views but acceptance of the 
beliefs and practices of others; this is the case in transnational topical network 
discussions of Muslim lesbians. In homophilic networks, like the hijabi fashion network, 
although hijabis could more easily reinforce their already strongly held beliefs, comments 
offered by Muslim women with divergent opinions invite introspection into this quasi-
insular space. Chapter 6 highlights several cases of collective action and the extent to 
which they demonstrate cosmopolitan praxis. The issue of hijab discrimination could be a 
cosmopolitan opportunity but, in the American context, a few cases of workplace 
discrimination against hijabis failed to even encourage the solidarity of other hijabis in 
the same society, while Muslim women on the other side of the world have circulated 
narratives regarding injustices against hijabis in the United States. This case reveals how 
socioeconomics and contentiousness related to veiling could impede cosmopolitan 
collective actions among Muslims locally and transnationally. The Pink Hijab Day 
movement also had the potential to become a form of cosmopolitan praxis but the 
purpose shifted toward greater relevance for Muslim women living in Muslim-minority 
countries. Therefore, it remained a form of Muslim cosmopolitanism because it spread to 
other countries but it failed to reach a truly cosmopolitan level of collective action 
because it faced difficulties in mediation into Muslim-majority countries. In this case, the 
transnational network could have reinforced offline participation in the MENA region in 
lieu of local organizational support, but the weak hub of the network failed to establish 
sufficient bridges toward this end. Finally, the organizers of SlutWalk Morocco 
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contextualized a transnational movement in a local context. Although the organizers 
changed the name and purpose of the collective action, the local-global dynamics of the 
movement created a substantial base of support. This was partially due to the universality 
of the issue that the movement was attempting to address but also the result of the 
inclusivity of the campaign because the organizers were able to express both local and 
global allegiances simultaneously. Vernacular cosmopolitan praxis in these cases is not 
limited to populations residing in the West—it stems from diverse populations around the 
world toward different ends.             
 The next chapter, Chapter 2, “Getting Lost in Networks,” discusses in more detail 
why I decided to focus on topics and collective actions related to Muslim women in 
transnational spaces rather than the typical studies of online Muslim populations in 
homophilic networks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 56	  
Chapter 2 
Getting Lost in Concentric Networks: Connective Content Analysis 
 
The proliferation of digital media and online social networks has enabled Muslim women around 
the world to develop their own understandings and discourses on Islam and gender relations. 
Although limited research has been done on the scope and types of Muslim women’s activities 
online, available studies and recent events suggest that the Internet has become a critical site in 
discussing, challenging, and understanding normative hierarchies of power and authority on both 
the transnational and community level. Just as the Internet reflects the plurality of Islamic 
traditions and interpretations, it also highlights a wide spectrum of political, social and religious 
activity among Muslim women…digital media has empowered women to speak out and take 
stands on culturally sensitive, political issues…Online sites that specialize in fatwas, or religious 
legal opinions, have also provided a means for women to ask private questions about religion or 
culture in a public setting, which they might not be able to do or want to do in a face-to-face 
encounter. The benefits of the Internet and digital media have also come with the dangers of 
participating online. Although the United Nations has recently declared access to the Internet as a 
human right, censorship and online surveillance limit women’s access…In addition to government 
censorship in some countries, Muslim women face other barriers in participating online. Muslim 
women generally have less access to computers and technology, and English remains the 
dominant language of the Internet. Despite these current barriers, however, Internet access and 
digital media are enabling Muslim women to speak out and become their own agents of change.9 
 
This quote highlights the opportunities and constraints related to Muslim women’s use of 
social media. While social media have clearly enabled some Muslim women to engage in 
local and transnational dialogues and collective actions who would not otherwise have a 
medium to share their voices, due to the aforementioned constraints (see Chapter 1) and 
others that will be presented throughout this dissertation, social media cannot be 
perceived as a panacea for women’s rights. However, similar to forms of “subtle 
resistance,” which will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, social media offer the promise 
of gradual change—spaces of hope (Harvey, 2000b) that have the potential to become 
spaces of change.  
 Chapter 1 introduced some of the problematics associated with literature on 
cosmopolitanism, mainly related to the Eurocentricism and imperialism connected with 
the concept. I settled on the term “vernacular cosmopolitan praxis” to reveal 
                                                      
9 http://www.wisemuslimwomen.org/currentissues/digitaltechnology/  
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conversations in transnational cyberspaces that could be both rooted in a local context 
and outward looking toward the cosmos. Cyberspaces offer places that are decentered 
from typically Western urban spaces in which cosmopolitanism is often investigated but 
the networks that structure these digital spaces operate under dynamics that are distinct 
from those in offline spaces. They assume a unique logical that is also of key interest to 
this research. That being said, this dissertation not only attempts to identify vernacular 
cosmopolitan praxis within networks but also how the networks themselves facilitate and 
constrain cosmopolitanism. To this end, some of the methodological questions related to 
networks that will be taken up in this chapter and subsequent ones are the following: 
what are the network dynamics that encourage and discourage cosmopolitan praxis? Are 
certain narratives, dialogues, collective actions, and forms of cosmopolitan praxis, 
particularly those related to Muslim women, more likely to be mediated within these 
networks? To what extent is cooke’s (2007) cosmopolitan Muslimwoman (see Chapter 1), 
both the empowered and the reluctant, reified by the dynamics of various networks? Does 
cosmopolitan praxis tend to emanate from Western social media networks?          
 As will be discussed further in Chapter 5, the manners in which online spaces are 
often studied, in this case in relation to Islam and Muslims, reinforce the vernacular 
without the cosmopolitan due to the methodological appeal of homogeneous networks, 
which for online Muslim populations include Islamic forums, websites of online muftis, 
authoritative blogs related to Islam, and blog clusters from particular locations. 
Nevertheless, these homogenous networks, which I refer to as homophilic networks in 
Chapter 5, are not the most appropriate spaces for studying vernacular cosmopolitan 
praxis among Muslims because there is little interaction between Muslims with divergent 
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beliefs or between Muslims and non-Muslims. The dynamics of homogenous networks 
tend to reinforce agreement and root out dissention, exhibiting defensive postures toward 
divergent opinions, which is perhaps related to the promotion of uniformity in the face of 
online trolling and offline discrimination perpetrated by Islamophobes and extreme 
secularists in relation to Muslim communities. Studies of homophilic networks contribute 
to scholarly and mainstream viewpoints that Muslims are intolerant of non-conformist 
Islamic opinions and practices and of elements of Western cultures. Moreover, 
transnational cyberspaces continue to operate under Western (neo-Orientalist?) 
dominance, illustrated by the extensive use of English and link preferences within the 
dominant transnational connective memory (see Introduction and Chapter 3), so certain 
viewpoints are more conducive to mediation than others, which will be discussed further 
in Chapter 3. Sometimes the mediated viewpoints are the most consistent with Western 
values and others are extremely oppositional to reinforce the incongruence between the 
East and the West. These dilemmas bring me to my research questions related to the 
methodologies underpinning research of Muslim social media networks: are the 
narratives and conversations of Muslim women social media users qualitatively different 
in transnational online spaces that are not oriented specifically to Muslims or Muslim 
women? If transnational networks and homogenous networks do exhibit differing 
tendencies toward cosmopolitan praxis, what social dynamics contribute to the appeal of 
each of these types of networks? What are the online social dynamics that foster and 
impede the mediation of the narratives, conversations, and collectives actions in 
transnational spaces?  
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 This chapter will discuss the methodology underpinning my data collection and 
the research design. I will offer a brief discussion of qualitative content analysis before 
situating how I expanded upon this method by introducing network underpinnings. In this 
case, I collected ten datasets, starting with a topic (artificial hymen) and the American 
node of a transnational network (hijabi fashion) related to an Islamic practice, which were 
both discussed in the blog postings of Muslim women. This initial topic and node linked 
to other discussions of topics and online/offline collective actions initiated by or related 
to Muslim women for which I also collected data. In the process of analyzing the data, I 
encountered many of the same qualitative thematic codes in the different datasets. 
Therefore, due to the network bridges that linked these topics and collective actions and 
the evident overlaps in the qualitative themes, I decided to put the datasets into 
conversation, creating what I call a connective content analysis. Thus this analysis is 
connective in the sense that, although social media users may have broached the topics 
and collective actions within specific networks, there were discussions and people that 
formed bridges between these topical network clusters. This chapter will outline how I 
extracted data from the internet and how I analyzed them. The next section will discuss 
qualitative content analysis broadly and the subsections will outline what Parker et al. 
(2011) suggest are important elements of content analysis that should be explicitly 
disclosed as a means of increasing the credibility of the research. 
Qualitative Content Analysis 
 The qualitative content analyses that I conducted for this research are not 
remarkably different from conventional applications of this method—it is the connective 
component perhaps that sets it apart from other content analyses. Content analysis 
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“involves taking data—text—that already exists and subjecting it to a new form of 
“analysis”” (Schutt, 2006, p. 428). It is a type of “unobtrusive indicator” that can counter 
the norm of people answering interview questions in socially acceptable ways, for 
example (Schutt, 2006, p. 108), that I alluded to in Chapter 1 in regard to the Mau et al. 
(2008) study. Content analyses have been conducted on text in “newspapers articles, 
speeches, or political conventions” (Schutt, 2006, 430) but using this method to analyze 
social media demonstrates the significant distinctions between the “collective memory,” 
or the national archives based on state and corporate-influenced conventional media 
artifacts that foster cultural cohesion, and the “connective memory” (see Chapter 3), 
which is the online digital record of dominant discourses and popularly constructed 
countersentences that challenge the control of information by the elite. The distinction 
between official discourse and online discourse is sometimes considerable, which will be 
demonstrated in Chapter 4 in association with official solutions to the Muslim 
spinsterhood “crisis” the popular responses to these solutions. Whereas Schutt (2006) 
focuses on content analyses of traditional text and dominant discourse, Adler and Clark 
(2011) have a much broader sense of the types of texts that could be analyzed through 
this method, including blogs and chat rooms (also see Attwood, 2009; Donelle & 
Hoffman-Goetz, 2008).  
 Content analysis of social media continues to be overrepresented by quantitative 
studies (Parker et al., 2011) but, while I could provide the number of times I encounter 
various themes in the datasets, a quantitative analysis would run counter to one of the 
objectives of this research: that is, privileging the digital self-expression (voice) of 
Muslim women in social media, which is consistent with what Harding (2002) refers to 
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as standpoint theory. Replacing their voices with a number would offer more space to 
discuss the themes that I coded for in the datasets but it would do so at the expense of the 
textual forms of expression of these women. I present these textual forms of voice to 
substantiate my conclusions, which I believe is equally valid to providing a quantitative 
figure. I accept, though, that text is polysemic so I leave it to the reader to agree or not 
with the claims I make based on the text. As Howard (2002) says, 
It can be especially challenging for a researcher to interpret the content of messages sent over new 
media, since many are text-based and can mean different things to different recipients. 
Researchers can easily reinterpret or misinterpret these messages if they lack deep knowledge of 
the individuals and relationships involved (p. 555).  
 
I would argue that providing textual forms of evidence for the conclusions I flesh out of 
the data is more transparent than allowing numbers to stand in for coded textual passages 
and it enables useful scholarly critiques based on divergent interpretations of the textual 
“evidence.” Since this dissertation is a part of an ongoing online ethnography, I am 
hoping that different readings of the text will contribute to my more nuanced 
understandings of these online conversations and narratives in the next phases of the 
research project. I recognize though that the “credibility” (Patton, 1992) of conclusions 
based on content analyses that are unsupported by triangulation with other methods may 
face criticisms.  
 Some researchers have attempted to articulate various factors, apart from 
credibility, that encourage more rigorous transparency in qualitative content analyses. For 
example, Parker et al. (2011), who define “QualCA” as a “research method which uses 
subjective interpretations of content-based phenomena within its context in an inductive 
iterative process to infer explicit, implicit and/or multiple meanings” (p.2; also see 
Krippendorff, 1980; Mayring, 2000), attempt to highlight important factors to consider 
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when conducting online qualitative research. The factors that they suggest should be 
explicitly detailed include the following: defining research objectives and units of 
analysis, selecting content, analyzing content, interpretation of content, and drawing 
conclusions (Parker et al., 2011). While these are quite broad issues, I will address them 
briefly here and in further detail in the subsections below. One of my methodological 
objectives is to advance a feminist, antiracist, anti-imperialist research agenda through 
challenging the idea that cosmopolitanism, liberally defined as one’s obligations to 
dissimilar others through a shared sense of humanity, is generally located in the West as 
well as disrupting the binary associated with the East/West divide. My units of analysis 
are online narratives and conversations related to topics and collective actions associated 
with Muslim women but also network linkages. In regard to the selection of content, I 
relied on Google authority to determine the most popular online narratives and 
conversations available in English. To interpret the content, I iteratively coded the data 
several times. I coded each dataset twice to include themes that became apparent toward 
the end of the first round of coding and then I recoded each set after I had finished coding 
all of them. In drawing conclusions, I discuss qualitative themes that I encountered in the 
datasets and provide evidence in textual forms. It is not uncommon in articles for 
researchers, myself included, to simply state that they conducted a qualitative content 
analysis; the prescription of Parker et al. (2011) is therefore useful perhaps. 
 This section provided a brief discussion of content analysis and some critiques of 
the method. In the next several subsections, I will expand upon the factors that Parker et 
al. (2011) suggest should be disclosed in relation to qualitative content analyses in more 
detail, starting with my objectives for undertaking this research project. 
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 Feminist, Antiracist, Anti-Imperialist Research 
 In examining topics of import to and the collective actions of Muslim women 
through their online discussions, researchers could avoid the pitfalls of stereotyping and 
othering by putting the dialogues and collectives of Muslim women living in various 
contexts into conversation. For example, Muslim women from several countries around 
the world participated in dialogue about the artificial hymen so, while it is important to 
understand the context from which they are writing, context does not need to be the 
principal focus of the analysis—the topic is central. Notwithstanding the comments of 
some Westerners, the artificial hymen data implies that the importance of female 
virginity is not limited to the Arab world. It is universal. My research emphasizes that 
Muslimness assumes various shades in conjunction with context and personal adoption of 
beliefs, which is a dynamic that might be missed in regionally and nationally bound 
analyses and those limited to the content analyses of the websites of influential Islamic 
scholars. This variety creates both endogenously and exogenously rendered ruptures in 
Muslim communities, based on the perceived authenticity of the Islamic beliefs 
articulated by the different members who make up these subgroupings as well as the 
various observance of Islamic practices among Muslims. These typologies are neither 
necessarily intentional nor are they always self-ascribed—many Muslims prefer just to be 
Muslims—but the diversity of Islamic practices leads people inside and outside of 
Muslim communities to compartmentalize Muslims with various labels based on their 
observable practices. For instance, Muslim women who disagree with polygyny, who in 
this case were based in Bahrain and the United Kingdom, may be labeled as “liberal 
Muslims,” (see Chapter 4), which challenges the proposition that “liberal” Islam is 
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housed in the West because some women from the Gulf region discredited the legitimacy 
of polygyny as well.  
 Part of the thrust of this research is the disrupt boundaries between the East and 
the West; therefore, concentrating on one identity, “Muslim women”—despite the 
significant variations in cultures, practices, and beliefs—and topics of interest and forms 
of collective action allowed me to analyze parallels in the experiences of Muslim women 
regardless of context. For example, Muslim women in the West are often bullied in 
public spaces for marking themselves as Muslims, while women in the Arab world are 
bullied to reinforce male dominance over the public sphere and the women are often 
blamed for the harassment for not complying with “traditional” social norms related to 
dress. In both cases, women are subjected to harassment for non-conformity with the 
dominant culture. Their responses to the bullying, however, may be quite distinct (see 
Chapter 4 and 6). In an effort to advance feminist, antiracist, and anti-imperialist 
(Mohanty, 2003) research, I focus on topics and collective actions rather than contexts, 
being that the focus on contexts sometimes reinforces the East/West binary. Furthermore, 
in an attempt to frustrate regionally bound stereotypes of women, I employ qualitative 
content analyses toward privileging the voices of Muslim women, which is consistent 
with standpoint epistemologies (Harding, 2002).  
 This subsection has briefly outlined some of my biases as a researcher. The next 
subsection will frame the units of analysis of my qualitative content analyses that are 
distinct from the units of analysis of the overall connective content analysis—the ten 
datasets. 
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 Unit of Analysis  
 The units of analysis were the content of links based on keyword search results on 
Google, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. For topical and collective action networks, I 
began with search queries on Google to determine the most linked to webpages. I used 
Google because it is the most popular search engine (Earl, 2006; Garrett, 2005; Hindman 
et al., 2003) and it tends to favor social media links (Kirchhoff et al., 2007), which are of 
principal importance to this research. However, since the Google algorithm relies on 
word tagging among other factors, some of the results were links to conventional and 
online news sites (Su et al., 2010). I looked at the top 100 results on Google which is 
inline with other studies that used as little as ten results to devise thematic codes for the 
topical content analysis of websites (Carpenter & Jose, 2012) or as many as 1,000 to 
analyze websites related to online collective action tactics (Earl, 2006). I also included 
links up to the third degree from the original search results, similar to Hindman et al. 
(2003). In extracting data from the internet, I noted the date of the data collection because 
ranking algorithms result in the constantly changing authority of the associated links. I 
stored the data from these searches offline to preserve the initial ranking. I also executed 
the same topical keyword searches on Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, which I will 
discuss more in the next subsection. 
 Selection of Content  
 I collected data for the top 100 Google results as well as links within those results 
up to the third degree. I did not discriminate between the links based on the keyword 
searches results but I favored the content written by Muslim women and the data from 
social media platforms in my write-up of the research. I will discuss timelines for the data 
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collections in “Datasets” section. I wanted to reproduce the everyday surfing experience 
of someone who was searching for these topics online, for which Huberman et al. (1998) 
created a formal model (also see Hindman et al., 2003).   
 I performed keyword searches on Google as well as the aforementioned social 
media platforms. The keyword searches were relatively straightforward in relation to the 
collective actions (“HarassMap,” “Pink Hijab Day,” “NiqaBitch,” “SlutWalk Morocco,” 
and so forth) and some of the topics (“Muslim lesbians,” “hijab discrimination,” and 
“artificial hymen”), but it was a more convoluted endeavor for the social phenomenon 
that I attempted to conceptualize, techno-ikhtilat. The “Muslim spinster” keyword search 
was also more complicated because, although I was interested in collecting data on the 
collective action related to destigmatizing spinsterhood in Egypt (the campaign that was 
initially linked to in the artificial hymen data), the keyword search tended to focus on 
links related to the Muslim spinsterhood in the West. In the case of the hijabi fashion 
network, I used the top Google results and links on the resulting blogs but I only included 
the blogs that had at least 100 followers to establish a baseline of authority. Although the 
hijabi fashion dataset is an outlier because it is related to a homogeneous network, I 
included it in the dissertation to illustrate the differences between Muslim-oriented 
networks and transnational networks related to religious practices, collective actions, and 
topics of import.  
 Analyzing Content 
 I coded each dataset at least three times. I initially coded each dataset twice to 
code for themes that presented themselves toward the midpoint of the dataset. After I had 
double-coded each dataset, I recoded each one to include the network overlaps between 
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the datasets, including themes, social media users, topics, and content. I have included the 
codebook for HarassMap (see Appendix A) to provide an example of the themes that I 
inductively developed in the data analysis. I coded passages for multiple themes, as the 
excerpts below demonstrate:  
women in Egypt have been harassed (verbally and physically) since they were little girls in school 
uniforms. i have been harassed when i was 11, been harassed by police officers and harassed 
wearing jeans & wearing a 3abaya in Ramadan alike, often when i am with my own mother who is 
a lady that in theory should be respected at least for her age. the problem is that it is sadly accepted 
as the norm.10 (alex girl) [t: norm, t: kid t: police, t: intervention t: myth t: sacred t: Ramadan t: 
age] 
 
What is really sickening is when these people use religion to back up their arguments, using the 
part of it which orders people to dress modestly and completely ignoring the one which preaches 
looking away from others whatever their type of dress may be. This, of course, is a hideous double 
standard that a significant percentage of our culture portrays today, and that forces young women 
to dress a certain way not because of their faith, but in order to guarantee their security (which 
even then isn't 100% guaranteed), completely undermining the essence of religion.11 [t: religion, t: 
veil t: myth t: victim-blame t: self-control t: gaze t: modesty t: double standards t: intervention] 
 
I applied many of the same themes in the HarassMap dataset to the SlutWalk Morocco 
dataset, although these collective actions are strongly linked in purpose and somewhat in 
context. Some of the themes, such as “double standards,” which I coded for in the quote 
above, and many others were laced throughout many of the datasets: for example, the 
issue of double standards was also prevalent in the datasets associated with artificial 
hymen and techno-ikhtilat (see Chapter 4). I conceptualize these themes, the ones that I 
encounter in many of the datasets, as “pervasive themes.” For instance, all the datasets 
included the “pervasive theme” of “silence”; that is, Muslim women are not expected to 
stand up for themselves and/or they are subjected to forced 
silences/confinements/disappearances, which I will discuss further in Chapter 3. All of 
the datasets tied the piety of Muslim women to their various religious practices: for 
                                                      
10 http://diaryofadeskgirl.wordpress.com/2011/06/20/im-an-egyptian-woman-and-i-like-being-sexually-
harrassed/ 
11 http://namelessbabble.blogspot.com/2011/06/sexual-harassment-in-egypt.html 
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example, veiling, which I will discuss in Chapter 5, and chastity and motherhood, which I 
will broach in Chapter 4. I also encountered “parallel themes,” such as the “myths” 
related to sexual harassment (for example, women who dress appropriately will not be 
subjected to sexually harassment) and “myths” or stereotypes related to spinsters (for 
example, if a beautiful, independent woman is not married by time she is 25, she must 
have loose morals). Another parallel theme is online and offline bullying: offline, through 
harassment on the streets, such as the sexual harassment of women (Chapter 4) and 
verbal and physical violence against hijabis (Chapter 5 and 6); and online, through 
trolling social media sites related to LGBTQ Muslims (Chapter 5), for example, and the 
social policing of the online behaviors of Muslim women (Chapter 4). In devising the 
chapters, I attempted to organize them based on pervasive themes and in putting the 
various datasets into conversation I drew upon parallel themes, although the influences of 
networks also informed the write-up of the data.     
 Drawing Conclusions 
 I offer as much textual proof as possible to substantiate the conclusions I make in 
the chapters that follow but, as mentioned above, I realize texts are polysemic so other 
people could draw different conclusions with these same texts. I flesh out my conclusions 
through pervasive and parallel themes, described in the previous subsection, as well as 
through network underpinnings. The conclusions are principally data-driven but I ground 
them in literature whenever possible. I also base my conclusions, particularly the 
disruption of the East-West dichotomy, on network linkages between social media users, 
content, topics, and collective actions, but there is not enough space here to 
systematically outline all of the network overlaps. I do point out the overlaps when it is 
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particularly relevant to the discussions in the subsequent chapters and I will also provide 
a brief discussion of them in the next section.  
 This section has discussed some important elements of content analysis, which I 
have outlined to demonstrate how I have dealt with each one. The next section will 
outline the connective content analysis methodology.    
Connective Content Analysis 
 Although I consider myself an online ethnographer, my methodology for this 
research were somewhat distinct from what I have done in the past (see Robinson and 
Parmentier, forthcoming). What started as the first of a multiple-methods research design, 
which would have included in-depth interviews and participant observation, was stalled 
in the first stage, qualitative content analysis, when I got lost in overlapping networks. I 
began collecting data for mini-projects related to online collective actions of and topics of 
interest to Muslim women, which were online/offline media events that I discovered 
through the blog postings of transnational networks of Muslim women. During my 
preliminary analyses of the datasets, I found significant consistencies in the qualitative 
themes and overlaps in the datasets that presented richer narratives when I put them into 
conversation with each other. By overlaps, I am referring to similar discussions and 
topics in multiple datasets and contributions by many of the same social media users.  
 While the data were initially collected to elucidate various disparate phenomena, 
they were qualitatively coded with consistent themes, which I used to flesh out the 
pervasive and parallel themes that demonstrated some analogous experiences and 
concerns among Muslim women regardless of context. Due the overlaps of users, topics, 
and content, I began to think of the overall project as a “connective content analysis” 
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because, while I extracted data as separate datasets, part of my third round of coding 
involved network linkages, including social media users and content that I found in 
multiple datasets. Although I initially intended to move to the next method of the larger 
online ethnography project, I stopped collecting data at this point to reflect on the 
thousands pages of text that I had already gathered and coded, which is what I have 
analyzed in the chapters to follow. The other two methods, participant observation and 
in-depth interviews, will be employed in future works to triangulate the findings of this 
connective content analysis. 
 To situate how I iteratively discovered the topics and collective actions included 
in this research, I should start at the beginning of my data collection. In 2009, I created a 
seed list of bloggers for a NSF grant proposal that included 150 female, Muslim bloggers 
from 17 different countries who blogged in English. During this time, I discovered hijabi 
fashion blogging through Malaysian networks, although many of the blogs were in Malay 
so I decided to conduct research on this movement in the United States. In the data 
associated with hijabi fashion blogging, I found discussions about hijab discrimination, 
Pink Hijab Day, and NiqaBitch as well as a reference to Muslim lesbianism. Similarly, I 
discovered discussions about the artificial hymen from one of the seed list bloggers, 
Zeinobia, blogging at Egyptian Chronicles; one of the links in this dataset was related 
spinsterhood and another broached sexual harassment in Egypt through which I 
discovered HarassMap. Through HarassMap, I discovered discussions about Muslim 
lesbians. Furthermore, some of the overlapping content of the artificial hymen and hijab 
discrimination datasets, led to the conceptualization of techno-ikhtilat, or online gender 
mixing, which is sometimes considered appropriate in contexts in which gender 
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segregation is enforced socially and/or legally offline. SlutWalk Morocco, although it 
often shares content from the HarassMap Facebook page, is the only collective action 
that did not link to at least one other datasets.   
 In the various datasets, I encountered many bloggers that I identified for the NSF 
proposal seed list; thus many of these women appear to be active participants in various 
online networks, including social media and/or online news outlets, and concerned with 
both local and global issues affecting women. These are some of the same bloggers 
whom I originally identified as “bridge bloggers” but I shifted away from focusing on 
this type of analysis because it would have mainly focused on topics and conversations 
targeted at non-Arabs and/or non-Muslims, when discussions about Muslimness and the 
concerns of Muslim women appeared richer and more intriguing. “Bridge blogging” 
typically entails reaching out to dissimilar people (Zuckerman, 2008) but there are 
enough differences within the folds of those who consider themselves to be Muslims. I 
also originally assumed, due to my extensive research on the Moroccan blogosphere, that 
bloggers from the Arab region who choose to blog in English were likely reaching out to 
others outside of the region, although more recent literature has suggested that English is 
one of the preferred languages of Muslim bloggers in the Arab world and the West (Bunt, 
2009a; 2009b; Etling et al., 2009), especially among women (Dubai School of 
Government, 2011). Analyzing vernacular cosmopolitan praxis in transnational networks 
erects more conversational bridges and presents more opportunities to understand the 
concerns of Muslim women than conversations between the rhetorical “West” and “East,” 
which often dissolve into Islamophobic trolling and defensive Muslim postures. Thus 
these transnational networks in conjunction with topics of interest to Muslim women and 
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their collective actions facilitate dialogue between Muslims and between Muslims and 
non-Muslims while offering opportunities to identify cosmopolitan praxis rather than 
trolling and hate speech. Focusing on the topics that Muslim women discuss and their 
collective actions fosters understanding of their concerns and how they frame issues 
related to women’s rights through their lived experiences. 
 This section has discussed connective content analysis, which is equally 
concerned with content and bridging mechanisms between various network clusters 
because these overlaps create interesting spaces to explore the data from various 
viewpoints that would not be apparent in disparate content analyses. The next section will 
discuss ethical considerations in conducting online research.  
Ethical Considerations	  
 In regard to ethic issues related to conducting online research, including 
confidentiality, informed consent, and the public/private nature of online content, I have 
treated the textual material that I gleaned from the internet as public information, 
although there is not universal agreement on whether or not digital materials should be 
approached in this manner. One perspective on the issues of privacy and informed 
consent in relation to internet research is that all information on the internet is public 
because the technology is public by its very nature (Pittenger, 2003). This perspective, 
however, ignores the possibility that certain forums are open to all people but, within 
some of these spaces, there is an implicit understanding that the privacy and anonymity 
of interlocutors will be respected: for example, dependency and abuse survivor support 
groups. I treat this textual material as public because there does not appear to be any 
assumption that social media and online news content are private arenas; in other words, 
 73	  
there is no “perceived privacy” (King 1996 as cited in Berry, 2004, p. 326) associated 
with the content. I do consider discussions over private listservs, password-protected 
blogs, and personal emails (which divulge identities) as private materials that would 
require informed consent to include in publications.  
 I have included internet dialogue that is accessible to the public because seeking 
informed consent, especially from the commenters, considering their already anonymized 
identities, would have been unrealistic. Furthermore, I have denoted the identities of 
interlocutors as they are posted on social media platforms in an effort to respect the level 
of anonymity that users have established online. Although I have explained the perceived 
publicness of the content I have used in this analysis, the problematic of “harvesting” 
remains. Harvesting is defined as extracting data from the web for uses other than for 
which it was intended (Bakardjieva & Feenberg, 2001 as cited in Berry, 2004, p. 327). 
One of the purposes of interaction in social media is to create dialogue among dissimilar 
people and to share narratives about one’s lived experiences, therefore, I believe that the 
benefits of using these public text to challenge widely held beliefs outweigh the risk of 
harvesting materials that were not perhaps posted on social media to be used in research.  
 I have discussed why I think using public content from online spaces is acceptable 
despite conflicting perspectives on the subject. I now turn to how I collected data for each 
dataset as well as major events associated with the topics and collective actions that 
contributed to the social media events.    
Datasets	  
 The following subsections to will discuss the principal online events associated 
with each dataset and any particularities related to the data collection.  
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 Global Hijabi Fashion Network 
 I collected this data in August of 2011. Hijabi fashion blogging is a transnational 
network comprised of bloggers who design modest outfits that comply with their 
understandings of the Islamic dress code. They come together to share fashion tips and 
designs and, in the American context, to iteratively configure the personal and collective 
identity of American hijabis and to engage in community building, including positioning 
themselves as role models for the next generation of Muslim women. In some ways, the 
bloggers function as an online community (for example, one hijabi organizes a bi-annual 
“Hijab Fashion Week”) but, in other ways, their postings suggest that they are part of an 
activist network because many of their postings and comments highlight the solidarity of 
hijabis amidst the failures of multiculturalism. They discuss discrimination they have 
faced and they link to cases in the conventional media of discrimination against Muslims 
worldwide to simultaneously configure a community of support and a network of 
activism. During the timeframe for which I collected data, there were also several 
discussions related to conventional media coverage of the hijabi fashion movement and 
“sharia-related industries” and consumerism, which is a $96 billion market worldwide12 
(see Gökariskel & McLarney, 2010).  
 Mariam Sobh, the creator of HijabTrendz, claims that hers was the first American 
hijabi fashion blog, which she founded in 2007. There are relatively few in the American 
blogosphere but they contribute to the global network, which is most pervasive in 
Indonesia and Malaysia. I initially found the blogs that I included through a Google 
search of “hijabi fashion blog” and “United States” or “American.” I then followed links 
                                                      
12 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/04/uk-islamic-fashion-idUKLNE71305V20110204 
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on the blog rolls of the initial bloggers that I discovered through the Google search and 
links to their “followers” to the third degree. I included the blogs postings from American 
hijabi fashion bloggers that had at least 100 followers and/or evidence of regular 
readership through commentary from July of 2009 to August of 2011.  
 Hijab Discrimination   
 I collected data for the hijab discrimination in January of 2012. At the time, there 
were several references to the growing number of reported cases of discrimination against 
Muslims in the United States in general, and against hijabis in particular, much higher 
than the number reported in the years following 9/11. I was attempting to discover if 
there was any evidence of organized Muslim boycotts of corporations that were linked to 
discriminatory practices against hijabis but I was unable to find any. This was just after 
the debacle of Lowe’s pulling its advertisements from the “All-American Muslim” 
television show, in which case there was evidence of organized boycotts of the 
corporation by American Muslims. The time period of the data collection followed the 
French niqab ban coming into effect so there were several references to this legislation. 
There were also articles related to Islamophobia among and the discriminatory practices 
of government agencies, courts, law enforcement, and educational administrators.   
 Aside from the initial Google search of “hijab discrimination,” I collected data 
from the aforementioned social media platforms using the same search term. My analysis 
of the data focused on the American context because the NiqaBitch dataset covered the 
topic in the other major hot spot of discrimination against veiled Muslim women: France. 
I found the discussion about El-Sherbini (see Chapter 3) on a Facebook page related to 
this query as well as discussions about discrimination against hijabis in North Africa, 
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which are consistent with discussions related to hijab discrimination in this region that I 
encountered on the hijabi fashion blogs. I analyzed dozens of related videos on YouTube. 
Since I relied on Google ranking, I did not set a specific time period for the relevant 
content that I included as I did for the data collection related to the hijabi fashion blogs.  
 Much of the data that I collected was related to the two highly publicized cases of 
hijab discrimination related to Boudlal’s complaint against Disney and Khan’s against 
Abercrombie and Fitch (Hollister and Co.), which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
I examined half of the 981 and 890 comments on the Los Angeles Times and Huffington 
Post, respectively, to ascertain politically center-right and center-left American 
perspectives on the “Boudlal v. Disney” and “Khan v. A&F” discrimination cases. I 
randomly selected comment pages. 
 Pink Hijab Day 
 Pink Hijab Day (PHD), an initiative that was created by a high school student 
from Missouri and became a national event in 2007 when it sought organizational support 
from the Susan G. Koman Foundation, was launched globally in 2008 with the objective 
of  “shattering stereotypes” and spreading breast cancer awareness. PHD became an 
annual event observed on the last Wednesday in October in which participants wear a 
pink hijab to demonstrate their support for the campaign. It was rumored to have spread 
to ten different countries, including four in the MENA region. In 2011, the movement 
changed its purpose along with its website from “shattering stereotypes” to promoting 
dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims about the hijab. According to the new 
website, the movement sustained a following in a few countries in 2011, South Africa, 
Bulgaria, and Canada, but there was no mention of events in the MENA region. 
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 I collected the data for this online/offline social movement in March of 2012. 
Much of the data in social media were narratives of people who participated in a PHD 
event and parallel initiatives, such as “Wear Hijab for a Day” events organized by 
Muslim Student Associations across the United States.  The data collection for PHD in 
Arab countries was a bit complicated because I found little evidence to support the 
proposition that the campaign had travelled to this region. I collected as much data as I 
could from online sources and the campaigns that were linked to PHD in social media 
and on the old PHD website before I contacted a representative of the American PHD 
movement to find out why the organizations in Arab countries had discontinued their 
participation. Although she did not mention any specific organizations with the exception 
of TPQ (Think Pink Qatar), the representative told me in our email exchange that some of 
the organizations that were listed on the old PHD website were not partners of the 
movement but ones that the campaign had identified to encourage people to donate to 
local breast cancer foundations.  
 However, affiliates of the American PHD campaign were interviewed in a piece 
that ran in the Missourian in 2009 that claimed that Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
UAE were participating and there was not any clarification that I could find to suggest 
the American PHD campaign had attempted to thwart rumors that Arab breast cancer 
organizations were participating, here,13 for example, which was written in 2010 and 
included Morocco as one of the participating countries, and, here (2009),14 which 
included Lebanon, as well as here15 and here,16 which claimed that the UAE was still 
                                                      
13 http://www.chezchiara.com/2010/10/october-27-2010-global-pink-hijab-day.html 
14 http://www.examiner.com/muslim-in-baltimore/global-pink-hijab-day-october-28th-not-just-for-muslims  
15 http://www.ameinfo.com/247763.html 
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participating as of 2011. I had been strung along by the odd mention of PHD in online 
news articles related to the event in the UAE,17 but I realized that I had based this micro-
project on misinformation and rumor. Other researchers were similarly confused by 
online information about the PHD campaign, including Sobani et al. (2011) who claimed 
that the initiative was a success in Middle Eastern countries. Although Qatar sponsors a 
similar event and Egypt participated in 2008, the organizations in the UAE and the KSA 
have never participated. I had sent emails to the Arab breast cancer organizations to find 
out more information about their mediation of PHD before contacting the American 
representative. After hearing back from the American campaign representative it made 
sense why the Breast Cancer Foundation of Egypt (BCFE) representative had asked for 
links suggesting that it was still participating in PHD in 2009 and why the Emirati Simply 
Check representative explained to me that the movement started in Missouri and its 
purpose was to counter stereotypes. Since I had already gathered data on breast cancer 
organizations in the MENA region, I decided to analyze how they promoted breast cancer 
awareness locally and why PHD had not gained a significant following in the region. 
Following the initial Google search of “Pink Hijab Day,” I examined the top 100 
Google results related to “Pink Hijab Day” in each of the Arab countries and to PHD and 
each of the Arab breast cancer organizations. To understand local breast cancer 
awareness in the Arab world, I examined the Arab breast cancer websites that were 
linked to the old PHD website including the following: Breast Cancer Foundation of 
                                                                                                                                                                 
16http://www.khaleejtimes.com/Displayarticle09.asp?section=todaysfeatures&xfile=data/todaysfeatures/20
11/October/todaysfeatures_October51.xml 
17 http://beduoinprincess.blogspot.com/2008/10/pink-hijab-day-report.html  
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/Displayarticle09.asp?section=todaysfeatures&xfile=data/todaysfeatures/2011
/October/todaysfeatures_October51.xml  
http://www.ameinfo.com/247763.html 
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Egypt (BCFE), Think Pink Qatar (TPQ), and the Zahra Breast Cancer Association of the 
KSA.18 Since both PHD and Simply Check were linked to the Susan G. Komen 
Foundation and the Global Initiative (SGKGI), I examined Simply Check for the UAE. I 
also contacted representatives from the organizations through email, requesting 
information about their involvement in PHD and other breast cancer initiatives. I 
collected relevant materials from YouTube and Facebook as well based on the same 
keyword searches.  
 Artificial Hymen 
 Discussions about the artificial hymen in social media were principally related to 
the demands advanced by Egyptian religious and governmental authorities to ban the 
product. The controversy came to a head in August of 2009, when Radio Netherlands 
translated an advertisement for the artificial hymen from Chinese to Arabic and aired it in 
Egypt, which spread false information about the widespread use of the artificial hymen in 
the Arab world and implied that the product was primarily designed for and marketed to 
Arab women while it had actually been available in Asia since 1993. The Egyptian 
correspondent for Radio Netherlands, Amira Al Tahawi, was fired when she published a 
blog posting related to the misinformation disseminated by the radio station. Al Tahawi 
had earlier tried to convince Radio Netherlands to retract the claims made in the 
advertisement but her superiors ignored her requests.19 Egyptian governmental and 
religious authorities began calling for the ban of the product in October of 2009, which 
one male blogger,20 Mohammed Al Rahhal, says backfired by creating a buzz in Egyptian 
                                                      
18 http://welovehijab.com/2009/10/07/global-pink-hijab-day/ 
19 http://globalvoicesonline.org/2010/02/12/egypt-blogger-loses-job-for-uncovering-fake-virginity-story/ 
20 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/oct/28/artificial-hymen  
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conventional and social media about the artificial hymen. Al Rahhal added to the 
controversy by purchasing the item through the internet and posting pictures of it online. 
Social media in the West picked up the controversy, not related to the fake hymen itself, 
but to the attempts to ban it in Egypt. Many of the links and comments in Western social 
media tended to reinforce the prejudices articulated by Radio Netherlands; that is, the 
product was mainly invented to save Muslim/Arab women from honor killings. Some 
Muslim women expressed their distain, not only because lawmakers were considering 
banning the artificial hymen to protect women from themselves (see Chapter 4), but also 
because Westerners were suggesting that the invention was mainly created for them, 
despite the odd suggestion in Western social media networks that the product is 
principally marketed in the West as a sex toy. One reporter tried out the “Joan of Arc” 
version of the artificial hymen and described the copious amounts of “cherry Kool-aid” 
that it produced could not be considered a realistic rendition of a woman’s deflowering,21 
which supports the rare assertions that it is intended as a sex toy. However, some brands, 
like the one that contributed to the Egyptian controversy,22 do market the product as a 
realistic prop to use to “marry with confidence”23 while guarding one’s “dark secret.”24  
 I collected data on the artificial hymen in September of 2012 from the top 100 
search results on Google and the comments and links associated with these results. Some 
of the related content discussed in the links included the following: hymen reconstruction, 
or hymenoplasty; virgin prostitutes; anatomical issues related to the failure of the hymen 
to rupture; the universal obsession with virginity, which is not limited to the Arab world; 
                                                      
21 http://nymag.com/thecut/2012/09/sex-with-a-fake-hymen.html   
22 http://www.afrik-news.com/article16896.html 
23 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/18/artificial-hymens-kits-restore-virginity_n_1894372.html  
24 http://www.groundreport.com/World/Will-Egypt-import-Chinese-Hymens/2908960 
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alternative forms of sexual relations (anal and oral) that have become popular in certain 
contexts to preserve the hymen; discussions related to various conceptualizations of 
virginity, typically rendered as the presence/absence of the hymen or to penal-vaginal 
penetration; and the dangers associated with using the artificial hymen.       
 HarassMap 
 In late 2009, Rebecca Chiao and Engy Ghozlan first came up with the idea for 
HarassMap, an initiative to crowdsource information about the incidence of sexual 
harassment on the streets of Cairo. They did not launch the initiative until December 
2010 because it took a year to develop the technology, a Ushahidi platform matched with 
Frontline SMS reporting capabilities. The launch of the campaign coincided with the 
release of the film “678,”25 which highlights the daily harassment of women in Egypt. 
The point of the initiative was to not only gather information about harassment but also to 
use this information to organize volunteers in “hotspots” located on the map to spread 
community awareness about the problem toward “ending the social acceptability” of it. 
The campaign has had more success with the more than 500 community volunteers than 
it has with the map26; reporting of sexual harassment on the map has been limited, 
considering that many Egyptian bloggers frame harassment as a daily occurrence.27 
HarassMap has co-sponsored successful online events, such as the “End Sexual 
Harassment” campaign, which encouraged social media users to write about sexual 
harassment on June 20, 2011. Over 150 people from four different countries participated 
in the online initiative. I did not include this online campaign as a separate dataset 
                                                      
25 http://harassmap.org/en/who-we-are/how-and-why-we-began/  
26 http://www.youthaward.org/winners/harassmap 
27 As of March 2014, there were nearly 1,100 incidents reported on the map. 
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because HarassMap posted the associated links on its blog but many of the personal 
narratives connected to HarassMap overlap with this online campaign. Organizations in 
28 different countries have requested advice from HarassMap on how to implement their 
own version of the technology, including Libya, Turkey, South Africa, US, Canada, Iran, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, Cambodia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Kenya, 
Sudan, UK, and activists in several other countries, like Palestine, Lebanon, Yemen, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Syria, India, and Algeria, have already launched HarassMap-
modeled platforms, demonstrating the universality of the issue and the innovativeness of 
the campaign and technology.28  
 Egypt has seen a surge in the incidence of harassment in the last several decades. 
HarassMap representatives and social media interlocutors have claimed that women in 
general dressed less modestly in the 1960s and the 1970s but harassment was less 
common because there were social mechanisms in place to protect women on the streets. 
For example, Chiao states that Egyptians will still joke that a man with a shaved head 
must have been harassing a woman because it is rumored that in earlier decades local 
men would shave the heads of harassers.29 Notwithstanding Suzanne Mubarak’s,30 a self-
proclaimed spokesperson for women’s rights under the Mubarak regime,31 denial of the 
issue, sexual harassment has been covered in conventional media since the mid-2000s. A 
few media events were particularly important in drawing attention to the epidemic 
incidence of harassment in Egypt: during the Eid festivities of 2006, groups of men in 
                                                      
28 http://harassmap.org/en/what-we-do/around-the-world/  
29 http://blog.harassmap.org/2010/10/making-harassment-unacceptable/ 
30 http://www.fastcompany.com/1698251/harassmap-asks-egyptian-women-plot-points-sexist-behavior-sms  
http://egyptianchronicles.blogspot.com/2011/05/lara-logan-speaks-out-will-egyptian.html 
31 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/25/harass-map-aims-to-curb-l_n_773488.html 
 83	  
downtown Cairo would gang harass any woman they saw on the streets, forcing women 
to stay in their homes to protect themselves.32 Gang harassment has since become an 
expected feature of the celebration33 but, in 2006, many of the incidents were videoed and 
uploaded to YouTube precluding any attempts by officials to deny the gendered violence 
in the streets; and, in 2008, Noha Rushdie (also referred to as Noha al-Ostaz) dragged the 
man who had groped her from his car into the police station, demanding that he be 
charged with harassment, which turned her into a national heroine.34 Her story was 
reenacted in the award-winning film, “678,”35 mentioned above.          
 I collected data on HarassMap in October of 2012. Many Egyptian female social 
media users were discouraged that the détente on street harassment that occurred during 
the revolution ended shortly thereafter. On International Women Day, March 8, 2011, 
crowds of men attacked a group of female protesters. Furthermore, military abuses in 
December 2011 and January 2012, such as virginity tests and the incarceration and 
torture of Mona Eltahawy, were highlighted in the data. In addition to the top 100 Google 
search results, I collected data from the HarassMap blog, including the social media 
postings of people involved in the online “End Sexual Harassment” campaign that were 
also posted on Twitter. Since the HarassMap Facebook page is primarily updated in 
Arabic and the Twitter page is mainly written in English, I gathered tweets and the links 
from tweets for a period of six months between June 2011 and January 2012. I also 
                                                      
32 http://bikyamasr.com/49628/timeline-of-sexual-attacks-in-egypt-and-action-to-combat/ 
http://bikyamasr.com/21372/egypt-reports-massive-sexual-harassment-during-holiday/ 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/25/harass-map-aims-to-curb-l_n_773488.html 
http://www.npr.org/2011/02/17/133845499/women-hope-harassment-will-end-in-new-egypt 
33 http://sarah-lessons.blogspot.com/2011/06/sick-society.html 
34 http://egyptianchronicles.blogspot.com/2011/05/lara-logan-speaks-out-will-egyptian.html 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/25/harass-map-aims-to-curb-l_n_773488.html 
35 http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1032/cu4.htm 
http://cmfilmcommentary.com/2013/10/04/mohamed-diab-sffs/  
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analyzed the film “678,” due to its strong connections with the HarassMap campaign, 
which featured fictionalized narratives of Egyptian women’s daily experiences with 
sexual harassment.  
 Techno-Ikhtilat 
 Since techno-ikhtilat is my own concept, it was somewhat difficult to configure 
search terms that spoke to the phenomenon I was attempting to elucidate, but some of the 
most appropriate ones that I used for the initial Google searches were “online gender 
mixing” and “gender segregation on the internet,” and “cyberveil” and “cyber-hijab” 
(Sevea, 2007), as the dynamic was coined elsewhere.36 The word ikhtilat is Arabic for 
appropriate gender mixing, for example, at a wedding, in contrast to khulwa, which 
denotes inappropriate gender mixing, such as an unmarried man and woman being alone 
together. I was not only interested in interrogating whether or not women were using the 
internet for the purpose of remaining invisible, because it appeared that they were, but 
also what they were doing in cyberspaces while they were physically invisible. The 
concept iteratively developed through my analysis of the hijab discrimination, artificial 
hymen, and HarassMap datasets. On the HarassMap Facebook page, for example, I found 
an interesting article about women using technology for social change in which one 
activist, Mallika Dutt, says,  
For women who have severe restrictions on their mobility, this allows them to step out into the 
world in a whole new way…We can’t underestimate the profound power and engagement that 
social media allows women who have historically had to really fight to be heard.37 
 
This gave me pause to consider how mobility restrictions, in order to ensure their safety, 
affect hijabis in the United States. Based on the comments made by some non-Muslim 
                                                      
36 http://www.islamicvoice.com/2001-05/women.htm 
37 http://www.more.com/social-media-activism 
 85	  
Americans who felt personally violated by the public display of this religious symbol, the 
hijab, and the propensity of hijabis to work from home, “backstage,” or among people 
who are less likely to find the hijab offensive (see Chapter 6), I began to wonder if some 
Muslim women were using the internet to interact with others or work or go to school, 
while remaining invisible in the physical public spheres in other contexts as well.  
 The artificial hymen data presented some ways that Muslim women were 
engaging in techno-ikhtilat but also in techno-khulwa. In an article by Mona Eltahawy, 
she discusses the sad existence of “Faiza X,” a Moroccan niqabi in France, who was 
denied citizenship because she “lives in “total submission” to the men in her 
family…leaving the house only to walk with her children or visit relatives.”38 However, 
what if Faiza X was obtaining her Masters degree online or working as a rape crisis 
counselor from her home? Would this change her perceived unworthiness to be French? I 
would argue that it probably would not but the internet now offers these opportunities to 
women who remain isolated from physical public spheres. Another piece by Marwa 
Rakha about her journey through an online dating site suggested that some Egyptian 
women are using social media to find romance, including certain varieties that might be 
difficult to encounter in the conventional dating scene, that is, among Egyptians who date. 
Some were willing to exchange “their services” for money or food. Others were looking 
for other lesbians and/or threesomes. Some were divorcées who were interested in having 
relationships but did not want to remarry.39 My curiosity with techno-ikhtilat was also 
reinforced by some Westerners who believed that, if a woman had to purchase a hymen 
over the internet to avoid the embarrassment or worse of not bleeding on her wedding 
                                                      
38 http://www.monaeltahawy.com/blog/?p=62 
39 http://marwarakha.newsvine.com/_news/2007/09/27/988123-back-from-the-adult-dating-world 
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night, she would not have computer access to begin with, ostensibly because Arabs 
continue to live in tents and ride camels.40  
  I collected data for techno-ikhtilat through Google searches in October of 2012 
based on the queries above. Some of the initial results were related to Muslims 
encouraging gender segregation online and guidelines for appropriate interaction between 
men and women online,41 which I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 4, and offline 
gender segregation.42 Similar to the links in the artificial hymen data, I found some 
articles about techno-ikhtilat (internet use for educational purposes, medical advice, to 
maintain connections with friends, to become acquainted with prospective husbands, to 
work from home,43 and “halal dating”44) and others about techno-khulwa 
(cyberstripping,45 swapping nude photographs,46 or engaging in “Sex in the City”-style 
dating47). Some of the articles and social media postings were related to activism against 
offline gender segregation, such as the “pray-in” movement in American mosques in 
which women have demanded the option of being integrated into the same prayer section 
as men,48 perhaps emphasizing the “gender segregation” component of the query without 
                                                      
40 http://www.popsci.com/scitech/article/2009-10/artificial-hymen-makes-women-virgins-again 
http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/08/29/saudi-arabia-independent-women/ 
41 http://www.ummah.com/forum/archive/index.php/t-54217.html 
http://sisters.islamway.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=336 
http://islamforsisters.wordpress.com/2011/01/09/the-communication-between-men-women-over-the-
internet/#more-104 
42 http://eshda3wa.blogspot.com/2008/02/anti-segregation-cool-vedio.html 
http://www.zdistrict.com/2008/08/07/more-kuwait-segregation/ 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/12/saudi-arabia-city-women-workers 
http://susiesbigadventure.blogspot.com/2011/10/extreme-gender-segregation.html 
http://www.chron.com/business/article/gender-segregation-s-reach-grows-in-saudi-arabia-1796193.php 
43 http://www.islamicvoice.com/2001-05/women.htm 
44 http://www.irfi.org/articles/articles_51_100/halal_dating.htm 
45 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FzKlAPbmd_w 
46 http://sisters.islamway.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=336 
47 http://www.irfi.org/articles/articles_51_100/halal_dating.htm 
48 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jehan-s-harney/can-mosque-pray-ins-chang_b_615313.html  
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the “internet” part. Yet even these unintended results suggest that gender segregation 
plays a role in the lives of Muslim women in various contexts to different extents. They 
also suggest that the different extents might inform gendered behavior online, which I 
will also discuss in Chapter 4. 
 NiqaBitch 
 NiqaBitch was a two-person online/offline protest involving two female French 
students and YouTube.49 The two women had an accomplice video them walking around 
the streets of Paris in mini-skirts, stilettos, and niqabs, which they posted on YouTube. 
The protest took place in October 2010 just after the government had passed the ban on 
the niqab, although niqabis (and their families) would not be subjected to fines and/or the 
mandatory citizenship classes until April of 2011. The French government argued that the 
ban was an effort to save women from being forced to wear what they framed as a 
symbol of subjugation but women who staged the NiqaBitch protest did not believe that 
the government should be able to determine what women wear in public, which they 
consider a “civic freedom.” Interestingly, a few commenters highlighted that it was not 
socially acceptable for women to wear slacks in France until the 1970s, a norm that was 
underwritten by an archaic law that is still on the books,50 thus it appears that France has 
a long history of deciding what is or is not appropriate for women to wear in public. 
Commenters expressed opposition to the protest both on “secular” and “religious” 
grounds. Secularists emphasized that NiqaBitch should celebrate the freedoms that 
women enjoy in secular France, including the freedom to engage in what they saw as a 
ridiculous protest, while some Muslim commenters believed that the protest was yet 
                                                      
49 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uw32TU7uAi4&feature=player_embedded 
50 http://www.rue89.com/2010/09/30/minishort-et-niqab-balade-provoc-dans-paris-avant-la-loi-168779 
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another slightly veiled attempt to tarnish the image of Islam through an indecent 
spectacle. Some of the Muslim commenters principally took issue with the “bitch” part of 
the name because they believed the protest was implying that niqabis are whores. 
Through my analysis of this dataset, I had intended to use it for a section or chapter on 
extremist secular viewpoints but I ran out of time and space, so I use this data sparingly 
to supplement other discussions (see Chapter 3, for example, and the introduction to 
Chapter 6). 
 I collected this data in September of 2012. The Google search results highlighted 
a few of the main links related to the protest: the YouTube video and articles that explain 
the protest in English and French in the Guardian and Rue89, from which I extracted 
comments. I also collected data for the protest on Twitter and Facebook but these pages 
did not attract as many comments as the aforementioned links. These three active internet 
sources, the YouTube video page and the Rue89 and Guardian articles, resulted in over 
400 pages of text, indicating that NiqaBitch was highly successful in generating dialogue 
and that small protests offline can become grandiose ones online due to the viral capacity 
of social media networks. Furthermore, since one social media user asked for permission 
to copy the NiqaBitch protest in Belgium and the NiqaBitch Facebook page linked to 
another NiqaBitch-style protest in the Netherland, the network-enhanced protest appears 
to have encouraged farther reaching effects than would typically be associated with a 
two-person campaign.   
 Muslim Spinster	  
 The idea that the emancipation of women has contributed both to the increase in 
sexual harassment and to the number of spinsters in Egypt was highlighted in a few 
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pieces in the HarassMap and artificial hymen datasets, which led me to collect data on 
this social phenomenon as well. Although the issues of spinsterhood and sexual 
harassment appear disconnected, I will discuss why they may be related in Chapter 4. In 
2008, Egyptian spinsters began speaking out through social media about their right not to 
be socially isolated due to their martial status. Global Voices Online showcased various 
links from where these anomalous women were speaking out.51 One woman’s, Youmna 
Mokhtar, Facebook group, “Spinster*/Old Maids for Change,” which was included in the 
Global Voices Online article, became a local and international media sensation in 2008, 
including AFP articles in both French and English and articles in the Los Angeles Times 
and Lepetitjournal.52 Muslimah Media Watch discussed the international coverage of 
Mokhtar’s group and offered another article on the “problem” of spinsterhood in the 
Gulf,53 which led me to expand my data collection beyond Egypt, although I discovered 
through links that spinsterhood is increasing throughout the Arab region and in Muslim 
communities in the West. Several of the links related to Egyptian spinsters, also 
highlighted a book that was published in 2008, “I Want to Get Married,” which was a 
compilation of blog postings by another Egyptian woman, Ghada Abdel Aal. The book 
was quite successful in Egypt and was subsequently translated into English and published 
by the University of Texas Press54 as well as by other publishers in other languages. 
Almost all of the articles related to the book discussed sexual harassment in Egypt, 
implying that there is some connection between the two issues but typically spinsterhood 
                                                      
51 http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/12/20/egyptian-spinsters/ 
52 http://muslimahmediawatch.org/2008/12/18/egyptian-spinsters-and-old-maids-sitting-happily-on-the-
shelf/  
53 http://www.patheos.com/blogs/mmw/2012/07/the-problem-of-spinsterhood-in-the-gulf/ 
54 http://utpress.utexas.edu/index.php/books/abdiwp  
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was highlighted as one of the causes of sexual harassment.55 None of the articles on 
spinsterhood, however, suggested that Mokhtar’s group might have been a reaction to the 
release of Abdel Aal’s book, a book that suggests that women in Egypt will do almost 
anything to get married. 
 Many of the links and commenters in the dataset were attempting to elucidate the 
issue by establishing whom to blame for spinsterhood and, after the finger pointing, 
offering solutions. For example, one female Jordanian blogger published a posting, a 
creative writing piece, in which the fictitious unmarried female narrator complains about 
being blamed for not getting married although she never found the right man.56 In 
response, a Jordanian male posted a rebuttal stating that he wanted to get married but his 
fiancée’s family was so greedy that he eventually withdrew his proposal.57 The male 
blogger’s response alludes to some of the dominant discourse related to the spinsterhood 
“crisis,” including the propositions that marriage is too expensive and that women and 
their families are demanding too much money from the prospective grooms. Several 
discussions were related to government-proposed solutions to the “crisis” and others were 
related to organic individual/community reactions58 to the current uncertainties related to 
marriage in Muslim communities, including the increase in divorce rates59 and the 
perceived lack of available men, all of which I will discuss in detail in Chapter 4.     
                                                      
55 The coverage of sexual harassment in Egypt also suggests that campaigns like HarassMap have been 
successful in mediating this issue within and between localized and transnational networks to the extent 
that the epidemic is highlighted in conjunction with many separate but related issues covered in 
transnational news media related to Egypt. 
56 http://thearabobserver.wordpress.com/2008/03/19/the-jordanian-spinster/ 
57 http://blog.sweetestmemories.com/default.asp?Display=1286 
58 Personal or localized community activism or resistance that is loosely connected to a larger network of 
activism will be discussed more in relation to PHD in Chapter 6. 
59 http://lauraofarabia1000.blogspot.com/2010/07/spinsters-in-saudi-arabia-epidemic.html 
‘Four million single women in Kingdom by 2015? 
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 I collected data for Muslim spinsters in February of 2013. Similar to the other 
datasets, I used Google to search for the query “Muslim spinster.” Many of the initial 
results were related to Muslim spinsterhood in Western countries, perhaps because I used 
the term “Muslim spinsters” and, at least in the case of Egypt, the online collective action 
related to spinsters was denoted by their nationality—Egyptian spinsters. Thus I also 
included the top 100 Google results for the queries “Egypt spinster” and “Arab spinster.” 
 Muslim Lesbians/LGBTQ Muslims  
 Although there were not any prominent events mentioned in this data collection, 
with the exception of the opening of a queer-friendly mosque in Paris by Ludovic-
Mohamed Zahed in December of 2012,60 there were some prominent figures associated 
with Muslim queerness. Irshad Manji was the most prominent figure in the dataset related 
to Muslim lesbians likely because she is one of the most well-known and controversial 
ones. Traditional Muslims often reference her as a “bad” sort of Muslim. Imam Daayiee 
Abdullah is also referenced quite often among traditional Muslims, perhaps because he is 
an imam who is outspokenly in favor of marriage equality. Scott Kugle, on the other hand, 
wrote and was mentioned in several pieces in the dataset but he is not often referenced as 
a “bad” Muslim in social media perhaps because he is not highly publicized in 
conventional media coverage. Kugle’s writings are typically consumed within academic 
circles and among people who are interested in Muslim queerness, while Manji’s, for 
example, are read and often celebrated by mainstream Americans and Western 
conventional media. 
                                                      
60 http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2012/12/frances-muslims 
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 Some of the conventional media coverage of Muslim lesbians highlighted radical 
changes in Muslim women’s lifestyle when they embraced their queerness perhaps to 
emphasize the idea that Muslimness and queerness are incompatible identities and 
Muslim lesbians must choose between one or the other (us/them?). Queer Muslims, like 
the American hijabi fashion bloggers, often employ cyberspaces to forge queer Muslim 
identities or supportive networks, while others seek advice on coming out or staying in 
the closet or some combination of both; for example, some queer Muslims used online 
spaces to “virtually come out” or to solicit “marriages of convenience” with queer 
Muslims of the opposite sex so they could practice homosexuality in the closet and 
remain acceptable members of their Muslim communities.  
 Several queer Muslim organizations, like Al-Fatiha, and queer-tolerant Muslim 
organizations, such as Muslims for Progressive Values, were highlighted in the data. 
Some members of these groups claimed that it was necessary to form groups specifically 
catering to Muslim queers because the larger LGBTQ communities in the United States, 
for example, often reject them for being religious and/or people of color. Traditional 
Muslims used the same stomping grounds to express their emphatic rejection of the idea 
of being both queer and Muslim. Since I did not use any geographic qualifiers in my 
search queries, most of the data are related to queer Muslims in the West, which is related 
to the issue of the search being executed on a topical issue within the “dominant 
transnational connective memory” (see the Introduction and Chapters 3), although there 
were several contributions from social media users in non-Western countries. Some non-
Western queer Muslim organization were mentioned in the data, like Helem in Lebanon, 
but some of the most vibrant contributions of non-Western queer Muslims came in the 
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form of films that showcased queerness in Muslim-majority countries. I viewed one of 
the most popular ones, “A Jihad for Love,” directed by Parvez Sharma.    
 In February of 2013, I collected the data based on the top 100 results on Google 
and associated links for the search queries “Muslim lesbian” and “LGBTQ Muslim.” 
These searches resulted in over 400 pages of text, demonstrating that this is an important 
topic for Muslims in the West and for the West in regard to Muslims.  
 SlutWalk Morocco/Woman Choufouch 
 Majdoline Lyazidi and Layla Belmahi created SlutWalk Morocco in August of 
2011 to express solidarity with the global SlutWalk movement and to address street 
harassment in Morocco. They see harassment and rape as universal issues that require 
global solidarity. SlutWalk Morocco is undeterred by accusations that the movement 
suffers from cultural colonialism as an offshoot of a movement that was initiated in the 
West, particularly because several aspects of the local campaign make it both uniquely 
Moroccan and global at once. Focusing on sexual harassment, as the most pressing 
concern of women in the Moroccan society, was the first attempt to contextualize the 
movement in Morocco and changing the name to Woman Choufouch was the second, 
although I use the campaign titles interchangeably throughout this dissertation. The case 
study in Chapter 6 will discuss the differences between the original SlutWalk movement 
in Toronto and how it was locally contextualized in Morocco in more detail as well as 
how it has both benefitted and suffered from its connections to Western SlutWalk 
campaigns.  
   Unlike the Toronto movement that solicits its support from left-leaning, young 
feminists in Canada and North America as well as elsewhere, SlutWalk Morocco has 
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attempted to remain highly inclusive of various perspectives toward having a greater 
overall impact on Moroccan social perceptions. While SlutWalk Toronto is creating 
awareness of various spaces and institutions in which women are more vulnerable to rape, 
SlutWalk Morocco is addressing an issue that is both visible and pervasive so it does not 
have to convince its Moroccan supporters that street harassment is a problem as they can 
witness it for themselves daily. As a result, SlutWalk Morocco highlights various social 
norms and misconceptions that contribute to the pervasiveness of street harassment, 
including the following: “flirting” in the street is natural and women like it; women who 
show more skin want the “attention”; the issue of sexual harassment is exaggerated; only 
“sluts” get harassed; harassing “sluts” will convince them to comply with social and 
religious norms; women who do not like it will speak up against it (even though those 
who do are often stigmatized); and giving women more rights and women’s rights 
movements in general will lead to social and familial disintegration. 
 The organizers of the SlutWalk Morocco campaign were speaking to the Morocco 
public in general until 16 year-old Amina Filali’s suicide in March 2012 urged them to 
direct their activism toward the government and legal reform. The courts, with the 
complicity of her family, forced Filali to marry the man who raped her, which was 
consistent with Article 475 of the Moroccan penal code that allows rapists to escape 
punishment if they agree to marry the minors whom they rape. Over the next ten months, 
SlutWalk Morocco organized sit-ins, spread awareness about other court cases in which 
officials were attempting to invoke Article 475, and solicited its supporters to donate 
funds toward the production of a few films that highlighted the injustice of this law. The 
efforts of SlutWalk Morocco and other Moroccan human and women’s rights groups 
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were successful; in January of 2013, the Moroccan government agreed to reform the law. 
While the campaign against Article 475 appears to be focusing on a local issue, SlutWalk 
Morocco posted content about similar laws in Jordan and Lebanon and, upon further 
scrutiny, I learned the law is relevant to women’s right in nearly 30 countries throughout 
the world.61 Due to the campaign’s popularity, it has been recognized internationally, 
illustrated by Belmahi’s invitation to speak about women’s rights in Morocco at the 
Amnesty International Human Rights Festival in San Diego, California in 2013. 
 I collected data for SlutWalk Morocco in December of 2013. It was the only 
collective action that was not connected to the overlapping networks of the other datasets, 
though it did reference HarassMap fairly often. I discovered the SlutWalk Morocco 
movement while I was collecting data on the global SlutWalk movement for the 
aforementioned grant and, although I cannot connect it to the other datasets, I would 
argue that it shares enough in common with the other topics and collective actions to 
warrant inclusion in this thesis. The founders of the movement share the Muslim identity 
along with other various allegiances and their efforts strongly mirror the concerns that led 
to the initiation of the HarassMap campaign and other like initiatives throughout the 
world. I conducted the initial Google search related to “SlutWalk Morocco,” which 
included links to the movement on various social media platforms. SlutWalk Morocco 
principally operates through Facebook and Twitter but, since most of the Twitter threads 
are in Arabic, I collected data from the Facebook posts that are predominantly in French. 
I included all of the content and comments on the SlutWalk Morocco Facebook page 
between August 2011 and March 2013. Although there are two Facebook pages 
                                                      
61 http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/blog/entry/from-morocco-to-denmark-rape-survivors-around-
the-world-are-forced-to-marry  
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associated with the SlutWalk Morocco movement with identical content, the SlutWalk 
Morocco and Woman Choufouch pages (at least since the inception of Woman 
Choufouch page in February of 2012), I included the content of the SlutWalk Morocco 
page because of its longer duration and its higher level of activity, denoted by the number 
of comments and “likes.”  
Conclusion 
 This chapter has discussed my proposed “connective content analysis,” which is 
equally concerned with the topics of interest to/collective actions of Muslim women and 
with how these topics/collective actions are mapped out on concentric networks. It 
highlighted how I collected the data and my agenda as a researcher who strives for 
research that is feminist, antiracist, and anti-imperialist through attempting to transcend 
simple binaries, like the East and West, and exposing parallels related the lived 
experiences of Muslim women regardless of contexts. This chapter has also situated how 
my methods have attempted to avoid homogenous networks of Muslims and identity 
politics associated with typologies of Muslims through studying topics and collective 
actions to preserve the inherent diversity of the positionalities and worldviews associated 
with Muslims, while simultaneously attempting to disentangle cosmopolitanism from 
Western urban spaces and identities. Through my focus on topics of interest and 
collective actions related to women who subscribe to one common identity, despite 
various other allegiances, I have attempted to decenter the analysis from “East” and 
“West” and locate it in the alternative spaces that social media and overlapping networks 
provide.  
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 The next chapter will illustrate some of the parallels in the lived experiences of 
Muslim women by focusing on their digital self-expressions and how they use social 
media to highlight the silenced voices of their martyred and disappeared sisters.    
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Chapter 3 
Conversations in Cyberspace: Resisting Silence 
  
The image of the “blue bra girl,”62 was seared into the international consciousness 
of social media users, emblematic of the struggle of the Egyptian people for dignity and 
rights. Few people knew her name or background but the image of her abused body and 
torn-open abaya was an introduction of the female body into popular resistance against 
the state that will not soon be forgotten. This image was initially disseminated by social 
media users and then picked up by international news outlets. In a sense, the 
unquestioned stereotype of “The Protester,” featured as the 2011 “Person of the Year” in 
Time magazine, which could more accurately be framed as “The Revolutionary,” is 
undermined by real-time examples of the lives of Muslim women captured in social 
media. In contrast to the sketch of the composed niqabi that was offered on the cover of 
Time to represent “The Protester,” free from the threat of imminent state-sponsored 
violence, the photos of the “blue bra girl” demonstrate the extent to which women have 
put their bodies in harm’s way to secure greater freedom for their society. Women’s 
bodies in protest are often symbols for gender equality but not symbols for revolutions—
revolutionary symbols are often limited to the male body. Social media, however, have 
the ability to expand the collective imagination beyond what is available in conventional 
media, including reframing rhetoric related to the submissive, veiled Muslim woman.  
Focusing on Arab women for the moment, miriam cooke (2000; 2001) argues that 
the multiple critique of Arab women involves the simultaneous rejection and cooptation 
of victimization. Says cooke (2000), “the effectiveness of their discourse is connected 
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with Arab women’s multiple representations as “victims” of transnational systems” (p. 
160). The photos of the “blue bra girl” are an eloquent example of this victimization but, 
in this case, they reveal violence at the hands of the state rather than the typical reprisals 
against the victimization of Arab women at the hands of Arab men. Part of the 
conventional wisdom that has perpetuated their status as victims is their conspicuous 
absence and silence in power structures and conventional media, which have 
overpowered the odd rebuttal of the powerlessness of Arab women. There is a growing 
body of literature related Muslim women harnessing social media to speak in their own 
voices (Skalli, 2006; Mishra, 2007; Karolak, 2012), but the extent to which others, 
especially others outside of their immediate often nationally-qualified social media 
networks, are consuming the narratives of these women is still a matter of debate. 
Although this literature frames the experiences of Arab women, much of the same could 
be said in regard to Muslim women everywhere—they are silenced or stereotyped as 
silenced through the male dominance associated with Islam.   
 Through social media use, Muslim women are able to share their perspectives 
with others in cyberspaces and expand the digital archive to include their voices in the 
absence of alternative outlets. In other words, women use cyberspaces to counter their 
silenced voices in other public spaces and media. They offer countersentences related to 
their lived experiences whether or not others choose to read their writings. They may 
employ social media as passive soundboards, simply venting or sharing their feelings. 
Some Muslim women use social media outlets as their textual and multimedia 
implements for artistic expression. This chapter attempts to answer the broad question of 
how Muslim women are using social media to share their lived experiences toward 
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furthering their rights and countering silence. It focuses on some narratives of women 
who have been silenced by local constraints related to patriarchy and violence as well as 
by national and transnational ones related to the mediation of their narratives. It will 
frame their “digital self-expressions” (storytelling/narrative/art) and discuss the extent to 
which these expressions can expand the “networked” or “connective memory,” which is 
inherent to digital archives. The process through which narratives find their way into the 
dominant transnational connective memory is called mediation (Couldry, 2008; 
Livingstone, 2009) and, as I will demonstrate below, there are certain aspects of the 
narratives of Muslim women that facilitate their mediation into and within dominant 
transnational networks—the victimization tropes, for example—and other aspects that 
relegate them to localized or alternative digital archives. 
Material Foundations of Storytelling in the Digital Age  
As social media were learning to walk in the Web 2.0 period, many people 
registered for online journals or diaries that came out in the late-1990s: LiveJoural, 
created in 1999 (boyd & Ellison, 2007), is a popular example of this technology. Carolyn 
Burke is credited with introducing the first online diary in 1995.63 Her diary and 
webpages of the same genre closely mirrored traditional diaries, featuring daily 
experiences, feelings, aspirations, and so forth. Rebecca Blood (2004) makes a distinction 
between online diaries and weblogs,64 which developed a few years later, because 
weblogs linked to other weblogs with related content thereby encouraging connections 
between webloggers but the connectivity was limited as hyperlinks had not yet been 
                                                      
63 http://www.salon.com/1998/06/30/feature947645118/  
64 http://siti-server01.siti.disco.unimib.it/itislab/uploads/2007/11/how-blogging-software-reshapes-the-
online-community.pdf  
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developed at this point. In 1997, Jorn Barger, weblogging at Robot Wisdom, coined the 
term weblog to describe these pages that listed related weblogs. Online diaries, on the 
other hand, were personal accounts that did not necessarily attempt to connect to other 
web users. 
As time progressed, weblogs became a combination of both of the previous uses 
of web technology. Blogs, as weblogs have come to be called, offer personal insight into 
the lives of those who share them with the ubiquity of cyberspace, similar to online 
diaries, but they also have the capability of fluidly linking likeminded people, mirroring 
the function of earlier weblogs. Later, other social media platforms, like Facebook that 
came online in 2006 (boyd & Ellison, 2007), became popular outlets for sharing one’s 
personal life through photographs and shorter, pithier remarks than were the norm of 
blogs. Tweets chronicle interesting links, news stories, and personal accounts in even 
shorter, pithier texts. Blogs, while in decline according to Lovink (2008), particularly 
since the advent of Facebook and Twitter (created in 2006), continue to provide windows 
into the personal lives of bloggers, outlets for self-expression and storytelling that are 
now supplemented with other social multimedia platforms, such as those mentioned 
above and Vimeo and YouTube (created in 2004 and 2005, respectively). Thus social 
media networks not only establish connections between internet users but internet users 
can establish dispersed narratives and identities over several media platforms, allowing 
them to tell their stories in different ways to different people. The importance of the Web 
2.0 era, and what sets it apart from the 1.0 era, is the high levels of interaction between 
netizens and the variety of platforms available for digital self-expression. 
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Some Muslim women use social media to engage in storytelling to share 
experiences that they feel cannot divulge to their families and/or their friends in various 
offline contexts; for example, they address issues that are considered taboo in their 
communities and/or they may ask religious questions that they would be uncomfortable 
addressing in face-to-face conversations at the mosque. Some women share their 
experiences with the hope that their efforts may contribute to changing impressions of 
Muslim women, both in their local communities and transnationally. They could seek out 
communities online in the absence of likeminded people in their immediate communities. 
It is not always clear if they are directing their comments at anyone in particular or, if 
they are, to whom, which is why these cybertexts can appropriately be rendered as 
storytelling in cyberspace, following the traditions of personal disclosure through online 
diaries and connections to likeminded people through weblogs.  
There is a substantial volume of work related to “Digital Storytelling” 
(capitalized), which is typically institutionally sponsored digital recordings of oral 
histories; however, this chapter discusses the non-capitalized form of “digital storytelling.” 
Nick Couldry (2008) states that the non-capitalized form could include “the whole range 
of personal stories now being told in potentially public form using digital media 
resources” (p. 374). I refer to creativity through social media outlets, storytelling as well 
as other forms of self-expression, like fashion designing and creative writing, as “digital 
self-expression.” Digital self-expression could arguably minimize the extent to which 
people who encounter Muslim women in social media platforms would stereotype them. 
Even a few decades ago, mass media in Western countries were remiss to portray Muslim 
women as equals to their Western counterparts. An American reporter’s blatant denial of 
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a female Kuwaiti soldier’s service during the first Gulf War (Fernea, 1998) is an apt 
example of how coverage of Arab women in Western media has contributed to 
stereotypical renditions of them. This reporter states, “Our view in America is that Arab 
women are behind our women, and they wear veils…That’s what makes news…Negative 
sells in this area” (Fernea, 1998, p. 192).  
However, it was difficult for the Western press to ignore the important role of 
Muslim women in the 2011 Arab Revolts. Two decades after the first Gulf War, news 
sources were more willing to publish pieces related to the contributions of Arab women 
in the struggles for liberation but they did not stray far from stereotypes. As mentioned 
previously, Time magazine featured “The Protester” to commemorate popular 
participation in widespread protests throughout the Arab and Western worlds, the “Arab 
Spring,” as it was somewhat disparagingly referred to the West, and the Occupy 
movements, respectively.65 The graphic on the cover accompanying “The Protester” was 
the reification of Orientalist imaginings of Arab women: a woman in hijab and niqab. 
Though the magazine did highlight the involvement of Muslim women in the protests and 
there were actually women protesting in niqab, the cover was meant to be provocative at 
the expense of relaying the multitudinous lived experience of Arab women. Time could 
have just as easily published a cover with an unveiled woman with an Egyptian or 
Tunisian flag or an actual photograph demonstrating the diversity of people who gathered 
in Tahrir Square to overthrow Mubarak but it did not because “they wear veils” rhetoric 
is still thriving.  
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Despite the magazine’s perpetuation of this stereotype, the inclusion of Arab 
women may not have been possible without their actual involvement in the protests—
offline activism that was facilitated by digital activism. Aasma Mahfouz’s viral video 
demanding that other Egyptians join her in Tahrir Square is one of the most well known 
examples of Arab women’s participation in the Egyptian Revolution. Mahfouz, who is 
affiliated with the April 6 Movement, posted a video on Facebook on January 18, 2011, 
which was viewed more than 100,000 times in the week before the gathering in Tahrir 
Square on January 25, 2011.66 Many Egyptian men and women of all stripes, moved by 
Mahfouz’s digital framing of the rampant social injustices perpetuated by the regime, met 
in the square to overthrow the government.  
Some women, like Mahfouz, employ social media to achieve seemingly 
insurmountable political objectives but many also use it to address everyday issues, some 
of which include the following: gender roles, marriage, family, sexuality, and so forth. 
Through their discussions of issues that may be taboo in their communities, social media 
provide Muslim women with a subtle, anonymizing, tool for “everyday resistance” (Scott, 
1985 as cited in Ong, 1990, p. 258; Scott, 1998). These subtle everyday resisters are not 
so much inciting people to take to the streets but simply asking “why?” which is 
sometimes enough to chip away at well-established communal norms. Some of the digital 
self-expressions of Muslim women provoke imaginings of what should be, speaking to an 
overarching cosmopolitan aesthetic of basics rights to which citizens, particularly women, 
should be entitled. Some of these basic rights include being able to walk down the street 
without being molested or to seek employment in a hijab without it being an obstacle. It 
                                                      
66 http://www.democracynow.org/2011/2/8/asmaa_mahfouz_the_youtube_video_that  
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is undeniable that, despite Orientalist tropes, Muslim women participate in political 
activism, even revolution, but this thesis is more concerned with examining subtle forms 
of everyday resistance.   
Digital self-expression also has the capacity to expand the collective memory of 
societies, at least the digital collective memory, variously labeled as the “networked” or 
“connective” memory (Hoskins, 2011). People who never thought of reading about 
Tunisian women, for example, might follow Lina Ben Hmenni on Facebook after reading 
in conventional news sources about her on-the-ground coverage of the Tunisian 
Revolution through social media networks. These new followers might continue to read 
about her experiences, not just as a revolutionary, but also as a woman. By directly 
engaging with Muslim women across the world through social media, social media users 
are able to bypass the essentialized portrayals of these women that are propagated in 
Western media and the lack of coverage related to them in conventional media in the 
Arab world (Mernissi, 2004).     
Social media allow citizens to participate in the framing of events so that the 
collective consciousness of a nation is not limited to what is covered by (corporate and/or 
state controlled) mainstream media or to issues debated by politicians, which is 
instrumental in the maintenance of the “imagined communities” of nations theorized by 
Benedict Anderson (1991). Anderson (1991) argues that conventional media are 
foundational to the collective memory of nations, contributing to a sense of nationalism 
and belonging within these “imagined communities.” Events that are ignored by the 
mainstream can be reintroduced and disseminated by social media (Graf, 2008). One such 
example from the hijab discrimination dataset was the murder of an Egyptian expatriate 
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hijabi, Marwa El-Sherbini, in a German courtroom, which was barely picked up by local 
and international media in the West but created a media phenomenon thousand of miles 
away in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world.  
The next section will detail El-Sherbini’s story as well as the narratives of other 
martyred women. Following the discussion in this section regarding how Muslim women 
are expanding connective memories through their social media use, the major premise of 
the next section is that social media users are able to resuscitate the narratives of 
martyred women that are quickly forgotten in conventional media outlets. Martyrdoms 
were not very common in the datasets but discussions related to silences and 
disappearances, the topics of the subsequent sections, were quite prominent. Nonetheless, 
martyrdoms, as extremely tragic cases, are more likely to be mediated into and within the 
dominant transnational connective memory so they are employed here to facilitate the 
discussion of mediation.  
The Voices of Martyred Muslim Women  
The videos and photographs of the “blue bra girl” circulated within social media 
networks until the international press began disseminating them as well. The coverage of 
this brutal spectacle included many elements of a good news story—violence, state 
oppression, and lingerie, conveyed in a sound byte. A lesser-known but equally powerful 
narrative was the self-immolation of Fadwa Laroui, who was the first Arab/Maghrebi 
woman as of February 2012 to set herself on fire during the regional uprisings.67 There 
were other self-immolations before Laroui’s, including Bouazizi in Tunisia in December 
of 2010 and, according to Mahfouz, several in Egypt as well, but she was the first woman 
                                                      
67 http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCATRE71M4ZF20110223  
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to set herself aflame. Yet Laroui’s act of protest neither captured the attention of local or 
international publics nor incited the outrage of Bouazizi’s self-immolation. Lim (2013) 
claims that Bouazizi’s death infuriated the Tunisian people because it was properly 
framed through “white lies” in the social media to capitalize on popular frustration 
related to corruption, censorship, cronyism, unemployment, and the general lack of 
meaningful political participation. Laroui, on the other hand, was a single mother from 
Morocco who was denied access to public housing ostensibly because she was unmarried. 
In contrast to the colorful storytelling surrounding Bouazizi’s suicide, Laroui’s 
protest, which was posted on YouTube, was scarcely covered by local and international 
media. Laroui’s tragic story, as a single working-class mother, apparently was not as 
relatable to the general population as Bouazizi’s tale or, more to the point, how social 
media users framed his story. Bouazizi was rumored to be a college graduate who could 
not find a job so he operated a produce cart to support his family. In contrast, Laroui, a 
single mother, an identity that remains stigmatized in the Moroccan culture (Sadiqi, 
2008), was denied public housing due to her unmarried status after the authorities 
destroyed her home in the bidonville (slums). There also appeared to be some shady 
agreements between authorities and a local developer that contributed to Laroui’s failure 
to secure housing.68 Bouazizi, driven to self-immolation, came to represent every ill 
associated with the Tunisian society, while Laroui remained a silenced social anomaly.  
Notwithstanding Laroui’s failed attempt to secure popular empathy, the internet 
has the capacity to promote the stories of Muslim women who would not otherwise have 
a voice. For instance, Laroui’s story was mentioned in conjunction with the promotion of 
                                                      
68 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rachel-newcomb/fadwa-laroui-morocco_b_829467.html  
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a film highlighting the tragic death of another martyred women on the SlutWalk Morocco 
(Woman Choufouch) Facebook page. SlutWalk Morocco, which is connected to the 
global SlutWalk initiative but aims to address street harassment and other types of gender 
violence and inequality in Morocco, used Facebook to promote the production of a few 
films that portrayed the life of Amina Filali, a 16 year-old girl who committed suicide 
after she was forced to marry the man who raped her.69 One of these films, “475: When 
Marriage Becomes Punishment,” was created to honor the memory of Filali and to spread 
awareness about the unjust “rape law,” Article 475 of the Moroccan penal code.70 Even 
though Laroui failed to become a symbol for the Moroccan protests that started in 
February of 2012, the film producers dedicated the film to both her and Filali so Laroui 
was commemorated as an important figure in struggle for the gender equality and human 
rights in Morocco, although not as a symbol of the struggle for greater political rights as 
Bouazizi was, despite the efforts of February 20 activists71 to frame her as the Moroccan 
Bouazizi.72  
“475: When Marriage Becomes Punishment“ was an overarching indictment of 
the system that perpetuates rape through allowing rapists to escape prosecution with 
impunity. Nadir Bouhmouch, a Moroccan activist connected with the February 20 
Movement and a Film and Global Justice student at San Diego State University, who 
                                                      
69https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=188042957976978&id=132681343491773&comm
ent_id=534720&offset=0&total_comments=3  
70 https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=409037705824345&id=132681343491773  
71 The February 20 Movement is a popular youth activist groups that formed in Morocco during the 2011 
Arab Revolts. 
72 http://moroccansforchange.com/2011/02/27/rip-fadoua-laroui/  
http://www.thenation.com/blog/158878/fadoua-laroui-moroccan-mohamed-bouazizi#  
https://www.facebook.com/MoroccansForChange/posts/206562199358114  
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wrote, directed, and produced “My Makhzen and Me,”73 directed the film. One of the co-
founders of Woman Choufouch, Layla Belmahi, was also involved in the film’s 
production.74 Bouhmouch released the film online on February 21, 2013 to commemorate 
the death of Laroui.75 His connections to the February 20 Movement may have influenced 
his decision to release the film on the anniversary of Laroui’s death so that both women 
could be immortalized in the struggle for gender and human rights in Morocco and, 
particularly in Laroui’s case, social and economic justice. Despite the inability of 
Laroui’s death to capture popular imagination as an important figure in the Moroccan 
protests, through the expansion of the networked memory, her sacrifice lives on as an 
emblem for the ongoing activism of the February 20 Movement. In contrast, Amina Filali 
became an international symbol for human rights/gender equality in oppressive regimes 
because her narrative was sufficiently mediated at local and national levels, which 
inspired its international coverage. 
The film, “475: When Marriage Punishment,” was one piece of the larger 
campaign spearheaded by online and offline activism, in which Woman Choufouch 
played an important role. As a popular Facebook page with over 8,000 likes and 
connections to other women’s rights movements through its solidarity with the global 
SlutWalk movement, Woman Choufouch was part of a larger network that spread 
awareness about the Filali tragedy. SlutWalk Toronto, for example, the initiator of global 
movement and the hub for discussions about other SlutWalks throughout the world, cited 
                                                      
73 http://www.nadirbouhmouch.com/bio.html  
74 http://www.alartemag.be/en/en-culture/marriage-as-punishment-documentary-about-womens-rights-in-
morocco/  
75 http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/10234/exposing-sexual-violence-in-morocco_an-interview-w  
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the Filali case on its Facebook page.76 Micro-mediations such as this bolstered efforts to 
reform the Moroccan penal code through encouraging international news and social 
media coverage of Filali’s narrative and, by extension, mediation into the dominant 
transnational connective memory.  
Article 475, a law inherited from the colonial French penal code, allows rapists to 
escape prosecution through marrying their underage victims. Amina Filali was a teenager 
from Larache who, with juridical and familial complicity, was forced to marry the man 
who raped her when she was 15. Under Article 475 of the Moroccan penal code, men 
who are found guilty of rape can marry the underage survivors to avoid the 5-10 year 
prison sentence. The families of the rape survivors have to agree to the marriage but they 
are often pressured by the courts and influenced by the communal belief that the 
reputations of rape victims are sullied and, as such, the survivors will not have any other 
option for marriage if they do not marry the rapists. In addition to the violence to which 
Filali was subjected before she was forced to marry, Filali’s rapist/husband, Mustafa 
Fallaq, physically abused her after they were wed. Fallaq’s family refutes the suggestion 
that Fallaq raped Filali, insisting that the couple had engaged in consensual sex before 
they were married77; however, perhaps the most damning evidence against Filali’s 
supposed willing participation in the rape and marriage was her decision to ingested rat 
poison to escape from the brutal life to which she had been confined by her family, the 
courts, and the Moroccan state. After she took the poison, Fallaq left her to die rather 
than taking her to seek medical attention.78 Similar to the attempts of the February 20 
                                                      
76 https://www.facebook.com/SlutWalkToronto/posts/370119686344770  
77 http://vimeo.com/60159666  
78 https://www.facebook.com/events/412117118803836/?ref=22  
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Movement to frame Laroui as a heroine, some online news sources compared Filali to 
Bouazizi79 because the incident awakened a sense of popular obligation to stymie the 
abuses of the state, particularly the apathy it had displayed in protecting vulnerable 
constituents of the population. 
During its involvement in the campaign to reform Article 475, Woman 
Choufouch used Facebook to highlight the stories of several other girls who were 
pressured by the courts to marry rapists, indicating that the systemic cruelty that Filali 
faced was not an isolated incident. A few weeks after Filali’s death, another teenage girl, 
Asmaa Kastit, was raped by her 39 year-old brother-in-law and forced to marry him.80 
Two months after Filali’s suicide, 14 year-old Safae from Tangier went before a judge 
who pressured her to marry the man who raped her.81 She and her family refused, 
although her family did end up dropping the rape charges. The rapist impregnated her and 
continued to harass her because she refused to marry him. Safae suffered from severe 
depression and attempted suicide several times.82 A month after Safae’s ordeal, in June of 
2012, the parents of 14 year-old Hajar were pressured by authorities in Rabat to withdraw 
rape charges against a man in their neighborhood who had allegedly raped their daughter. 
In February 2012, the family had reported the rape to the authorities and to l'Association 
Marocaine des Droits de l'Homme (AMDH), a local NGO, but the man was not arrested 
until three months later. The family eventually succumbed to the pressure of the 
authorities, refused the presence of the ADMH in court, and agreed to have their daughter 
                                                      
79 http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2012/03/31206/amina-is-my-bouazizi-a-girl-who-committed-
suicide-after-being-forced-to-marry-her-rapist/31206/ 
80 http://www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/9731/asmaa-kastit-histoire-d-une-nouvelle.html  
81https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=288517451237449&id=132681343491773&comm
ent_id=1734279&offset=0&total_comments=8  
82 http://www.bladi.net/tanger-juge-mariage-violeur.html  
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marry the rapist.83 These incidents might not have been covered in local news were it not 
for Filali’s sacrifice and the activism surrounding her death to prevent future 
implementations of Article 475. 
Woman Choufouch’s activism through social media complemented its offline 
activism. Woman Choufouch co-sponsored and publicized several offline events to 
spread awareness about the Filali tragedy and Article 475 toward the reformation the law. 
Woman Choufouch highlighted the first public demonstration in Larache on March 15, 
2012 that mobilized in opposition to the contributing factors that led to Filali’s suicide. 
Woman Choufouch sponsored a sit-in at the parliament building in Rabat two days later 
on March 17, 2012. Woman Choufouch also co-hosted several offline screenings of the 
films that were produced to spread awareness about Article 475. After ten months of 
online/offline campaigning, the government agreed to reform Article 475. Woman 
Choufouch published the following Facebook posting on January 23, 2013: “Nous avons 
réussi, mais il faut continuer le combat ! Encore beaucoup de travail à faire sur le code 
pénal et le code de la famille...” [We have succeeded, but we must continue the fight! 
Still a lot of work to do on the penal code and the family code...”]. Even after the 
campaign had succeeded in pressuring the government to take action, the movement 
continued to capture the international attention of the activist community; for example, in 
February 2013, Layla Belmahi, the co-founder of Woman Choufouch, was hosted by the 
Amnesty International Human Rights Festival to speak about women’s rights in Morocco 
before sharing “475: When Marriage Becomes Punishment”84 with the audience. This 
campaign against Article 475 highlights the complementarity of online and offline 
                                                      
83 https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=319447371481835&id=132681343491773  
84 https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=403309749762247&id=132681343491773   
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activism and the importance of connections between art/film, activism, and media in the 
mediation of social symbols. 
The activism surrounding the Laroui and Filali tragedies in Morocco was directed 
at the state but it was more difficult to frame in the case of the murder of a hijabi in 
Germany because the state avoided complicity, dismissing the possibility of systemic 
intolerance, through casting the incident as one of personal hatred and bigotry. The 
“Global Campaign to Stop Hijabophobia” Facebook page, in the hijab discrimination 
dataset, references this murder,85 although it was not mentioned anywhere elsewhere in 
the datasets so I used Google’s top ten results in October of 2013 to frame the narrative. 
In 2008, Marwa El-Sherbini, a veiled Egyptian expatriate living in Germany, took Alex 
Wiens to court for verbal abuse after he called her an “Islamist,” a “bitch,” and a 
“terrorist” (ostensibly because she was wearing a hijab) in a public park where she had 
brought her 3 year-old son to play. It was during the appeals trial in July of 2009 that 
Wiens stabbed El-Sherbini 18 times as she attempted to leave the courtroom. She was 
three-months pregnant with her second child at the time. El-Sherbini’s husband, Elwi 
Okaz, and her three year-old son, Mustafa, were also present in court. Okaz managed to 
wrestle the knife away from Wiens after Wiens stabbed his wife but the armed security 
guard whom entered the courtroom mistook Okaz for the attacker and shot him. Mustafa 
watched his mother die and his father sustain critical injuries.  
El-Sherbini attained international fame, especially in Egypt, as the “Hijab Martyr,” 
even though the incident did not receive much attention in Germany except among 
Muslims. Though her murder gained notoriety in Muslim-majority countries, it was 
                                                      
85 http://www.patheos.com/blogs/mmw/2009/07/living-in-denial-the-tragic-murder-of-marwa-el-sherbini/  
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relatively unknown in the West. For example, discussants on a forum highlighted how 
Katie Couric’s inability to identify El-Sherbini in a photo left the reporter open to Iranian 
President Ahmadinejad’s attack related to Western media often ignoring stories related to 
violence against Muslims in Western countries.86 Ahmadinejad’s comment was 
warranted in this case as there appeared to be more articles in Western media about the 
Egyptian response to the slaying than related to the murder itself. The lack of mediation 
of El-Sherbini’s narrative within Western media contributed to the paucity of 
online/offline mobilization in Western countries against discriminatory reactions to the 
hijab. Tellingly, although hundreds of Muslims and Arabs demonstrated in the streets of 
Germany after the murder of El-Sherbini,87 thousands gathered for her funeral procession 
in Alexandria, Egypt.88   
The Guardian article compared the Arab/Muslim reactions to the tragedy both in 
the West and in the Arab region to the anti-West sentiment that was borne out of the 
Danish Jyllands-Posten caricature renditions of the Prophet Mohammad, signaling that 
this was an event that created a buzz within the transnational event-oriented digital 
ummah network.89 I argue elsewhere (Robinson, Hijab in the American Workplace, under 
review), similar to the theoretical position taken up by Lim (2012), that the digital 
ummah network is not viable in regard to many issues facing Muslims (see Chapter 5 and 
the hijab discrimination case study in Chapter 6), being that that observance of Islam is 
highly diverse as are the contexts of various Muslim communities. Notwithstanding, 
                                                      
86 http://www.thephora.net/forum/showthread.php?t=55049  
87 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/07/german-trial-hijab-murder-egypt  
88 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/06/headscarf-martyr-marwa-sh_n_226104.html  
89 This is a large, loosely connected network that encompasses various clusters of Muslim social media 
users. Nodes within the networks may rarely connect except when multiple bridges between these nodes 
begin mediating particular events/issues. 
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certain events resonate with Muslims in various contexts and the digital ummah network 
comes alive to discuss the intricacies of Muslimness in the modern world. The digital 
ummah network often takes up events related to Islamophobia and certain network 
clusters mediate and discuss women’s issues. In this case, the digital ummah network 
mediated El-Sherbini’s voice, as a woman who stood up for herself in the face of hatred 
and her death was imprinted onto the connective memory of the digital ummah network 
as her story either never arrived or quickly began to fade in the West.  
This section framed the ways in which social media have the capacity to digitally 
capture the narratives of Muslim women who can no longer speak for themselves. Social 
media have the ability to keep the stories of these women alive when they are cycled out 
of the mainstream media but some narratives are more readily mediated than others, 
which I will discuss further in this chapter’s “Discussion.” The next section reveals how 
the online discussions of Muslim women address taboos, such as virginity and veiling, 
toward preventing future martyrdoms, disappearances, and forced silences. Muslim 
women are challenging the norm of silence in the safety of cyberspaces by digitally 
amplifying their voices. 
Speaking Out Against Disappearances through Violence 
Similar to Moroccan social media users’ opposition to gender-discriminatory laws, 
the techno-ikhtilat data revealed that in March of 2009 Jordanian bloggers came together 
online to decry Articles 340 and 98 of the Jordanian penal code after a man and his two 
sons were convicted of beating their daughter/sister to death in 2007 for “going out in full 
make-up.”90 Articles 340 and 98 result in reduced sentences for men who kill their wives 
                                                      
90 http://globalvoicesonline.org/2009/04/08/jordan-no-honour-in-killing/ 
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or female relatives in a “fit of fury” because these women have ostensibly engaged in 
“adultery.” There is growing awareness of honor killings through conventional media but 
commentary in social media suggests that conventional coverage does not always 
demonstrate unequivocal support for the women who are killed by their families. For 
example, Fadi Zaghmout, a Jordanian blogger writing at the Arab Observer, shared a 
letter that he sent to several Jordanian media outlets that demanded that they take a 
definitive stance against honor crimes.91 Nevertheless, Kinzi, an active blogger in the 
Jordanian blogosphere, suggests that the heightened awareness of honor killings has 
contributed to more appropriate sentences for men who perpetrate these crimes: for 
example, the father involved in the aforementioned case was sentenced to seven years 
rather than the customary six-month prison term under Articles 340 and 98.92 Despite the 
growing awareness of the issue through social media activism and coverage of honor 
killings in the conventional media, within weeks of the conviction of the father in the 
2007 killing, a 19 year-old brother killed his older sister because she left her “home to go 
to an unknown destination.”93  
 Another issue that has contributed to online discussions among Muslim women 
from Jordan and other countries throughout the world is the universal obsession with 
female virginity. Muslim women have conversed about ways of ensuring the illusion of 
virginity on their wedding nights in the dataset related to the artificial hymen. Some 
mentioned that they would like to be able to tell the truth about their sexual experience 
but the societal and familial repercussion might be dire. The honor killings of the girl 
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92 http://globalvoicesonline.org/2009/04/08/jordan-no-honour-in-killing/ 
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who went out in “full make-up” and the other one who left the house to go to “unknown 
destinations” were obviously extreme case, but the failure of women to bleed on their 
wedding nights is often perceived as evidence of sexual impropriety, which might result 
divorce and social ostracism. Virginity, as rendered by proponents of the “cult of the 
hymen,”94 is the presence or absence of the hymen. Cast in these terms, it makes little 
difference if the hymen ruptured through injury, exercise, or other non-sexual acts—what 
matters is whether or not a woman can product blood when it is necessary to do so. 
Perhaps the women most at risk of scandal and social isolation, in the worst cases honor 
killings, are those who have never had sex but unwittingly ruptured their hymens through 
injuries and those who have very elastic hymens that may not break during their first 
sexual encounter because they do not make plans to produce the bloody sheets through 
alternative means. Women who can afford it might get their virginity certified by a doctor 
or have it re-sewn through hymenoplasty, but the unsuspecting are left to the mercy of 
anatomy.  
 An Arab woman initiated a conversation on a transnational forum that well 
illustrated aspects of virginity obsession. A woman from Qatar, “Designer,” started a 
thread on the Fluther forum entitled “How can I fake my virginity?”95 “Designer” was 
considering her friend’s advice to use the “virginity pill,” which is inserted into the 
vagina prior to intercourse to produce a blood-like substance, but she was concerned 
about the safe and efficacy of the pill. One respondent, “Jack79,” encouraged her to be 
honest about her sexual experience but “Designer” stated that it was not possible to be 
truthful in her social context. “Designer” claimed that she had heard about one Qatari 
                                                      
94 http://www.afrik-news.com/article15419.html  
95 http://www.fluther.com/36634/how-can-i-fake-my-virginity/ 
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woman who was nearly beaten to death by her relatives and another who was twice run 
over by her male relative’s car when the women’s families discovered that they were not 
virgins. After hearing about the possibility of “Designer’s” life being in danger, “Jack79” 
reconsidered his earlier advice and made the seminal point that perhaps she might be less 
judgmental “when she finds out that her own daughter or daughter-in-law is not a virgin.” 
This is certainly a possibility in regard to how changing norms take root. 
 “Designer” notes that she could not attempt honesty because she is fearful of the 
reactions of her family and the larger community. She does not appear to want to lie but 
she feels that she has no other option. She is not interested in being deceitful to preserve 
her own reputation but her comments convey her fear of becoming another martyred 
woman. Her posting garnered responses from two other women, “fuschia” and 
“qzofheart,” who claimed to be in the same situation; thus “Designer’s” own struggle, 
and employing social media to mitigate it, may contribute to the creation of a support 
network and facilitate the subtle resistance of other women as well. Although this is a 
form of resistance that is taking place at a personal level throughout the world, women 
are able to reach out to and collectivize with other women around this common issue in 
online spaces. As I will discuss in the case study related to PHD in Chapter 6, networked 
discussions related to individual resistance could contribute to the mediation of loosely 
defined activism that does not require the backing of online/offline social movements or 
local organizations. This could also be the case with networked interactions related to 
faking one’s virginity. Furthermore, if men read online dialogues about women resorting 
to virginity pills and Chinese-made hymens, it may encourage them, especially men who 
are not themselves virgins, to question the importance of the hymen-measure in gauging 
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the worthiness of women as brides. Thus these discussions could contribute to the 
evolution of social norms on various fronts.  
In the end, “Designer” decided to call off her wedding but she states that “time is 
ticking,” meaning that she can only put off marriage for so long. As I will discuss in 
Chapter 4, there were several passages in the Muslim spinsterhood dataset that imply, 
similar to “Designer’s” case, that the loss of a woman’s hymen may be a contributing 
factor to spinsterhood. In other words, women who are unable to “prove” their virginity 
may avoid marriage contracts until they are have reached their “expiration date” on 
marriage market, which could be achieved in some places by 25 years of age. After all, 
the stigma of remaining unmarried may be less significant than the shame of facing 
divorce for failing to produce bloody sheets on the wedding night. Nonetheless, as 
Chapter 4 will demonstrate, women who remain unmarried are also shamed as Muslim 
communities often cast spinsters as social pariahs and ostracized them from the larger 
community, which results in their de facto disappearances; however, this social isolation 
is likely to be a more attractive option than being disappeared through violence, such as 
the disappearances that “Designer” discusses.   
 Violence against Muslim women that contributes to their disappearances is not 
limited to the home as the HarassMap data demonstrates. Violence in the public sphere, 
like sexual harassment, may also contribute to disappearances, particularly because some 
social actors tend to blame women for being harassed simply for being present on the 
street. One well-known example of this tendency in the Egyptian context was broached 
on Ahmed Awadalla’s blog, Rebel With A Cause. Awadalla discussed reactions to 
protesters attacking a celebrity performer, Sherihan, during a liberal/secularist 
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demonstration in Tahrir Square on May 27, 2011. He states that some people reacted by 
blaming the Sherihan: “Some wonder why she went out of her home!”96 Similarly, 
Rebecca Chiao, the co-founder of HarassMap, notes that “stay home” and “get veiled” 
are common responses to women who complain about being sexually harassed.97 Mona 
Ezzat articulated an analogous statement in connection with the online “End Sexual 
Harassment” campaign. Says Ezzat, “In a male–dominated society where the woman is 
supposed to stay at home and cover all her body, the society puts all the responsibility on 
the woman to protect herself.”98    
While it may seem absurd that women could be blamed for sexual harassment for 
simply leaving their homes, it appears that some women have chosen to conform to this 
dominant societal prescription to ensure their safety by withdrawing from the public 
sphere. Social media users have shared the narratives of Egyptian women who were self-
disappeared, or self-confined in the home, due to harassment. For instance, “Sama 
Singer,” an Egyptian woman blogging at Between Brackets, shares the narrative of one of 
her friends who was harassed by a mob of boys, one of which removed his belt and beat 
her with it. After two years of daily harassment, Singer claims that her friend “is now 
afraid to get out of her house as she has the idea that every man in the street is a savage 
animal who is awaiting her.”99 Self-disappearances have occurred on a larger scale as 
well. The gang harassments in downtown Cairo during the Eid festivities of 2006, for 
instance, resulted in the widespread self-confinement of women in their homes100 (also 
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see Chapter 2). “Sina,” an Egyptian woman blogging at Natural Conspiracy, relates the 
trend of self-disappearances to the growing influence of conservative Islam. She believes 
that the progressively “barbaric” tendencies of the Egyptian society have fueled the 
epidemic of sexual harassment and she sees no end in sight for “the 
sweeping Islamist trend of considering women “unmentionables,” who need to be locked 
up and treated like shit.”101 In extreme cases, when women are unable to protect 
themselves through self-confinements, they may opt for martyrdoms instead. For 
example, a 15 year-old girl jumped out of a second story window, attempting suicide, 
after the building owner’s son harassed her in the apartment complex where she lives.102 
Even for women who do not completely self-confine themselves, most will refrain 
from going out after dark,103 which may suggest they have internalized part of the blame 
for sexual harassment even if they are not as severely traumatized as some of their 
disappeared friends. Other members of the Egyptian society, like parents who refuse to 
allow their daughters to go out,104 have also internalized the norm of victim-blaming, 
which Muslim women are speaking out against in social media. As Hena Zuberi of 
MuslimMatters.org states, “Men need to support their daughters, sisters, wives when they 
complain of harassment instead of forbidding them from going out or blaming them for 
causing the incident.”105 The cases of parental confinement can no longer be referred to 
as self-confinement; they are more appropriately framed as forced confinement. Until the 
Egyptian society rejects the victim-blaming associated with sexual harassment, some of 
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which may be internalized by women, leading them to attempt various interventions to 
prevent harassment (like veiling or staying in after dark), women and their families will 
continue to engage in self or forced confinement to varying degrees because, even if 
some women do not blame themselves for harassment, the majority of the society likely 
will and, despite the interventions women employ to protect themselves, the only nearly 
foolproof measure is to remain in their homes. 
Social media users involved in the “End Sexual Harassment” and HarassMap 
campaigns are not just speaking out against sexual harassment for other Egyptian women 
or Muslim women in other countries, but for women all over the world. Muslim women 
share their digital self-expressions, not only to be heard and to share the stories of 
disappeared women, they also appeal to the lived experiences of other women, Muslim or 
not, through their narratives. While they clearly want to be heard by the larger Egyptian 
society, it is also possible that one of the aims of these campaigns is to create a universal 
basic level of safety and security for women in physical public spheres all over the world, 
which speaks to vernacular cosmopolitan praxis involving the disclosure of local 
narratives toward universal objectives. I will return to this possibility shortly.  
This section has discussed how Muslim women use social media to share the 
narratives of women who have been disappeared through violence in an effort to prevent 
future disappearances and martyrdoms. The next section will present other 
disappearances through violence and state-imposed confinements related to Muslim 
women’s observance of their interpretations of the Qur’anic mandate on modesty, 
typically rendered through forms of veiling.  
 123	  
Disappearances Through Modesty   
  North of the silenced voices in Egypt, there are women speaking out about 
disappearances in France. In France, we have a clear picture of the number of 
disappeared Muslim women; based on figures in the NiqaBitch dataset, there are 
approximately 2,000 niqabis in France who are affected by the ban that came into effect 
in April of 2011.106 However, this number cannot project the number of women who are 
affected by niqab bans in other European nations, such as Belgium, and other nations that 
are considering similar bans, such as the Netherlands and a part of Switzerland. 
NiqaBitch opposed the ban to “protect citizens' freedom”107 because the two women 
involved in the protest do not believe that laws should dictate how people dress or that 
the ban serves any purpose other than the marginalization of women.108 
In terms of marginalization, many believed that the ban would not save women 
from being forced to wear the niqab by their “oppressive” husband, the French 
government’s primary justification for the law, but that it would lead to the state-imposed 
confinements of the women who wear the niqab because it is their interpretation of the 
Islamic mandate on modesty. Palfrey, one commenter on the NiqaBitch YouTube video, 
says “those 1,900 [niqabis] may well feel compelled (either by their own beliefs, or those 
of their immediate family) to remain indoors.”109 “mikeeverest” makes a similar 
comment: “if the ban is legally enforced, will women be forced/choose to stay at home 
                                                      
106 http://connexionfrance.com/Woman-arrested-protest-Avignon-France-veil-burqa-niqab-12662-view-
article.html  
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109 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uw32TU7uAi4 
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for the rest of their lives in order to avoid being “seen”?”110 Although the resulting forced 
confinement, either by the family or the state, would manifest in the same way, most 
commenters believed that forced confinements by family members, specifically husbands, 
would be more likely than niqabis engaging in self-confinement due to their belief in the 
sanctity of the veil. “Freeman Moxy,” another YouTube interlocutor, states, “If they are 
really that cowed, it is more likely that their oppressive husbands will no longer let them 
leave the house at all.”111 “Jibbajibba,” “Gaiseric,” “Eipermoid,” and “Ionie” on YouTube 
and “Autistic Reading” on Rue 89112 advance similar claims. Although they make these 
statements to illustrate the futility of the ban, they reinforce the government’s stereotype 
of Muslim women to make their point.  
One commenter, “Emiboot,” claims that most of these “ghosts” (veiled women) 
are actually French women of European origin who have converted to Islam and they 
wear the veil due to their own strongly held beliefs, not because their possibly non-
Muslim families force them to cover or due to cultural indoctrination.113 Another 
problematic aspect of the ban is that, while the law also targets families (husbands) that 
force women to veil, it does not address community norms in neighborhoods that may 
pressure women to veil. A commenter on Rue 89, “Salaves,” for instance, cites an article 
in the French press about “a young single woman with a child who said she was forced to 
put the burqa to avoid being constantly scolded by groups of young people of the city 
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where she lives.”114 “Salaves’s” statement highlights the onus on single mothers to prove 
their morality in communities where they are perceived as social enigma. This communal 
pressure is not necessarily a result of the inherent conservatism of Islam; it could just as 
likely be related to the pervasiveness of Islamophobia in the French society that leads to 
greater insularity of Muslim communities, a dynamic that appears to be common in many 
Muslim-minority countries. On the other hand, considering “Emiboot’s” comment above 
about most niqabis being European French converts, the article cited by “Salaves” may 
just be state propaganda to augment support for the ban.   
On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean in North America, niqabis do not have to 
worry about bans but both niqabis and hijabis have to be concerned with discrimination, 
even violent forms of discrimination. This invisible form of discrimination is perhaps 
more insidious than institutionalized discrimination through legal injunctions because the 
former is dismissed as personal bigotry, similar to the slaying of El-Sherbini, rather than 
being addressed as a manifestation of systemic racism and xenophobia in “multicultural” 
societies (Mohanty, 2003). In the decade following 9/11, there was a steady increase in 
the number of complaints registered with the Council on American-Islamic Relations 
(CAIR) and the Arab Anti-Discrimination Council (ADC) in the United States. Perhaps 
this is related to Muslims being framed as synonymous with terrorists in Western 
conventional media since the attacks on 9/11 or maybe Muslims and Arabs in North 
America have become more aware of the pervasiveness of Islamophobia in Western 
societies since the incident, which has contributed to more of them coming forward when 
they faced with intolerance.  
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Following 9/11, the incidence of violent attacks against hijabis jumped 
exponentially in the United States. In September 2001, CAIR and ADC reported a 
substantial increase in the number of complaints involving the verbal and physical 
harassment of hijabis as well as those related to hijabs being ripped off of the heads of 
Muslim women and girls, mainly younger hijabis at schools and universities. In New 
Orleans, a teacher reported that one of her student who wore hijab dropped out of school 
because she became fearful of the climate of intolerance. The same circumstances led 
another high school girl in Nevada to drop out in 2004. In 2007, CAIR posted a video on 
YouTube related to an incident involving an 11-year-old hijabi in Florida who had her 
hijab snatched from her head by a classmate. The classmate then allegedly threatened to 
shoot her. Hijabis are not only vulnerable to harassment in schools but in public spaces in 
general. In 2004, a pregnant hijabi was walking home with her toddler in Massachusetts 
when a man verbally accosted her, tore off her hijab, and brutally beat her until she lost 
consciousness.115 Since these events were reported to grassroots organizations rather than 
through the digital self-expression of Muslim women in social media, it appears that 
hijabis have come to rely on entities such as CAIR and ADC to spread awareness, 
although CAIR and ADC use social media to disseminate the narratives of hijabis who 
have faced discrimination. CAIR, in particular, has uploaded hundreds of video narratives 
to YouTube, many of which involve discrimination against hijabis and both organizations 
are active on Facebook and Twitter. Considering the steady increase in complaints of 
violence, it seems that the dominant American culture is unwilling to accept Muslims, 
particularly those who overtly express their faith through the hijab in public spaces, 
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despite the efforts of these grassroots organizations. Therefore, some hijabis, such as the 
students discussed above, will likely continue to withdraw from public spaces. The 
instances of violence and harassment, particularly the ones that involve girls dropping out 
of school, speak to disappearances because the institutions charged with keeping Muslim 
girls safe have failed them so they withdraw from the society that cannot accept them.  
Unlike the El-Sherbini tragedy, some incidents in the United States that reach a 
significant level of notoriety through grassroots efforts are mediated into conventional 
media, like the Boudlal v. Disney and Khan v. A&F (see Chapter 6) cases, although these 
cases quickly fizzle out of the 24-hour news cycle. On rare occasions, Muslim women 
have had the opportunity to share their 2-second stories in the mainstream press but these 
are typically extreme cases that have been reported to the authorities. For example, in a 
YouTube video of an ABC News report, Nohayia Javed, a Muslim women going to 
college in Texas, states that she so often faces discrimination that she no longer goes out 
in public by herself.116 She was the alleged victim of a hate crime on the Baylor campus, 
involving a man with a Southern accent who beat her while shouting “Islamic 
expletives.”117 Javed’s narrative was part of a larger segment that included a “sting 
operation” conducted by an ABC News crew in which they staged a hijabi customer at a 
bakery to investigate how Texans would react to blatant Islamophobia directed at veiled 
Muslim women. According the ABC reporter, Javed helped to design the experiment. The 
counter-person/actor in this experiment refused to serve the hijabi actress and even 
suggested that she may be carrying a bomb. A minority of the customers (6) applauded 
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 128	  
the counterperson’s discriminatory behavior, the majority (22) remained silent, and about 
one in three (13) stood up for the “Muslim woman.”  
Like Javed, Slma Shelbayah was able to share her story with a mainstream media 
outlet, CNN, and the CNN interview was posted on YouTube.118 Shelbayah filed a 
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission in 2008 after Dr. Mary 
Stuckey, a professor in Communication at Georgia State University, repeatedly verbally 
harassed her during class. On one of these occasions, Stuckey asked Shelbayah if she had 
a bomb under her hijab. After Shelbayah filed the complaint, she lost her funding as a 
doctoral student and the university terminated her positions as a visiting scholar and with 
the Middle East Institute Exchange Program.119 While these mainstream news reports 
have the potential to reach a significant audience, the case study on hijab discrimination 
in Chapter 6 suggests that mainstream coverage of discrimination against hijabis might 
contribute to further backlash against Muslims rather than countering violence against 
them. It will also demonstrate that the negative mainstream reactions to these cases might 
dissuade some Muslim women from coming forward to report discrimination.  
Some Muslim women prefer to share their stories with grassroots organizations 
and/or the mainstream news media, if given the rare opportunity, because perhaps they 
believe it is important to create a unified voice among Muslims to spread awareness 
about the discrimination to which they are subjected. Nonetheless, their stories are also 
mediated into social media networks through YouTube, for example, as the Javed and 
Shelbayah incidents suggest. Thus people who missed the airing of these interviews on 
CNN and ABC could still access the narratives of these Muslim women in online spaces, 
                                                      
118 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kiT8pSpN1-U&feature=related 
119 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/yvonne-r-davis/georgia-state-university_b_225951.html  
 129	  
propelling the reach of the narratives after they are cycled out of mainstream media. On 
the other hand, in cases in which conventional media are unlikely to pick up the stories of 
everyday harassment, Muslim women have shared their stories directly on social media. 
For example, in a YouTube video, Stephanie Luff, a blogger connected to both the hijab 
discrimination and the hijabi fashion datasets, discusses a Muslim woman who decided to 
remove her hijab because she could not find employment and, when she unveiled, she 
was quickly able to find a job.120 Luff’s video narrative suggests that the disappearances 
of hijabis and niqabis may be occurring not only through the self-confinement of women 
who have tired of discrimination but refuse to remove their hijabs and niqabs but also 
through some Muslim women deciding to unveil to ensure their safety and/or attain 
employment, for example. Everyday discrimination in subtle and overt forms was an 
important topic of discussion among hijabi fashion bloggers, which demonstrates the 
extent of the stigmatization of the veil, although most hijabis used the spaces provided by 
their blogs to encourage hijabis to persevere with the religious practice of hijab despite 
the distain they face from the dominant cultures in Muslim-minority societies, perhaps 
even their inability to secure employment (see Chapter 6). 
As a final point regarding the disappearances of hijabis and niqabis, it should be 
emphasized that there were comments related to discrimination in North Africa against 
women based on their levels of modesty in the hijab discrimination and hijabi fashion 
datasets. For example, the veil is banned in certain venues in Turkey, Tunisia, and 
Algeria.121 In a posting on We Love Hijab, a commenter, Samira, says that in Morocco, 
Tunisia, and Egypt there are unspoken limitations to the employment options for women 
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in hijab,122 especially in establishments that cater to tourists. In a Facebook posting, two 
Egyptian hijabis, Sherine Gala El-Messary and Zeinab Y El-Fiqi, reiterate this statement, 
claiming that veiled women in Egypt are denied entry to various social venues and they 
are denied employment with certain companies.123 Similarly, Mona Eltahawy discusses 
the discriminatory hiring practices of companies in the region in a Huffington Post article, 
entitled “Headscarves and Hymens.” She states that Egyptian women have lost court 
battles related to their right to wear hijab as television anchors on state-run networks and 
as flight attendants on Egypt Air. In the Egyptian context, women could face obstacles to 
employment for wearing the hijab and violence in the street for not wearing it. Although 
many social media interlocutors suggest that veiling does not protect women from street 
harassment, when a woman complains about harassment, one of the first statements that 
is mentioned in regarding to the incident is whether or not the woman was veiled. While 
there are some unspoken social restrictions related to wearing the hijab, particularly 
stemming from corporate structures that want to present a “modern image,” there are also 
social pressures to veil, mainly articulated by religious authorities and social actors who 
promote traditional interpretations of Islam, which also underpin the victim-blaming of 
unveiled women when they are harassed in public spaces.  
Nonetheless, when hijabis struggle for their right to wear hijab in Western public 
spaces, particularly spaces in which the right to religious freedom is ostensibly 
guaranteed, some Western commenters demand that those who immigrated from Arab 
countries go back to their countries of origin where their form of modesty is presumed to 
be acceptable. These Western social media users are most likely unaware that hijabis also 
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face discrimination in parts of the Arab world, due to their essentialized, neo-Orientalist 
vision of the region. The issues of discrimination against hijabi and the stigmatization of 
veiling create bridges between many cultures even though the discrimination and 
resulting disappearances occur for distinct reasons based on context. In Western countries, 
veiling is stigmatized because of the pervasiveness of Islamophobia, resulting from the 
racialization and politicization of Islam. In Arab countries, it has because a contested 
symbol of the anti-modern, unwelcomed in venues that wish to convey a “modern image.” 
Since hijab/niqab related issues affect so many women around the world, they present a 
cosmopolitan opportunity for dialogue across various cultures through social media, 
which can facilely and instantaneously connect dissimilar people throughout the world 
around a specific topic, illustrated by the hijabi fashion network and the NiqaBitch 
protest. 
 This section has discussed the disappearances of veiled Muslim women. The self-
confinement of hijabis is partially forced because, if Muslim women had adequate 
protection from the states or sufficient representation within the lawmaking apparatuses, 
in the case of France, they might not feel compelled to engage in self-confinement to 
protect themselves and their religious freedoms. In contrast to these disappeared women, 
other Muslim women have become hyper-visible in Western media. Aside from the 
narratives that reinforce the tropes of victimized Muslim women, the next section will 
highlight another group of Muslim women whose voices are likely to be circulated in 
Western conventional media—those of “native informant spokespeople”—because their 
perspectives on Muslim women are largely in agreement with those of dominant Western 
cultures and they advance common stereotypes of Muslim women and their lived 
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experiences. In opposition, social media users utilize online spaces created by the media 
coverage of the native informant spokespeople to refute the extent to which these 
spokespeople’s opinions actually represent larger communities of Muslims.  
Well-Mediated Perspectives 
Considering the Muslim women who have become favored spokespeople for 
Muslim women everywhere in mainstream American and other Western media and 
cultures, who tend to be unveiled and highly critical of various interpretations of the 
Islamic faith—Mona Eltahawy, Irshad Manji, and Ayaan Hirsi Ali are a few such 
examples mentioned in the datasets—Westerners may mistakenly perceive other forms of 
Islam, especially the forms that these spokespeople reject, as extremist. These “native 
informants,” as Rey Chow (1993) calls them, are criticized in turn by Muslims in social 
media for presuming that they have the right to speak for other Muslim women. While 
these Western-essentializing informants are interesting because they demonstrate the 
variance associated with the Islamic faith, they should not be perceived as the only 
Muslim women who have liberated themselves from the misogyny and violence 
connected to Islam, the so-called “safe” version of Muslims, but simply Muslims who 
conform to particular version Islam.  
A blogger known as “Wood Turtle,” in the hijabi fashion data, broaches the topic 
of “safe” Muslims in a posting about “hijabistas,” which is what Western conventional 
media coverage tends to call hijabi fashion bloggers. Says “Wood Turtle,” “Ever since 
9/11 the Media has been looking for the “safe” Islam.”124 She argues that Western media 
have sensationalized this conspicuously consumptive version of Islam that mixes 
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““Western dress” and hijab” and they have staged the so-called “hijabista” as a “safe” 
typology of Islam, ostensibly because the “hijabistas” are too busy shopping to raise 
future terrorists. However, the most acceptable spokespeople, the ones mentioned above, 
are unveiled. The notion that there is one safe version of Islam, which tends to be 
populated by “Westernized” or “liberated” Muslims, and all other Islamic beliefs veer 
toward extremes is analogous with the comments offered by “ForSoothSayer,” a 
Christian Egyptian woman who blogs at Unnecessary and not very diverting musings, in 
the HarassMap dataset. “ForSoothSayer” states that she resists the urge to blame veiled 
women for the heightened sexual harassment that unveiled women face, although she 
believes that “the ubiquity of the veil makes the unveiled stand out in a manner that 
attracts attention.”125 It is not so much that unveiled women are attempting to attract more 
attention—they may not believe that the hijab is mandated by the Qur’an or they may not 
even be Muslims—but some harassers wrongly perceive the contrast as an invitation to 
direct “sexual advances” at unveiled women. 
In this perhaps inelegant analogy, Western mainstream media are sexual harassers. 
These media devise a model for a “safe” Muslim’s appearance and beliefs. On the 
Egyptian streets, the model of the woman least likely to be available to male advances is 
the fully veiled woman in niqab, hijab, and abaya. Other choices in dress lead the 
harassers to fallaciously judge the woman’s sexual availability or desire to attract male 
“attention.” The “safe” Muslims, like native informant spokespeople, who claim to have 
the credentials to speak on behalf of other Muslims, also create a standard by which other 
Muslims are judged. A “safe” Muslim basically regurgitates the ideals of conservative 
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Western ideology and fabricates the illusion that only Muslims who agree with pre-
established Western norms are “safe” and other interpretations are necessarily more 
extreme. This dynamic tends to result in a hollow form of cosmopolitanism in which 
select members of the cultural “other” move into the category of cosmopolitan through 
their agreement with Western ideals. If the mainstream media and political rhetoric could 
somehow move toward framing the overwhelming majority of Muslims as moderate with 
small strains that are more radical, as is the case with all religions, Western countries 
could reconsider their Islamophobic tendencies and move beyond 
Americentric/Eurocentric cosmopolitanism that selects the criteria through which people 
are assigned the statuses of cosmopolitans and anti-cosmopolitans based on their 
conformity to Western norms.    
Although a niqabi in abaya might not fit the typical (Eurocentric) profile of a 
cosmopolitan, a genuine framing of cosmopolitanism would include very different types 
of people, not just those who agree with Western worldviews and dress like Westerners 
do. In a CNN debate that was posted on YouTube between Mona Eltahawy and Hebah 
Ahmed, a niqabi based in New Mexico, Eltahawy states that she supports the ban of the 
niqab everywhere. Say Eltahawy, “I detest…the niqab and I say this as a Muslim 
woman…It represents an ideology that does not believe in a Muslim woman’s right to do 
anything…[the niqab] dangerously equates piety with the disappearance of women.”126 In 
this quote, Eltahawy stresses her credentials “as a Muslim woman,” to substantiate her 
claim that she is representing the correct version of Islam, while alluding to the idea that 
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the niqab is an instrument of subjugation that implies affiliation with a singular extremist 
“ideology,” an incorrect version of Islam. Ahmed counters,  
[The niqab ban is] yet another example of men telling women how to dress, how to live their life. 
It’s another way to try to control women. To try to legislate what women wear is not only wrong 
it’s against human rights…violates the whole basis of democracy…Just because someone does not 
agree with my interpretation of Islam…doesn’t mean we can use laws to violate freedom of 
expression and freedom of religion. 
 
Although Ahmed says she wears the niqab by volition, Eltahawy believes that the “right-
wing” indoctrination that underpins the niqab leaves women with little choice other than 
veiling or “hellfire” because this “ideology” sets up a spectrum of piety positioning 
niqabis as the pinnacle of righteousness. In other words, she claims that women are 
inculcated with the belief that the more they cover their bodies, the closer they come to 
God. Eltahawy also states that French women’s rights activists support the ban because 
women in the projects, perhaps referring to the barbès, are pressured by the community 
to wear the niqab, which is supported by “Salaves” comment above in reference to the 
(propagandized?) article in the French press. Ahmed refutes this argument, citing 
statistics that put the number of French niqabis at 2,000, the majority of whom are 
European French converts rather than French Muslims of North African descent. 
 Ahmed emphasizes that it is her own choice to veil. Says Ahmed, “…when I 
choose to cover this way I am fighting against a systematic oppression against women in 
which women’s bodies are being sexualized and objectified…” This form of oppression, 
Ahmed opines, manifests in unhealthy diets, eating disorders, plastic surgery, and so 
forth: efforts to create “the perfect body.” She also lays bare the idea that the niqab is a 
symbol of oppression, stating that it “is a different form of empowerment in which I think 
when I’m in public my sexuality is in my control and people have to deal with my brain 
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and who I really am and not judge me by my body.” Ahmed categorically denies the 
proposition that women are forced to veil, which rings untrue in relation to a few of the 
comments in the hijabi fashion dataset, but Eltahawy attempts to deny that any woman 
veils of her own free will, so clearly the truth is somewhere between these polarized 
viewpoints.  
 Global Voices Online published an exposé on “niqab punditry,” featuring 
reactions to the Eltahawy/Ahmed debate. Most of the blog postings that Jillian C. York 
included in article tended to side with Ahmed on the debate. Shanfaraa, an Egyptian 
American bloggers, rejects Eltahawy’s assertion that Muslim women cannot throw off 
religious indoctrination, suggesting the Eltahawy is an apt example of a Muslim woman 
who was able to do just that, being that she was raised in Saudi Arabia and does not now 
follow “Wahhabi-Salafi theology.”127 Shanfaraa goes on to claim that through her support 
of the niqab ban, Eltahawy is tacitly agreeing with the “French State’s characterization 
of…[the niqab] as a form of slavery.” A Lebanese-American female blogger, who writes 
at The Cynical Arab, claims that Eltahawy has become the “go-to feminist icon for the 
“liberation” of women” and, like Shanfaraa, disputes the idea that niqabis “have no 
apparent mind of their own.”128 The “Mouse,” a niqabi blogging at Musings of a Muslim 
Mouse, debunks Eltahawy’s homogenous, right-wing characterization of the “ideology” 
(singular) the underpins the niqab simply by referencing a few niqabis in her family—her 
“Sufi aunt” and her “Indian aunty.”129 Another blogger, Sami Kishawi, reiterates the 
point made by “Wood Turtle” about “safe” Muslims. Says Kishawi, “she boldly claims to 
                                                      
127 http://shanfaraa.com/2011/04/the-niqab-ban-and-mona-el-tahawi/  
128 http://thecynicalarab.wordpress.com/2011/04/13/on-caged-birds-and-liberators/  
129 http://muslimmouse.blogspot.com/2011/04/open-letter-to-mona-el-tahawy.html  
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represent entire groups of people…She used her “Egyptianness” to elevate her agenda 
during the revolution and to push her ideas through mainstream media, which is 
searching for that supremely rare “liberated Muslim woman.”130 Kishawi also reinforces 
my analogy of the sexual harasser and Western media, stating, “Naturally, she insists that 
she’s right and that everyone else is more than just wrong – they’re radicals. Her work 
instigates the divisions within our communities.”  
It seems that some Muslims take issue with those who attempt to represent them, 
especially representatives who Western media deem as “safe” Muslim spokespeople. The 
bloggers above did not so much reject Eltahawy’s right to share her own views but they 
disagreed with her attempt to represent Muslims in general. The “Mouse” states,  
“I strongly disagree with what you say about the niqaab and much about what you say about Islam 
and Muslims in general. But that doesn’t mean I’m going to threaten to kill you…What I will do is 
invite you over for coffee at my place, with…a warm smile that you can detect even beneath my 
niqaab.” 
 
The “Mouse,” like Ahmed, does not perhaps fit the usual rendition of a cosmopolitan, but 
her comments convey a form of vernacular cosmopolitan praxis. The “Mouse” says, 
“Let’s talk over coffee,” rather than “Listen to me! I’m right.” This praxis involves 
vernacular cosmopolitans who remain true to their own beliefs but encourage dialogue 
with those who have different opinions. It encourages dialogue rather than attempting to 
impose beliefs on others. Ahmed, for instance, demonstrates her cosmopolitan affiliation, 
which is often difficult to maintain in conjunction with religious beliefs, with her 
statement that “if [Eltahawy] wants diversity in Islamic belief, then she has to accept my 
version, just like I have to accept hers.”131 This vernacular cosmopolitan praxis might 
have been limited to a form of Muslim cosmopolitanism if it had only circulated within 
                                                      
130 http://smpalestine.com/2011/04/11/why-mona-eltahawy-is-fundamentally-wrong/  
131 http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/04/20/global-bloggers-take-issue-with-anti-niqaab-punditry/ 
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nodes of the digital ummah network, which I will discuss further in Chapter 5, but, since 
Ahmed’s opinions were aired on conventional media and the Mouse’s discussion was 
shared within transnational, rather than Muslim-oriented, cyberspaces, their messages had 
the more profound cosmopolitan impact of reaching the dominant transnational 
connective memory. Both the “Muslim Mouse” and Ahmed were able to enhance the 
dominant transnational connective memory through revealing that Muslim women, even 
those who are often framed as extremists due to their “radical” interpretations of the 
Qur’anic mandate on modesty, are tolerant of divergent interpretations of Islam. Their 
stances of openness frustrate renditions of Islam that present it as a monolith, which are 
badly needed to counter neo-Oreintalism, and these niqabis demonstrate that Muslim 
women who practice more extreme interpretations of modesty do not necessarily comply 
with the stereotype of the cowed, voiceless Muslim woman. They actually demonstrate 
more tolerance than the “safe” Muslims championed in conventional media, while 
simultaneously challenging neo-Orientalist stereotypes.  
Discussion 
The voices of Muslim women expand the networked memories because, through 
social media outlets, they have the opportunity to share their worldviews. This chapter 
has demonstrated how the participation of Muslim women in social media has kept 
fellow Muslim women alive, immortalized in the networked memory, when they quickly 
disappear from conventional news sources. Sometimes the narratives are not mediated 
into the dominant transnational collective memory because they involve Muslim women 
who defy stereotypes imposed by the Western media that frame them as victims. The 
stories of martyred women demonstrate strength and resistance in the face of 
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insurmountable injustices. Some chose death rather than oppression. Others are murdered 
for standing up for themselves or challenging social norms. Muslim women also use 
social media to prevent future martyrdoms and disappearances. These social media users 
are not trying to achieve grandiose concessions, like the right to abortion or sexual 
liberations, but they do want unfettered access to the public sphere and they want the 
freedom to choose how they will live their lives even if their actions do not comply with 
social norms. They reject social conventions that limit the free movement of women, 
especially since their mobility is sometimes met with violence in the streets or at home. 
Muslims women also demand protection of their right to free religious expression but 
laws, which in some contexts protect their freedoms, could in other contexts contribute to 
disappearances, like in France where national unity is deemed as more important than 
individual rights. 
Since their inception, social media have served as platforms for self-expression 
and, soon thereafter, as platforms for connections and bridges. Couldry (2008) frames 
“digital storytelling” as “the ability to represent the world around us – using a shared 
infrastructure” (p. 374). As social media networks began to connect people throughout 
the world, they became platforms for intercultural communication (Shuter, 2012; Chen, 
2012) and spheres for cosmopolitan opportunities. The act of digital storytelling is 
transformative on both the transmitter’s and receptor’s ends because the former, 
especially if the transmitter is an Muslim women who is challenging social taboos, has 
engaged in subtle resistance and the latter has the option of discovering alternative 
narratives related to the experiences of Muslims women. The tragic deaths of Muslim 
women ironically provide opportunities for discussions of women’s rights without 
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discussing women’s rights. Nearly everyone can agree that the suicide of a teenage girl, 
for example, is a tragedy that should be prevented so digital storytellers can provide the 
circumstances contributing to the suicide—in the case of Filali, legal, governmental, and 
familial complicity—without indicting the systemic patriarchy that gave rise to the 
disaster. Discussions of patriarchy, gender equality, and feminism often delegitimize 
claims for the extension of women’s rights in Muslim communities so acts of subtle 
resistance have become an art form in which women tell stories with deeper underlying 
meanings without themselves articulating the systemic factors that contribute to the 
injustices.    
Couldry used both the concepts of “mediatization” and “mediation” to position 
digital storytelling’s potentially important contributions to the larger “mediascape” 
(Appadurai, 1996) as well as to social and political discourses. Mediatization relates to 
the standardization of media practice and how “real-world” events are staged to mimic 
media offerings, while mediation refers to the complex interplay through which messages 
are transmitted, received, and dispersed. Mediated messages not only alter the sender and 
recipient but also the medium through which the message is relayed and the larger social 
settings of both the sender and receiver. To use an example from a previous section, the 
case of Amina Filali can be employed to illustrate both concepts. Filali’s suicide was ripe 
for “mediatization”; within months of her death two different producers were planning 
documentary projects to render Filali’s trying life and untimely death. She had a beautiful 
face and, either by accident or design, activists who championed her cause used the same 
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photo in all the materials,132 including protest signs, press releases, and social media sites, 
so her face became easily recognizable. Although the story of her rape and suicide are 
somewhat contested, in regard to whether or not she was actually raped or engaged in 
consensual intercourse133 and whether Fallaq, the rapist/husband, left her to die rather 
than taking her to the hospital or dragged her dying through the streets by her hair,134 the 
reporting of the incidents before and after the suicide became increasingly consistent in 
media offerings. Furthermore, the framing of the incident was crucial to its mediatization 
and its mediation. If the story had been framed as the domestic abuse of a young wife 
rather than the rape of a minor, it would not have likely inspired much media attention 
locally or internationally—it was the victimization tropes and the scandalous nature of 
the events that became newsworthy.  
The framing of Filali’s story fostered the process of mediation through which it 
shifted from the Moroccan collective memory into the dominant transnational connective 
memory. Davis and Weinsbenker (2012) state that narrative framing is a crucial element 
of storytelling because “As we narrate, we interpret what things mean, evaluate their 
significance, and infer why they happened” (p. 52). They go on to say, “the narrative 
itself becomes a tool that shapes memory and mediates future experience” (Davis & 
Weinsbenker, 2012, p. 53). As such, the Moroccan courts could no longer invoke this law 
without remembering or being reminded of the tragic death of Filali because her narrative 
had become part of the collective Moroccan memory and activists moved forward with 
                                                      
132 Filali appeared to come from a poor family so it is also possible that this was the only photograph that 
her parents had of her. 
133 http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/03/17/201337.html  
134 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17379721  
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their work remembering her sacrifice—the 16-year-old’s sacrifice became a paragon that 
few would emulate but many would share.  
And share they did. Moroccan activists started the “We Are All Amina Filali” 
Facebook page, the #RIPAmina meme, and an online petition and the international press 
quickly picked up the story. Although some of the materials associated with the campaign 
were in French and many of the protest signs were in Arabic, as the message traveled into 
transnational digital spaces, materials were increasingly conveyed in English along with 
well-recognized shorthand, like RIP. A visualization of the #RIPAmina hashtag from the 
SlutWalk Morocco Facebook page demonstrated that this shorthand was aptly mediated 
as the meme trended more in France and Egypt than in Morocco. Filali became a 
Moroccan symbol for gender equality and legal reform and an international symbol for 
human rights. Although Moroccan activists were spreading awareness of the issue to 
expand national discourse on political and legal rights, part of the reason that the story 
was picked up internationally is because the event coincided with preconceptions of the 
experiences of Arab women as victims.  
The narratives of the other martyred women were not as well mediated, starting at 
the national level, which appears to be the crucial vaulting point in some cases for the 
successful mediation of narratives into the dominant transnational connective memory. 
Although Laroui was the first female to self-immolate during the uprisings in the MENA 
region, as a woman, Moroccans had a difficult time promoting her as the face of 
Moroccan protests. She executed her protest the day after the widespread protests in cities 
across Morocco on February 20, 2011, which should have tied her suicide to the general 
frustration related to political rights in Morocco. Furthermore, Laroui’s last words before 
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she lit the accelerant were that she hoped her sacrifice would incite others to “take a stand 
against injustice, corruption, and tyranny.”135 Laroui wanted her death to motivate people 
toward change, while it appears that Filali mainly wanted to escape the context of violent 
that had been forced upon her. Laroui’s tale was as tragic if not more so than Filali’s, as a 
homeless, single woman with children, but Laroui’s biggest problem, the one that 
prevented her from becoming a popular heroine among the Moroccan people, is that she 
did not have a husband in a context in which single motherhood could be equated with 
prostitution. Since the narrative of Laroui’s suicide was not widely shared locally and 
nationally, it had little chance of transnational mediation. The February 20 Movement 
attempted to promote Laroui as a symbol against tyranny but the digital materials 
available were mostly in Arabic and French, which perhaps limited their mediation into 
the dominant transnational connective memory. Tellingly, in February 2014, a Google 
search of the names Amina Filali and Fadwa Laroui resulted in over half a million hits 
and under 10,000, respectively. 
Although national mediation appeared to be a critical determinant in the failed 
dissemination of Laroui’s narrative into the dominant transnational connective memory, 
the story of El Sherbini’s murder bypassed this level. Since the transnational connective 
memory continues to be dominated by Western gatekeepers, particularly subject coverage 
in international news media, narratives that do not comply with well-established beliefs 
about the subject’s positionality might have a difficult time being mediated at the 
transnational level. El-Sherbini did not fit comfortably into the stereotype of the veiled 
Muslim woman because she spoke out against the verbal abuse of an Islamophobe, and 
                                                      
135 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rachel-newcomb/fadwa-laroui-morocco_b_829467.html  
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by extension against systemic discrimination against Muslim, and was able to 
successfully navigate the German criminal justice system to seek justice against Wiens, 
her attacker. The German press stressed that Wiens was not a German but a Russian 
immigrant to advance the case as an incident of personal bigotry, leaving the myth of the 
functionality of multiculturalism intact. Notwithstanding, Western media are reluctant to 
actively cover cases of discrimination against Muslims unless the motives of the Muslims 
could be rendered as spurious, such as the case of Boudlal v. Disney in Chapter 6 in 
which many commenters claimed she was trying to swindle money from the company. 
El-Sherbini’s case demonstrates the dialectic between expanding the connective memory 
through digital self-expression and the suppression alternative narratives by the 
gatekeeping of “institutionalized media” which continue to dominate the “general 
circulation of symbols in social life” (Silverstone, 2002, p. 762).            
 Although Western institutionalized media serve as a gatekeeping mechanism for 
the dominant transnational connective memory, there are also alternative connective 
memories, which, in the case of transnational Muslim networks, has been referred to as 
the “digital ummah,” or what I call the “digital ummah network.” In the case of El-
Sherbini as well as other cases, like the Jyllands-Posten affair (Saunders, 2008; Klausen, 
2009), it was not the issue itself disseminated among Muslim cyberpublics that 
encouraged dominant transnational mediation, but the reactions of Muslims to these 
incidents. Muslim cyberpublics, or nodes of the digital ummah network, variously labeled 
as the “Islamic Internet souq” and “public Islam,” are typically analyzed through 
scholarly focuses on Muslim discussion boards or authoritative Islamic sites. El-
Nawaway and Khamis (2010), for example, broach the “Islamic Internet souq” in terms 
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of the Habermasian public sphere, following Salvatore and Eickelman’s (2006) “public 
Islam,” through their study of two popular Islamic forums. However, studies such as this 
tend to perhaps conflate nodes with networks, particularly in invoking the “souq” through 
two forums and presenting them as representative of larger Muslim cyberpublics. Though 
the digital ummah network comes alive during debates of certain issues, particularly 
incidents of Islamophobia and, among Muslim women, those related to women’s rights, 
the sphere is too fragmented to offer a detailed picture of the interactions and dialogues 
of Muslims online but it is possible to analyze specific snapshots, which are offered by 
studies like Nawaway and Khamis’s (2010). In the case of the Jyllands-Posten affair, 
parts of the “public Islam” online were able to promote widespread boycotts of Danish 
products that were effective in impacting the economy in general (Ammitzbøll & Vidino, 
2007). In the case of El-Sherbini, the lack of international coverage of the tragedy did not 
translate into widespread mediation in the dominant transnational connective memory, 
but contributed to her iconography as the “Hijab Martyr” for other Muslims who 
participate in the digital ummah network, particularly Egyptians who attended her funeral 
services in droves. It also presented another case in which discrimination against 
Muslims was largely ignored in Western and international news media. 
The connective memory is not simply the idea of the collective memory 
transcribed online but it is similar to the latter in the sense that it relates to connections 
that individuals have with the communal past(s) (Sørensen, 2007) and because the 
archive is subject to gatekeeping mechanisms of the technology, similar to the 
corporate/state gatekeeping of conventional media. Yet it is dissimilar in regard to the 
sociality that underpins the connective memory. According the van Dijck (2010), the 
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“networked memory requires a new understanding of agency where minds and technics 
are intertwined” (p. 3) and “the intricate co-evolution of sociality and technicity” (p. 4). 
Van Dijck borrows the concept of connective memory from Hoskins (2011), who coined 
the phrase to describe the “devices and media, shaping an ongoing recalibration of time, 
space (and place) and memory by people as they connect with, inhabit and constitute 
increasingly both dense and diffused social networks” (p. 271). Due to the ready access 
of networked technology, becoming part of an alternative connective memory even 
actively participating in the mediation of messages through these networks becomes 
relatively easy, but there is no guarantee that messages circulating within these 
alternative spheres will translate into mediation into the dominant transnational 
connective memory. The perspectives of “safe Muslims” in conventional media, such as 
Eltahawy’s views on the niqab ban, are actually useful in regard to mediation from 
Muslim cyberpublics into the dominant connective memory because it is unlikely, for 
example, that Ahmed alone would have been invited to share her views. Thus, when 
Western media invite debates between “safe” Muslims and “others,” they present 
opportunities for Muslim cyberpublics to be integrated into the dominant connective 
memory.   
Whether dialogue takes place on a well-known conventional media outlet, like the 
Eltahawy/Ahmed debate, or a blogger reflects on this debate on her blog, some theorists 
maintain that either intervention might serve to expand dominant transnational discourse 
related to Muslim women in the contemporary era. Sørensen (2007) discusses what 
Jansson (2002) categorizes as “communicative fabric,” following Lefevbre (2005), and 
how this fabric leaves marks on the spaces where it weaves together (p. 68). Therefore, 
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even if not all voices leave large “marks” on the dominant transnational connective 
memory, they do leave marks. Some of these marks involve Muslim women exhibiting 
the cosmopolitan praxis of positive dialogue and remaining true to their own beliefs 
while accepting the inherent differences of people, even divergent religious 
interpretations of other Muslims. The media coverage of “safe” Muslims actually 
provides an important cosmopolitan opportunity for oppositional Muslim voices to 
demonstrate the tolerance and variation of contemporary Islamic viewpoints, especially 
among stereotypical “extremists.” Due to this variation among Muslims, the digital 
ummah is a mythical space but topics like hijab discrimination, the French niqab ban, 
HarassMap, and so forth attract the attention of social media users from various loosely 
connected Muslim cyberpublics within the larger digital ummah network, demonstrating 
that cosmopolitan praxis does not necessarily need to include Westerners as long as 
interlocutors from various national contexts are conversing with one another in the spirit 
of cooperation and accepting difference.        
Conclusion 
 This chapter has highlighted some of the efforts of Muslim women to speak up 
against the disappearances and, in extreme cases, martyrdoms, of their Muslim sisters. 
Some cases are more successfully mediated than others because of unchallenged 
presuppositions about the uniform victimized identity of Muslim women and due to the 
Western propagated model of what Muslim women should be through encounters with 
native informants spokespeople. Digital self-expressions that reinforce expectations of 
the lived of experiences of Muslim women are more likely to be mediated into the 
dominant connective memory of cyberspaces, while stories that challenge these 
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preconceptions may be mediated within more localized connective memories but they 
may seldom move beyond them.   
 The next chapter analyzes divergent perspective within alternative connective 
memories regarding the divisive issue of spinsterhood in Muslim communities in the 
Arab world and the West. It will detail measures proposed by governments to reduce the 
increasing number of unmarried women, localized community and individual responses, 
and the perspectives of Muslims spinsters themselves. The social media interventions of 
Muslim women and Muslim spinsters suggest that part of the issue that is not alluded to 
in dominant discourse related to spinsterhood is women’s lack of agency and communal 
gendered double standards, which instill women with apprehension that potential suitors 
will not likely treat them as equals.  
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Chapter 4 
Women’s Agency and Muslim Marriage 
 
 In a blog posting, “48Refugee,” a Palestinian woman in the United States, 
discusses the conflict between her dreams and the expectations of potential suitors.136 She 
looks forward to her 25th birthday, even though she has been taught to fear it her whole 
life, because she is tired of apologizing for whom she is to make herself more appealing 
to men. She would prefer to use her talents to contribute to her community rather than be 
coerced into quitting her job to have a “half-dozen kids.” She says that people make her 
feel like a “freak” for wanting to use “the blessings God has given [her]…to serve Him, 
before serving” her prospective husband. “48Refugee” hopes that now that her pool of 
prospective suitors is limited to men over 30, due to her “advanced” age, they will be less 
likely to be looking for “just-out-of-high-school, baby-making, live-in maids…a younger, 
hotter version of their mother” and more likely to realize that intelligent women are not a 
threat to their manhood and have as much to offer “to the world and God as men do.” She 
decides to celebrate her 25-year-old spinsterhood instead of perceiving it as a personal 
failure. She emphasizes her worth as a human being, “independent of the roles of mother 
and wife” that her community attempts to force upon her. “48Refugee” is stating that her 
decision to delay marriage so that she can use her talents toward the betterment of her 
community should not be understood as a personal flaw but as a rejection of the judgment 
of women, based on their compliance with social norms and their procreative promise, 
and a choice that is partially due to the lack of suitors who will see her as their equal 
rather than their maid.  
                                                      
136 http://48refugee.blogspot.com/2013/01/celebrating-spinsterhood.html 
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 “48 Refugee’s” narrative highlights several issues related to spinsterhood from the 
perspective of Muslim women that will be addressed in this chapter. There is very little 
scholarly literature on the trend of spinsterhood within Muslim communities. 
Significantly, the query “Muslim spinster” only yielded two results on Google Scholar in 
January of 2013. The topic is theorized indirectly by scholars in discussions of women’s 
rights and forms of women’s activism (Tohidi, 1998) and in articles related to the agency 
of Muslim women (Mahmood, 2001; Ong, 1990), which is central to the theoretical 
framework broached in this chapter’s “Discussion.” In what follows, I will attempt to 
address the question of how different Muslims from various social positions frame the 
issue of spinsterhood and their proposed solutions for countering its increasing 
prevalence. This chapter will demonstrate not only the variance of Muslim communities 
but also how Muslim spinsters have used social media to advance countersentences to 
dominant discourses related to spinsterhood.   
 The proposed solutions to what has been marked by governments and media in 
the Arab world as a “crisis”—government grants, an imposed ceiling on mahr (the “bride 
price,” or the financial responsibility that a man pledges to his prospective wife in the 
marriage contract), temporary marriages (misyar), initiatives to prevent marriages 
between nationals and foreign women, and polygyny (related to the disputed Qur’anic 
permissibility of marrying up to four women)—do not largely benefit women, although 
polygyny has become a collective/individual response to the perceived lack of available 
men in some contexts. Some Muslim women view spinsterhood as an empowered choice 
and resent the social stigma that they face for remaining unmarried. These spinsters tend 
to suggest that the problem lies in the shortcomings of their suitors rather than in their 
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own character flaws. I piece together discussions from several datasets to demonstrate 
how spinsterhood could be seen as a form of subtle resistance to the following: the 
obsession with female virginity, the limitations on women’s agency, the pervasive 
gendered double standards in Muslim communities, and violence against women that 
diminishes their desire to form relationships with men.  
 This section has introduced different perspectives on Muslim spinsterhood and 
how the proposed solutions in dominant discourse do not tend to favor women or address 
why Muslim women might want to delay marriage or not marry at all. The next section 
will discuss how the internet has been “domesticated” or “cultured” to facilitate marriage 
and other religious obligations. 
Social Media as Spiritual Technologies 
 Marriage is often considered a religious obligation for Muslims (Situmorang, 
2007; Ghaffar & Shenaz, 2010) and, as such, the internet is sometimes employed to 
facilitate this important socio-religious duty, though its use toward this end is contested 
among Muslims. Some use the internet to engage in “halal dating,” which is related to 
prospective spouses becoming acquainted online. Others use it to find prospective 
spouses in contexts in which traditional circuits for matchmaking are diminished (Piela, 
2011). Although some scholars theorize that the internet is acting upon religion, 
particularly hierarchies of ecumenical knowledge, Campbell (2005) discusses how 
religious people are acting upon the technology through its “domestication.” She claims, 
“technology is cultured by the culture in which it lives and by the agents who utilize it” 
(Campbell, 2005, p. 3). Thus, while within non-religious communities, social media users 
might use the internet to “hook up,” people from religious communities may use it to find 
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prospective marriage partners. Piela (2011) finds that British Muslim women on Muslim 
dating websites stipulate that they are only interested in meeting men who are serious 
about marriage, no “players” or men who are already married or in relationships. Beyond 
that these women also map out the type of marriages they want—partnerships—and 
whom they consider to be “‘Islamically suitable’ partners”—no “mummies boy[s]” or 
“cultural Muslims.” Some of these Muslim women articulate that they would rather 
remain single than marry into a subservience positions vis-à-vis their husbands.     
 Traditional religious groups sometimes divide aspects of contemporary living into 
the categories of “sacred” and “profane” and internet technologies are occasionally 
associated with “profane” modernity. Thus some Muslims who wish to utilize this 
profane technology are faced with the task of domesticating it toward expressions that 
comply with their religious cultures. As I will discuss below, Muslims who oppose 
gender mixing online etch out ways that Muslim men and women can appropriately 
interact within cyberspaces, which can be seen as a way of making the profane more 
sacred. Muslim women are also advised by some interlocutors who attempt to influence 
the technology toward the sacred to police each other’s internet use, which has led some 
female bloggers, like “Fadi 7aki,” to complain that social media serve to reinforce offline 
social norms and gendered double standards. Other women, such as Reem Asaad, 
substantiate the theory of “cultured technology” (Barzilai-Nahon & Barzilai, 2005), 
arguing that the internet has allowed women to shape the technology, in the Saudi context, 
for example, by engaging in social interaction while remaining “physically invisible.” For 
Asaad, “cultured technology” is not necessarily a process of spiritualization but an 
instrument that serves to extend the public sphere, at least virtual one. Muslim women 
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can also “culture” their social media use toward more extreme forms of resistance, while 
remaining physically invisible, in contexts in which their mobility in the physical public 
sphere is limited. Later in this chapter, I argue that more extreme “invisible” forms of 
resistance enacted in cyberspaces are tied to Muslim women’s lack of agency (Tohidi 
1991, 2002; Mahmood 2001) but, although they are extreme forms of resistance in the 
spaces in which they are played out, they remain “subtle” due to their invisibility.  
  Campbell (2005) also notes some general trends in internet use toward the 
promotion of religion both on and offline. One of these trends is the iterative 
development of “religious identity,” which she conceptualizes as “individuals [who] 
subscribe to common beliefs based on specific religious tradition lived out through public 
rituals” (p. 18). Her focus on practices is germane to Muslims who may not qualify their 
own Muslim identity but they may demarcate typologies of Muslimness based on others’ 
Islamic “public rituals” (or outward expressions of faith), which I will discuss further in 
the Chapter 5. Using social media to develop religious identity can be seen as expanding 
the Habermasian public sphere, which has often been framed as secular because “to root 
political participation in civic virtue is to impose a demand on the citizen that necessarily 
restricts his or her individual freedom” (Hirschkind, 2001, p. 4). However, Hirschkind 
(2001) recognizes that the public sphere theorized by Habermas was never free from the 
influence of Christianity. Likewise, Campbell (2005) notes, “religion still plays a key role 
in the social construction of cultural spaces” (p. 5). Hence, despite the norm in secular 
societies to cast publics as non-religious political spheres, “private” religion, as an 
important element of political and cultural formations, continues to weigh in on “public” 
politics. Feminist theorists have also argued that public and private is a false dichotomy 
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(Elshtain 1982), which will be demonstrated by this chapter’s linkages between gender 
inequality in on and offline “public” spheres and its effects on the family in the “private” 
sphere. As I discussed in the Chapter 3, cyberpublics can be expanded to accommodate 
voices that are absent from the physical public sphere but this accommodation also 
implies that these voices are positioned outside of dominant discourses. This chapter will 
outline how the internet can be domesticated to serve as a tool for countering dominant 
discourses and advancing counterclaims related to the rights of Muslim women and their 
access to the public spheres, as forms of resistance that are sometimes proscribed in 
physical public spheres, as exemplified by the resistance of spinsters to ostracism and 
women’s rejection of victim-blaming associated with sexual harassment.   
 Some women use the spaces created by this “cultured technology” to assert their 
God-given rights to access public spheres and to equal, rather than subordinated, 
positions in the family. Moghadam and Sadiqi (2006) argue, “Women’s strategic use of 
media as a means of access to the public sphere transforms and feminizes both” (p. 3). 
They do not specifically mention online media but a few of the blog postings well 
illustrate the efforts of Muslim women to transform public spheres toward their equal 
inclusion and feminize the patriarchal family. “48Refugee,” for example, cites her desire 
to use her “God-given” talents to contribute to her community in ways other than keeping 
a home and having children. Other Muslim women, like Hina Khan, reference the 
intention of the Qur’an rather than its verbatim passages to argue against the modern-day 
practice of polygyny, claiming their right to disagree with the Qur’anic hermeneutics of 
traditional male scholars. Online discussions in the HarassMap dataset assert that 
Egyptian women have earned their equal access to the physical public sphere through 
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their God-given rights and their participation in the revolution. These Egyptian women 
also reject social norms that excuse men’s actions based on the common belief that men 
cannot control themselves—“God made them that way.” Muslim women are feminizing 
social media, and by extension online and offline public spheres, through demanding that 
men treat them as equals.  
 This section has discussed how social media are cultured to facilitate religious 
obligations, such as marriage, promote religious interventions in “public” spheres, and 
exercise subtle, yet in some cases extreme, forms of resistance against hierarchical 
configurations of public spaces. The next several sections will present examples of how 
social media have been cultured to offer counterclaims to dominant discourse on 
spinsterhood in contexts in which female access to public spheres is contested. While 
dominant discourse renders the high and growing number of unmarried women as a 
“crisis,” the counterclaims offered by some Muslim women suggest that, although many 
of them view marriage as an important social institution, the proposed solutions offered 
in dominant discourses would not address their concerns regarding the type of marriage 
to which they would commit themselves. 
Governmental Responses to Spinsterhood 
Based on the Muslim spinster dataset, spinsterhood has been framed as a “crisis” 
by governments and online news sources throughout the Arab world.137 Spinsterhood 
                                                      
137 According to Middle East Online, 60% of women over 30 in the UAE are single: http://www.middle-
east-online.com/english/?id=53150. Another article lists the numbers of spinsters in various MENA 
countries: Egypt (nine million), Algeria (four million), Iraq (three million), and Yemen (two million) as the 
countries. Although Morocco, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia all have about 1.5 million spinsters, in Saudi 
Arabia, this figure makes up 30 percent of the women of marriageable ages, the same percentage of 
unmarried women in Yemen and Libya. Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and UAE have percentages of 35%: 
http://www.emirates247.com/news/region/saudi-arabia-warned-of-women-explosion-2011-12-18-
1.433275. 
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would not be of such grave concern were there not an implicit “expiration date” on the 
age of marriageable women—a woman’s choices of prospective husbands greatly 
diminishes by the time she reaches 25 and by the age of 30 her chances of getting a 
marriage proposal are nearly nil. Online news commentators suggest various reasons for 
the rise in the number of spinsters. In the Gulf region, some articles blame men who 
choose to marry foreign brides138 along with prohibitions on marriages between Gulf 
women and Muslim and non-Muslim men of other nationalities.139 Some articles and 
social media interlocutors claim that the greed of women and their families, related to the 
trend of demanding exorbitant mahr (bride prices), is to blame for the growing incidence 
of spinsterhood. Other commentators blamed women for putting off marriage to pursue 
their education and/or careers. The problem perhaps is not so much that a substantial 
proportion of the population of marriageable women is unmarried but that Saudi men, for 
example, are not marrying Saudi women and creating Saudi babies. In countries with 
slight populations, like the population of Emiratis in the UAE that stands at less than 1 
million, if Emirati men and women do not have children, the culture is likely to evolve 
into something else. While some might not consider cultural evolution to be tragic, it 
could disrupt the status quo that allows the establishment to maintain its power (Nahas, 
1985; Mach, 1993). Thus, taking measures to ensure that the population maintains 
cultural homogeneity through nationals marrying other nationals plays a part in 
reinforcing existing power structures. Furthermore, families, communities, and 
governments all have their motivations for encouraging women to marry, and women 
                                                      
138 For example, in 2010, 30% of the marriages performed in the UAE were between Emirati men and non-
Emirati women. 
139 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/society/rise-in-number-of-spinsters-as-emiratis-marry-foreigners-
1.672200 
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have their own reasons for remaining single, so this issue demonstrates a variety of 
Muslim perspectives as well as dominant discourses and counterclaims.   
Due to the “crisis” incidence of spinsterhood in the Gulf, some governments have 
proposed measures to counter the growing number of unwed women, which have mainly 
addressed the principal complaint of prospective grooms—the high cost of getting 
married. The Emirati government has instituted a ceiling on what a bride’s family can 
request in mahr, although families do still ask for more than the $14,000 ceiling imposed 
by the government.140 The Emirati government has also offered $19,000 to men for their 
first marriage to ameliorate the expense of getting married; it only offers funds for a 
second wife if the first is unable to conceive.141 The Kuwaiti government has approved a 
proposal to give loans to men who marry spinsters, divorcées, and widows142 and it has 
attempted to prevent Kuwaiti men from marrying foreigners by imposing a law that 
stipulates that foreign women married to local men must attain governmental approval to 
live in Kuwait.143 The UAE has passed a similar measure to prevent marriages between 
nationals and foreign women by refusing to issue visas to women under 40 unless a male 
relative accompanies them.144 The Saudi government also blocks marriages between 
Saudi men and foreign women.145 The Bahraini government, particularly religious 
authorities, has encouraged men and women to embrace polygyny, which is true of other 
Gulf officials as well. 
                                                      
140 http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=53150 
141 http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=53150  
142http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/169617/reftab/56/Default.as
px 
143 http://expatandthecity.blogspot.com/2013/01/being-american-gold-digger-in-
kuwait.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+ExpatAndTheCityK
uwait+%28Expat+and+the+City+%7E+Kuwait%29  
144 http://www.economist.com/node/486762 
145 http://xrdarabia.org/2011/01/22/looking-at-saudi-marriage/  
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This section has outlined how spinsterhood is framed in dominant governmental 
and media discourses. The next section will discuss individual and collective responses to 
the growing trend of spinsterhood as well as examples of social media users gathering in 
cyberspaces to expand public spheres through advancing counterclaims to these dominant 
discourses, particularly the promotion of polygyny.   
Collective/Individual Responses 
Social media users did not so much appear to care about the growing rates of 
spinsterhood as they did about government officials’ encouragement of polygyny, which 
some viewed as socially regressive. Sarah Alaoiu, a Bahraini blogger, cites the stir that 
Sheikh Jasem Al Saidi created in the Bahraini blogosphere for encouraging men to marry 
four wives to reduce the number of spinsters in the country. Alaoiu advises Al Saidi to 
return to his cave.146 “SoulSearch,” another female Bahraini blogger, writes, “Women 
don't need men like you to live a dignified life, women are more resilient, more 
determined, more empowered to live an independent way of life, and don't need cavemen 
like you to marry them.”147 One of the commenters on “SoulSearch,” “Think Pink,” a 
transgender female, recognizes Al Saidi as the same governmental official who had 
previously called for the segregation of schools and suggests that Bahraini bloggers vote 
him onto the French television program “Just For Laughs.” Another interlocutor, 
“Bahraini and proud,” suggests that this could be the start of a long entourage of 
regressions including the following: leaving houses for tents, banning computers (as a 
satanic, Western technology), and riding horses instead of bicycles. “Doe14” questions 
why members of the government are attempting to interfere in issues that s/he believes to 
                                                      
146 http://sarahalaoui.blogspot.com/2009/07/all-boxed-in.html 
147 http://soulsearch78.blogspot.com/2007/04/saidism.html  
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be outside of their purview, which is representative of several comments on this thread, 
suggesting instead that officials could better serve the populace through addressing the 
dilapidated state of infrastructure and operation of Bahraini cities. These comments 
implied that Bahraini netizens believe that operational cities are more of a function of the 
government than interfering in the private lives of Bahraini citizens. Although Bahraini 
social media users appear to find the promotion of polygyny anti-modern, it is likely that 
government officials proposed polygyny to maintain status quo through bolstering 
cultural homogeneity. This discussion not only highlights the polarized views on 
contemporary Muslimness, but also how the practice of Islam propagated by Muslims in 
positions of power does not always reflect that of average Muslims whom they ostensibly 
represent.  
What if Muslim women opt to become second-wives of their own volition? 
Should this choice be equally rejected, as it was by the Bahraini social media users? A 
blog posting on A Big Message for an Upside Down World148 discusses an article in the 
Daily Mail149 about some Muslim women in the United Kingdom who have proactively 
sought to become second wives, perhaps to avoid the spinster label, through contracting 
matchmakers to find them interested potential married husbands. The matchmaker, 
mentioned in this blog posting by “nuryn,” says that he has received hundreds of requests 
from women who want to become second wives. “nuryn” claims that British Muslim 
women have had difficulty marrying because they “find themselves between two 
cultures.” They are not keen to agree to arranged marriages but they also reject typical 
                                                      
148 http://www.abigmessage.com/uk-has-muslim-spinster-crisis.html  
149 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2113366/Muslim-women-share-husbands-lack-suitable-
men.html  
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Western-style engagements involving cohabitation. The number of available men also 
contributes to the problematic; for example, the matchmaker referenced above claims that 
women outnumber men five to one at social events to meet potential spouses. “nuryn” 
suggests two reasons that women so starkly outnumber available men: first, the success 
of the woman substantially reduces the number of prospective mates who are her equals 
in terms of intellect and earning potential and it hinders her appeal to available Muslim 
men; and, second, parents encourage their sons to “import” brides because these 
“culturally authentic” women are perceived to be more likely to stay home and look after 
them as they age. Thus some parents encourage cultural stasis through the opposite 
means that governments in the Gulf address it; rather than blocking the entrance of 
foreign brides, they promote it.    
Hina Khan, a Pakistani Londoner blogging at Simply, Hinoo, broaches the same 
Daily Mail article on her blog.150 Khan takes up the controversial stance that polygyny is 
an unacceptable modern-day Islamic practice because the circumstances that gave rise to 
its permissibility in the Qur’an no longer hold true. Khan suggests that it is not so much 
the scarce availability of Muslim men that has contributed to this trend but, to the 
contrary, it is the priorities of career-minded Muslim women that lessen the appeal of 
becoming first wives. First wives are expected to manage the home first and foremost and, 
since it is clearly difficult for women to juggle their career aspirations and their 
household obligations, many women are forced to choose between one and the other. 
This is a difficult choice for women who are inclined to favor the former and view the 
latter as and inconvenience that hinders their potential. As Khan states, “a hectic day at 
                                                      
150 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2113366/Muslim-women-share-husbands-lack-suitable-
men.html  
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work is more important [to them] than cooking.” As a result, the priorities of Muslim 
career women come into conflict with what appeals to potential spouses. Khan also 
claims that the only Muslim men who would consider marrying career women are those 
who already have “someone at home doing the wifey stuff,” although, Khan believes, 
adding the career-oriented second wife creates an imbalance in the relationship between 
the husband and the wife “doing wifey stuff.” Khan speculates that the first wife would 
become a maid for both her husband and the second wife, allowing the second wife to 
sidestep domestic responsibilities and focus on her career, while the second wife has the 
leisure time to act as a companion and intellectual muse for their husband. She 
characterizes the second wife’s position in the threesome as a “part time” relationship, 
akin to being a mistress. 
Khan and the commenters on her blog also collectively attempt to situate why the 
Qur’an allowed polygyny and whether or not the stipulations related to its permissibility 
still apply in the current era. Khan believes that the Qur’anic imperative to treat multiple 
wives equally creates a “catch-22” because, she opines, not even mothers are capable of 
treating their children in a precisely egalitarian fashion. “qrratugai” reinforces Khan’s 
assertion with Qur’anic verse 4:129: “You cannot be just and fair to your wives, even if it 
is your ardent desire.” “Utmani” agrees that men cannot treat multiple wives equally. He 
also claims that the permissibility of polygyny was granted by the Qur’an to address a 
crisis—the “welfare of orphans”—and, in the modern age, it is illegitimate because men 
are not marrying women to help care for their children. “Utmani” goes on to say that a 
few Muslim countries, such as Tunisia and Turkey, have banned polygyny because “they 
believe in IJTEHAD.” Ijtihad is “the power to interpret the revealed text” (Cesari, 2008), 
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which is a practice that has historically been limited to the hermeneutics of popularly 
recognized male scholars. “Utmani” is perhaps referring to ijtihad, in this case, as 
policymakers moving away from traditional interpretations of the Qur’an that also 
stipulate that the gates of ijtihad were closed in the 4th or 7th century of the hijra (the 10th 
or 13th century CE) (Hallaq, 1984), meaning that Muslims who consume traditional 
religious knowledge do not feel that anyone after the 4th or 7th century of hijra has the 
power to interpret the Islamic scriptures.  
Khan recognizes that the practice of ijtihad is disputed among modern-day 
Muslims, which she classifies as “another debate…[between] “practising” Muslims and 
“liberal” Muslims.” Counterparts perhaps associated with the “practising” typology of 
Muslims also commented on her blog. “HUtopian” claims that polygyny is perfectly 
inline with modern day Islamic practices but “westernized feminism,” which accepts 
“single, never married mothers” but rejects “a legitimate relation allowed in Islam,” has 
disrupted tolerance of polygyny. “HUtopian” also claims that Khan, “Utmani,” and 
“qrratugai,” are distorting Islam, or introducing bid’ah (heretical religious innovation), to 
support their personal views. “Anonymous” agrees with “HUtopian,” stating, “there's no 
need to call someone else's lifestyle disgusting. It may not work for you but it may work 
for them.” This commenter claims that it is hypocritical to accept adultery but deny an 
Islamically sanctioned nikah (religious marriage) between two people, which, to be fair, 
the “liberal” camp, including Khan and her supporters, never suggests is acceptable. This 
anonymous commenter also rejects the idea of ijtihad, retorting, “let us stop trying to be 
jurists.” S/he goes on to say, “When you think you can interpret the quran on your own, it 
becomes extremis[t] in my opinion,” offering the examples of Irshad Manji and Osama 
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Bin Laden, whom s/he believes have advanced their own interpretations of the Qur’an 
toward the destabilization of Islam and the weakening of the rhetorical ummah. Most 
readers will immediately identify the latter, Bin Laden, but the former is also quite well 
known in some social media networks as a Muslim lesbian who believes that her 
sexuality does not conflict with the tenets of Islam, which I will discuss further in 
Chapter 5. Thus, “Anonymous” posits that both the extremes of the fundamentalist 
political Islam and “liberal” Islam are contradictory to and weakening the faith. However, 
it is a stretch to lump Muslims who disagree with the practice of the polygyny into the 
same “liberal Muslim” camp with Manji as even Muslims who accept that polygyny is 
permissible in Islam in modern times may not themselves believe that it is a practice in 
which they would want to participate and fewer still might believe that queerness is 
permissible in Islam. “qrratugai” rebukes the statement of the anonymous commenter, 
writing,  
I acknowledge…the mainstream interpretation of Qur'anc [sic] verses pertinent to women, but I do 
not support most of them as they ultimate demean me, subjugate me ... there's a huge difference 
between the Word of my God and the words of scholars…their opinions…are just that – 
opinions…Not one of the interpreters was ever [a] woman, and few seem to realize the problem 
with this! Imagine a group of men making decisions FOR me, deciding what "Islam" says "about" 
me…I'd like to read the text for myself, study it for myself, and understand it for myself, all the 
while surveying the various *different* conclusions made about women by men scholars of Islam 
who saw the dower (mahr) as "the price of the vulva.” 
 
In this comment “qrratugai” also references her credential as a doctoral student in Islamic 
Studies. She avers, as many female Muslim scholars have done (Wadud, 1999; Mernissi, 
1991; Barlas, 2002; Barazangi, 2004; Ali, 2008), that it is her right as a Muslim woman 
to engage in hermeneutics and offer a female interpretation of the Qur’an. Perhaps she 
believes that if more people engaged in ijtihad they would agree that the permissibility of 
polygyny in the Qur’an is not a blanket acceptance of the practice.  
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 Shifting from the United Kingdom back to the Arab world, not only polygyny but 
also the practice of misyar marriages has become more prevalent due to the large number 
of unwed women. These marriages, like the requests of British women to become second 
wives, may be likewise recognized as a collective/individual response to the high number 
of spinsters but this type of marriage is equally controversial. The Crossroads Arabia151 
and Susie’s Big Adventures152 blogs both mention the increase in misyar marriages and 
the trend of taking second wives without the consent of the first wives. These 
arrangements allow men and women to legally engage in sexual relations, in countries in 
which fornication prosecutions result in corporeal punishment, but misyar husbands are 
not in any way obligated to their misyar wives, financially or otherwise. The couple in a 
misyar marriage lives in separate households and may only see one another for a week or 
two per year, so perhaps the only benefit to women is to detangle them from the title of 
spinster. “Susie” says that she personally knows of five families in which the husbands 
took second wives and, in all of these cases, the men did so secretly without having 
informed their first wives and the children from their first marriages. Susie states that the 
first families were devastated when they found out about the second wives. 
 Most of the commenters on “Susie of Arabia’s” posting were against polygyny 
and misyar marriage but “Omani Princess” says,  
“I am totally okay with my husband marrying a second wife (with my full knowledge and respect 
for my feelings…) or with BEING a seocnd  [sic] wife if the first wife is not going to be hurt by it. 
Islam allows it for a reason. But too many women AND men abuse it.”153  
 
“Omani Princess” is qualifying the practice rather than stating that polygyny is actually 
not Islamic, such as marrying a second wife to “upgrade…[the first wife] with a younger 
                                                      
151 http://xrdarabia.org/2011/01/22/looking-at-saudi-marriage/ 
152 http://susiesbigadventure.blogspot.com/2010/07/spinsters-in-saudi-arabia.html 
153 http://susiesbigadventure.blogspot.com/2010/07/spinsters-in-saudi-arabia.html 
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model” as “Aafke-Art” states, or Islamic without exception. In her comment she also 
includes links to a few blog posts that she has written on the subject. “Omani Princess” 
starts by saying that polygyny is abused for “prestige and sex”154 but most of her first 
posting is another blogger’s—“Pixie,” blogging at Beautiful Muslimah—rationale for 
accepting polygyny.155 “Pixie” stresses that a man should only marry more than one wife 
if he can physically, mentally, and spiritually treat the wives equally and the only women 
who should be considered as potential second wives are orphans, unmarried reverts, 
divorced women without families, and women with little or no financial support. “Pixie” 
claims that treating orphans fairly means that a man should marry them to prevent 
himself “from taking advantage of them or doing things improper.” Other interpretations 
of this verse (4:3) claim that treating orphans fairly is more of a fiduciary concern related 
to absconding the wealth of orphans (Wadud, 1999) so “Pixie’s” interpretation actual 
counters “Omani Princess’s” earlier statement that marrying a second wife for sex is an 
abuse of the practice. “Pixie” ends her posting with a description of a polygynous family 
that was “done correctly” to demonstrate that it is possible. In this arrangement, the first 
wife and third wife, who was a divorcée from an abusive family, were close in age and 
the second wife, a widow who was thirty years older than the husband, served as a 
mother figure to the other wives. The three wives were close friends. This example does 
appear to comply with the stipulations that “Pixie” mentioned above, demonstrating that 
genuinely Islamic forms of polygyny are possible though perhaps rare.    
In the second posting, “Omani Princess” emphasizes the importance of the first 
wife’s consent to the second marriage by sharing a touching letter that a prospective 
                                                      
154 http://howtolivelikeanomaniprincess.blogspot.com/2009/12/all-these-posts-about-second-wives.html  
155 http://ilovehishmatheblog.blogspot.com/2009/08/when-would-i-consider-this-second-wife.html 
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second wife sent to the first wife.156 The posting situates the appropriate practice of 
polygyny as a communal rather than personal undertaking through encouraging potential 
second wives to secure the permission of the first wife.  However, she also makes an 
inflammatory remark by placing the blame for the first wife’s emotional distress, due to 
her husband marrying a second wife without her consent, squarely on the shoulders of the 
second wife because the husband “is just a man.” However, the Qur’an says nothing 
about the second wife’s obligations to the first wife other than perhaps the dictates of the 
common decency that Muslims should demonstrate to one another. It is the husband who 
is commanded by the Qur’an to treat his wives with fairness but the prospective second 
wife has made no such commitment to the first wife. Certainly, the first wife should have 
the opportunity to consent or object to the second-wife marriage but “Omani Princess” 
takes up the tenuous position that women should once again bear the onus of men’s 
misdeeds because “he is just a man.” Her statement also mimics the excuses that 
Egyptian men and women use to justify violence against of women in the streets in the 
HarassMap dataset; that is, men cannot control themselves so women bear the burden of 
protecting themselves. “Just being a man” then becomes a catchall for stupidity, violence, 
and oppression.  
Despite “Omani Princess’s” incendiary remarks, both she and “Pixie” are 
attempting to contribute to basic standards of comportment, including the following: first 
wives should have the opportunity to consent or not to their husbands marrying second 
wives and potential second wives should be limited to women whom may need financial, 
social, and emotional support. This is a form of cosmopolitan praxis in that “Omani 
                                                      
156 http://howtolivelikeanomaniprincess.blogspot.com/2010/07/letter-from-other-woman-to-first-wife.html 
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Princess” and “Pixie” do not believe that polygyny is universally acceptable but they are 
suggesting certain basic standards through which it can be practiced in an Islamic manner. 
If the practice of polygyny were limited to Muslim countries, this praxis might be 
considered a form Muslim cosmopolitanism but, since it is practiced throughout the 
world it, these standards could apply to polygynous relationships elsewhere as well.  
There is a myriad of proposed “solutions” to the spinsterhood dilemma, which 
demonstrates extraordinary variance among those who consider themselves Muslims. 
These solutions vary based on geography (for example, the legality of proposed solutions 
in various contexts), culture, local communities, and families but they generally do not 
appear to be beneficial to women, unless a woman is eager to become second wives even 
though her polygynous family may face the disdain of the larger society and other 
Muslims who disagree with the practice. Reducing mahr leaves women vulnerable in the 
event that their husbands divorce them. Imposing measures to prevent Gulf men from 
marrying foreigners, may coerce men into marrying local women but, if one of these men 
is in love with a foreign woman, how will he treat the local woman that he is forced to 
marry instead? Although some governmental initiatives stipulate that funds to encourage 
marriage are only granted to men for their first marriages, giving men money to 
ameliorate the costs of marriage or encouraging them to take multiple wives does not 
necessarily signify that they will marry spinsters. Many men may continue to draw from 
the pool of more attractive (read: younger) prospective brides, described by “Refugee 48” 
as women in their late teens/early twenties who lack college educations and/or career 
aspirations. Nonetheless, these measures may encourage men and women to marry if they 
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really want to or if they really do not want to be branded as spinsters, but others may 
prefer to remain unmarried, which I will discuss in the next section.  
This section has highlighted various perspectives on polygyny, one of the 
solutions that government officials have advanced to counter the growing number of 
unmarried women in the Gulf region and a communal/individual response to the 
perceived lack of available men in some Western Muslim communities. In Bahrain, some 
commenters framed polygyny as an anti-modern proposition, countering dominant 
discourse that it is an acceptable solution to the issue of spinsterhood. In the United 
Kingdom, some women were embracing polygyny as an organic response to reconciling 
their desires to have careers and families. Some commenters argued that polygyny is one 
of many “solutions” that do not benefit women, while others claimed that it might be an 
acceptable option if it is arranged in the proper way. Although some women have chosen 
to become second wives, polygyny remains contested within Muslim communities. The 
next section will highlight the perspectives of some of the unmarried women whom 
everyone is interested in “fixing,” in Egypt, where spinsterhood has become somewhat of 
a movement.    
Responses of Spinsters 
Some Muslim women do not see spinsterhood as a “crisis”; they see it as their 
right. Some, like the ones pursuing their education or careers, choose to delay marriage 
and object to being stigmatized by their respective communities. Global Voices Online 
showcased the blog postings of some Egyptian spinsters who have been attempting to 
destigmatize spinsterhood,157 starting with “Khokha’s” who blogs at The daily diaries of 
                                                      
157 http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/12/20/egyptian-spinsters/ 
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a sinister spinster. Says “Khokha,” “There was a time when every time I opened my 
mouth or voiced an opinion, they would look at me and say “ah … yes … she is a jealous 
sinister.”158 This passage characterizes a common reaction to spinsters; they are silenced 
by their status in society. The principal responsibility of Muslim women within their 
communities is to marry and have babies and, if they fail to do so, they are often 
considered outcasts and judged as having irremediable character flaws that have 
contributed to their pathetic inability to attract a man. They are not considered full 
participants in their communities because their failure to marry is often deemed as 
contrary to Islam. Although Reynold and Wetherell (2004) cast singleness as a “troubled 
category” (as cited in Piela 2011), some spinsters are attempting to recast it in an 
empowered sense. For example, Abeer Soliman, blogging at The Journal of a Spinster, 
writes, “we managed to nail down a few common factors that lead to our “miserable” 
situation. Independence, success, and brains were our stigma for we live in a society 
where the smart successful independent woman attracts and challenges the man.”159 She 
goes on to say that their blessings are curses when it comes to marriage because Middle 
Eastern men are simultaneously attracted to and repelled by successful women. Soliman 
claims, since Middle Eastern men, the “Alfa male,” needs “the upper hand, the better job, 
the bigger income,” women who refuse to position themselves as subordinate to them 
remain unmarried and become social enigmas.  
Another spinster, 27-year-old Egyptian Youma Mokhtar, formed a Facebook 
group in 2008 called “Spinster/Old Maids for Change*,” which attracted about 600 
followers by the end of 2008. Mokhtar’s group gained national and international media 
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attention, most likely because the stigma attached to spinsterhood is somewhat universal. 
According to a Muslimah Media Watch article, its mission statement is the following:  
[to change] the negative attitude towards every unmarried girl who finds herself facing two dead 
ends: either forced to get married to any man so she can get rid of the ‘spinster’ title that’s 
suffocating her, or maintaining her position, insisting on waiting until she finds the right guy and 
[in the meantime] dealing with the curses that society will throw at her.160  
 
This statement suggests that women may be coerced into marrying any guy, not because 
they want to, but to avoid the distain of the larger community. Mokhtar claims that one of 
the goals of the group is to prevent the social isolation of women by encouraging them to 
make “the world a better place…not only through marriage and producing babies, but in 
improving…[their] community through the abilities God gave…[them],” reminiscent of 
“48Refugee’s” statement at the beginning of the chapter. Both “48Refugee” and Mokhtar 
are advancing their right to be appreciated as equal members of their communities, 
whether or not they contribute to it in the conventional sense by having babies. 
 When Mokhtar was interviewed for an Egyptian forum, she was asked several 
loaded questions as to whether or not her group is promoting the rejection of marriage 
and to comment on the bad behavior of certain spinsters, which, the interviewer suggests, 
has given all spinsters bad reputations. To the last question, she replied,  
Your question encapsulates exactly the view of society towards women whose marriage date was 
delayed, who look at her as the girl with a bad reputation, and this is the viewpoint we are fighting 
against. Especially since a lot of [unmarried] women […] hold the highest educational degrees and 
the highest positions. But no, society begrudges them their success and considers it a way of 
compensating for delaying marriage.161   
 
The interviewer is clearly articulating the prevalent perceptions of the society; that is, 
spinsters are attempting to subvert the foundational institution of marriage and shrug off 
social norms of propriety. The social preconception of an unmarried woman’s “bad 
                                                      
160 http://www.patheos.com/blogs/mmw/2008/12/egyptian-spinsters-and-old-maids-sitting-happily-on-the-
shelf/ 
161 http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/12/20/egyptian-spinsters/ 
 171	  
reputation” assumes that, if she has not married by 25 years of age, she must have 
engaged in sexual impropriety, which is perhaps connected to the equally pervasive 
stereotype that educated, successful women are “liberated,” shrinking away from 
tradition, so societal status quo pushes back, bullying them with the spinster label.  
Due to the belief that unmarried women are “liberated” and morally ambivalent 
and challenging social norms by refusing to get married by their “deadlines,” they must 
constantly defend their actions. To this end, Mokhtar posted the following comment on 
the group’s Facebook page:  
We aren’t seeking to make men enemies…nor are we calling on girls to boycott marriage. But we 
reject the idea that girls should get married under pressure from their families or societies or just to 
get rid of the title ‘spinster,’ [so they do not] come back to their families…carrying the label 
‘divorcée.’162  
 
In the quote above, Mokhtar is denying accusations that spinsters are attempting to 
undermine the institution of marriage and the stereotype that spinsters are feminists and, 
by extension, avid man-haters who promote female supremacy, a subject to which I will 
return in relation to SlutWalk Morocco in Chapter 6. However, the resistance of women 
to social norms, such as marriage, or more specifically to marrying any man, is often 
framed in terms of “radical” feminism—their push for small concessions, such as 
universal rejection of sexual harassment, is embellished to the point that their demands 
would ultimately lead to the downfall of conventional familial and societal relations and 
result in the moral bankruptcy that is believed to have become standard in Western 
countries.  
Mokhtar’s quote above also highlights another important issue; that is, divorcées 
are also stigmatized. Several articles discuss the growing divorce rates of several 
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Muslim-majority countries, especially in Gulf countries, among which Saudi Arabia has 
the highest divorce rate,163 perhaps because some women are marrying any man to avoid 
the “spinster” label or because men and women are not able to get acquainted prior to 
marriage due to the legal sanctions against gender mixing, as the techno-ikhtilat dataset 
suggests. Other articles discuss greedy Saudi fathers asking for high bride prices in order 
to settle debts,164 thus, being that fathers are sometimes arranging marriages based on the 
suitors’ finances rather than the couple’s compatibility, this could be a contributing factor 
to the increase in divorces. The escalating rates of divorce could also fuel women’s 
apprehension of accepting the first marriage proposal they receive, deciding instead to 
wait for more promising suitors but, as time passes and more of the suitors’ expectations 
are consistent, women decide in favor of the first stigmatized label, spinster, to avoid the 
other one, divorcée. 
A Muslimah Media Watch posting takes up the international news coverage of 
Mokhtar’s group. The Egyptian author, Ethat ElKatatney, begins the piece with the 
statement, “I am a 21-year-old spinster.”165 She discusses the familial and social 
pressures women face to marry: “unmarried women are (alternatively) rejected, 
stigmatized, mocked, gossiped about, pitied and constantly reminded of what they’re 
missing out on.”166 ElKatatney offers a few proverbs, like “Better a man’s shadow than 
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that of a wall,” to illustrate this imperative to marry, which are repeated to women by 
their families, friends, and neighbors as a constant reminder of the role of women in the 
community—to make babies. She also references a column that Mokhtar wrote for 
Youm7 in which Mokhtar describes a friend whom had a nervous breakdown due to the 
pressures she faced to get married.167 In contrast to the government initiatives that tend to 
view the spinsterhood “crisis” in monetary terms or as the result of men straying from 
their cultural roots to marry foreigners, women cited here tend to see the problem in 
terms of finding men who will treat them as partners, which is substantiated by Piela’s 
(2011) study mentioned above. Muslim women have tired of the dynamic that ties 
communal acceptance of them to their procreative promise, so perhaps they are subtly 
resisting this norm by remaining unmarried.  
The comments posted to the Muslimah Media Watch article suggest the 
universality of the stigmatization of spinsters. “Broomstick” mentions that both Hindu 
and Muslim South Asian women in the UK are stigmatized for remaining single. She 
goes on to broaden the disgrace of spinsterhood to women everywhere “except here in the 
Western world (unless you’re the daughter of an immigrant).” “Just a spinster” says, “this 
applies to every girl from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East J not just Egypt.” “Sakura 
Passion,” however, extends the imperative for women to marry into the United States: “I 
live in the midwest, where women feel their main goal in life is to get married, and if they 
don’t they’ll become “old maids.” Another commenter, “Tabassum,” also acknowledges 
that the stigma of spinsterhood extends into the West in a Muslimah Media Watch article 
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about spinsterhood in the Gulf168; she writes, “The fact that she is older, more educated 
and financially independent can actually work against her. We certainly face it here in 
North America.”   
The age of spinsters in various parts of the world may be a bit higher or lower but 
spinsterhood continues to be equated with the character flaws of women, especially 
independent, successful women, and societies everywhere continue to perceive it in a 
derogatory manner. Although Mokhtar and other Egyptians social media users are 
attempting to contribute to change at a societal level, they are also addressing an issue 
that affects women everywhere. Thus, following the theoretical position of some scholars, 
like Amin (2004), their actions reflect the rooted cosmopolitan aesthetic of acting locally 
but thinking globally. Egyptian women who support the empowerment of spinsters draw 
on their local experiences to establish both local and transnational support. Mokhtar’s use 
of Arabic, as well as Arabic being the popular linguist choice for many of the supporters 
of the initiative, make related campaigns inaccessible to non-Arabic speakers so it is 
actually the importance of the topic that has created the impetus for mediation in 
international media and networks.169 Thus an issue, and the collective actors’ handling of 
it, is not inherently cosmopolitan but, if the topic spreads through social and conventional 
media networks and becomes accessible to many, its transnational popularity suggests its 
saliency in various contexts, its universalism. It is the interconnections within multiple 
spaces that allow the cosmopolitan dynamics of the topics to take root.  
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This section has demonstrated that spinsters do not necessarily believe that they 
need to be fixed by the proposed solutions offered by governments and their larger 
communities, solutions that are underpinned by communal and familial bullying of 
women to marry any man. Spinsters who speak out against their stigmatization want to 
convince others that they are valuable members of their communities even if they do not 
contribute to it in the conventional sense of procreating. They also deny that the cost of 
marriage is the principal factor that prevents them from wanting to marry; they want to 
wait until they find the right man or not marry at all. The subsequent sections will cull 
discussions from various datasets in an attempt to situate extenuating circumstances that 
might encourage Muslim women to remain single or resist marriage. As some Muslim 
spinsters have implied, they want marriage to be a choice rather than an inescapable 
obligation. Their pervasive lack of choices is reflected in their everyday lives in which 
they are generally denied agency in order to ensure communal moral standards with 
which they may or may not agree.   
Extenuating Circumstances, Policing, and Agency   
 The various perspectives as to why there is a large and growing number of 
Muslims spinsters both in the Arab world and in the West encouraged me to look at the 
other datasets to determine if they could illuminate the trend. I found several possible 
extenuating issues that could explain why women are remaining unmarried. First, based 
on some of the discussions in the artificial hymen dataset, some may not be able to 
“prove” their virginity and they do not have the money to pay for a surgery and/or they 
do not trust that the artificial hymen will work; therefore, similar to the case of “Designer” 
in Chapter 3, they put off their wedding dates. Second, based on the dynamics 
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highlighted in the techno-ikhtilat dataset, due to online/offline gender segregation, some 
women cannot become adequately acquainted with their potential suitors, which may 
leave them apprehensive of committing to a man without first getting to know him first. 
While some women get acquainted with potential spouses through the internet, online 
gender mixing is contested within Muslim communities so this is not a viable option for 
all Muslim women. Discussions of gender segregation also highlighted pervasive 
gendered double standards within Muslim communities, which Muslim women may be 
attempting to destabilize. Third, based on the HarassMap dataset, women, in Egypt for 
example, where the percentage of unmarried women is quite high, may become 
distrusting of men in general due to the violence they face in the streets, which could 
contribute to their hesitation to marry. Fourth, based on the artificial hymen data, but also 
as a theme that threads throughout many of the datasets, stereotypes of Muslim women 
often render them as incapable of making their own choices so their families and 
communities attempt to control them through surveillance and bullying. In conjunction 
with the possible inability to “prove” one’s virginity, I will start with prevalent 
stereotypes of Muslim women in an attempt to elucidate why preconceptions of them 
may contribute to the policing of their behaviors, which ultimately limits their agency. 
 Broken Moral Compasses?  
 Sometimes Muslim women are denied choices due to the widespread belief that 
they will not make the right ones. While some Muslim women will engage in premarital 
sex in spite of social and familial policing, others, even those who are subjected to less 
policing, will decide to wait until they are married. However, stereotypes of women often 
lead larger communities to believe that women will without fail choose to ignore the 
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Qur’anic sanctions on premarital sex if they have the chance to do so without facing 
consequences. In a Muslimah Media Watch article related to why Muslim Brotherhood 
Shiekh Saied Askar believes that the artificial hymen should be banned in Egypt, the 
author, Eman Hashim, describes his misogyny in the following terms: “a woman is a 
weak creature who is incapable of choosing what to do and what not to do, and is easily 
tempted to commit “sins” if they became “easier to her.””170 Hashim argues that women 
do not simply refrain from sex to be able to “prove” that they are virgins. Likewise, an 
appropriate response to the sheikh’s remarks is articulated by “7ayat Q.” on another 
posting about the proposed ban of the artificial hymen on Mona Eltahawy’s blog:  
you’re demonstrating…a complete lack of faith in Muslim women to make ethical choices about 
what to do with their bodies. You are naive to think that banning a fake hymen will prevent 
premarital sex, and a tyrant to think it’s your place to say when and with whom a woman might 
part her thighs. Do you think that your values are so profoundly superior to that of a Muslim 
woman that you get to make that choice for us? Do you think we’re so stupid…that we can’t make 
any decent choices?171  
 
“7ayat Q.” is averring that women have a right to decide what to do with their bodies and 
whether or not to engage in premarital sex and, if they do, she says that the larger society 
should not judge them. Her statement, as well as Hashim’s, also refutes the widely held 
belief that women have broken moral compasses, which would lead them to behave in an 
unseemly fashion if they thought they could get away with it.  
 In another article, Marwa Rakha reinforces “7ayat Q.’s” point that banning the 
artificial hymen would not prevent more women from engaging in premarital sex if that is 
what they choose to do. Rakha says that she does not understand why the news of the 
artificial hymen created such an outcry when “hymen restoration procedures have been 
ongoing since the nineties, [and] anal sex has replaced vaginal intercourse in many pre-
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marital relations.”172 She questions why the more convenient and cheaper prop offends 
Egyptians so much and inquires, “Don't they believe that there are many girls who just 
want to preserve their virginity until they get married because they WANT TO as 
opposed to they HAVE TO?” The statements of Rakha and “7ayat Q.” highlight the 
social propensity to assume that women will make immoral choices, rather than women 
being given the benefit of the doubt, so social actors who are thus persuaded attempt to 
deprive women of the opportunity to make their own choices. Although some will remain 
virgins because of they choose to, others, like “Leila,” a Moroccan woman cited in an 
Afrik piece, may want to explore their sexuality. “Leila” states that she remained a virgin 
until she was married to please her mother but she wished she had not. Says “Leila,” 
“This hymen paves the way…to become more liberated…If this object had been 
available a decade ago, I would have used it.”173 
 Reflective of the various positions that Muslim women take on the issue of 
virginity, religious leaders articulate divergent opinions in regard to “revirginization” but, 
while these leaders expand religiously sanctioned choices for women, their views do not 
endeavor to challenge the social norm of women producing bloody sheets on their 
wedding night. In contrast to the Egyptian Sheikh mentioned above who supported the 
official ban of the artificial hymen, “Sandmonkey” references a fatwa in which another 
mufti states that it is permissible for women to “re-instate” their hymens for any reason 
due to the Islamic principle of avoiding of “El Satr” (scandal). If a woman is revirginated 
through hymenoplasty or if she engages an extramarital affair, the mufti states that she 
should not tell her fiancé or husband due to the same principle of avoiding scandal. His 
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reasoning is that this gives “fornicating girls…a second chance in life and [to] be able to 
get married.”174 This fatwa may be reassuring to some women, like “Amel,” a Moroccan 
woman studying in France who decided to undergo hymenoplasty. Says “Amel” about 
her first sexual experience, “I dated a boy when I was 15 and I didn't even realize what 
had happened.”175 She has saved up for the hymenoplasty mainly to spare her family 
from embarrassment. “If my mother ever found out about this, she would have a mental 
breakdown…I don't want to have this surgery, but I don't have any choice,” Amel told the 
Reuters reporter. Other women, who cannot afford the surgery or are concerned that the 
artificial hymen might not work, might decide to put off marriage until they reach their 
“expiration date” because it does not appear to be an option to be honest about their 
sexual experience, even if their fiancés are not themselves virgins. The hypocrisy related 
to their potential spouses not being virgins, while it appears that women have no choice, 
highlights one of the gendered double standards with which some Muslim women take 
issue, which I will discuss further in the next subsection.  
 This subsection highlighted the general assumption that women will act 
immorally if they have a chance, which was the basis for the proposed ban of the 
artificial hymen in Egypt. Some women voiced their indignation of being stereotyped as 
“naturally” lacking morality. While some Muslim women will remain virgins because 
they personally feel that it is important, other women, despite the efforts to control them, 
will continue to engage in premarital sex. Women of means will pay for the surgery and 
less affluent women will engage in anal intercourse to preserve their hymens or spill 
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poultry blood on the sheets, which women have been doing for centuries (Shirazi, 2009). 
Women are at the very least expected to keep up the illusion of virginity even if they may 
want to be honest with their future spouses about their previous sexual encounters. 
However, in general, men are not even expected to maintain the façade of virginity, 
which is one of many double standards that I will explore in the next subsection.   
 Gender Segregation and Double Standards    
 The Qur’anic sanctions on premarital sex are fairly straightforward but other 
issues are less so, especially ones that were not addressed in the Qur’an because they did 
not exist during the time of the Prophet. The internet could be used in contexts that 
legally or socially proscribe gender mixing to get better acquainted with potential spouses 
but some Muslims argue that cyberspaces should be segregated just like offline venues, 
including online forums, even blog rolls.176 In this case, the “cultured technology” 
reinforces offline religious values. Nevertheless, since online interactions function under 
a cloak of anonymity, men and women have the ability to engage in online gender mixing 
without suffering the judgment of their communities. Despite this autonomy granted by 
online identity concealment, a poll from the “Sister” section of IslamWay.com 
demonstrates that women will not necessarily disregard their religious beliefs when they 
have the option of doing so anonymously. Nearly half (512) of the 1075 women who 
responded to the question “Do you get Involved in Unnecessary Chatting with Men On 
the Net?” said they never did; 19% (213) said they did and they knew it was “Not 
Islamic”; nine percent responded that they did but they didn’t know that is was not 
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Islamic; and 23% said that they only did so “Very Rarely.”177 In this example, only one in 
five willingly engage in behavior that they believe to be contrary to their faith. In some 
contexts in which cyberspaces are the only public spaces in which women can escape 
social surveillance, some women use the cloak of anonymity to engage in quite risqué 
behavior, like Saudi women stripping in front of chat audiences of more than 300 men,178 
but these incidents are rare and should be situated in the context of extreme subversion to 
the extreme denial of personal choices.  
 In light of the shared stories of Muslim women being taken advantage of by men 
online, some Muslims, such as Hafsah, claim that gender mixing is acceptable to further 
one’s Islamic knowledge but that Muslims should avoid using the internet to “free 
mix.”179 Hafsah offered some guidelines for proper online conduct between men and 
women on Ummah.com, which included not sending pictures, avoiding audible 
communication, maintaining formality, remaining vigilante, and keeping in close contact 
with other women when using the internet at work. The last point suggests a certain level 
of surveillance among women, which is substantiated by the experiences of Mystique, a 
Saudi erotica blogger who decided to stop updating her blog after she told one of her 
female coworkers about it and then began to feel like the coworker was “watching 
[her]…every movement.”180 However, discussants on Sunniforum.org claimed that even 
gender mixing to discuss religion is problematic, offering the example of Muslims’ 
overuse of the terms “brother” and “sister” on Islamic forums to create inappropriate 
endearment between men and women, which, according to these commenters, could lead 
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to “fitnah”181 (social chaos). Since Muslims might use Islamic forums to flirt, one 
commenter says, “Regular Muslims,” denoted as a separate categorization from new 
converts or non-Muslims interested in Islam, “should behave with Islamic conduct of no 
causal talk.” Hence, one’s observance of online gender segregation could be a practice 
used to gauge one’s Muslimness, which I will discuss more in the Chapter 5, but it should 
be noted that both of the forums discussed above are based in contexts in which gender 
segregation is a choice. 
 Some Saudi women are clearly fatigued with their lack of options due to gender 
segregation. A Huffington Post article by Fahad Faruqui identifies an extreme measure 
that some Saudi women are willing to take to oppose gender segregation legislation: 
breastfeeding adult males to convert them to a woman’s mahram (male relatives that 
women cannot marry).182 In 2010, Saudi Sheikh Abdul Mohsen al-Obeikan, an adviser to 
the royal cabinet who was fired by King Abdullah,183 claimed that women could 
undermine segregation in the workplace through offering male co-workers their breasts. 
In 2007, a similar fatwa was issued by an Egyptian cleric, Sheikh Izzat Attiya, who 
advised “direct breastfeeding…at least five times.” Although women to whom Faruqui 
spoke felt “ridiculed as a result of the exceedingly sexualized approach to gender mixing,” 
other women threatened the same measure as an organic response to limitations they face 
due to their gender. Saudi women associated with the Women2Drive movement, for 
example, said that they would breastfeed their male drivers if they were not given the 
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right to drive.184 Some women also used the space created by media coverage of this 
fatwa to highlight the prevalence of gendered double standards in cultural practices 
fallaciously attributed to Islam; for example, one Saudi woman claims that men should 
then also be obliged to drink the breast milk of their domestic servants.   
 In contexts in which gender segregation is imposed on the population even the 
opening of a women-only spa in Riyadh can be controversial185 because women do not 
have a choice in their everyday lives. According to Reem Asaad, the instigator of the 
Saudi lingerie campaign, the internet provides a space for Saudis to normalize gender 
relations through women’s ability to converse while remaining “physically invisible,”186 
which perhaps explains the remark by “Saudijeans” (Ahmed Al-Omran) who noted that 
the migration of Saudi women into cyberspace has outpaced that of men. However, even 
online, there are limitations, or double standards, related to women’s online behaviors, 
such as the percentage of women who post their photographs on Facebook (5%) versus 
the percentage of men who use their photographs as avatars (60%).187  
 Similarly, a Jordanian blogger, “7aki Fadi,” claims there are differences in the 
blogging styles of men and women from the Middle East (also see Chapter 1). “7aki Fadi” 
begins by stating that if women want to fully protect themselves, they must blog 
anonymously because “an Arab woman’s morals are judged by every single word that is 
uttered on her blog.”188 She goes on, “If a woman talks about going out with the 
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girls…dating, or even if a woman is married and talks about her marriage 
openly…[she] is harshly judged and criticized, called slut or immoral.” Therefore, if a 
woman desires to broach these topics on her blog, she must remain anonymous. On the 
other hand, if a woman chooses to reveal her identity, she will censor the content of her 
social media use and rarely share her pictures. “7aki Fadi” says that the limited number of 
bloggers from the Middle East lends to the replication of societal norms online because 
the small size of Arabic blogospheres facilitates the efficiency of surveillance toward 
imposing compliance with social norms. In contrast, “7aki Fadi” claims that men will 
speak openly about sex and partying and, rather than being shamed, such content is 
considered humorous. Although men do engage in political and religious self-censorship 
for fear of inciting the wrath of the authorities, they are not targeted with the community 
policing to which female bloggers are subjected. “7aki Fadi” says, “if you are trying to 
escape your society by blogging…you will find it duplicated on the Internet. If you 
express thoughts that are different or that are not acceptable then you will be shamed, 
criticized and shunned.” There were a lot of interesting comments posted to this thread 
but Yakuza’s is particularly relevant to the discussion at hand. Yakuza says that being an 
unspoken Arab woman is itself taboo, a parallel theme (as well as a pervasive one), 
which coincides with perceptions of female appropriateness and “good wives.” I will 
discuss this parallel more in the next subsection.  
 Although the internet could be a viable option for intended spouses to get to know 
one another, the prevalent policing of women’s actions online and offline often precludes 
its potential in this regard. Furthermore, some Muslim women will refrain from gender 
mixing online because they feel that the practice of gender segregation should apply to 
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online spaces as well. Yet social media are useful in relation to situating Muslim 
women’s rejection of double standards, which hold them responsible for communal 
morality through limiting their agency, because they are often shamed or labeled as 
“liberated” and/or “feminist” for speaking out against these double standards offline. The 
next section will highlight how these double standards and the denial of women’s agency, 
imposed through violence, may result in the general distrust and dehumanization of 
Egyptian men by women, which feeds the latter’s apprehension of marriage.     
 Violence and Distrust 
 Many Muslim communities socially impose gender segregation to varying 
degrees. Egypt, for example, does not have any laws stipulating gender segregation, but 
sexual violence on the street creates the ad hoc imposition of a segregated public sphere 
dominated by men, which, as described in Chapter 3, results in the self-disappearances of 
some Egyptian women to avoid gendered violence. In this section, I will argue that the 
limited choices of women as well as the violent dominance over the public sphere by men 
could undermine the appeal of marriage from the perspectives of women who face daily 
harassments in the streets. This is a data-driven theory that may only accommodate a few 
social outliers, like the spinsters and a few of the women in the HarassMap dataset, 
though it could also be evidence of a growing trend.  
 There were a few connections between sexual harassment and spinsterhood in the 
datasets related to Muslim spinsters and HarassMap, most notably the international 
coverage of Ghada Abdel Aal’s book, “I Want to Get Married!” Almost all the online 
news coverage of the book discusses the rampant sexual harassment in the Egyptian 
society but the articles tend to imply that harassment is due to the inability of many 
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couples to get married due to financial constraints, a notion that is disputed by many of 
the Egyptian bloggers because married men and young boys also harass women. “678,” 
an award-winning film about sexual harassment in Egypt, drew several parallels between 
marriage and harassment, including the following: Fayza, after being harassed on the bus 
daily, refuses her husband sex and he eventually becomes a harasser himself; Seba is 
attacked by a crowd of men with her husband watching the scene but unable to 
intervene—the attack ends up destroying their marriage when her husband cannot offer 
her the support that she needs; and Nelly’s court case against a harasser, a rendition of the 
experiences of Noha Rushdie (see Chapter 2), creates problems between she and her 
fiancée when he pressures her to withdraw the harassment charges. While the narratives 
are fictional the director, Mohamed Diab, claims they are related to experiences that 
women have personally divulged to him.189 
 Economic issues are clearly important determinants of a couple’s ability to marry. 
A woman may take steps to become financially independent, due to the uncertainty of the 
marriage market, which makes her less attractive to potential spouses. In other cases, she 
may not want children to be her defining moment; she may want her career to be. 
According to a study of Algeria women, 50% of respondents wanted to work in 
comparison to 6.2% of the women who were primarily in interested in marriage but, even 
among the latter group, 72% of the respondents wanted to keep working after they were 
married (Dris-Ait-Hamadouche, 2007). Some of these women do not want to have to 
choose between one and the other option.  
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 Some literature implies that women’s are becoming generally disillusioned with 
courtship and marriage, particularly the hierarchical arrangement of marital relations. 
Situmorang (2007) quotes Jones (2004) in stating that “women have lost faith in 
marriage,” speaking to the experience of Indonesia women in Muslim-majority 
communities (p. 289). Similarly, as Kholoussy (2010) points out in regard to Abdel Aal’s 
book, people tend to focus on male concerns regarding the “marriage crisis” and overlook 
that spinsters, like Abdel Aal, who is perhaps somewhat representative of other Egyptian 
spinsters, are rejecting the social norm of marrying the first man with a flat to ask for 
their hand. Says Kholoussy, “[Abdel Aal] demands her right to get to know her suitor to 
make sure he is right for her. And if she never finds a partner, she is asking society to 
respect her nonetheless” (n.d.). Relatedly, an activist with the Egyptian New Woman 
Foundation, Lanya Lofty, says, “I have two daughters and am teaching them two 
things…Don’t let any men harass you, and before you get married to a man, see what his 
brothers and mother have to say about women.”190 Lofty is implying that, particularly due 
to the limited contact between prospective spouses prior to marriage due to socially 
imposed gender segregation, women are not really permitted to get to know men before 
they get married and, more importantly, how they will treat their wives once they are 
married. Thus women must rely on their interactions with others with whom their 
prospective spouses are associated to gain a sense of the type of men they are. 
 As I see it, the streets of Egypt might also suggest to women how men will treat 
them when they are married. Men on the street determine what they wear, where they go, 
and the times of day that are safer to travel, which are forms of policing imposed through 
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violent male dominance over the public sphere. There were several references to this 
dominance through violence in the HarassMap and SlutWalk Morocco datasets. 
According to a blog posting on Stuck in the Middle,  
Old men as well as prepubescent boys harass their female counterparts, making Cairo streets safe 
and comfortable only for males. Because of this, many women avoid walking completely. This 
limited mobility widens the gender gap and hinders women’s opportunities to get an education, 
work, socialize; move around their country freely.191  
 
Maggie Osama, writing at The World through Egyptian Eyes, relates the male public 
sphere to male chauvinism in that “men were brought up to believe they are superior to 
women, and that they should be in charge. A woman’s success scares a man and pushes 
him to act in an inconvenient manner trying to block her way or bring her down.” “Leila,” 
blogging at 9.20 M for Miscellaneous, observes that male chauvinism has resulted from 
the pervasiveness of gendered double standards. Says “Leila,” “our society…[has] 
developed a perfect excuses system for the men. We wear Hijjabs to protect us…it’s ok 
because God made…[men] that way…it’s ok for men to date…to cheat…they are made 
differently, so it’s not their fault.”192 In this same posting, “Leila” claims that this 
contributes to blaming women for harassment due to the just world fallacy, in which 
people tend to rationalize injustice by blaming the victim (also see Chapter 3). Since the 
Egyptian society buys into the idea that men cannot help but to act violently toward 
women, it appeases itself by insisting that the woman must have done something to 
deserve the sexual violence she suffered. 
 Part of women’s lack of choices in the Egyptian society manifests in them being 
pawns in the “modern” and “traditional” dialectic, which is often played out through 
judging them based on their choice in clothing. Although the “traditional” standpoint 
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insists that modesty (read: veiling) protects women in the streets, woman demand the 
right to wear whatever they would like because veiling, from a heuristic position, does 
not make any difference in regard to minimizing harassment. “Menna,” for example, 
shares a note on the HarassMap Facebook page in which she describes the harasser who 
lives in her head. Says “Menna,”  
He looks at my body in the morning as I put on my clothes, justifying why his friends in the street 
will rip me apart…He shuts me up when I try to speak for myself in the street saying "I told you so, 
that shirt was too low cut...” He looks through my eyes and sees a piece of meat, convincing me 
that its all anybody ever sees.193 
 
The voice that “Menna” hears is not just that of the harasser but also the voice of the 
Egyptian society in its judgment of women. Many of the activists involved in the “End 
Sexual Harassment” campaign are demanding the right to wear whatever they want 
because they are rejecting the social norm of victim-blaming. On June 20, 2011, 
“Ghazala Irshad” writes on the HarassMap Twitter page, “I want the right to walk where I 
want, whenever I want--whether in hijab or not”194 Similarly, “NadaPrudence” says, “I 
hope one day I can walk freely in egypt…wearing whatever i feel like wearing.”195 
Osama claims that harassment has increased despite the more modest levels of dress in 
comparison to several decades ago,  
I am blaming [the norm of street harassment on] people who are accusing women of being totally 
responsible…as they believe that women encourage men to harass because of their outfits. If this 
is true…why [are] women with niqab, hijab, conservative clothing are not safe from harassment? 
even children…get sexually harassed!. In 60's & 70's, women used to wear short skirts/dresses and 
high heels, took public transportation and…the percentage of harassment was very low.196 
 
Osama is addressing street harassment as a “modern” phenomenon in which the 
newfound disrespect of women coincides with disfunctionality of the Muburak era, 
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194 https://twitter.com/harassmap  
195 http://nadaprudence.blogspot.com/2011/06/gender-female.html 
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although the 1970s also coincide with the rise of the modern Islamists movement that 
contributed to the backtracking of women’s rights that had been achieved under the 
platform of national development after the fall of the Ottoman empire (Badran, 2005). 
 Egyptian women do not believe that they should have to limit their access to the 
public sphere to avoid being harassed. “The Angry Egyptian,” a woman blogging at 
Tahrir and Beyond, says, “The rhetoric of accusing the women [sic] for “bringing sexual 
harassment upon herself” by being late on the street is the most ridiculous.”197 She also 
claims that women from lower socioeconomic backgrounds are harassed more simply 
because they are forced to spend more time on the street and on public transportation, 
which is consistent with the character portrayals in the film “678,” being that the working 
class woman was the one who was subjected to the most harassment. “Nameless Babble,” 
claims, “A person has the right to walk freely anywhere in this world without being 
subject to excruciating encroachments on their private space.”198 Sama Singer alludes to 
the notion that sexual harassment is the result of the objectification of women and 
demands that the Egyptian society recognize her as a person. Says Singer,  
Dear society instead of asking me to cover up, to stay at home...before you separate me in public 
transportation , instead of asking me not to exist in places where men exist , you should know that 
I am a human…not an entertainment tool, I have the right to walk down the streets...199 
 
However, women are understandably afraid to go out due to the habitual violence they 
suffer in the public sphere. “emmkaykay,” blogging at Title Pending, says, “I don’t feel 
safe in my own city, in my own neighborhood, in my own street. They are mine aren’t 
they? As [an] Egyptian I do own them, then why do they scare me?”200 This claim to 
                                                      
197 http://theangryegyptian.wordpress.com/2011/06/20/enough-sexual-harassment/ 
198 http://namelessbabble.blogspot.com/2011/06/sexual-harassment-in-egypt.html 
199 http://betweenbracts.blogspot.com/2011/06/i-share-my-daily-harassement-experience.html 
200 http://emmkaykay.tumblr.com/post/6718086348/its-hard-out-there-for-a-female 
 191	  
ownership of the streets has perhaps become more pronounced since women participated 
in the revolution alongside men. The limitations of women’s agency related to their 
mobility (Badran, 1996; MacLeod, 1991; cooke, 2000), choices in dress (MacLeod, 
1991), and concerns about violence (Gallagher, 2012) are all issues that women must 
consider in selecting a mate and/or deciding to remain single.  
 Several Egyptian women see this as a struggle that they were disenchanted to 
discover persisted even after their participation in ousting Mubarak. However, 
particularly since women and men freely co-inhabited the streets during the revolution, 
some women say that they will return violence against men who manhandle them in 
public. For example, Singer has let her actions speak for her in relation to a few incidents 
of sexual harassment: when a man fondled her legs on a bus, she pushed him off the seat 
they shared and stomped on him; and, on another occasion, a man sitting behind her had 
shoved his hand between the bus seats to touch her back and she reacted by crushing his 
fingers with the seat. Although those present on the buses disagreed with her tactics, she 
claims that both of those men will think twice before harassing another woman. Says 
Singer, “Stop blaming me if I acted violently towards the harasser…I have each and 
every right to defend my body.”201 Another woman on the HarassMap Twitter page says 
she beat a harasser with her flag at a protest. Similarly, “ForSoothSayer” suggests, 
“Tazers, stun guns, mace, pepper spray…Yes, they’re largely illegal. I don’t give a fuck. 
When enough men get tazed, they’ll think twice about harassment.”202 In “678,” “Fayza” 
likewise becomes so enraged by the daily harassment she is subjected to on the bus that 
she begins carrying a razor blade to slice the genitals of men who grope her. These 
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women are likely driven to return violence because the society and state have not only 
failed to protect women but also they contribute to blaming women for harassment 
because they frame harassed women as having deviated from social norms, especially 
those who cause a scene by speaking out against harassment. 
 Some of the blog discussions outline women’s growing distrust, even hatred, of 
men, which clearly conflicts with the possibility of women wanting marry one of them. 
Yosra Abdel Meguid Mostafa, for example, articulates this possibility on her Facebook 
page. She says, “Every harassment situation a girl goes through affects her and her 
coming life (in terms of how she would react to harassment situations in the future, 
maybe even her relationship with the other sex in general).”203 Likewise, “Leila” claims 
that her experiences with sexual harassment in the streets have resulted in recurring 
nightmares and psychological trauma, which her therapist associates with her distrust of 
men, a point to which she concedes: “the nightmares are a result of becoming the target 
of sexual harassment…that I was only conscious of on a subconscious level.”204 Later in 
the same post, Leila states, “I am not totally comfortable with any male who[m] I haven’t 
known all my life.” Being that, according to a study conducted by the Egyptian Center 
for Women’s Rights (ECWR), 63% of Egyptian males admit to perpetrating sexual 
harassment in the streets,205 the chances that a woman’s prospective spouse may have 
engaged in the verbal and/or physical harassment of women are substantial and, as such, 
the element of distrust may be warranted.  
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 In another blog posting, “Leila” says that she has no desire to marry. Although 
she says that Egyptian girls are taught from a very young age to consider “marrying well” 
as the “crowning achievement,” she claims that she falls outside of the margins of female 
desirability, which, in the Egyptian context, she frames as being “beautiful, biddable, 
quiet, unopinionated, not too intelligent, a good breeder and last but not least a good 
housekeeper.” “Leila” has been told that she was “unfit to be a girl” and a “disgrace to 
womankind” because she is “naturally messy, clumsy, and loud.”206 In reality, none of 
the female bloggers who participated in the “End Sexual Harassment” campaign 
appeared to fit into this tidy compartment of what is considered appropriate for woman, 
simply because they were speaking out against injustices. In a third posting connected to 
the “End Sexual Harassment” campaign, “Leila” states that people assume that, since she 
wears hijab, she is a “good girl” and does not have the “right not to marry and procreate” 
and to serve her “husband and his every whim.”207 By using the term “good girl,” she is 
referring to typologies of Muslims, which I will discuss further in the Chapter 5, similar 
to Hina Khan’s discussion of liberal v. practicing Muslims that was noted previously in 
conjunction with polygyny and ijtihad. Furthermore, “Leila’s” comment highlights her 
thoughts on what married life entails—serving her husband’s every whim, which may not 
be an attractive prospect for many women—and reinforces the statement of Muslim 
spinsters regarding communal perceptions of unmarried women as “bad girls.” 
 For some women, their apprehension of men has escalated into detest. “Sarah,” 
blogging at Lessons Yet to Be Learned, says, “If it wasn't for my amazing father, I 
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would've hated every single man on the face of the planet!”208 “Sarah” claims that the 
prevalence of sexual harassment is symptomatic of the diseased Egyptian society in 
which men exert a perverse form of manliness through belittling women, which has 
become normalized in the society. However, she also avers that the struggles of Egyptian 
women have marked their femininity as strong, robust, and smart; they are, therefore, up 
to the task of challenging unjust social norms. In response to her posting, one man 
accuses her of exhibiting fascist female chauvinism and another claims that women are 
inferior to men because Allah said that women lack “brains and religion.” Charming! The 
latter comment demonstrates that ahadith such as these likely underpin the stereotype of 
women lacking morality that I discussed an earlier subsection. 
 More often than not harassers, which make up the majority of men in Egypt, are 
not even referenced as men. “D,” for example, calls them “pigs.”209 “Suzeeinthecity,” 
blogging at Diary of A DeskGirl in Cairo, refers to a man as a “predator” and men as “a 
pack of rapid dogs.” She also creates a scenario in her head to deal with the trauma of 
violence in the street:     
So I play a little game in my head. It’s like walking through a videogame scene, where every man 
is a potential predator, and I keep my radar finely tuned, my walk fast and dontmesswithme, my 
eyes scanning every corner for attackers. Over the years, I’ve acquired a Robocop face that 
occasionally scares the living shit out of small children and animals, and my middle finger is my 
videogame weapon that I choose to shoot when the moment comes.210 
 
“Suzeeinthecity’s” narrative implies that not only have women become objectified in the 
streets, but also women have begun to dehumanized men as a coping mechanism for 
sexual violence. An English Ahram article also recognizes the dehumanization of 
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harassers, stating, “a more compassionate outlook [on harassment]…neither blames the 
victim nor strips the perpetrator of his humanity, since it views the latter as a sick 
person.”211 This article also links the issues of the emancipation of women, harassment, 
and spinsterhood. 
 The new enemy of Egyptian women, Egyptian men on the street, is often framed 
as an animal, not a potential spouse. Being catcalled and fondled all day hardly leaves a 
woman open to friendly dialogue with a man whom may actually want to get to know her 
toward forming an enduring relationship. The problem is that women are so accustomed 
to getting harassed that they may ignore even the sincere efforts of men to get to know 
them so, if HarassMap is successful in curbing the rampant violence against women on 
the streets, some of the nine million spinsters in Egypt might consider reevaluating their 
single status. Hence, in Egypt, as in other contexts, spinsterhood is partially related to the 
exorbitant cost of marriage but it could also be related to suitors and their perceived 
likelihood to treat their wives like human beings, or better yet partners. That being said, 
spinsterhood could be seen as subtle resistance against gender inequality, including the 
pervasive double standards mentioned above. It is perhaps easier to remain on the “shelf” 
until one’s expiration date has passed than to openly challenge patriarchy. Similar to the 
activism against martyrdoms in Chapter 3, the women I have discussed in this subsection 
engage in subtle resistance by focusing on a specific issue, sexual harassment, allowing 
them to discuss their rights without linking abuses of patriarchy, which could 
delegitimize women’s right movements in some Muslim communities.  
                                                      
211 http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/4/37162/Opinion/Sexual-harassment-in-Egypt-after-the-
revolution-.aspx 
 196	  
 Like international activism related to spinsterhood, the HarassMap campaign 
frames sexual harassment as a universal concern. Due to the universality of these issues, 
they also present the cosmopolitan aesthetic of developing basic common standards. Just 
as women have the right to remain single without suffering stigmatization, women have 
the right to walk in the street in whatever clothing they choose without being harassed. 
Collectivization around spinsterhood and sexual harassment demonstrates that Muslim 
women want choices. They do not want their worth to be judged by their ability to marry 
and have children because some may want to contribute to their communities in other 
ways. In the same vein, Muslim women do not want to be coerced into veiling to prevent 
the community from blaming them when they face sexual harassment. They want 
unfettered access to the public sphere and they want to be equally, not completely, 
responsible for the maintenance of social mores.  
 This subsection has discussed how violence against women in the street may be 
indicative of general beliefs regarding the status of women in the community and the 
family, which may discourage some women from wanting to commit to marriage. The 
next section will draw on literature related to women’s agency to further situate how 
social media, as cultured technologies, may foster the extension of subtle resistance and 
collectivization among women at least through digital conversations if not also through 
online/offline actions.  
Discussion 
 This chapter has discussed the myriad of Muslim perspectives on and solutions to 
the issue of spinsterhood. While it may appear melodramatic to call it a crisis, it is a 
grave concern for the maintenance of patriarchy and the avoidance of “fitna,” a term that 
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signifies moral and social chaos in Muslims communities but is also employed in social 
media in regard to illicit relationships between men and women and even to reference 
women’s resistance to social norms. According to Moghadam (2004), following 
Mernissi’s (1987) discussion of the changing dynamics of marriage in the Arab world, 
“the idea of a young unmarried woman is completely novel in the Muslim world, for the 
whole concept of patriarchal honor is built around the idea of virginity, which reduces 
woman’s role to its sexual dimension: reproduction within early marriage” (p. 153). 
Some women want to challenge the “cult of the hymen,” but they recognize that being 
honest about engaging in sexual relations could have disastrous effects on their future 
acceptance within their communities. Thus women who cannot produce bloody sheets 
or/and do not want to perpetuate the double standard that stipulates that women must at 
least feign virginity, while it is a choice for men, may put off marriage. I am not implying 
that all women would engage in premarital sex if they had the opportunity; as discussed 
in a previous subsection related to women chatting online with men, one in five would 
willingly commit an act they believed to be unIslamic. But they do want the choice. The 
assumption that women must be saved from themselves stems from cultural 
preconceptions that have no Qur’anic foundations because, as Wadud (1999) emphasizes, 
the Qur’an renders the spirituality of men and women as essentially equal (also see 
Bodman, 1998; Stowasser, 1984). However, the prevalent double standards based on 
gender do not demonstrate that much is expected of men spiritually so women are often 
charged with upholding the morality of both genders This is not only true of the Arab 
world, as women from all over the world in the hijabi fashion dataset also believe that it 
is their duty to veil to protect the morality of men and their communities (see Chapter 5). 
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 This tendency to charge women with upholding the moral standards of the 
community is not a norm that is unique to Muslim communities either. According to 
McClintock (1995), it is the norm in all cultures (as cited in Ringrose & Renold, 2012). 
In the Arab world, the imposition of this charge is often most acutely played out in the 
home because, as Tohidi (1991) says, “the painfully disorienting process of 
modernization…revived calls for patriarchal control over the family and female 
mobility…For the insecure and mustaz’af [disempowered] Muslim male…the patriarchal 
family provides…the last remaining bastion of authority and sense of honor” (p. 281). 
She goes on to say that the family network, although it opposes “individualization and 
self-actualization of the male and especially female persons” has served as a buffer 
against repressive states and  
Most women in developing countries…although wanting to ensure that their rights are respected 
and acknowledged cannot afford or are unwilling to assert women’s right in a way that “estranges 
them not just from their family but also from their larger community” (p. 282). 
 
Despite this dialectic between wanting to assert women’s rights and avoiding the 
estrangement of their families and communities, Tohidi (1991) also recognizes “the 
growing sense of self-assertion among modern middle-class women aware of their more 
personal choice in marriage and motherhood” (p. 283), which does not necessarily 
present itself as an explicit rejection of the patriarchal family but implies the increasing 
importance of agency to this group of women within public spheres and the home. 
 Women’s agency does not necessarily suggest that women will do whatever they 
want, particularly in light of Tohidi’s (1991) statement that women are not willing to 
assert themselves in ways that estrange their families or communities. For example, both 
“Amel” and “Leila,” mentioned above from the artificial hymen dataset, reference their 
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mothers in their decisions to “revirginize” or remain virginal, respectively. The desire of 
some women to please their families will continue to weigh in on their choices and some 
will choose to remain virgins as a result of the importance of their chastity to their 
families or to themselves. In the same vein, Mahmood (2001) situates agency as “the 
capacity to realize one’s own interests against the weights of custom, tradition, 
transcendental will, or other obstacles (whether individual or collective)” (p. 206). 
“Capacity to realize” does not always translate into action but Mahmood (2001) sees it as 
a “slumbering ember that can spark to flame in the form of an act of resistance when 
conditions permit” (p. 206). She also argues that “illiberal actions can arguably be 
tolerated if it is determined that they are undertaken by a freely consenting individual 
who acted on her own accord” (p. 207). By “illiberal,” Mahmood (2001) is referencing 
religious social actors who were the focus of her study: the women’s mosque movement. 
From Mahmood’s (2001) perspective, it is not only agency, which she claims that Butler 
(1997) defines as synonymous with resistance, that produces change but also “agentival” 
efforts to sustain traditional religious beliefs; for example, women, in their efforts to 
perfectly conform with Islamic norms, engage in practices of self-actualization, which 
move them beyond the objective of the “negative rights” (freedom from obstacles) into 
the realm of “positive rights” (self-actualization). Her point is that, although the agency 
of Muslim women may not play out in the same way that the concept is theorized by 
Western feminists, at times, for example, Muslim women invoking Islam as a force of 
empowerment, this form of agency is equally important, particularly in regard to religious 
women.   
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 On the other hand, Bucar (2010) classifies Mahmood’s theoretical position on 
agency as “heteronomy,” or “good girls” acting out “religious traditions” (p. 666), which 
she conceptualizes as distinct from “autonomy” and “theonomy.” Says Bucar (2010),  
““Autonomy” emphasizes the importance of the individual in moral life and sees a 
woman as the source of her freedom and innovation” (p. 665) and “theonomy” is a 
“possible middle ground between autonomy and heteronomy” (p. 666). However, she 
claims that theonomy, which would likely describe the agency related to Islamic 
feminism, due to its deity-centered focus, tends to sidestep the lived experiences of 
women living in religious communities. Bucar (2010), therefore, introduces “dianomy” 
as a theoretical stance that addresses moral economies without ignoring the empirical 
realities of women. According to Bucar (2010), “Dianomy recognizes that both an 
individual and her community are important; that agency is shaped within specific 
conditions…and that there is a possibility of creative compliance that is not necessarily 
intentional resistance” (p. 666). Dianomy is, in some ways, similar to subtle resistance, 
although Bucar (2010) does not explicitly situate one’s personal relationship with God in 
her theoretical framework, which might be considered distinct from both individual and 
communal influences on agency.  
 While dianomy is an important concept and one that frames some of the examples 
of agency I encountered in this research, there are also examples that migrate toward 
heteronomy and autonomy, which mark distinctions between communities, practices, 
preferences in the consumption of religious knowledge, and so forth. Further, the forms 
of agency that Bucar categorizes as heteronomy are not necessarily limited to “good girls.” 
Many of the discussions in the datasets exhibited more of a tendency toward heteronomy 
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than autonomy, but they were not limited to “women’s mosque movement” (Mahmood, 
2001). For example, some whom other Muslims might describe as “liberal” were arguing 
for female interpretations of the Qur’an to counter what they viewed as misogynous 
traditions based on male interpretations. My point is that the variance among Muslims 
makes it difficult to render agency in homogenous terms, even if the concept attempts to 
make sense of the multiple dialectics that come into play in the decision-making 
processes of these women.      
 Although Muslim women have an opportunity to exert their agency online, there 
are notable obstacles to the possibilities offered through social media toward this end. For 
instance, I found multiple references to women’s participation in policing other women in 
both online and offline spaces, as demonstrated by the earlier discussion of online gender 
segregation. Skalli (2006) cites other obstacles, including the “exclusionary patriarchal 
ideologies on- and off-line” as well as “the cost of computer/connection, low computer 
literacy, relevance of language and Internet material…and censorship” (p. 50). Despite 
the “exclusionary patriarchal ideologies” and regardless of whether or not readers agree 
with what these women say online, even if opponents troll their websites and social 
media commentary, social media users are being exposed to other viewpoints related to 
topics of interest to Muslim women that may expand how they think about these issues. If 
one views the increasing use of the internet by Muslim women, like Saudi women whose 
migration online that has outpaced men’s, as a unrealized ember, as Mahmood (2001) 
says, social media could be perceived as spaces of potential resistance. Furthermore, 
through their social media engage, Muslim women are challenging dominant discourse 
related to sexual harassment, for example, by framing it as violence rather than flirting, 
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and refuting the well-established social norm of blaming women for the actions of men. 
In regard to spinsterhood, Muslim women are subverting the dominant discourse that 
suggests that women’s only means of contributing to society is through having babies. 
While conspicuous challenges to social norms and dominant discourses remain somewhat 
rare, everyday resistance buffered through social media has become increasingly 
prevalent.    
 An important aspect of women’s agency thus appears to be men’s accountability 
for their own actions. While the perpetuation of the “just a man” philosophy persists, 
illustrated, for example, by the remarks of “Omani Princess,” other women ardently 
reject being held responsible for the inexcusable actions of men, especially when they 
have taken every precaution to prevent being blamed for men’s misdeeds (such as women 
who veil but continue to be harassed in the streets). They employ the internet as a “third 
space” or “‘in-between space’”(Christensen, 2011; Muller & Druin, 2003; Bhabha, 1994) 
to discuss issues that are not easily broached among the larger disapproving society 
offline. According to Hoover and Echchaibi (2012), cited in Campbell (2012b), this third 
space is “a hybridized and fluid context requiring new logics and evoking unique forms 
of meaning-making” (also see Campbell, 2012a). Campbell (2012b) goes on to say that 
“digital religion” requires the acknowledgement of “how the unique character of digital 
technology and culture shapes religious practices and beliefs [and]…how religions seek 
to culture new media contexts with established ways of being and convictions about the 
nature of reality and the larger world” (p. 4). This statement not only highlights how 
online religion could lead to the evolution of religious beliefs and practices but also how 
Muslim women could draw on their lived experiences to foster greater understanding of 
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their perspectives and promote the establishment of universal basics standards of rights 
through the delicate art of debunking patriarchy without framing their actions as such.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter has framed a variety of opinions on the growing trend of 
spinsterhood among Muslims women. The dominant governmental and communal 
discourse on the issue has generally ignored the possibility that some Muslim women 
may not want to marry. Some may want to focus on their careers and others may not be 
thrilled with the prospect of marrying men who may believe that they are superior to 
women. However, male superiority does not begin and end with men and women; 
members of any given community are socialized through dominant beliefs on gender 
relations. Men are often socialized to believe that they are not responsible for their 
actions and the larger society is ever forgiving of their mistakes because the 
responsibility for the morality of both genders is placed firmly on the shoulders of 
women. Women are challenging related social norms spuriously connected to Islam 
through male interpretations of the Qur’an, which are grounded in the male scholars’ 
preconceived notions based on their own socialization. One of the most effective ways of 
unhinging patriarchy without challenging it directly is through the disruption of the 
foundation of this hierarchical system—the patriarchal family (Engels, 2010). Muslim 
women would face insurmountable obstacles in challenging the whole system but they 
could reject what the community has deemed to be their principal role in the maintenance 
of the system: marriage and motherhood. 
 The next chapter will build on some of the concepts discussed in this chapter, 
ijtihad and typologies of Muslims. It will elucidate how online communities based on 
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Islamic practices and the consumption of religious knowledge have migrated online and 
how these communities resist and/or reinforce the sanctity of the “ummah” through their 
online and offline promotion of specific ritual. 
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Chapter 5 
Communities and Ijtihad	  
  
 Urooj Arshad is a Pakistani expatriate and queer Muslim activist. When she 
immigrated to the United States at the age of 16, she felt isolated in the predominantly 
white suburb where her family moved. Later, in college, when she came out as a lesbian, 
she again felt ostracized from the larger LGBTQ community as a Muslim and a woman 
of color. She finally discovered a sense of community when she joined the Al-Fatitha 
Foundation, an organization dedicated to normalizing the queer Muslims identity. Arshad 
says that the knowledge that there was “another Pakistani Muslim queer person out there, 
started to fill a hole…[that she] did not even know existed and…[she] stopped believing 
that…[she] would never be able to reconcile…[her] sexuality with…[her] religion and 
culture.”212 Al-Fatiha not only attempts to normalize relations between the queer Muslims 
and the larger Muslim community but it also counters the widespread Islamophobia and 
homophobia in the American society. In the dataset related to Muslim lesbians, many 
queer Muslims, like Arshad, feel isolated but social media have the capacity to connect 
these isolated individuals with each other and to contribute to community building online, 
if not offline as well. However, as I will discuss, social media can also reinforce 
online/offline boundaries of inclusion between these various Muslim communities.  
 In contrast to the scholarly tendencies to study websites oriented specifically to 
Muslims (Bunt, 2004) or particular online communities of Muslims based on 
geographical locations and ethnic compositions (Christensen, 2012), this chapter 
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broaches a distinct method of studying online Muslim networks. The first part will 
analyze the American node of the transnational network of hijabi fashion bloggers that 
collectivizes around the Islamic mandate on modesty in a creative manner. The second 
part will introduce everyday discussions related to the topic of Muslim lesbians or 
Muslims who are attracted to others of the same sex in dominant transnational 
cyberspaces. The chapter will attempt to locate how these “networks of practice,” which 
are online networks that foster interaction among people who subscribe to common 
beliefs and/or rituals, speak to multiple textures of Islamic knowledge consumption. The 
network based on the traditional practice of veiling tends to display greater homophily, a 
theoretical position that argues that all types of networks veer toward greater 
homogeneity (McPherson et al., 2001), while the topically oriented data on Muslim 
lesbians demonstrates greater heterogeneity in practices and approaches to religious 
knowledge, principally illustrated through differing opinions on who could legitimately 
engage in ijtihad (personal interpretation of religious texts).   
 This chapter will expand upon the discussions in Chapter 4 regarding typologies 
of Muslims, what Hina Khan describes as “practising,” and “liberal,” but, as I will 
demonstrate in the subsequent sections, the categories are more multivalent than this 
dichotomy suggests. By “practising” Khan is referring to traditional Islamic beliefs and 
practices and the category of “liberal” implies Muslims who question traditional beliefs 
and practices. These labels are not necessarily self-ascribed but have developed both 
from inside and outside Muslim communities based on “public rituals,” or the observable 
practices of the Muslims. However, scholars also use the typologies to describe 
ideological diversity, differing opinions on Shari’ah, and approaches to Islamic 
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knowledge (Mandaville, 2001; Roy, 2012; al-Hibri, 1997; Duderija, 2007; Safi, 2007). 
The “practising,” or traditional, Muslims examined below are members of the hijabi 
fashion network in which the hijab and social media serve as technologies of exclusion 
within Muslim communities because these technologies have erected parameters of 
acceptability based on a specific practice and the strong opinions articulated on these 
hijabis’ blogs discourage unveiled women from joining these online conversations about 
the practice of veiling. The topical analysis of Muslim lesbians demonstrates both 
“traditional” and “liberal,” alternately labeled as “progressive,” Muslim perspectives and 
some confluence of both. Some queer Muslims have no problem reconciling their 
sexuality with the Islamic faith through their practice of ijtihad, while other Muslims 
reject queerness through traditional interpretations of the Islamic scriptures and frame 
ijtihad as bid’ah (heretical, religious innovation); the latter Muslims also argue that 
coming out as “queer Muslims” is weakening the (heteronormative) ummah. Despite the 
distinct methodologies, the Muslim-oriented network versus the transnational 
cyberspaces topical analysis, these cases share commonalities in that they both relate to 
Islamic practices and approaches to religious knowledge. 
 The next section will situate how online Muslim populations and their associated 
cyberspaces have often been analyzed in scholarly studies, which are not perhaps 
sufficiently sensitive to the network dynamics that underpin online interactions among 
these populations.  
Digital Muslim Spaces   
 The lack of a central authority and wealth of issues on which clerics disagree, like 
revirgination (see Chapter 4), contribute to the multitudinous textures of Islamic 
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knowledge and Muslim perspectives. Ignoring various Islamic sects for a moment, Sunni 
Muslims will themselves categorize other Sunni Muslims, for example, into numerous 
categories based on their observance of interpretation-based Islamic practices: how often 
they pray; if they go to the mosque on Fridays; if they only eat halal meat; if they date; if 
they speak Arabic; if they wear modest clothing; if they drink alcoholic beverages; if they 
fast during Ramadan; if they marry, particularly other Muslims; if they remain virgins 
until they are married, and so on. There are additional categories for Muslim women: if 
they wear hijab/niqab/burqa; if they work outside of the home; if they resist social norms 
and/or are involved in protests; if they refrain from engaging in sexual acts apart from 
coitus; if they go out to clubs; if they have guy friends; if they talk to men online; if they 
have boyfriends; if they buy into traditional male interpretations of the Qur’an and 
ahadith, and so forth. 
 As discussed in Chapter 4, since this research does not simply broach Islam but 
online Islam, it is important to characterize the online spaces in which Muslims interact. 
These spaces have been variously labeled as the “digital ummah” (Bunt, 2009; Mernissi, 
2004) “cyber Islamic environments” (Bunt, 2000; 2003) and the “virtual Islamic” (El-
Nawawy & Khamis, 2010). Saunders (2008) casts the ummah as a nation based on the 
unified responses among Muslims to the Jyllands-Posten cartoon incident in which 
caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad rendered him as a terrorist. He also references 
universal rituals associated with Islam, such as hajj and salat that, he opines, connect 
Muslims to a nation-like community, similar to how cultural practices link groups within 
national territories. Saunders (2008) mainly concerns himself with “internet 
use…defining praxis of ummahism through its ability to facilitate information exchange 
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and perceived harmonization among dispersed and distinct communities of Muslims” (p. 
313), although he frames these interactions as by-products of hostility against Islam in 
Muslim-minority societies. His approach demonstrates how scholars often focus on 
identity or geography—in this case, by referencing Islamophobic Muslim-minority 
societies, he is likely invoking Muslims in the West—to examine Muslim communities. 
This chapter, in contrast, includes contributions from participants from all over the world 
who are drawn into conversations regarding particular practices of Islam, demonstrating 
that the “digital ummah network” is more relevant to this discussion than 
conceptualizations of the ummah as a nation stemming from the Islamophobic West.  
 This chapter will not argue that the digital ummah is a coherent cyberpublic; it 
supports Varisco’s (2010) suggestion that the “idealized we-are-one Ummah” (p. 158) is 
unrealistic. It is possible to speak of the digital ummah not as a nation but as a network, 
which can be studied through topics and nodes that take shape within the larger context 
of fragmented digital ummah network. This network comes alive when confronted with 
certain events related to the lived experiences of Muslims but this does not necessarily 
imply that Muslims who engage in dialogue about these events and topics on either 
Muslim or non-Muslim sites agree on how the issues are framed or how the problematics 
should be addressed. In Bunt’s (2004) discussion of the “cyber Islamic environments,” he 
focuses mainly on websites oriented specifically to Muslims who adopt more or less 
conservative interpretations of Islam. Says Bunt (2004),  
The Internet can highlight what is individual and distinct about different Muslim perspectives and 
communities. It may therefore serve to enhance dialogue and ideas of difference, countering those 
notions of homogeneity promoted on occasion both by non-Muslims and by Islamic “authorities” 
as part of a singular path of Islam—one that excludes marginalised groups, or alternative 
interpretations of Islam, such as those that are traditionally less political and more quietist in their 
outlook (p. 108). 
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In this statement, Bunt is mainly speaking to the facilely applied references to the 
homogenous Muslim community (singular) and to hermeneutical divides within Muslim 
communities that lead some Muslims to denounce other Muslims as heretics. However, 
his own methods may obscure the voices of Muslims who are not attracted to 
“authoritative” Muslim websites or those dedicated to “marginalized groups” both of 
which are likely exhibit tendencies toward homogeneity (and evidence of trolling by 
“others”), which with be discussed promptly.   
 This chapter analyzes two networks: first, the websites of the popular American 
cohort of hijabi fashion bloggers, part of a larger transnational network, which are 
principally dedicated to Muslims who agree on one practice they interpret as Islamic: 
veiling. However, their practice and discussions also disrupt preconceptions of veiled 
women because they apply a creative, fashionable outlook to the practice; and, second, 
everyday topical discussions within transnational cyberspaces related to queer Muslims. 
My data collection for Muslim lesbians was not actually far removed from Bunt’s (2003), 
although rather than focusing on the broad topic of “Islam” and a geographical location, I 
centered my analysis on the topic of “Muslim lesbians” and “LGBTQ Muslims” without 
geographical qualifiers. While the hijabi fashion network and the everydayness of 
discussions related to queer Muslims may be less influential than the websites operated 
by muftis, focusing on the websites of authoritative Muslims may very well obscure the 
diversity within and between Muslim communities, not all Muslims are drawn to these 
sites, and the cosmopolitan opportunities that are occurring within transnational spaces 
based on topics and practices. This obscurity is due to the propensity of networks to 
evolve toward greater homophily:  
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homophily means that cultural..,or material information that flows through networks will tend to 
be localized. Homophily implies that distance in terms of social characteristics translates into 
network distance…It also implies that any social entity that depends to a substantial degree on 
networks for its transmission will tend to be localized in social space and will obey certain 
fundamental dynamics as it interacts with other social entities in an ecology of social forms 
(McPherson et al., 2001, p. 416). 
 
The tendency toward homophily leads theorists, like O’Neil (2009), to argue that online 
spaces serve as “echo chambers” (p. 116). For this reason, I chose to analyze a 
homophilic network and another more heterogeneous topical network, although both are 
connected through Muslimness and specific practices. I will begin with the homophilic 
network of hijabi fashion bloggers in the next section.    
Hijabi Fashion Network 
 Most Muslims agree that modesty is an important virtue in Islam but there is 
disagreement within Muslim communities about what modesty entails and how it should 
be practiced, even though muftis will often emphasize that all four schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence agree that women must cover their heads (Ali, 2010). Most of the women 
in the hijabi fashion dataset likewise agree that veiling is an obligatory practice for 
Muslim women; therefore, they believe that women who do not comply with this 
mandate are not practicing their faith correctly. For example, Elif Kavakci, who blogs 
and markets her line of sporty hijab at Hijabitopia, claims that wearing the hijab is fard 
(obligatory) for Muslim women:  
When people say it is a choice, it makes my blood boil. There is no question! To wear or not to 
wear hijab is not an option. If you love Allah and want to please him, you wear it. If you don't 
wear it, that is a decision you make as a Muslim, not a choice.213 
 
Kavakci is putting the solidarity (read: homogeneity) of the (pro-hijab) ummah above the 
right of Muslim women to choose for themselves how they interpret the Qur’anic 
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mandate on modesty. She goes on to say that she does have unveiled friends but those 
closest to her have lifestyles that coincide with her own, which speaks to the hijab as a 
symbol that not only denotes modesty but also inclusion.  
 Other bloggers, like Asma Parvez of Haute Muslimah, acknowledge that Muslim 
women “have different levels of hijab,”214 and they blog to encourage modesty without 
reinforcing parameters of inclusion based on the use of the hijab. Parvez claims that some 
women would wear her fashion ensembles “right out of the house,” while others might 
deem them appropriate for “women’s only events.” Similarly, when “Em” is asked if 
open-toed shoes are permissible, she responds that it is a “grey area,” meaning that not all 
Muslim women/hijabis consider the feet to be awrah (an intimate part of the body), 
although some hijabis consider the entirety of women’s bodies except her face and hands 
as awrat.215 Parvez also states that hijab “is between that person and Allah” and women’s 
level of modesty is not for others to judge. Mariam Sobh of HijabTrendz makes a similar 
comment: “there are differences of opinion and some might feel that hijab is more of a 
code of conduct and a guideline for how Muslim women should behave. I personally 
understand it [veiling] as something that God wanted us to do.”216 The first part of Sobh’s 
statement is inline with the arguments of some female Muslim scholars who do not 
interpret hijab as a head covering but as a behavior. Asma Barlas (2002), for example, 
claims that the true hijab is related to diverting one’s gaze from members of the opposite 
sex. Relatedly, Barazangi (2004) claims that the Qur’an would not have made distinctions 
between awrah and zinah, the latter of which is the parts of the female body that have 
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215 http://welovehijab.com/2009/11/26/hijab-101-hijabs-during-salah-at-home/ 
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typically been adorned with jewelry (neck, ears, arms, and ankles), if the whole female 
body was considered awrat. This section has highlighted some of the principal debates 
related to modesty within Muslim communities. While hijabis mostly agree that the hijab 
is required, some acknowledge that there are differing perspectives on the parts of the 
female body that are considered “intimate” and that some Muslim women might believe 
that the mandate of modesty is more related to behavior than to the headscarf. 
 The next subsection, as well as the rest of the subsections related to the hijabi 
fashion network, will expand on these perspectives through one long thread with nearly 
200 comments on the We Love Hijab blog, entitled “Hot Topic: Who’s Got A Problem 
With Hijab?”217 This posting by “Kima” discusses the issue of the hijab serving as an 
instrument of exclusion within Muslim communities, citing an article from Muslimette, in 
which a commenter claims that other Muslims, especially unveiled women, are more 
opposed to the hijab than non-Muslims. While hijabis shared a variety of opinions on the 
subject, their comments suggest that that their families and immediate communities 
pressure them to comply with more or less modest standards of dress to project a certain 
image of Islam or typology of Muslim. This categorizing, played out over women’s 
bodies, is related to the hierarchy of piety associated with modesty; in other words, 
Muslims sometimes believe that Muslim women’s practice of modesty, rendered as the 
headscarf, reflects their relative piety and by extension the extremism or liberalism 
associated with their religious beliefs, which are surmised as indicative of the beliefs of 
the larger community.  
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 Mapping the Hierarchy of Piety 	  
 The responses of Muslim women in regard to whether Muslims or non-Muslims 
have more of a problem with the hijab were fairly mixed but I will focus on the 
contestation related to hijab within Muslim communities. Several hijabis who have faced 
the scorn of other Muslims claimed that their family members were often the principal 
culprits. “Naemah,” (American), for example, writes,  
I get more comments from other muslimah’s that don’t cover, particularly my family…I used to 
be one of them that disliked the hijab cause I thought it was unnecessary and represented 
oppression. That is basically what I have gotten from my family since I decided to cover.  
 
Similarly “Neila” (French) claims that she does not veil due to “the reaction of…[her] 
parents.” “mermz,” a Pakistani expatriate, and “naba” (Pakistani) both state that there is a 
lot of anti-hijab sentiment in Pakistan and they have faced criticisms from their extended 
Pakistani families due to their practice of veiling.  
 Some families disagree with veiling among their wives and daughters because 
they think the hijab disrupts the “liberal Muslim” image of their communities. This 
interplay perhaps explains “Amy’s” conversation with an unveiled woman in which the 
latter claims that she does not veil because her husband threatened to divorce her if she 
does.  Tellingly, a few hijabis, like “Farisha” and “siti hajar” (Malaysian), said that their 
families linked the hijab to Islamic extremism: “siti hajar’s” family even called her a 
Taliban. “Farisha” claims that she became distanced from her family because when she 
started veiling her family believed that she “became the “extreme” Muslim and not the 
“moderate or liberal” Muslim” typology that her family favors. Other Muslims tolerate 
the hijab but the niqab is considered extreme. A few niqabis, such as “Kulsoom” 
(Pakistani) and “Fatima,” said that they have gotten many negative comments about their 
practice of “extreme” veiling, mostly from other Muslims who do not believe that the 
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niqab has anything to do with Islam. For other Muslims, as “Zaynah” mentions, the hijab 
is not considered extreme if it is mixed with Western clothing rather than the abaya (the 
long, loose outer garment that women wear in public in the Gulf region and elsewhere). 
However, there were also a few comments that suggest that some family members 
encourage more modest standards of dress as well: “Ameenah Yasin” (American) and 
“Jasse” (European) mention that their husbands pressure them to dress more modestly in 
jilbab (abaya) and hijab, respectively. Likewise, “Waheeda Khalfan” says she was forced 
by her family to wear the hijab for almost ten years and she was thrilled to remove it 
when she gained enough independence to do so. 
 As the comments in the last paragraph suggest, particularly those offered by the 
niqabis, Muslim women are also pressured to conform to more or less modest standards 
of dress by their immediate communities. For example, a Muslim revert, “Inal” says that 
wearing the hijab has sometimes been hard for her, especially when other Muslim women 
criticize her for wearing it or not wearing it “to their particular specifications.” The 
specifications on modesty are often quite particular; notably, “Alize” says that when she 
went to a “Pakistani” party in the SF Bay Area, some girls tried to convince her to 
remove her hijab “indoors,” although these same girls called others wearing short sleeves 
“sluts.” The “specifications” are also highly localized, which results in contradictory 
opinions of coercive dictates on modesty even within particular Muslim subcultures. This 
contradiction is illustrated by the comments of two women from the “BAM” (Black 
American Muslim) community. While “Samira” believes that her BAM community 
encourages the use of hijab, “Shereece” claims that women in her predominantly Black 
Muslim community rarely veil and some have tried to discourage her from wearing it. 
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Local communities play a large role in devising highly localized standards of modesty, 
which influence how women practice modesty, toward projecting a specific typology of 
Islam. In certain localized communities, like “Shereece’s” BAM community, women are 
encouraged not to veil to reinforce a “liberal” image of Islam. Similarly, a Canadian 
woman of Egyptian descent, Rana, states, “I don’t have any hijabi friends, and I must say 
that is probably why I don’t wear one myself. Yes, society plays a huge part in your daily 
decisions.” “Deniz” articulates a like comment in regard to her largely immigrant Muslim 
community in Australia, which rejects veiling in order to foster its assimilation into the 
dominant culture. 
 As stated previously, Muslim families and localized Muslim communities often 
pressure Muslim women to dress more or less modestly because a woman’s outward 
expression of modesty is often linked not only to the her piety but also to the version of 
Islam embraced by her community. This may be due to what I call the “hierarchy of piety 
associated with modesty.” I developed this concept based on the French niqab ban debate 
between Eltahawy, a native informant spokesperson, and Ahmed, a niqabi (see Chapter 
3). In this debate, Eltahawy argues that the niqab should be banned everywhere because 
modesty among Muslim women has created a hierarchy in which the piety of Muslim 
women is measured by how much of their body is covered or, in her words, disappears.218 
Thus the niqabi serves as the “pinnacle” of this hierarchy. Due to this connection between 
modesty and piety and the connection between piety and typologies of Muslims, linkages 
that are substantiated by the Williams and Vashi (2007) study (also see Ajrouch, 2004), 
women are trapped in dialectics involving their own beliefs, the necessity of conforming 
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to the beliefs of localized communities, and identity politics related to typologies of Islam. 
As a result, the hijab becomes an instrument of exclusion to divide “liberal” Muslims 
from more “extreme” varieties, even within the same family, which also reinforces the 
girl/bad girl dichotomy mentioned in Chapter 4, which I will detail further in the next 
subsection. 
 This subsection has discussed the familial and communal pressures exerted on 
Muslim women to conform with various levels of modesty in an effort to reinforce 
homogeneity toward a certain typology or image of Islam, which is performed, in the 
cases of women, through the “hierarchy of piety associated with modesty.” The next 
subsection will discuss the extent to which Muslim women have internalizes this 
hierarchy and how they are stereotyped within Muslim communities based on whether or 
not they comply with the practice of veiling. 
 Internalized Hierarchy and Stereotypes of Hijabis  
 Due to the “hierarchy of piety associated with modesty,” Muslim communities 
tend to have certain expectations (stereotypes) of veiled women. In Egypt, where, based 
on the HarassMap dataset, one would expect that compliance with practice of veiling is 
not only acceptable but violently enforced, “Sanna” says, “i’m living in Egypt...most 
people tell me that i shouldn’t wear…[the hijab] b/c it doesn’t allow me to put make-up.” 
“Sanna’s” comment implies a stereotype of veiled women, similar to “Leila’s” assertion 
in Chapter 4 that people assume that she must be a “good girl” because she wears hijab. 
One of the stereotypes that “Leila” mentions, in conjunction with the good girl stereotype, 
is that people assume that her top priorities are marriage and childbearing. Another 
stereotype, based on “khadija’s” comment, is that hijabis perform all their salat (prayers). 
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She says, “My mom although she is very religious, ironically she doesn’t feel…[the 
hijab] is necessary. She is someone who never misses a salah [prayer singular] and she is 
kind-hearted,” implying that a woman as pious as her mother would be expected to veil. 
Based on the comments of some hijabis, the connection between modesty and piety is not 
only projected onto them but is also a dynamic that some Muslim women have 
internalized. For example, one hijabi, “Ameenah Yasin” (American) questions if her 
failure to wear jilbab maker her “less of a muslimah.” Another hijabi, “Naseha,” “as an 
insider” who used to have a problem with the hijab before she started wearing it herself, 
says as a formerly unveiled woman she used to have the impression that hijabis think that 
they are “superior” to unveiled women. This sentiment is also reflected in the comments 
of several other Muslim women who did not yet feel ready to commit to veiling because 
they want to improve their practice of Islam in other ways to make their outward piety 
(the hijab) mirror their less visible expressions of the faith. “khadija,” for example, says 
“I have already made up my mind to wear the hijab, but I want to get better with my 
prayers first…I though it would be hypocritical to wear hijab, while not performing my 
salah consistently.” “khadija’s” comment emphasizes that, due to the hierarchy of piety, 
hijabis are assumed to be exemplary practitioner of the Islamic faith.   
 Although some hijabis appear to accept the hierarchy of piety associated with 
modesty, other Muslimahs have attempted to frustrate this connection between modesty 
and piety; for example, “Tina” mentions women who veil for cultural reasons and “Heba” 
claims that modesty can be expressed not only through the practice of veiling but also 
through other behaviors, such as diverting one’s gaze. “Heba,” goes on to cite a picture 
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that was circulated within the digital ummah network to argue against the good/bad, 
un/veiled muslimah binaries:  
Many ulema and average muslims distinguish…[hijabis] as being pure and worthy of respect 
whereas…[unveiled women] are defined as unworth of respect…or just plain whores. Yet nobody 
finds this insulting. A picture of a lollipop has been widely circulated among muslims…Two 
lollipops, one has its cover on while the other does not and is [in] turn surrounded by insects. This 
is insulting and intolerance at its best.  
 
Heba lays to grief the idea that only hijabis deserve respect and rejects the stereotype that 
unveiled women are “whores” who are trying to attract men (flies) by remaining 
uncovered.  
 Most of the commenters on this We Love Hijab thread were hijabis but a few 
unveiled women spoke up for their right not to be judged by other muslimahs for not 
conforming to this networked community’s standards of modesty. For instance, “Mya,” 
like “Heba,” rejects the notion that women choose not to cover in order to attract men and 
claims that veiling is a personal choice that does not necessarily speak to the piety of 
Muslim women. She writes,  
I…do not wear a hijab and never will, I feel there is no need for it and THAT is just my personal 
choice…someone here said[, “]A woman who covers herself is showing that she isn’t a slave to 
men…” So…if a woman does Not cover herself…she is a slave to men?...If someone does not 
respect a muslim that does not wear the hijab…they are Ignorant. 
 
“Mya” feels that she has a right to present herself however she sees fit without other 
Muslims judging her piety based on one practice that is not even among the five pillars of 
Islam, including shahada (the declaration of one’s belief in one God and that Mohammad 
was a Prophet), salat, Ramadan, hajj, and zakat (charitable offerings). The propensity of 
Muslims to judge women by their modesty first and foremost may contribute to 
“Forouhar23’s” annoyance that the hijab “seems to be the number 1 priority” of Muslims. 
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 Returning to “Heba’s” statement that modesty can be expressed in various ways, 
some Muslim women take to task the idea that modesty begins and ends with the hijab. 
For example, “Soumaya,” an unveiled woman who interprets modesty in a more flexible 
way than some hijabis, explains her position:  
a woman wearing Hijab attractively with much care spent on details has lost the point comparing 
[sic] to a woman who is not necessarily wearing Hijab, but dressed properly and respectfully, and 
is so discrete in color and way of walking and attitude that nobody notices her… So as not to fall 
into the stereotype of non-veiled Muslim women you’re talking about, I don’t think that Hijab is 
wrong or insulting, I just see a greater flexibility in it than let’s say, most women do. 
 
“Soumaya” is not only stating the modesty goes beyond the headscarf but that hijabi 
fashion may contradict the overarching purpose of dressing modestly—to detract 
attention away from people’s bodies. Similarly, “Heba” writes that fashion does not often 
accommodate “the idea of being respected for one[‘]s mind” rather than for one’s 
“female attributes” and that it could actually contradict the objective of hijab.219 Thus, 
even if women are wearing the hijab, they are not necessarily complying with the purpose 
of hijab, or modest behavior, which further frustrates the hijabi/unveiled binary that 
underpins the liberal/traditional typologies. 
  This section has outlined how some Muslim women have likely internalized the 
hierarchy of piety associated with modesty, while others are attempting to counter the 
tendency of Muslims to judge the morality of women based on whether or not they wear 
the hijab. Nonetheless, the hijab continues to demarcate boundaries related to piety and 
inclusion and contributes to the othering of Muslims by other Muslims. The next 
subsection will discuss features of this othering that are reinforced by conversations 
within homophilic networks. As stated earlier, the interplay of networks tends to draw 
                                                      
219 I should emphasize the distinction between the terms “the hijab” and “hijab.” “The hijab” is 
synonymous with “the headscarf,” while the term “hijab” refers to the Islamic mandate on modesty more 
generally, which extends beyond articles of clothing.   
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people into discussions with others who already agree with them, reinforcing the “echo 
chamber” (O’Neil, 2009) dynamic, which perhaps undermines the ability of interlocutors 
within the echo chamber to empathize with divergent opinions and discourages the 
participation of those with oppositional viewpoints.    
 Traditional Homophilic Networks 
 Since these hijabis are promoting veiling through their blogs, they tend to 
reinforce each other’s belief regarding the issue; in other words, they encourage the belief 
that veiling is obligatory. Although hijabis clearly feel that unveiled women and other 
Muslims, including those in their immediate communities and families, judge them, 
hijabis discuss unveiled women in judgmental terms as well. For example, 
“CanadianMuslim” writes, “i dont understand why they [unveiled women] would not like 
to be recognized as a muslim, why dont they want to represent their ummah? If they were 
right[e]ous muslims they would want to…stand along side their muslim sisters.” She also 
says, “By wearing the hijab…you are saying “im a muslim and I am proud of it...” Some 
hijabis see the hijab as overt display of pride in Muslimness that bolsters the solidarity of 
the (pro-hijab) ummah and, due to this belief, they imply that unveiled women could be 
Muslims but not “proud” Muslims. Hijabis’ dedication to the solidarity of the ummah 
through promoting conformity with the practice of veiling was validated by the 
comments of a few hijabis and recent converts who said that the “Great Hijab Debate” 
(the debate as to whether or not the hijab is required by the Qur’an) creates confusion 
(see comments of “Kendriana,” “CanandianMuslim,” and “New Hijabi & Soon to be 
Convert”). For some of these hijabis and Muslim communities that promote the hijab, the 
hijab is an expression of pride and solidarity and detractors make it seem like Muslims 
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argue among themselves about religious tenets, which they do, but the (pro-hijab) ummah 
often attempts to gloss over disagreements such as this.   
 Due to the strong belief that the hijab is unquestionably required by Islam, which 
is reinforced by conversations among Muslims who agree with this tenet in homophilics 
networks, some hijabis believe that unveiled women actually recognize that it is required 
as well but choose not to wear it for various reasons. For instance, “Tina” says, “just 
because someone does not wear hijab and gives you a list of reasons for not wearing it 
doesn’t mean they don’t believe the hijab is a MUST.” A few unveiled women 
substantiate “Tina’s” point by stating that they want to veil but they are afraid of losing 
their jobs and/or facing discrimination (see comments by “Eleni” and “Jana”). Several 
hijabis offered long lists of “stupid excuses,” according to “um mautez,” that unveiled 
women feigned to justify their non-compliance with the practice of hijab (see comments 
by “heva,” “Maisah,” “Kima,” “Busana Muslim Modern,” and “Dhian”) but the hijabis 
dismissed these excuses as inconsequential, especially in comparison to the importance of 
exhibiting pride in the (pro-hijab) ummah. Since hijabis personally heard these excuses, 
they must have been conversing with unveiled women about the hijab but the former do 
not tend to consider that unveiled women might be uncomfortable saying that they do not 
believe that the hijab is required in the presence of a hijabs. 
 Several hijabis believed that these excuses were simply subterfuge for the desire 
of unveiled women to assimilate into dominant non-Muslim cultures; some comments of 
hijabis speculated that unveiled women were more concerned with fitting in than with 
their religion. For example, “Forouhar23” (European hijabi) states, “there are muslims 
who try to become more western, and therefore, leave their hijab behind.” Likewise, 
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“Rabbia” (American) says, “some [unveiled women] just want to be western and don’t 
care about what it means to be a muslim.” Assimilation is perceived in strictly negative 
terms by some hijabis as being a “proud” Muslim woman appears to require one’s overt 
affiliation with the faith. Some hijabis view non-compliance with the hijab as a result of 
fear of discrimination or a desire to assimilate but these hijabis often do not consider that 
unveiled women might have differing opinions on modesty. The hijabis’ unwavering 
belief that unveiled women actually know that the hijab is required allows them to bypass 
the possibility of divergent opinions on the hijab mandate and instead render non-
compliance as dereliction of the faith to maintain the guise of uniformity in Islamic 
beliefs and practices. Divergent opinions, like “Heba’s,” emphasize that the Qur’anic 
mandate on the hijab (headscarf) is not as well defined as some hijabis make it out to be: 
I personally believe Allah is much more tolerant than the average muslim. In the Quran Hijab is 
mentioned a handful of times, but nowhere in context with a woman’s dresscode [sic] or headgear 
or such. Modesty is subject to the context, time and environment we live in. Certainly a female 
can be modest without a headscarf. 
 
Although a few comments like “Heba’s” made it onto the thread, the overwhelming 
majority, emboldened by the assenting crowd of the homophilic network, continues to 
advance the belief that the hijab mandate, the headscarf, that is, is uncontestable.  
 Since many hijabis view the hijab as mandatory and believe that the solidarity of 
the (pro-hijab) ummah is of utmost importance, they feel that it is their duty to “help” 
others correctly comply with the practice of hijab as one of their duties as Muslims to 
speak out against unIslamic practices within Muslim communities. “Ameerah,” for 
instance, claims that one of the reasons that women are not complying with the hijab 
mandate (the headscarf) is because “other Muslims aren’t reminding them to avoid 
wrong.” Some hijabis refute the idea that they are being judgmental of unveiled 
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women—many tend to see the distain they face from unveiled women and other Muslims 
related to their use of the hijab as unidirectional—but their comments suggest that they 
are tolerant of the circumstances and opinions of unveiled women only to the extent that 
this tolerance may one day facilitate unveiled women’s conformity to the practice of 
veiling. For example, “new balance outlet” states that she is not saying that an unveiled 
woman is “bad” but that “she should open heartedly embrace, understand, and follow her 
religion.” Similarly, “Rabbia” states, “I did not mean to imply that any muslim woman 
who does not wear a hijab is a bad muslim…I just believe that if a muslim truly 
understands Islam they will recognize the significance of being modest.” Thus, to avoid 
being labeled as judgmental, like they accuse other Muslims of being, they suggest that it 
is their duty to correct unIslamic practices without articulating the label of “bad” Muslim; 
however, due to the hierarchy of piety, the branding of unveiled women as “bad” is 
implicit.    
 While hijabis may feel that they are helping unveiled women and fulfilling one of 
their duties as Muslims—to correct unIslamic practices within their community—
unveiled women may not perceive these corrective admonishments as help. Some 
unveiled women reject this “help” and the judgment they face from hijabis for not 
conforming to the latter’s interpretation of modesty. For example, “zaida” says, “many 
muslims say bad things because I do not cover and that hurts. I love my religion but dont 
[sic] feel the need to cover.” Likewise, “ssg” (American) writes, 
Some muslim sisters who do not wear hijab have also told me they have gotten a lot of negative 
comments from sisters who do cover, pressuring them to wear it…We need to remember that there 
is no coercion in religion…the act is meaningful because you do it based on our faith, not because 
someone forces you.  
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“ssg” also says that this pressure makes unveiled women want to cover even less. As I 
said before, dissenting views on veiling were not common on the thread in this 
homophilic network but they encouraged a few hijabi commenters to become 
introspective (or defensive) about how Muslims ascribe labels, such as “bad,” to other 
Muslims and how this tendency reflects on Muslim communities in general. 
 This subsection has discussed the paucity of dissent that finds its way into 
homophilic networks of practice. Hijabis tend to deny that the mandate on wearing the 
hijab is contested among Muslims, a perspective that is reinforced through discussing the 
topic with other Muslims who subscribe to the same belief. The last subsection will 
discuss vernacular cosmopolitan praxis within this thread. This praxis reflected 
viewpoints that were true to the commenters’ own beliefs but promoted tolerance of 
divergent interpretations even if these concessions could perhaps detract from the 
solidarity of the (pro-hijab) ummah. 
 Cosmopolitan Dialogue Within Networks of Practice 
 There were cosmopolitan stances expressed both by hijabis and unveiled women 
in this discussion. For example, one hijabi, “Mira,” says,  
Wearing hijab takes a lot of strength and guts…Especially if you live in a Western non muslim 
country. I dont think we should put down the girls who dont wear it, just like those who dont wear 
it shouldnt put down the ones who do. We must always remember that Allah swt is the judge of 
human beings, not us.  
 
“Mira” emphasizes that it is not the charge of Muslims to judge the practices of other 
Muslims. She does not abandon her own beliefs but promotes a space of tolerance for 
others to practice theirs as well. “Heba,” an unveiled European woman, writes,  
My problem is not with what people wear or not, but rather the lack of tolerance extended to those 
who interpret the Qur’an differently. I also oppose the narrowminded catagorization between scarf 
wearing girls and those without…before we start demanding tolerance of others to let us dress as 
we deem fit, then the same tolerance of interpretation and understanding ones faith on an indvidual 
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[sic] level, should be extended muslim to muslim. Even when we dont understand each other or 
don’t agree.    
 
These women exhibit vernacular cosmopolitan praxis through remaining true to their own 
beliefs but calling on others not to judge divergent beliefs within the faith. Hijabis 
demonstrated that the hijab signifies their belief in Islamic modesty and pride in their 
Muslim identities but this practice also reflects their consumption of Islamic knowledge. 
Most of these hijabis likely consume traditional Islamic knowledge based on the 
centuries-old interpretations of male scholars. Significantly, like the mufti above suggests, 
among these scholars from all of the schools of Islamic jurisprudence, there is no 
disagreement regarding veiling, as all of them agree that it is obligatory. Similar to the 
anonymous commenter on Hina Khan’s blog (see Chapter 4)—“let us stop trying to be 
jurists”—most of these hijabis do not likely believe that they have the credentials to 
interpret the Qur’an for themselves. In fact, only one comment out of nearly 200 included 
a verse from the Qur’an (33:59) to provide scriptural backing for the practice of veiling. 
The practice of hijab offline, reinforced through network solidarity online, establishes a 
technology of exclusion—hijabis can readily identity their “friends,” those who exhibit 
similar pride in the (pro-hijab) ummah. Likewise, the network itself is a technology of 
exclusion because dissenting opinions related to veiling are gradually weeded out of this 
homophilic network of practice.    
 The next section contrasts traditional Islamic truths regarding homosexuality with 
beliefs about queerness among Muslims who practice ijtihad, which has allowed queer 
“liberal” Muslims to reconcile their sexuality and their faith even though Muslims who 
rely on traditional Islamic knowledge consumption rebuff this practice. The data suggest 
positionalities that do not lean toward either the “traditional” or “liberal” camps, which 
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are more evident in studies of topical networks in transnational spaces than in studies 
related to homophilic networks.  
Muslim Lesbians: Ijtihad or Bid’ah? 
 The first part of this section will frame approaches to the consumption of Islamic 
knowledge. As pointed out above, while some Muslims believe that they must rely on the 
interpretations of traditional jurists, other Muslims believe that they can engage directly 
with the Qur’an in order to develop interpretations that are more consistent with their 
understanding of overall liberatory intent of the text rather than advancing non-
contextualized, verbatim passages.  
 Ijtihad is a process that some Muslims undertake to dispute what they belief to be 
misinterpretations of religious texts and to make sense of Islam in the current era. For 
example, “OneDivineLight” says ijtihad involves, “gathering all the ayat…to study not 
only the verses themselves, but the verses surrounding them and the words in each verse 
and the verses which are related”220: in other words, Islamic methodology (Mandaville, 
2001). Irshad Manji was mentioned in Chapter 4 as a proponent of what the commenter 
referred to as the extremist liberal Muslim camp because Manji believes it is possible to 
reconcile Islam and queerness by promoting the revival of ijtihad, which she 
conceptualizes as “struggling to understand our world by using our minds…exercising 
the freedom to ask questions.”221 The “ijtihadists” unpack Qur’anic verses to make them 
more consistent with the merciful intent of the Qur’an (Wadud, 1999), which some 
Muslims believe is necessary to make sense of social phenomena that did not exist during 
                                                      
220 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/07/gay-and-muslim-islam-homophobia_n_2258802.html  
221 http://blog.beliefnet.com/news/2011/09/bestselling-lesbian-muslim-author-says-her-mission-is-to-spark-
discussion-debate.php 
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the time of the Prophet. “Arash Naranghi,” for instance, states that ijtihad is necessary to 
revisit passages of the Qur’an that relied on the common beliefs of the time in which they 
were revealed to interpret them, such as common beliefs regarding homosexuality and 
slavery.222 Similarly, “R.S.” says, “there was not [a] direct LGBT community 
during…[the Prophet’s] time so to try and place a modern development and 
understanding of alternative sexual lifestyles in the context of his time is a moot 
argument.”223 Hence ijtihadists believe that personal engagement with the Qur’an is 
necessary to reclaim Islam from traditional interpretations based on the widely held 
preconceptions of scholars from the 10th (or 13th) century CE, which I will discuss further 
in this chapter’s “Discussion.”  
 Muslims who agree that ijtihad is acceptable emphasize that religious beliefs are a 
personal matter that should not be subject to the consensus of the community. For 
example, “Sinan12’s” says, “I am gay and muslim…before you jugde [sic] me…this is a 
matter between me and God and it is not for other people to interfere with.” Similarly, in 
reaction to an article about a lesbian leaving Islam because she could not reconcile her 
sexuality and her faith, “Imaan Ali” (British), says, “Her religion is between her and 
Allah…I don’t know why she left Islam.”224 Other commenters suggest that verbatim 
interpretations of holy texts often miss the overarching merciful intent of the religion that 
the texts are supposed to promote. For example, “Gail Coleman,” a revert, states, “I am 
glad to see that there are others who question tradition…if we never think beyond just the 
words in a book…we miss a lot. Faith should be a journey and it is not the same for any 
                                                      
222 http://www.alternet.org/story/12817/to_be_gay_and_muslim 
223 http://gaymuslims.org/2011/02/20/marriage-fallacy/#comments 
224 http://blog.beliefnet.com/news/2011/09/bestselling-lesbian-muslim-author-says-her-mission-is-to-spark-
discussion-debate.php 
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two people.”225 These comments suggest that personal affirmation of religious beliefs is 
central to faith and takes precedence over conforming to the practices of the majority of 
adherents.  
 While some people, like “Gail Coleman,” laud the efforts of Muslims who engage 
personally with religious texts, other Muslims believe that the solidarity of the ummah, 
based on traditional Qur’anic exegeses, is more important than acceptance of the 
resulting diversity of beliefs based on personal, critical reflections (ijtihad) on the Islamic 
scriptures. Rasheed Eldin, for example, discredits ijtihad by framing it as bi’dah 
(heretical religious innovations), particularly in regard to creating a space for “queer 
Muslim” identities. Says Eldin, “Just because someone has certain desires, that does not 
entitle them to re-write God’s religion according to those desires.”226 Eldin does not view 
ijtihad as an acceptable practice because it involves challenging the significant 
uniformity among traditional interpretations, which are also more widely accepted among 
Muslims. Likewise, “sjaent2001” says that freethinking lends to confusion, which is not 
in the best interest of the ummah,227 similar to the stance that some hijabis take on the 
Great Hijab Debate, although Manji claims that it is fundamentalism to deny 
individualism in Islam.228 Henry Makow, rejects Manji’s emphasis on individualism, 
which he believes is bred of an elaborate conspiracy to encourage female chauvinism and 
Zionism: “What better way to disinherit Muslims than encourage them to become “free 
thinkers” like…here in the West.”229 This controversy points to a pervasive theme that 
                                                      
225 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/07/gay-and-muslim-islam-homophobia_n_2258802.html  
226 http://gaymuslims.org/2011/02/20/marriage-fallacy/#comments  
227 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/f-yusef/gay-muslims-the-elephant-in-the-prayer-room_b_2232263.html 
228 https://www.irshadmanji.com/sites/default/files/news/IMspeech_99Oct.html 
229 http://www.savethemales.ca/000642.html  
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threads throughout many of the datasets: the tension between the right to practice 
personal Islamic beliefs and the solidarity of the ummah. Although some Muslims, like 
Eldin, describe dedication to ijtihad as bid’ah, ijtihadists believe that the Qur’an 
commanded Muslims to engage in the practice with the first word of the Qur’an 
following the bismallah: iqra (read)230 (al-Hibri, 1997). 
 This section has framed various perspectives on one debate related to Islamic 
knowledge, the contested permissibility of Muslims interpreting the Qur’an for 
themselves. Some believe that ijtihad is both permissible and necessary to advance the 
liberatory intent of the Qur’an in the contemporary era, while others perceive it as heresy 
leveraged in an effort to undermine the solidarity of the ummah. The next subsection will 
frame traditional perspectives on queerness, which cast it as a curable “disease,” and 
some strategies that Muslims have attempted to cure themselves of queer desires.   
 “Traditional” Perspectives	  	  
 Traditional interpretations of the Qur’an typically render queerness as a “disease” 
that requires rehabilitation or punishment. For example, “Salma M. Ali” claims, “I think 
they just need help. Lesbianism and Gay-ness is honestly a disease to me.” For Muslims 
who render queerness as a disease, they also believe that there must be a “cure” for it, 
typically involving prayer, psychiatric treatment, corporeal punishment, and/or 
heterosexual marriage. “guest-ljmalwa,” for instance, says that LGBTQ Muslims should 
seek psychiatric treatment.231 Another commenter, “Laila,” who claims to have been 
tempted by same-sex attraction, states, “…you decide that…[your sexuality] is far more 
                                                      
230 http://dailycaller.com/2011/07/28/gay-and-muslim-%E2%80%94-is-that-even-possible-one-imam-says-
%E2%80%98yes%E2%80%99/ 
231 http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2012/12/frances-muslims 
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important to you than your own religion. Otherwise you would, as I have done, prayed to 
Allah (SWT) to remove these sinful thoughts.”232 “Leila” is stating that Muslims can cure 
themselves of queerness if they pray enough, counting herself as an example of the 
effectiveness of this intervention. Other cures are enacted by the state in communities that 
do not accept queerness. “Samo Adtun,” a gay Yemeni man, says that in Yemen, queers 
are either killed or imprisoned until they “become straights.”233 “Shalabieh” claims that 
shock therapy is still practiced in Jordan, Egypt, and the KSA to “cure” queerness.234 
Even in places where homosexuality is legal, like Turkey, honor killings and corrective 
rapes and beatings have occurred.235  
 Some queer Muslims believe that the best “cure” for their homosexuality is to 
marry a heterosexual. “Halim1814,” a gay Egyptian, writes that, although he has never 
acted upon his attraction to other men, he does not feel that he can change his sexual 
orientation toward same-sex attraction, which he calls a “sickness,” even though he has 
undergone therapy and prayed endlessly to “cure” himself. “Halim1814” asks for 
feedback on his idea of marrying a lesbian who would be able to sympathize with his 
own experiences.236 Some of the commenters (“Asiya,” “LastFriday,” and “Medievalist”) 
believe that he would do better to “cure” himself by marrying a heterosexual woman. 
However, “xyz” tells the story of a gay friend who followed similar advice from a doctor 
and he lived miserably with his wife for 20 years before divorcing her.237 Notably, all 
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these “cures” involve queer Muslims rejecting their sexuality, thereby endorsing 
traditional Muslim communities’ denunciation of homosexuality.                                  
 Where does this dialectic leave queer Muslims who favor the solidarity of the 
ummah over personal faith? Some Muslims who rely on traditional transmissions of 
religious knowledge feel that they must choose between their queerness and their 
religious communities. Several of the articles and blog postings described professed 
Muslim queers as very pious in their traditionally-rendered Islamic practices, which 
frustrates the simple typologies of traditional/liberal and good/bad particularly in regard 
to the assumption that queer Muslims must be “liberal” Muslims. The narratives of a few 
Muslim lesbians suggest that they conformed to traditional practices before their 
sexuality and religion came to a head. “Zara,” a lesbian of Pakistani descent, left Islam 
because of her lesbianism but she has faced an enduring sadness as a result of this 
decision. The article about “Zara” states, “she was the most pious of all her siblings and 
always took her religion seriously.”238 Despite or perhaps because of her traditional 
strong faith, she believes that her sexuality conflicts with her Muslim identity. Says 
“Zara,” “There are people out there who think they can be Muslim and gay, and that’s 
great. But to me, that sounds the same as people who claim Islam but still drink or don’t 
practice it properly.” Another Muslim lesbian, “Aliyah Bacchus,” from a conservative 
Muslim family, who wore hijab and abaya throughout middle and high school and taught 
community courses on Islamic tenets, realized that she was queer in her late teens after 
she left her husband from an arranged marriage. She did not overtly distance herself from 
Islam, like “Zara,” but she did become estranged from her family and her Muslim 
                                                      
238 http://www.shewired.com/lifestyle/2013/01/28/lesbian-muslim-unveiled-moving-forward-muslims-
progressive-values 
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community when she fell in love with a woman.239 The Muslimah Media Watch posting 
about “Aliyah” suggested that she moved away from her more traditional approach to 
Islam but it was unclear as to whether or not she left the faith altogether. Another article 
highlighted “Aliyah’s” tattoos and consumption of alcoholic beverages perhaps to 
suggest that she did leave Islam.240   
 “Zara” kept her queerness from her parents who found out that she was a lesbian 
when they read her diary. When they found out, they kept her under house arrest that 
included ritualistic verbal and physical abuse. “Zara’s” family supported her decision to 
leave Islam, or perhaps created the impetus for her to do so. Her family member told her 
as she was fleeing her forced imprisonment within the family home at the age of 19, 
“Don’t tell anyone you’re related to us. And please God, don’t tell anyone you’re 
Muslim.”241 “Zara’s” story suggests that traditionalist lesbians may be comfortably 
accommodated by the closet unless their queerness inadvertently comes out. The desire to 
remain in the closet is understandable considering how some Muslim families, like 
“Zara’s,” react to the news that their children are queer, which typically involves the 
aforementioned “cures” or the families disowning their queer offspring. A blog posting 
about “Reviva,” a Muslim lesbian in the United Kingdom, relays similar patterns of 
familial abuse to which “Zara” was subjected. “Reviva” recounted the “cures” her family 
imposed upon her, including exorcisms, physical and mental abuse, forced confinement, 
and several attempts to marry her off to foreigners without her consent. Similar to 
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“Aliyah’s” case, the family of a gay Jordanian, “H,” threatened to disown him and throw 
him out of the house when his mother discovered the gay websites he had been reading in 
an attempt to “cure” himself of his homosexual desires. Thus it appears that queer 
Muslims from traditional families must keep their sexuality a secret to prevent their 
ostracism from the home and from their religious communities. 
 Nonetheless, the familial reactions are perhaps more merciful than the 
prescriptions of larger traditional Muslim communities. Several commenters connect the 
suitable punishment for homosexuality, the stoning of gays and lesbians, to the fate of the 
people of Sodom and Gomorrah. Similarly, “Huzaifah” and “al Zayn” share a hadith 
narrated by Ibn Abbas, which states that gay men should be thrown from the highest 
point of the city and stoned.242 Another commenter relays the hadith that Muslims should 
“turn [effeminate men]…out of…[their] houses” (Bukhari 72:774).243 In all of these 
proposed penalties, public discipline (Foucault, 1977) is enacted upon a wayward 
member of the group by the community or the state rather than Allah to reinforce the 
social norm that such behavior is an affront to the community and to prevent others from 
similar lapses in judgment, which consumers of non-traditional religious knowledge 
argue is contrary to Islam because such discipline appropriates the sole prerogative of 
Allah to judge and punish and places it within the hands of the community. This 
dissention from consumers of non-traditional religious knowledge also speaks to whether 
or not the social policing of sexuality within Muslim communities—not simply the 
policing of non-heteronormative sexuality, but also that spinsters and Muslim women in 
general—should be condoned. Public discipline implicitly casts the sexuality of Muslims 
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as public rather than private; in other words, spinsterhood, pre-marital sexual relations, 
dating, female virginity, marriage, and familial configurations (polygyny, for example) 
within Muslim communities are all issues that are considered open to communal 
discussion and consensus. 
 Muslims who oppose queerness cite a few verses from the Qur’an to substantiate 
the prescribed punishments mentioned above: 11:82 and 26:165-6. The first verse 
discusses the fate of Sodom and Gomorrah due to men calling on Lot to send out the 
angels, disguised as boys, so that the men could satisfy their lust. Allah is said to have 
lifted up the city from the ground and sent it crashing back to the earth (Sadia et al., 
2011). The second verses state that men who lie with “men” as they do with women are 
“transgressing limits.” Although the Qur’an does not stipulate any punishments for those 
who transgress these limits and it does not mention lesbianism at all (Murray, 1997), it 
stands to reason that homosexual relations would be considered a form of zina 
(extramarital sexual relations) because, traditionally speaking, gay marriage is not 
tolerated and, therefore, sexual relations between same-sex couples could not be accepted 
as legitimate within traditional Muslim communities. Based on the limited number of 
passages in the Qur’an that broach homosexuality and the divergent interpretations of 
these passages, which I will discuss below, it is difficult to argue that the Qur’an 
unquestioning calls for the death of queer Muslims, so Muslims who consume traditional 
religious knowledge often substantiate the condemnation and corporeal punishment of 
gays and lesbians through the ahadith cited previously. 
 This subsection has discussed Muslim approaches to queerness based on the 
consumption of traditional religious knowledge, which normally renders homosexuality 
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as a disease that should be cured because, in “traditional” Muslim communities, sexuality 
is cast as a public, communal issue. Therefore, queer Muslims who consume traditional 
religious knowledge are often forced to choose between their religion and sexuality. The 
next subsection will highlight “liberal” Muslim perceptions of queerness, some of which 
are underpinned by the practice of ijtihad. Through engaging directly with the Qur’an, 
some Muslims feel that they are able to make sense of modern-day social phenomenon 
that were not prevalent during the time of the Prophet. 
 “Liberal” Perspectives 	  
 As mentioned above, a few commenters suggested that, since a LGBTQ 
community did not exist during the time of the Prophet, Muslims can either take up the 
issue through connecting it to other parallel issues that are addressed in the Qur’an or 
they can attempt to reinterpret accepted truths based traditional interpretations. For 
example, some “traditional” interpretations render homosexuality as synonymous with 
lewdness. However, “OneDivineLight” attempts to correct this misconception:  
Islam is against "lewd" behaviors not normal sexuality. Lewd and homosexual are not synonyms. 
A same gender couple who have a mature, respectful relationship are not lewd. Lewd…is 
everyone getting naked in the streets in a way that disrespects others. What happens in a home 
between a loving couple is between the couple. Quran requires 4 people witness the actual 
penetration to make an accusation of [lewdness].244 
 
S/he is attempting to demonstrate that traditional interpretations of the Qur’an have 
wrongly stretched the concept of lewdness, a crime punishable by 100 lashes if it is 
witnessed by four people (there is no mention of stoning), to reinforce prejudices against 
queerness. Barlas (2002) substantiates this commenter’s claim that public sexual acts 
were not uncommon during the Jahiliya (pre-Islamic) period, thus the Qur’an prescribes 
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an equally public punishment but it should not be embellished to the point of warranting 
death, particularly to punish people who do not engage in public sexual acts.  
 “OneDivineLight” also asks Muslims to ruminate on how “private” consensual 
relations between adults affect them. This topical network allowed the space for people to 
reflect on “OneDivineLight’s” suggestion. Several Jordanians spoke out in favor of “H’s,” 
the gay Jordanian whose parents threatened to disown him, right to engage in sexual 
relations with whomever he would like. For example, “Madian” writes, “He has the right 
to…practice his private…sexual life freely within his own closed doors as by the laws of 
this country.”245 Similarly, a queer Jordanian, “Enchanted Fairy,” claims, “whoever you 
have in your bed by the end of the day is up to you not the entire world!”246 Attempting 
to render Muslim sexuality as a personal rather than communal issue may be one of the 
most trying issues facing the consumers of “liberal” religious knowledge but even some 
Muslims who lean toward consumption of traditional religious knowledge may agree that 
sexuality should be situated as a private matter.  
 While “OneDivineLight” disputed lewdness as synonymous with homosexuality, 
other Muslims introduce divergent interpretations of the same Qur’anic passages that 
other Muslims use to condemn queerness, such as 11:82 and 26:165-6 mentioned above. 
Non-traditional interpretations of the first verse stress that fact that the angels in the story 
of Lot were disguised as beautiful, young boys. Ijtihadists also claim that the other verses, 
26:165-6, related to men lying with other “men,” have also been interpreted as men lying 
with boys. Thus consumers of non-traditional religious knowledge believe that these 
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verses are rejections of child rape and pedophilia rather than of consensual sexual 
relations among gay men.  
 Muslims who promote tolerance of Muslim queerness do not often mention 
ahadith perhaps because, even among consumers of traditional Islamic knowledge, the 
proposition that authentic ahadith should be granted equal weight to the Qur’an is 
contested. The relative weight that the ahadith should be granted in guiding Islamic 
practices was mentioned in several of the datasets; some Muslims believe that the Qur’an 
and ahadith should be given equal weight in interpreting Islamic beliefs and practices, 
while others believe that the ahadith are of little or no consequence. Some ijtihadists 
disregard ahadith in general, particularly those that contradict the Qur’an. For example, 
the commenters who cite the ahadith calling for the stoning of homosexuals fail to 
acknowledge Qur’anic passages that counter them: 4:16, for example, which states, “And 
the two who commit it among you, dishonor them both. But if they repent and correct 
themselves, leave them alone. Indeed, Allah is ever Accepting of repentance and 
Merciful.”247 This verse is referring to homosexual relations between two men, but 
instead of stipulating that the men should be stoned, as the ahadith suggest, it says they 
should repent and be forgiven.248 Although this verse does imply that Muslims should 
reject queerness, passages of the Qur’an do not command that queers be put to death 
because they would be incapable of penitence if they were dead.  
 Another traditional rejection of homosexuality is advanced due to the importance 
of procreation that is articulated by the Qur’an. Eldin, for example, cites 16:72: “And 
Allah has given you spouses (azwaj) of your own kind, and has given you, from your 
                                                      
247 http://quran.com/4/16  
248 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gay_muslims 
 239	  
spouses, sons and grandsons, and has made provision of good things for you.”249 
Although Eldin acknowledges that the word azwaj denotes “the opposite parts of a pair,” 
he also believes that the only way to interpret “opposite” is in terms of gender. In 
response, “S,” a Muslim lesbian, questions, “How would you feel if you cant [sic] be 
with your partner that you love?” “S” goes on to say, “[nikah] is a vow…not [to] commit 
infidelity and that you will love that person through the good and bad and what is wrong 
if two women or men want to do it in the way of Islam?”250 Like “S,” Daayiee Abdullah, 
a well known queer imam, says, “By not allowing same-sex couples to wed, there is a 
direct attack on the Qur'an's message that each person has a mate who is their 'comfort 
and their cloak.'”251 Abdullah reasons that the Qur’an does not only use the term azwaj 
(“mate”) in reference to husbands and wives and it purposefully employs gender-neutral 
language to counter the limited interpretation of the word to denote a male-female pair.252 
“Liberal” Muslims, like Abdullah, who have reconciled their faith with their sexuality, 
believe that queer nikah (religious marriage) must be accepted within Muslim 
communities due to Qur’anic sanctions on extramarital sexual relations. Abdullah adds, 
“Islamic jurisprudence of ancient lore prevents samesex couples from marrying by 
making it a legal impossibility...not that two samesex cannot wed before witnesses and 
Allah,”253 which is what nikah entails. Furthermore, since nikah allows for Muslim 
marriages to be recognized by the community without the involvement of legislation, if 
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Muslim communities become more accepting of queerness, this could allow for an 
extension of queer rights beyond those attribute to law in some Western nations.  
 While some “liberal” Muslims are fighting to secure the right to nikah for queer 
Muslims, others just want a space to be who they are and find support from others like 
them. Some Muslim lesbians are able to guard their secret and use the internet to 
anonymously reach out to others who are in similar situations so they do not have to 
choose between their sexuality and their religion or face ostracism of their families, 
which appear to be tendencies among “traditional” Muslims. In one posting, “shim099” 
confesses her attraction to other women, concluding the posting with the following 
statement: “i can’t believe I just admitted all this.”254 In reply, “imjustfine” states, “I 
think it is really good that you did admit it if not here than where?” Similarly, a Pakistani 
lesbian states that it is impossible for her to come out due to the homophobic climate of 
her local community so she relies on the internet to connect with others for support and to 
form relationships. These comments suggests that Muslim lesbians are using social media 
as spaces for mapping out queer Muslim subcultures and to reach out to others like them 
in contexts in which it may be unsafe to do so offline. The internet provides a space for 
“virtual coming out,” subtle resistance against pervasive heteronormativities found in 
every culture. 
 Some of the Muslim lesbians who came out virtually were understandably 
worried about how their families would react to their queerness, perhaps in light of the 
stories that they might have read about other Muslim lesbians, like “Zara.” In one posting, 
a Muslim lesbian shares her narrative about coming out to her parents, which resulted in 
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her being thrown out of her house, to warn other women not to do the same unless they 
were financially secure enough to live on their own.255 One Muslim lesbian states that she 
has never told anyone about her queerness because she believes if she did her family 
make sure that not even “her ashes” were found, emphasizing the possibility of violence 
against queers in her community.256 Another Muslim lesbian solicits advice on mitigating 
her family’s anxiety about to her failure to marry. This last comment suggests a 
connection between Muslim spinsterhood and lesbianism and, although there were few 
linkages articulated in either of the datasets, this could be another explanation for some 
Muslim women remaining single. 
 Similar to this Muslim lesbian who accepted her queerness and was resisting 
heterosexual marriage, others attempt to maintain a “traditional” Islamic lifestyle without 
denying their sexual proclivities through “marriages of convenience.” One article 
discusses “Syed Mansoor,” a devout Muslim of Indian descent, who is among nearly 400 
gays and lesbians who were attempting to maintain both their Islamic and queer lifestyles 
through posting personals on a South Asian websites to find LGBTQ Muslims of the 
opposite sex to marry.257 Unlike “Halim1814,” they are not proposing these marriages of 
convenience to “cure” themselves but to stay in the closet to their friends and relatives. 
Muslims, like Mansoor and the lesbians who virtually come out, have come to terms with 
their queerness and do not perceive it to be incompatible with their Muslim identities but 
they stay in the closet because larger (traditional) Muslim communities may not be ready 
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to accept them and they are concerned by how their communities and families might react 
to disclosure of their homosexuality. 
 This subsection has discussed “liberal” Muslim perspectives on queerness. These 
Muslims are mainly attempting to normalize the queer Muslim identity through 
debunking the supposed Qur’anic rejection of queerness. They are also trying to create a 
space to discuss queer nikah because, they argue, that Muslims should have a right to 
practice their sexuality within Islamically sanctioned relationships. The next subsection 
will discuss perspectives that that are not easily accommodated by either of these two 
typologies discussed above, “traditional” or “liberal.”   
 Middle Ground Perspectives 
 Some of the perspectives I encountered in the dataset were not easily 
accommodated by either “liberal” or “traditional” typologies but I would argue that the 
same is true of the other two perspectives outlined here; consumption of traditional or 
liberal religious knowledge in absolute term is likely difficult to maintain. For instance, 
although the Qur’an does not definitively proscribed slavery, it is unlikely that any 
Muslim would argue that it is an acceptable practice. Among the perspectives that were 
difficult to compartmentalize as either “liberal” or “traditional,” some Muslims believe 
that engaging in homosexual acts is a “sin” but they do not necessarily believe that same-
sex attraction is unnatural, which perhaps sets their beliefs apart from other religions that 
believe it is unnatural and a sin to even desire others of the same sex. According to 
Rasheed Eldin, “A person will only be rewarded or punished according to what they 
CHOOSE to do, not how they were made.”258 Similarly, “Opinionopinion59” states, 
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“Saying you feel that you were born with a homosexual orientation is one thing and 
engaging in homosexual acts is another (a big sin).”259 Thus, despite a Muslim’s queer 
tendencies, she can remain a respectable part of the community if she refrains from acting 
upon her desires. This middle ground perspective varies from traditional Muslim 
perspectives, which cast queerness as a disease, and from “liberal” Muslim viewpoints 
that promote the unconditional acceptance of queerness and queer relationships, even 
queer Muslim marriages.  
 Muslims who demonstrate a middle ground approach frame queerness as a jihad, 
a personal struggle, for which Muslims, who refrain from acting upon their desires, will 
be rewarded. For example, Husnaa, says, “Allah made people gay/lesbian in the same 
way he made people blind, deaf, athletes, good at math…The test for them is to not 
commit zina.”260 “Barbara0309” offers a similar comment:  
 …everyone on this earth is given a test. It could be illness, the death of a child, money…If you 
 stick fast with God's laws…you will be rewarded in the next life; if you act upon your 
 carnal/earthly desires, you will be punished.261   
 
It should be noted that the Muslims who believe that queer Muslims will be punished for 
acting on their desires also reject the idea that they are exhibiting homophobia by 
standing up for “God’s laws,” which is analogous to the beliefs of some hijabis who 
opined that it was their duty to “help” unveiled women by telling the latter that they are 
not adequately complying with an Islamic mandate. “Husnaa’s” comment, however, 
reinforces the claim of some “liberal” Muslims, like Abdullah, who argue that queer 
nikah must be allowed so that queer Muslims would have the right engage in Islamically 
permissible sexual relations. 
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 These middle ground Muslim perspectives appear to be contending with scientific 
evidence that homosexuality is a natural tendency and with the widely accepted 
infallibility of Allah as the creator of all people; in other words, these Muslims cannot 
argue either that queerness is unnatural or that Allah made a mistake by creating lesbians. 
Traditional Muslims sidestep this issue by calling it a psychological disorder or a disease, 
which was not created by Allah. In contrast, the middle ground perspective frames it as 
jihad, which underscores that it is a queer Muslim’s deeds rather than her natural 
tendencies that will determine her rewards and punishments in in the next life. While 
middle ground Muslim perspectives accept queerness as natural, they take issue with 
Muslims who attempt to identify as both queer and Muslim because they see queerness 
among Muslims as a jihad that Muslims should resist rather than as intersectional 
identities that could be reconciled, as liberal Muslims suggest. Thus, although queerness 
is inscribed on the body, as is identity, Muslimness is not based on who a person is but 
instead on what she does. For these Muslims, saying, “I am Muslim and I want to sleep 
with people of the same sex” is very different from saying “I am a queer Muslim.” As 
such, they may view the entrance of “queer Muslims” into online and physical spaces as a 
blow to Islam, due to the collusion of identity and practice, while they believe that piety 
should be strictly related to practice.  
 Cosmopolitan Dialogues on Muslim Queerness 
 Queer rights are not only international issues but they also present cosmopolitan 
opportunities—in this case, for example, several activists employ the Qur’an to argue for 
the acceptance of queerness, including marriage equality. Some approaches to queer 
rights may support personal rights but they do not advance local or international queer 
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rights that are part of the nexus of cosmopolitanism. Some commenters told “H” that he 
should emigrate to a Western country, while “Sorab Shroff” claims that “H” might also 
be subjected to violence in Western nations, just as he was as a (racialized Muslim) gay 
in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, “aramramwebtv,” “Ahmad Al-Sholi,” and 
“Fadi Zaghmout” encourage “H” to stay in Jordan and work toward tolerance for the 
Jordanian LGBTQ community. “Ahmad Al-Sholi” writes, “I would want you to stay not 
only for yourself, but for all of us, for the kind of society that we would want to live 
in…we stand second/next to you…by taking it in as a struggle for a free and liberal 
person.” “Fadi Zaghmout” suggests that it may be more difficult for “H” to come out to 
his parent than to leave Jordan, but the former option would be the first step in creating a 
more tolerant society. These comments demonstrate support for both local and 
international queers rights, including those within Muslim-majority communities, which 
is more inline with vernacular cosmopolitan praxis than the implication that tolerance of 
queerness is only possible in the West. 
 Muslims who take middle ground approaches also demonstrate vernacular 
cosmopolitan praxis by remaining true to their own beliefs but exhibiting tolerance for 
others to do the same. “ThePillarOfAutumn,” a British Muslim, writes, “I’d say 
homosexuality is unnatural…it isn't something that should be encouraged but neither 
should it be discriminated against since people's sexual lives are part of their own private 
sphere.”262 S/he also says,  
As for Gay marriage, if the population wants it then why not?... It's something I find odd and don't 
understand but I feel the same way about all sets of beliefs that aren't my own and am in no 
position to enforce mine upon anybody else… Gay couples can't have children maybe they'll adopt 
some of those orphans who would otherwise be rotting away on the streets or receiving a lack of 
parental love in an orphanage. 
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“PillarOfAutumn” does not him/herself agree with queerness but suggests that it does no 
harm to others and may actually address an important concern of the Qur’an—a concern 
that some Muslims use to justify the practice of polygyny—the welfare of orphans. 
Similarly, “Muslim Brother,” writes,  
The beauty of Islam is that there are many facets to its people, the way they practice, the way they 
interpret the Quran…As far is the nikkah is concerned, it’s not my business, but it’s still better 
than sleeping around. It’s two grown adults in good conscience making a commitment of fidelity 
to one another. To me thats better than the alternative.263 
  
This quote frames some of the issues at stake for queer Muslims: the choice between 
disregarding injunctions against extramarital sex or facing the scorn of some Muslims for 
having a queer nikah; and personally engaging in hermeneutics to develop interpretations 
that are aligned with what a person believes to be the intent of the Qur’an or relying on 
the interpretations of men who have been dead for centuries. Cosmopolitan aesthetics 
imply that Muslims remain true their own beliefs, while understanding that other 
Muslims must have the right to do the same, despite the possibility that divergent beliefs 
could detract from solidarity (read: homogeneity) of the ummah.  
Discussion	  
 These networks of practice demonstrate the dialectic between consumption of 
traditional knowledge and the solidarity of the ummah and the exercise of personal faith 
adopted at times through the practice of ijtihad. This dialectic also includes Muslims who 
take middle ground approaches, such as those who contextualize religious tradition in 
contemporary social phenomenon, which are often missed in studies of homophilic 
networks. It may be overly simplistic to cast these divergent beliefs as typologies because 
inter-Muslim disagreements are often based on their understandings of Islamic 
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knowledge and, as such, more related to practices than identities. For instance, would 
“PillarOfAutumn” fall into the category of a “traditional Muslim” because s/he believes 
that homosexuality is unnatural or would s/he fit more comfortably into the category of 
“liberal Muslim” because s/he is not against queer nikah?  
 “Liberal Islam” is not a straightforward concept among scholars who have 
attempted to frame it. For example, Filali-Ansary (2003) casts Fazlur Rahman as a 
proponent of “liberal Islam” because he criticized orthodox Islam for its inability to 
address modern norms. However, Rahman (1986) was not “liberal” on all issues; he 
posits, for example, that the Prophet did not prohibit women from attending 
congregational prayers but he clearly preferred that women pray at home. Conversely, 
Al-Hibri (1997) cites the narrative of a woman who stood up in the mosque and said to 
Caliph Omar “you shall not take away from us what God has given us” when the caliph 
attempted to put a ceiling on the amount that women’s families could request in mahr—
similar to the proposal of officials in the Gulf states in an effort to reduce the cost of 
marriage and discourage spinsterhood (see Chapter 4). Caliph Omar conceded to this 
woman’s point. This woman was not only at the mosque but she confronted the leader of 
the Muslim community, informing him of women’s God-given rights. Thus it appears 
that Rahman is trapped in the orthodoxy he accused others of in regard to women’s rights, 
particularly in light of the works of female Muslim scholars who have demonstrated that 
women played an active role in the first Muslim community, including the mosque, and 
served as important transmitters of religious knowledge (Mernissi, 1991). This exchange 
between the caliph and the Muslim woman who stood up for the rights of women 
highlights an important aspect of Islamic knowledge that some Muslims suggest has been 
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undermined for centuries due to the monopoly of the male ulama over its accumulation: 
debate (Bowen, 2004).  
 Kort recognizes the similar incoherence between Maududi’s supposed liberalism 
and his traditional approach to gender relations. Maududi, for example, agrees with 
interpretations of the verse 4:34 that grant husbands the right to lightly beat their wives 
(Kort, 2005, p. 373). Maududi (1976) also equates the decline of civilizations with their 
granting “undue freedom upon the fair sex.” Based on Maududi and Rahman’s myopic 
views on the status of women perhaps their interpretations are more appropriately framed 
as “neotraditionalist” (Kort, 2005; Wadud, 1999). While male scholars might be 
progressive on other issues, their positions on women’s rights tend to be the slowest to 
evolve. To add to Kort’s (2005) discussion, Wadud’s (1999) interpretation of verse 4:34 
is that men should leave, not beat, their wives for nushuz (traditionally rendered as 
“disobedience,” eventually leading to the beatings), which she interprets as infidelity (p. 
74-75).   
 In several pieces, the modern West appears to hold a monopoly on “liberal Islam” 
(Filali-Ansary, 2003; Cliteur, 2011). Yet, although queer Muslims would likely be 
grouped into the liberal camp, in addition to multiple queer Muslim websites originating 
in the Arab region and various films dedicated to the narratives of queer Muslims 
throughout the world, some of the commenters in the dataset were queers based in 
Muslim-majority countries. The contributions of non-Westerners to the topic of LGBTQ 
Muslims in transnational cyberspaces dispute the notion that tolerance, illustrated by the 
comments of Jordanians in relation to “H’s” situation, and positions of alterity are limited 
to the West. In contrast, American hijabi fashion bloggers did not appear to conform to 
 249	  
the principles of liberal Islam, despite the blog postings emanating from supposed 
epicenter of liberal philosophy. Hijabi fashion blogger should not, however, be perceived 
as the most traditional among their Muslims counterparts; as a few of the commenters 
suggested, staying abreast of the latest styles and paying acute attention to one’s 
appearance can often detract from a Muslim woman’s dedication to modesty being that 
she is accentuating her feminine attributes. My point is that it is too easy to fall into the 
trap of the East-West divide regarding the tolerance of Muslims, the same divide that 
tacitly informs discussions of cosmopolitanism. As Turner (2007) says, “Generalizations 
about Islam in terms of traditionalism and reformism are notoriously dangerous and 
unreliable” (p. 124). He offers the example of Wahhabi-influenced reform movements in 
Indonesia that were expected to result in a contraction of gender rights but this 
expectation never materialized (Turner, 2007). It is perhaps appropriate to say that nearly 
all Muslims are moderate but they have more or less conservative perspectives on various 
issues based on their understandings of religious knowledge.            
 Despite scholarly attempts to geographically situate diffuse approaches to Islamic 
authority over knowledge, Safi (1997) argues that progressive Muslim reformists are 
neither limited to North America nor are their contributions a very recent phenomenon. 
He argues that liberal Islam has “150-year-old tradition,” noting important reformers, 
such as al-Afghani, Rida, Iqbal, and, again, Rahman makes the list. Roy (2012) concedes 
to the geographical dispersion of liberal Islamic thought but he does recognize it as a 
modern phenomenon. In his discussion of post-revolutionary politics in the Arab region, 
he points out the important role that Salafism has played in encouraging popular demands 
for the secularization of governance. Says Roy (2012), “The young [in the MENA 
 250	  
region] are more individualistic and less prone to feel the pull of holistic ideologies, 
whether Islamist or nationalist…The new generation calls for debate, freedom, 
democracy, and good governance” (p. 8-9) without rejecting their religiosity. He does not 
relate this to “liberal Islam” but instead to greater personal attachment to religion: “The 
usual religious authorities…have largely lost their legitimacy amid the rise of self-
appointed and often self-taught religious entrepreneurs. Young “born-again” Muslims 
have found their own way by surfing the Internet and joining peer groups” (Roy, 2012, p. 
10). Nonetheless, Roy’s (2012) discussion of “born-again” Muslims is not far removed 
from how other scholars render liberal Islam. Aras (2004), for example, states that 
“liberal Muslims” promote secularity and personal religiosity, which does not conflict 
with Roy’s framing of the “born-again” Arab Muslims.  
 To discuss what qualifies or not as liberal Islam one must look at the concepts of 
authority, ummah, and ijtihad. John Bowen (2004) argues that since Muslim populations, 
which make up the ummah, and political and religious authority have historically been 
geographically dispersed, Muslim are bound to the ummah through rituals (also see 
Hirschkind 2001), such as salat and hajj. He also claims that “Transnational Islam” tends 
to encourage Muslims to seek out the highest religious authorities to guide their practices; 
one of the qualifying characteristics of these authorities is that they are typically well-
versed in classical Arabic (Bowen, 2004) and it appears that often, in the contemporary, 
hyper-connected world, they tend to cite other acknowledged authorities to reinforce their 
own hermeneutics (Ali, 2010).  
 However, while the religio-political boundaries of Muslim populations have 
historically been dispersed, religious knowledge has not been. Mandaville (2001) points 
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out that the reliance on oral transmission of scriptures and interpretations of them have 
“allowed ulama…to maintain a virtual monopoly over the production of authoritative 
religious knowledge” (p. 176; also see Mandaville, 2007). Furthermore, according to al-
Hibri (1997), some mujtahids (religious scholars) maintained close relationships with the 
political establishment and those who dissented faced intimidation and torture; thus, 
although political encroachments impacted religious authority, it was also reliant on 
popular support. As Turner (2007) argues, “the authority of the mullah…was based 
on…a local, discursive and popular form of authority ” (p. 119). He goes on to say that 
popular support was based on the ulama’s ability to offer sound advise, but this point 
could also be read as the ulama maintaining popular authority through his ability to 
substantiate already deeply held beliefs within a community. In other words, the ulama 
draws from community norms through his socialization to offer his rulings/advice, which 
reinforce his popularity, and the preconceived beliefs of the community become 
underpinned with religious authority through his approval of them. In contrast, if the 
ulama attempted to normalize Muslim queerness in a homophobic community, for 
example, he would undoubtedly risk the legitimization of his credentials within that 
community. Popular religious authority has also contributed to the second-class status of 
women in most Muslim-majority countries, al-Hibri (1997) argues, by substantiating 
widespread misogyny through traditional interpretations of Qur’anic verse, such as 4:34. 
Says Al-Hibri, “they utilized the Stereotype and their…power to assert the automatic 
qiwamah [(superiority)] of all men” (p. 34) rather than their complementarity to their 
wives and women in general. Based on this traditional model of religious authority, only 
the mujtahids have the authority to engage in ijtihad and, although there are various 
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opinions in regard to when the “gates of ijtihad closed,”264 few tend to dispute the notion 
that the gates were closed.     
 Similar to Roy’s (2012) discussion, Mandaville (2001) states that, beginning with 
the ready availability of information and communication technologies, religious authority 
has become dispersed through average Muslims engaging directly with digital versions of 
the Qur’an, Sunnah, and fatawa (the answers of religious authorities to questions posed 
by the community) rather than rely on the interpretations of the popularly credentialed 
ulama. Mandaville (2001) states that increasing literacy and printed versions of the 
Qur’an have removed it from oral tradition and drawn it into “debate within the public 
sphere” and, as a result, “the fragmentation of traditional sources of authority is…a key 
theme with regard to the nexus of Islam and new media” (p. 177). Mandaville (2001) 
claims that Muslims with a basic knowledge of Islamic methodology can use hyperlinks 
on databases related to the Qur’an and Sunnah to digitally replace the functions that have 
historically been monopolized by the alim (plural form of ulama). Says Mandaville 
(2003), “For many young Muslims today, a legitimate promulgator of ijtihad is anyone 
who speaks to a particular question or cause with morality, perspicacity and insight” (as 
cited in Kort, 2005, p. 369). Thus, as Robinson (1993) claims, any “Ahmad, Mahmud, or 
Muhammad” could provide an alternative to the interpretations of the local ulama 
(Mandaville, 2001, p. 177). Kort (2005) recasts this statement, suggesting that the 
internet may also pave the way for every “Aisha, Fatima, and Khadija” (p. 368) to engage 
in Qur’anic hermeneutics. The internet not only facilitates Muslims’ ability to develop 
                                                      
264 Scholars typically date the closure to the 4th (10th century CE) or the 7th (13th) of hijra (Hallaq, 1984). 
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their own exegeses but also provides platforms to disseminate these alternative 
interpretations toward fostering debate. 
 Duderija (2007), following Safi (2005), discusses a group similar to “liberal 
Muslims,” “Progressive Muslims,” that strives “to realize a just and pluralistic society 
through critically engaging Islam, a relentless pursuit of social justice, an emphasis on 
gender equality as a foundation of human rights, a vision of religious and ethnic 
pluralism, and a methodology of non-violent resistance” (p. 353-354). He also locates 
some of the leading proponents of the Progressive Muslims movement in the West, 
although he states that they can be found throughout the Muslim world as well. One of 
Duderija’s (2007) most salient points in regard to this discussion is that rather than the 
term “Progressive Muslim” being an identity, it is “a heuristic device which…[helps] 
delineate and describe a particular way of ‘being a Muslim’” (p. 355), which I would 
argue is true of many of the labels applied and/or self-ascribed to Muslims. As stated 
previously, one of the principle differences among Muslims is related to their preferences 
in relation to the consumptions of religious knowledge. For example, “Progressive 
Muslims” believe that interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunnah “are subject to humanly 
constructed interpretational processes and that a distinction between ‘religion and 
religious knowledge’…ought to be made” (Duderija, 2007, p. 356). Thus “Progressive 
Muslims” are particularly likely to engage in their own hermeneutics. On the other hand, 
Muslims who lean toward the consumption of traditional religious knowledge may not 
believe that they are qualified to engage directly with the Qur’an or to question the 
traditional authorities who transmit religious knowledge. Moosa (2005) claims that 
concepts like “Progressive Muslim” are not simply identities, but involve “identity, texts, 
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practices and history” and the additional element of belonging (as cited in Duderija, 2007, 
p. 356). Following from this statement, I am not arguing that identity does not play a role 
in how Muslims articulate distinctions within and between Muslim communities, but 
inter-community policing based on practices and consumption of religion knowledge also 
contribute to splintering within immediate communities, which is often overlooked in 
identity/typology-based and geographically focused analyses.   
Conclusion	  
 This chapter has discussed how various networks of practice may not only exhibit 
differing tendencies toward personal religiosity and the solidarity of the ummah but they 
frustrate typologies that are endogenously and exogenously imposed on Muslims with 
differing beliefs. These networks also demonstrate diversity that might be overlooked in 
studies based on geography and identity. Some of the Muslims discussed here do not 
easily fit into one or another typology but they are more or less united through their 
approaches to practices and religious knowledge. Certain Muslims may not have much of 
a choice as to which typology they are lumped into; if progressive Muslim organizations 
in the United States, like Muslims for Progressive Values that was referenced in the 
dataset related to Muslim lesbians, are the only groups that accept people who self-
ascribe as “queer Muslims,” it is likely the only category in which queer Muslims will 
feel that they belong (Moosa, 2005). Similarly, hijabi fashion bloggers tend to flock 
together because they may be lumped into the traditional camp by unveiled women and 
into the Westernized, liberal camp by others who veil but not in a “fashionable” way. 
These impasses related to belonging are not likely to resolve themselves anytime soon 
but there is perhaps comfort in knowing that almost everyone can find someone else who 
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agrees with their practices and approaches to religious knowledge on the internet. The 
internet has also revived an important element of the accumulation of religious 
knowledge that has been undermined for centuries—debate—especially due to it 
facilitation of popular engagement with digitized forms of Islamic scriptures.  
 The next chapter will offer case studies related to the difficulty in locating the 
ummah in relation to women’s rights issues. The case study on hijab discrimination 
demonstrates that there are obstacles to inclusion that move beyond practices. In this case, 
socio-economics contribute to hindrances in solidarity that mirror the digital divide, 
which will also be discussed in relation to women’s rights activism. The case study on 
Pink Hijab Day will discuss how societal taboos and weak networks undermine 
movements when they attempt to travel to other contexts. Finally, the case study on 
SlutWalk Morocco (Woman Choufouch) shows how women’s movements can be 
delegitimized based on the perceived influences of Western feminism on the campaigns.    
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Chapter 6 
Collective Action Case Studies 
 
 Two female, French students, one of whom was Muslim, used their bodies as sites 
of protest to express their opposition to the ban of the niqab in France in an effort to 
protect the rights of women in Muslim communities. In September 2010, they posted a 
video on YouTube of the pair walking down the streets of the 7th district of Paris in 
stilettos, miniskirts, and niqabs, as a means of participating in the niqab ban debate. 
Although the women claimed that their intentions were politically rather than religiously 
motivated, they received quite a bit of dissention from both conservative Muslims and 
extreme secularists. Several Muslim commenters on YouTube took issue with the name, 
believing that “NiqaBitch,” the title that the women gave the campaign, was insinuating 
that women in niqab were bitches, which is often translated as “whore” in other 
languages. Several people thought they were boys or that they could not be Muslims, 
perhaps related to the assumption that Muslim women would not participate in “body 
protest” (Alexandre, 2006), which is typically perceived as a Westernized form of public 
dissent. Some of the extreme secularist opponents claimed that they should have gone to 
the barbès (areas primarily inhabited by French of North African descent) or to Iran so 
that they could understand the freedoms that they enjoy in secular France. A few of the 
comments were aggressively oppositional. The extreme reactions reinforce the idea that 
Western freedom of speech tends to be met with religious violence, similar to the 
Jyllands-Posten (Blaagard, 2010)265 and Rushdie (Malik, 2009; Asad, 1993)266 affairs. 
                                                      
265 In 2005, the Danish newspaper published various cartoons in which the Prophet was caricatured as a 
terrorist among other inflammatory content. 
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Despite the negative religious and secularist reactions, several commenters claimed that 
the protest was successful in promoting debate as people throughout the world had 
viewed and commented on the video. The NiqaBitch experiment demonstrates the 
difficulties in situating activism related to issues of concern for Muslim women, 
particularly in enacting a transnational “body protest” (Alexandre, 2006) around an issue 
as contentious as the right to wear niqab. 
 This chapter will stray from the structure of previous ones to present three case 
studies related to the difficulties in locating the “digital ummah network,” particularly in 
regard to online collective action among Muslim women and initiatives dedicating to 
promoting their rights. Chapter 3 conveys that digital self-expression is a form of 
activism related to expanding the localized/alternative and dominant transnational 
connective memories to include the voices of Muslim women that are often absent or 
silenced. Yet both Chapter 3 and 4 demonstrated that there are some impediments to 
women’s full participation in online spaces and, by extension, their ability to contribute 
to connective memories: the mediation of their narratives and social policing. Chapter 3 
and 4 also introduced the term “subtle resistance,” which I suggested has become an art 
form involving the disruption of patriarchy through focusing on specific issues related to 
the lived experiences of Muslim women toward promoting their rights. Although the 
previous chapters touched on resistance, this chapter will broach specific events and 
movements that perhaps called for reactions within the “digital ummah network” and 
either did not translate into such or faced criticisms related to legitimacy. Although 
Chapter 5 demonstrated that Islamic practices could be a uniting force among Muslims, 
                                                                                                                                                                 
266 In 1988, Rushdie published a novel in which he suggested that Satan tempted the Prophet during some 
of ` revelations. 
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there are also barriers to online inclusion in these networks of practice based on 
socioeconomic class, for example (Graham, 2011; Sassi, 2005; Couldry, 2003; Putnam, 
1995; Ellis et al., 2004). Other obstacles relate to tactics and network bridging (Lim, 
2012; Bennett, 2005; della Porta & Mosca, 2009) and localized taboos within 
communities, including those related to Westernization and modernization that are 
prevalent to varying degrees in many Muslim communities (Tohidi, 2002; Basu, 2000), 
even among communities in the West. 
 This chapter will discuss online reactions to three cases of online/offline activism 
related to the lived experiences and rights of Muslim women. The first case study is 
associated with workplace discrimination against hijabis in the United States. When I 
discovered workplace discrimination cases against two hijabis, Imane Boudlal and Hani 
Khan, I initially anticipated that the hijabi fashion bloggers would support the right of 
these women to wear the hijab in the workplace because they tend to advocate for 
conformity to veiling despite the hijab being an obstacle to securing jobs in Arab 
countries and in the West. However, the reactions of these bloggers were not 
overwhelmingly supportive of this right, which I suggest is related to socioeconomic 
boundaries of exclusion. From a theoretical standpoint, the digital divide within and 
between countries may hinder activism within the digital ummah network. The second 
case, Pink Hijab Day (PHD), a campaign to spread awareness about the hijab and breast 
cancer, discusses various obstacles to the transnational mediation of activism. Hend El-
Buri, a Missourian high school student at the time of the campaign’s inception, created 
PHD and attempted to globalize the movement through online activism and establishing 
contacts with organizations in Arab nations. Her efforts were only partially successful for 
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several reasons including the following: governments, rather than grassroots 
organizations, are taking the lead in promoting breast cancer awareness in some Arab 
countries; local stigmas related to cancer; the weak hub of the network; and failure to 
establish organizational support, which is often crucial to online/offline mediation. 
SlutWalk Morocco, the third case, faced criticisms due to its connections with the global 
SlutWalk movement that began in the West. The movement has been somewhat 
successful because SlutWalk Morocco organizers have contextualized the campaign to 
conform to Moroccan social values, although its connections to the global SlutWalk 
brand have contributed to its perceived linkages to Western feminism, which some 
commenters believe promotes sexual liberation, female chauvinism, moral disintegration, 
and the decline of the (patriarchal) family.              
 I will start by offering a brief overview of online activism of Muslim women, 
focusing on collective action in transnational cyberspaces and Arab regional women’s 
activism. Although I offer examples of both social movements, principally disseminated 
online, and cases that encouraged and/or had the potential to promote online collective 
action among Muslims, I will use collective action theory rather than social movement 
theory to frame the activism discussed below because it is a bit broader and able to more 
appropriately speak to activists’ uses of social media in all of the datasets. Collective 
action is “all activity involving two or more individuals contributing to a collective effort 
on the basis of mutual interests and the possibility of benefits from coordinated action” 
(Hemetsberger, 2006 as cited in Agarwal et al., 2011, p. 226).  
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Muslim Women and Online/Offline Activism 
 Although the internet could hardly be called a panacea for activism, it has 
inarguably facilitated some of the basic requirements of successful activism, including 
the dissemination of awareness and the recruitment of supporters at a low cost and fast 
speed (Boncheck, 1995 as cited in Garrett, 2006, p. 205; also see Myer, 1994). As 
Bimber et al. (2005) say, “As a result of emerging information technologies, 
communication is not necessarily as costly, difficult, time consuming, or limited by 
cognitive constraints of individuals as it once was” (p. 366). Furthermore, cyberspace 
allows for decentralized, non-corporeal collective action to emerge, despite the 
previously widespread presumption that collective action was impossible without the 
realization of formal organizational backing (Olson, 1965 as cited in Bimber et al., 2005, 
p. 368). Decentralized, non-corporeal activism as well as increased connectivity through 
the cost-effectiveness and instantaneity of the internet is clearly reflected in Mahfouz’s 
call to action, helping to mobilize citizenry through her YouTube video at the onset of the 
Egyptian Revolution (see Chapter 3). She was able to reach people through her 
connections to the April 6 Movement but these associates did not account for the million 
“views” of her video on YouTube. The potential for one’s message to go viral is a feature 
of social media networks that can scarcely be matched by offline sources of mediation, 
especially with the speed and cost-effectiveness of internet activism. 
 Although social media users often mingle with others based on national identities, 
mobilization through the internet is not limited nationality. According to Garrett (2006), 
netizens also collaborate due to the “perception among individuals that they are members 
of a larger community by virtue of the grievances they share. ICTs may be able to foster 
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collective identity across a dispersed population, which organizer can then mobilize in 
support of collective action.” (p. 205). Collective identity may explain the formation of 
an active new group known as “The uprising of women in the Arab world,” referenced in 
the HarassMap and the SlutWalk Morocco datasets, which garnered over 121,000 likes 
on Facebook between October 2011 and February 2014. The Facebook page features 
narratives from women all over the Arab world explaining why they support the uprising. 
Perhaps the “digital ummah network” that often actively emerges to decry Islamophobia, 
as it did in reaction to the Jylland-Postens and Rushdie affairs and more recently, in 
December 2011, when Lowe’s pulled its sponsorship from the television series “All-
American Muslim” (Whitehouse, 2012), is expanding to include women’s rights issues as 
well. This appears to be the case in relation to a Facebook page in the hijab 
discrimination dataset. An Indonesian activist started a Facebook page, which had 588 
members in November 2011, to support Bashira Muhammad Jordan, a hijabi in Georgia 
who faced discrimination from law enforcement due to her religious attire.267 A Google 
search of the same name did not yield any results related to the incident at the time but 
the over 500, mostly Indonesia, followers were speaking out for her rights from the other 
side of the world.  
 Although the internet fosters transnational activism, it is unclear if Muslim 
women rally around issues that speak to the localized contexts of the collective actions or 
if they are attempting to forge a transnational base of support for women throughout the 
world, as appears to be the case regarding the Facebook page dedicated to Bashira 
Muhammad Jordan. Media Badger published a survey of between 5,000 and 6,000 blogs 
                                                      
267 http://www.facebook.com/groups/islam4you/ 
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written by Muslims in English from “Muslim societies” and the West (excluding “Asian 
countries”).268 The findings indicate, “Over 35% of the news articles in popular online 
publications that we looked at addressed “misconceptions” of Muslim women. The 
second most popular topic of coverage was the Hijab.” It also said that Muslim women 
“are very open to positive dialogue with non-Muslims…[and they] are 27% more likely 
to respond to inquiries than Muslim men and are 62% more likely to maintain a positive, 
open dialogue than males.” According to the study, Muslim women are using social 
media, “to discuss religious issues and the roles of gender specific understandings of 
scripture.” At first glance it may appear that the study is overrepresented by Muslim 
women in the West; however, studies of Arabic blogs have demonstrated consistent 
results regarding Arab Muslim women.   
 Etling and his colleagues (2009) found that Arab women in general tend to 
discuss local and international news and they were more inclined than their male 
counterparts to broach the following topics: women’s issues, “rights, status, hijab”; 
literature, poetry, and arts; and personal religiosity (p. 37). Furthermore, similar to 
Saudijeans’s observation in Chapter 4 that Saudi women were flocking online, Etling et 
al. (2009) found that in the Egyptian blogosphere male bloggers were equally matched by 
female ones and the latter were much more likely than men to talk about women’s issue 
and express acceptance of Western cultures and values (p. 17), although I would argue 
that theirs is likely a reflexive acceptance (cooke, 2001). Though the level of internet 
penetration varies throughout the Arab region, these figures demonstrate that Arab 
women perceive social media as important vehicles for expressing themselves and 
                                                      
268 http://www.mediabadger.com/2011/04/muslim-women-and-social-media-an-overview/ 
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promoting change. They are not only speaking out and promoting change through online 
storytelling and debate but also through activism, such as HarassMap and 
“Women2Drive,” which are cited as some of the most well known online initiatives in 
the region (Dubai School of Government, 2011; also see Yuce et al., 2013). However, 
one should not discount the importance of storytelling as well, as I demonstrated in 
Chapter 3. A few female bloggers in the region have had the storytelling on their blogs 
published into books, such as Riverbend’s counterhegemonic coverage of the occupation 
of Iraq (Lynch, 2007) and Ghada Abdel Aal’s “I want to Get Married!,” which was 
referenced in the Muslim spinster dataset (see Chapter 4). Thus, storytelling that might 
not be readily visible to the dominant transnational connective memory can be mediated 
through other avenues and become visible to many.   
 Based on the studies discussed above by Media Badger and Etling et al. (2009), it 
is difficult to decipher if there is a significant difference between the topics that Muslim 
women are discussing based on the contexts from which they are writing. If the Media 
Badger study had elaborated on what it means by “misconceptions” (in other words, 
stereotypes, Islamophobia, and/or misogyny) and if both studies had discussed how the 
hijab had been framed it might be clearer. However this may be less important than the 
confluence of topics discussed by Muslim women in social media regardless of context 
because these topics create opportunities for Muslim women from all over the world to 
connect with each other, debate, and form network linkages and bridges. For example, 
women from several different countries posted comments on the We Love Hijab posting 
detailed in Chapter 5. In less homophilic networks as well, Muslim women may not agree 
on practices or variations in regard to the consumption of religious knowledge but some 
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will come to the debate in transnational networks with attitudes of openness and tolerance, 
demonstrating vernacular cosmopolitan praxis. The interactions based on these topics 
could foster “bridging and brokering,” in the parlance of Social Network Analysis. My 
colleagues and I recently submitted a paper to a journal in which we framed these 
linkages as resources, following Resource Mobilization Theory, which analyzes the 
“variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other 
groups, the dependence of movements upon external support for success, and the tactics 
used by authorities to control or incorporate movements”  (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 
1213; also see Yuce et al., under review). One of these “resources,” we argue, is bridging 
nodes that facilitate the brokering of information and the dissemination of collective 
action between related but disconnected networks (Yuce et al., under review; Burt, 2004). 
Returning to Mahmood’s (2001) framing of agency in Chapter 4, these network linkages 
could also facilitate the “slumbering embers that can spark to flame in the form of 
resistance when conditions permit” if they are able to reach a “critical mass” (Oliver et al., 
1985, p. 523), or the accumulation of sufficient resources (bridges) and supporters for 
linkages to translate into action. 
 The next section will discuss the cases of Boudlal and Khan, two American 
hijabis who faced workplace discrimination. I attempt to elucidate why they did not 
receive the unconditional support of hijabi fashion bloggers and why these cases did not 
stimulate the activism of the digital ummah network, as did the murder of El-Sherbini, in 
which case the story was mediated into Egypt and other Arab countries through this 
alternative connective memory, leading to her iconography as the “Hijab Martyr” (see 
Chapter 3).  
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Workplace Discrimination and the Socioeconomics of Hijab	  
 In Ghumman and Jackson’s (2010) study of over 200 American hijabis, they 
found that hijabis have lower expectations of job placement, especially in relations to 
jobs in which they are highly visible to the public, because they are aware of the stigma 
attached to the hijab. They claim that stigmatized groups in general have lower 
expectations of job placement in situation in which they are outnumbered by the outgroup 
(Ghumman and Jackson, 2010), which is almost everywhere for hijabis in the United 
States. The invisibility of hijabis in the American workplace has been noted elsewhere by 
a freelance journalist and longtime resident of New York City, Amal Hegab. He 
comments, hijabis “don’t have a need to work or they work in businesses owned by other 
Muslims, Arabs or Indians…or they work in jobs that don’t require much contact with 
the public (thus not posing a ‘threat’).”269 Have hijabis become self-disappeared or tightly 
insulated within Muslim communities? This is a possibility given they are aware of the 
stigma attached to their hijabs, being that many non-Muslim Americans find the garment 
offensive, disturbing, and/or threatening.  
 The next section will discuss American mainstream perspectives on hijabi rights 
in the workplace culled from comments on politically center-right and center-left news 
media outlets.  
 Hijabs in the Workplace and the Decline of the Dominant Culture 
While social media highlighted many incidents of workplace discrimination 
against hijabis in the United States, this subsection will focus on two highly publicized 
cases. These cases are illustrative of American perspectives on the right of hijabis to 
                                                      
269 http://www.indypressny.org/nycma/voices/144/editorials/editorials/ 
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practice their religious beliefs in workplaces that are visible to the public, creating a 
baseline to discuss the collusion between the perspectives of non-Muslim Americans and 
those of hijabi fashion bloggers in the next subsection. The comments related to 
Boudlal’s case against Disney (Boudlal v. Disney) were culled from L. A. Times blog270 
and those related to Khan’s suit against Abercrombie & Fitch (Khan v. A&F) were 
extracted from the Huffington Post,271 in an attempt to ascertain politically center-right 
and center-left reactions, respectively.  
The Boudlal v. Disney case started in August 2010 when Boudlal came into her 
job at the Storyteller Café in the Grand California Hotel, a Disneyland resort, wearing her 
hijab. Imane Boudlal emigrated from Morocco and had been working at Disneyland for 
two years before the incident. She claims to have realized that she had the right to wear 
her hijab at her place of employment when she took her citizenship test in 2010 
(previously, she had been wearing her hijab when she was not at work). She asked 
Disney to accommodate her so that her “costume” would comply with her religious 
beliefs but heard nothing back from the company for two months. It should be noted that 
one month later a hijabi summer intern was accommodated with a Disney-approved 
“costume” within a week.272 At the beginning of Ramadan, Boudlal decided to wear her 
hijab to work and she was sent home. She contacted the local branch of CAIR (Council 
on American-Islamic Relations) to file a complaint so that she would be able to exercise 
her right to wear her hijab in the public view at Disneyland.  
                                                      
270 http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/08/should-disneyland-bar-worker-from-wearing-religious-
headscarf-join-the-debate-/comments/page/1/#comments 
271 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/27/hani-khan-shocked-over-headscarf-firing_n_885621.html  
272 http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/cair-disney-agrees-to-allow-hijab-for-ill-muslim-intern-
103858113.html 
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In the case of Khan v. A&F, starting in October 2009, Khan had been working as 
a stockperson in a branch of Hollister Co. in San Mateo, California, when, in February 
2010, a human resources representative told her that she was in violation of the A&F 
“Look Policy.” Unlike Boudlal, Hani Khan had worn her hijab to her interview and she 
had been working there for five months before a district manager visited the branch and 
saw her in her hijab. The next day, Khan and told that she would have to remove her 
hijab to continue working there.     
The reactions of mainstream (white, Judeo-Christian, heterosexual) Americans to 
Boudlal’s suit against Disney were loaded with anti-Islamic sentiment—telling her to go 
home or to a place where her form of dress would be acceptable, which, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, is a myth, since there are implicit limitations to the employability of hijabis in 
North Africa as well. Many believed that Boudlal was seeking to swindle some money 
from the company, despite the comment of one person who commented that Boudlal was 
simply filing the complaint to gain the right to wear the hijab in the public eye at 
Disneyland. An interesting aspect of this case is that she wears a nametag that divulges 
her name and city of origin, “Casablanca, Morocco.” Boudlal commented in an interview 
with Fox News that she is asked about Casablanca by customers on a daily basis.273 While 
being Moroccan does not necessarily entail being Muslim, for customers with any 
knowledge of Morocco, they would know that the likelihood of her being Muslim is 
substantial. Thus, how much more intrusive is the hijab in a public space when the 
person’s attachment to Islam has already been established? 
                                                      
273 http://www.myfoxla.com/dpp/news/muslim-employee-disney-banned-hijab-head-covering-20100818 
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For many people who commented on L. A. Times website, the hijab is infinitely 
more intrusive than the knowledge that someone is most likely Muslim. Many people 
made comments like “Go Disney!” or “stay strong Disney” as if this corporation were 
fundamental to American ideals. Some commented that the dress code is instituted to 
create a “fantasyland” and the contentiousness of this religious symbol would dampen 
visitors’ experiences. Several women stated that a woman wearing the hijab is somehow 
imposing her religious beliefs on them. These women, along with other commenters, said 
that churches and mosques are the only appropriate spaces to express one’s religious 
beliefs—not in the workplace or even in public. Some interlocutors claimed that Muslims 
are being “cry babies” and seeking “special privileges,” which Jews and Christians are 
denied. However, they fail to acknowledge that many Christians and Jews do not feel that 
they are required by their religions to wear specific garments. 
 The idea that the grooming standards and costumes at Disney are neutral, lacking 
any hint of religious or political affiliation, perpetuates the dominance of white, middle 
class, heteronormative culture in the supposedly multicultural American society. For 
commenters seeking to remove religious symbols from the public eye, so as to not have 
another’s religion “forced down…[their] throats,” as well as for those who were blatantly 
Islamophobic and xenophobic, the underlying issue is not so much associated with 
secularism as it is with their perception of the decline of privilege associated with the 
dominant culture. This is most clearly articulated by the commenters who believed that 
this complaint was a stepping stone toward the eventual Muslim takeover of the 
American society, ultimately aimed at establishing Shari’ah, and by those who opined 
that the civil rights of (white, Judeo-Christian, heterosexual…) “Americans” are never 
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the focus of protectionist measures, only those of immigrants and minority ethnic and 
racial groups.  
Although the comments on the Huffington Post regarding Khan’s lawsuit against 
A&F were much less patently intolerant than those posted on the L. A. Times, some of the 
interlocutors expressed their concern that opinions on the site of late had regressed to 
conservative xenophobia. One poster commented, “Has the HP allowed itself to be taken 
over by a horde of sicko rightwing trolls??,” and several people agreed this was a 
possibility. The slant of “progressive” Americans on the Huffington Post, similar to the 
reactions in the Boudlal case, was that private companies have the right to impose dress 
codes and Muslims were demanding too many special rights. Others believed, analogous 
to the imagined global sisterhood proposed by some white feminists, that they were 
saving the hopelessly oppressed Muslim woman from herself (Abu-Lughod, 2002, p. 
789-790). Some argued that women are forced to wear the hijab through familial coercion 
or because they are brainwashed into thinking that it is an Islamic mandate. One white 
woman even commented, “[wearing hijab] is most definitely a threat to me and to every 
American” because she believes that Muslim women do not have a choice. She, like 
several other commenters, refused to recognize that the hijab could be a personal choice 
or that it could be anything more than a symbol of misogyny, although scholars have 
demonstrated that it worn for a variety of reasons (Ahmed, 2005; Robinson, Sexuality, 
Difference, and American Hijabi Fashion Bloggers, under review). Therefore, in response 
to the question about the “sicko rightwing trolls,” this could be the case, but it is also 
possible that it is not so much related to the growing conservativism of the website but to 
the acceptability of Islamophobia across various mainstream American political 
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affiliations. The commenters who were more tolerant of the hijab were accused of 
“cultural relativism,” which was a common theme in several of the datasets, particularly 
in relation to veiling. For Westerners to question the link between the hijab and misogyny 
is akin to cultural treason.     
“Get another job” or “why would she work there in the first place” were common 
responses, particularly regarding Khan’s case against A & F, a retailer that capitalizes on 
immodesty. One respondent claims that Khan applied for the job because some of her 
friends were already working there.274 Boudlal states that she accepted employment with 
Disney because she needed a job.275 Some people encouraged these women to start their 
own businesses—a few even thought that Boudlal could start her own theme park. These 
comments obviously ignore the reality of today’s economy. Of the hundreds of comments 
posted regarding these two cases, only a few people mentioned that these women 
probably took the first jobs that were offered to them. The underlying conflict between 
the widespread rejection of the hijab and the employability of hijabis is an important 
concern to which I will return promptly.  
This subsection has demonstrated that mainstream Americans often perceive 
accommodating religious beliefs as an assault on the privilege of the dominant culture, 
which encourages the acceptability of Islamophobia among various political persuasions, 
even among the so-called “progressive” varieties. The next subsection will frame 
reactions to these cases on the hijabi fashion blogs, which were more or less consistent 
with mainstream responses. 
                                                      
274 http://southsanfrancisco.patch.com/groups/business-news/p/woman-shocked-over-headscarf-firing  
275 http://www.myfoxla.com/dpp/news/muslim-employee-disney-banned-hijab-head-covering-20100818 
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 Hijabi Reactions 
The reactions of non-Muslim Americans to these two cases were not enormously 
surprising but the fact that they mirrored the responses of hijabis on the hijabi fashion 
blogs was startling indeed,276 particularly since some hijabis referred to this as one of the 
“stupid excuses” that women employ to justify their non-conformity with the practice of 
veiling. Some hijabis questioned why the women accepted employment at these 
companies and suggested that certain jobs were inappropriate for hijabis, particularly jobs 
with these corporations for the following reasons: Disney, for its controversial exhibit 
that framed Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, igniting protests and proposed boycotts by 
American Muslim groups in 1999277; and Abercrombie & Fitch, for capitalizing on 
hypersexualized advertisements and the overall lack of modesty of its clothing line. 
Others disagreed that there are jobs that should be off limits to hijabis, other than Playboy 
and Hooters. For instance, Miriam Sobh, the creator Hijabtrendz, is sympathetic to why a 
hijabi may have applied at A & F because Sobh had likewise accepted employment at 
Victoria’s Secret because she needed a job.278  
Similar to the mainstream non-Muslim commenters, some of the hijabi 
interlocutors believed that companies have the right to impose a standard of dress on their 
employees and to present a certain “image” or “look.” In the case of Boudlal v. Disney, 
                                                      
276 http://www.hijabtrendz.com/2010/08/24/disney-hijab-controversy/ 
http://www.hijabtrendz.com/2009/09/22/why-is-hijab-always-such-a-big-deal/  
277 http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Muslims+and+Arabs+to+Boycott+Disney.-a055806494 
http://www.thejewishweek.com/news/israel/disney_boycott_seen_economic_warfare  
http://www.jta.org/1999/10/04/life-religion/features/disney-world-exhibit-links-jerusalem-to-israel-
without-a-mention-of-capital-3  
http://www.jweekly.com/article/full/11749/disney-response-on-jerusalem-exhibit-calms-arabs/  
278 It should be noted the Sobh’s comments were linked to another case of discrimination against a hijabi by 
A & F, in which the EEOC found the company at fault: http://www.hijabtrendz.com/2009/09/22/why-is-
hijab-always-such-a-big-deal/#more-5615, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/muslim-teen-denied-
abercrombie-job-hijab/story?id=8608173. Samantha Elauf was told by the interviewers at a branch of 
Abercrombie kids in Missouri that her hijab did not comply with the company’s “Look Policy.”    
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many of the hijabis believed that Disney had offered a reasonable compromise (either the 
alternative “costume” or the “backstage” job) and implied that Boudlal was being 
“inflexible.” The hijabis largely ignored two commenters who mentioned that Disney 
offered an alternative only after Boudlal had filed the complaint. Furthermore, Disney 
played the “backstage” card when it moved hijab-wearing Aicha Baha to another position 
in 2004. She ended up with such a substantial pay decrease that she was forced to quit.279 
Similarly, if Boudlal had agreed to move to a telephone-based job with the same salary, 
she would have likely faced a substantial pay decrease through her loss of gratuities, 
which, as anyone who has worked in the hospitality sector knows, is a substantial portion 
of the employee’s income. Comparable to mainstream discussions, some of the 
comments on the hijabi fashion blogs failed to recognize the distinction between violating 
a dress code (wearing a tank top) and violating it to uphold a religious conviction, which 
I will return to promptly. The commenters on the hijabi fashion blogs were also 
concerned about how lawsuits and complaints would reflect on hijabis and Muslims in 
general, which they opined could result in extreme secularist and Islamophobic 
backlashes, and many believed that the hijabis should have simply looked for other jobs 
without filing the complaints.  
The subsection above demonstrated some consistency between mainstream 
American and hijabi reactions to the issue of hijabi rights in the workplace. The next will 
attempt to elucidate why American Muslim communities, including the hijabi fashion 
bloggers, have not promoted hijabi workplace rights through collective action while they 
have collectivized around other issues.    
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 Obstacles to Collective Action in Support of Workplace Rights for Hijabis 
One of the greatest obstacles to hijabis demanding their workplace rights is the 
general lack of understanding of the protections guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act 
regarding the reasonable accommodation of religious beliefs. The most pertinent aspect 
of reasonable accommodation related to the incidents above is that “Employers [with 
more than 15 employees] must reasonably accommodate employees’ sincerely held 
religious practices unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the employer.”280 
The website denotes “undue hardship” as typically limited to “safety concerns” in 
relation to religious apparel and that the preferences of the company’s clientele for 
company representatives who do not wear religious garments cannot be considered an 
“undue hardship.” The mainstream and hijabi perspective that companies should have the 
right to enforce a dress code begs the question of, if all companies should be able to 
enforce a dress code, what would happen if all companies decided that employees could 
not wear anything on their heads? This freedom of private entities to impose certain 
“image” standards would make certain populations structurally unemployable. Only one 
person, not a hijabi, suggested this possibility out of the hundreds of comments that were 
posted in response to these cases. Denying reasonable accommodation to uphold a 
company’s image is clearly not what the Civil Rights Act had in mind.   
Another obstacle may be the lack of consensus within Muslim communities 
regarding the hijab mandate. As noted previously, Muslims have come together in 
protests against Islamophobia and Zionism, notably, in 1999, when Muslims proposed 
boycotts of Disney and, in 2011, when Muslims boycotted Lowe’s. However, solidarity 
                                                      
280 http://www.adl.org/religious_freedom/resource_kit/religion_workplace.asp 
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in relation to hijabi rights appears constrained. Similar collective actions were not 
proposed following Disney’s de facto termination of Baha in 2004 or after Boudlal’s 
suspension in 2010. Similarly, A&F has been involved in several lawsuits for denying 
employment to women who wear the hijab but there is little evidence of organized 
Muslim boycotts of this retailer. Collective action surrounding a woman’s right to wear 
the hijab in the workplace is perhaps hampered because there is not universal agreement 
within Muslim communities regarding the veiling mandate (see Chapter 5). For example, 
some scholars argue that the imperative of modesty should be culturally contextualized 
rather than instituting the standards of dress that were recommended for Muslim women 
during the time of the Prophet (Barlas, 2002; Wadud, 1999; Barazangi, 2004). The 
contentiousness of this issue is also highlighted by the comments on the We Love Hijab 
posting in Chapter 5, particularly by the criticisms that women face from their Muslim 
families and immediate communities.  
A third obstacle, which I will explore in further detail in the next subsection, is 
related to what I call the “socioeconomics of hijab.” In a nationwide survey of Muslim 
Americans undertaken by the Pew Research Center, the findings indicated that the 
majority of Muslims in the United States are “middle class and mostly mainstream.”281 
While it cannot be said that all or even most of the commenters on the hijabi fashion 
blogs come from middle or upper middle class backgrounds, the creators of these sites 
appear to emanate from these socioeconomic groups. As such, they are undoubtedly more 
concerned with general reactions to Muslims than they are with the anxiety that the 
manager at McDonalds will discriminate against them for wearing a hijab to an 
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interview,282 which has, in fact, happened on several occasions in the greater Detroit area, 
despite the local McDonalds featuring halal chicken nuggets to appeal to the Muslim 
clientele.283 Due to the higher socioeconomic statuses of the creators of hijabi fashion 
blogs, the bloggers and commenters may lack sympathy for working-class hijabis who 
face discrimination in the labor market because the former, some of whom are stay-at-
home mothers or self-employed, are not likely to be subjected to it.     
This subsection has discussed possible obstacles to collective action among 
Muslims communities in opposition to workplace discrimination against hijabis, 
including the following: lack of understanding regarding corporate responsibilities in 
relation to reasonable accommodation, lack of agreement on the veiling mandate within 
the Muslim communities, and lack of empathy among hijabis for women of lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds. The next subsection will discuss the last obstacle in more 
detail, positioning the issue theoretically as an aspect of the digital divide.  
 Discussion: Socioeconomics of Hijab 
 Graham broaches the complexity and textures of digital spaces, arguing that one 
must recognize the “economic, cultural, political and technological” aspects of each 
person accessing these spaces (Graham, 2011, p. 212 as cited in Robinson and Parmentier, 
forthcoming), which vary within communities based on factors such as race, gender, and 
socioeconomic class. Couldry (2003) articulates a similar claim that community and 
societal differences offline will manifest online as well (also see Couldry, 2012). In the 
same vein, Robinson and Parmentier (forthcoming) found that the online collective action 
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frames advanced by upper and upper middle class Moroccan bloggers during the protests 
in 2011 did not resonate with majority of Moroccans, who principally emanate from the 
lower class. This is not strictly a norm of less developed nations though, as Sparks (2000) 
demonstrates in his discussion of information-rich and information-poor groups within 
the United States (as cited in Sassi, 2005, p. 689; also see Hüsing & Selhofer, 2002). 
Consequently, although scholars have often focused on digital divides between countries, 
similar divides are also reflected in the various positionalities of people within the same 
societies and communities. As a result, socioeconomic rifts could have adverse effects on 
the likelihood of communities collectivizing around common objectives.   
 In the present case, one of the objectives of the network of practice related to 
hijabi fashion is to detangle the hijab from its association with oppression and resituate it 
as a symbol of pride for one’s membership in Muslim communities and the larger ummah 
(see Chapter 5). Nevertheless, being that American hijabis are also part of the American 
society, they also appear to be attempting to normalize the American hijabi identity, 
which is supported by findings of the Williams and Vashi (2007) study. To accomplish 
these perhaps contradictory aims, they interact with other hijabis online and they share 
narratives about why they wear the hijab through their blogs; the latter action is most 
likely targeted toward others who do not already understand why Muslim women wear 
the hijab rather than other hijabis. Putnam (1995) describes this as building online social 
capital: “Social capital is…exercised through bridging, or exclusive, networks, 
connecting people who are different, via, for example, collective action and the creation 
of broader collective identity” (as cited in Ellis et al., 2004, p. 168). In other words, 
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American hijabis believe that, if they normalize the hijabi identity, belonging in the 
American societies can be broadened toward their inclusion. 
 Hijabis fashion bloggers may believe that the high notoriety of and negative 
mainstream reactions to these cases involving hijabis, Boudlal v. Disney and Khan v. 
A&F, undermine their attempts to normalize the American hijabi identity. Ellis et al. 
(2004) say, “A central assumption is that social networks have value proportional to the 
extent to which they encourage mutually beneficial behavior, information sharing, and 
cooperation” (p. 168). It is the last part, especially toward “encourag[ing] mutually 
beneficial behavior,” in which Boudlal and Khan went astray. Moreover, Komito’s 
(2001) assertion that online social networks interact “without reference to the diversity of 
the contemporary community” (as cited in Ellis et al., 2004, p. 169) is the dynamic in 
which the hijabi fashion bloggers went astray. If Boudlal and Khan had been privy to 
conversations on these blogs, they might have realized that other hijabis would have 
encouraged them to leave their jobs quietly so that they did not encourage negative 
perceptions, related to the supposed intransigence of Muslim communities, of hijabis and 
other Muslims within mainstream America. They may have realized for the mutual 
benefit of other hijabis that filing complaints with CAIR and the high notoriety of the 
cases would encourage backlash against other hijabis. They may have also realized that 
certain venues were not considered appropriate places for hijabis to seek employment. 
However, the comfortable class status of the hijabi fashion bloggers discourages them 
from acknowledging the realities of the job market. Boudlal had no overwhelming to 
desire to work for Disney but she needed a job. The bloggers’ intolerance for the “stupid 
excuses” that unveiled women make for not veiling should also translate into the 
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unconditional support of hijabi fashion blogger for the plights of hijabis, especially 
“excuses” related to their livelihood but this was not the case. Some of the hijabi fashion 
bloggers, notably Sobh,284 have featured news items related to hijab discrimination 
around the world so this is an issue that hijabi fashion bloggers collectivize around but 
certain cases closer to home do not encourage their solidarity, particularly cases which 
are perceived to undermine the normalization of Muslim communities in the American 
society for perhaps what are regarded as individualistic motivations—a paycheck. 
 This case study has demonstrated the difficulties in uniting Muslims within the 
same society toward collective action in support of hijabi rights in the workplace, 
demonstrated by the lack of support among more affluent hijabis whose reactions to cases 
of discrimination against hijabis mirrored those of non-Muslim Americans. Collective 
action within the digital ummah network appears to mobilize around cases related to 
Islamophobia and Zionism but, since the veiling mandate remains contested within 
Muslim communities, mobilization around the rights of hijabis remains spotty. This is not 
to say that another node of the transnational hijabi fashion network did not pick up and 
mediate the cases of Boudlal v. Disney and Khan v. A&F, which lends to the possibility 
of extensions to network bridges and the potential for future collective action related to 
this issue, possibly stemming from outside of the United States.  
 Due to the noted obstacles within societies, transnational forms of collective 
action are even more complicated. The next case study will demonstrate to the difficulties 
in mediating an initiative, Pink Hijab Day, among Muslims transnationally.     
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Pink Hijab Day (PHD) 
Pink Hijab Day is a campaign that started in the United States in 2004 to spread 
awareness about breast cancer and the hijab. The event went national in 2007 when the 
founder of PHD, Hend El-Buri, partnered with the Susan G. Koman Foundation285 and it 
went global in 2008 through Facebook.286 An article in the Missourian states that the 
movement was disseminated into ten countries, including Botswana, Canada, Egypt, 
Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Trinidad, the United Kingdom and the United 
Arab Emirates. At first glance, PHD appeared to have some following in Arab nations, at 
least in the UAE, Egypt, and Qatar; however, it quickly became apparent that most of the 
MENA organizations that were linked to PHD in American social and conventional 
media were not currently participating in the event.  
I contacted a representative of the American PHD campaign through email to 
ascertain more information about why the organizations in the Arab region that were 
linked to PHD had stopped participating. Her response was that some of the organizations, 
without mentioning names, that the campaign linked to on the original PHD website were 
not partners of the movement but organizations that the campaign had listed to facilitate 
the ease of making contributions to local breast cancer initiatives. The American PHD 
representative told me that the movement encourages “people in each community to find 
their own resources, create their own events, and donate to the cancer organizations that 
they choose.”287 This open stance on participation speaks to PHD’s transnational appeal. 
However, the representative also remarked that the MENA region organizations in 
                                                      
285 https://www.facebook.com/pages/Pink-Hijab-Day/159442831321?sk=info  
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287 Anonymized, email message to author, March 28, 2012. 
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question, with the exception of Think Pink Qatar (TPQ), stopped participating in PHD 
either because they failed to maintain contact with the American campaign or because it 
failed to follow up with them. This failure to maintain relations, despite PHD’s lax views 
on participation, could speak to the lack of consistency between the goals of the 
American PHD campaign and those of the MENA organizations or to societal constraints 
that might qualify participation in the region. This difficulty in establishing local 
organizational support also was articulated elsewhere in social media coverage of the 
campaign. El-Buri says in an interview with Sobh, “I’m trying to get national 
representatives…so we can be more efficient and plan together. It was challenging in 
some places (particularly in Muslim countries) where there was no breast cancer research 
foundation to refer people to when they wanted to donate.”288 However, I found little 
evidence to suggest that some of the organizations had ever participated, which I will 
expand upon in this section’s “Discussion.”    
 Framing the American PHD Movement  
In 2003, El-Buri noticed that she and some of her friends had coincidentally worn 
pink hijabs on the same day289 and she had an epiphany of expanding this coincidence 
into a movement so she contacted the Susan G. Komen Foundation and established PHD 
as a national event in 2007. In 2008, El-Buri created a Facebook page, which enabled the 
campaign to spread to other countries,290 attracting 7,000 people in the first year.291 The 
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last Wednesday of October was designated as the ongoing date of the event.292 In the 
initial years of the event, the stated mission, based on the now defunct 
www.pinkhijabday.net website,293 was to “shatter stereotypes of Muslim women as well 
as raise awareness and funds for breast cancer research. All over the world, Muslims 
participated by wearing pink hijabs, pink ribbons, and donating to breast cancer 
foundations.” The new website, www.pinkhijabday.org, which came online in 2011, had 
shifted its purpose the following:  
to encourage those who are curious about Muslim women and about hijab to ask Muslim women 
about what their hijab means…to encourage Muslim women to participate in various community 
improvement projects [including breast cancer] because we are a valuable part of the fabric of the 
societies we live in.294  
 
This is a subtle but important shift that relocalizes a global initiative to specific contexts. 
“Shattering stereotypes” could have applied to Muslim women all over the world, as the 
Media Badger study suggests (also see Chapter 4 related to stereotypes), but the revised 
objective, to encourage “those who are curious about Muslim women and about hijab to 
as Muslim women about what their hijab means,” is not likely to be an important issue in 
Muslim-majority societies. 
The new website does include content that is perhaps relevant to Muslims 
everywhere. One of the “Talking Points” states that people should think of their bodies as 
“a trust from Allah (swt)…[and] improving one’s health IS something that Allah (swt) 
will reward us for.”295 Another speaks to the empowerment of women by stating, “During 
the time of the Prophet (pbuh), he used to praise the women of Medina for not shying 
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away from asking questions in order to learn and better themselves.” However, despite 
the appeal to Muslims everywhere, in 2011, not even Qatar, the organization that the 
American representative claimed to be the most faithful affiliate in the region in our 
email exchange, is listed among the countries sponsoring events on the new PHD website. 
The Arab world is noticeably absent, particularly because it is often cited in articles and 
posting about PHD perhaps to reinforce the universal importance of breast cancer 
awareness and substantiate the transnationalism of the PHD movement. Most of the 
events included on the website were based in the United States, but there are also events 
listed for Canada, South Africa, and Bulgaria. PHD may have also cut ties with the 
Komen initiative—there was nothing posted on its website about PHD since 2009—while 
organizations from Egypt, the KSA, and the UAE have partnered with the Susan G. 
Komen Global Initiative (SGKGI) as recently as 2011, 2009, and 2009, respectively. 
Since there were few connections between the American PHD campaign and breast 
cancer awareness campaigns in the Arab region, I decided to analyze the MENA 
organizations that were initially linked to PHD on the old website in an attempt to 
elucidate why the campaign did not take root in the region.   
This subsection framed how PHD may have initially appealed to Muslim women 
throughout the world but, upon shifting its focus, the stated aims became more consistent 
with Muslim women living Muslim-minority societies. The next subsection will discuss 
the sparse evident of Egypt’s past involvement with PHD and how the Breast Cancer 
Foundation of Egypt (BCFE) has promoted Egyptian-style breast cancer awareness.   
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 Egypt  
Through personal emails with a representative of the Breast Cancer Foundation of 
Egypt (BCFE), I discovered that it has not been involved in the PHD initiative since 
2008.296 The only record of its participation in PHD on the BCFE website encouraged 
women to wear pink hijabs on Monday, October 27, 2008.297 There is little evidence that 
PHD is or was disseminated through social media. One woman asked about the Egyptian 
event on the PHD Facebook page in September and October of 2010 but did not receive a 
reply,298 which suggests the inconsistency of American PHD coordinators in 
disseminating information about the movement online. Nonetheless, the BCFE is actively 
supporting breast cancer awareness and raising funds toward a cure in a distinctly 
Egyptian fashion. 
One such example of local flair from the BCFE website highlights the popularity 
of Egyptian cinematography in disseminating social messages. A docudrama on the 
website outlines Aida’s predicament of choosing between conforming to societal norms 
or following her intuition to get screened for breast cancer after her sister dies of the 
disease. In one scene, Aida’s hijabi co-worker rejects the idea that women should get 
screened because she believes that health and disease are in Allah’s hands. This co-
worker avers that her ancestors were not screened for cancer and they were better people 
than her. Despite her co-worker’s reaction, Aida eventually gets examined for breast 
cancer to find that she does have a lump in her breast. Before her surgery, Aida cries out 
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in her despair that she “won’t be a woman anymore” if she loses her breast and hair. 
Ultimately, Aida is able to save her breasts through early detection.299  
In another video mainly in English with subtitles for Mrs. Manal’s narrative in 
Arabic, Mrs. Manal highlights religion as a source of strength for women battling the 
cancer.300 She states that she read the Qur’an twice in the twenty-day period between her 
diagnosis and surgery. The two videos may be unwittingly connecting the health 
outcomes of Aida and Mrs. Manal with their worldviews and personas. Aida, in her late 
forties/early fifties, is working outside of the home, free of conspicuous religious 
affiliation, and she prevails through her health issues relatively unscathed. Mrs. Manal, 
on the other hand, seems to be in her sixties and is diagnosed in the latter stages of 
disease. Her religious proclivities, wearing the hijab and citing the Qur’an as a source of 
comfort, are much more obvious than Aida’s. The repercussions of breast cancer in her 
case are also much more severe—a double mastectomy. Do these outcomes implicitly 
link the benefits of modern medicine and survival to the “modern” Egyptian woman and 
link tradition to morbidity?  
BCFE’s partnership with SGKGI has given rise to the “Race for the Cure” that 
has attracted 10,000 people annually since its onset in 2009,301 which demonstrates that it 
is not opposed to affiliations with transnational campaigns. BCFE had a solid support 
base before it partnered with SGKGI though. The BCFE-sponsored “Run for the Cure” 
drew 300 participants in 2004,302 including various celebrity personalities, and 
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300 http://www.bcfe.org/en/multimedia.asp?vidid=2#vid  
301 http://globalkomen.org/where-we-work/egypt/race-for-the-cure/ 
302 http://www.bcfe.org/en/article.asp?pg=1&SecID=24&NewsID=167  
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participation doubled the following year303 and nearly tripled in 2006.304 The “Run” was 
replaced by the “Race” in 2009. But why was PHD less successful? There are few 
constraints to Egyptian women wearing hijabs in various colors and BCFE had already 
established a substantial support base by 2008, the year that PHD went global, so why did 
it discontinue its involvement after that first year?  One can only speculate given the 
cryptic email responses from the American PHD representative and BCFE one. 
The next section will discuss Qatar, which also had a thriving campaign at the 
onset of the American PHD campaign.   
 Qatar 
 A representative of Think Pink Qatar (TPQ) stated through email that TPQ has 
annually participated in PHD since 2009.305 Karen Al kharouf, the founder of TPQ, the 
preeminent breast cancer organization in Qatar, which is tied to the National Qatar 
Cancer Society (NQCS), has been organizing local events since 2007.306 An email from a 
TPQ representative stated, “We encourage and set aside a day when all the women in 
Qatar who cover to wear…a Pink Headcovering.  Many ladies throughout Qatar 
regardless of their religious backgrounds participate…to rally as a united support system.” 
Qatari events typically take place on Saturdays in October307 and the pink hijab is one 
among many manifestations of solidarity with the promotion of breast cancer awareness: 
                                                      
303 http://www.bcfe.org/en/article.asp?pg=1&SecID=24&NewsID=168.  
304 http://www.bcfe.org/en/article.asp?pg=1&SecID=24&NewsID=170.  
305 Anonymized, email message to author, December 4, 2011. 
306 http://www.timeoutdoha.com/community/features/18257-breast-cancer-month 
307 http://www.qatarshub.com/english/newsfeeds.aspx?nfid=248&pn=5. 
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Pink-Out Day in schools, Think Pink Benefit Gala, Harley Davidson Women’s Ride for 
Life, and so forth.308 
An important element of the Qatari campaign is destigmatizing the disease for 
younger generations so that they could influence awareness among older generations, 
which is emphasized by “Pink-Out Day” events sponsored in schools. Al kharouf states, 
“Qatar [has]…a massive awareness campaign in universities and schools. This will make 
the daughters talk to the mothers about the symptoms and the need of early diagnoses.”309 
Unlike the other countries discussed here, Qatar was not listed as one of the countries that 
has partnered with the SGKGI perhaps, due to the already “massive” momentum 
surrounding breast cancer awareness in Qatar, transnational partnerships were 
superfluous.  
Despite Qatar’s proactive stance on breast cancer awareness, some media on the 
Qatar National Cancer Society website advance a subtle connection between the modern 
West and the prospects of remission and tradition and morbidity, similar to the Egyptian 
examples of Aida and Mrs. Manal. An Al Jazeera report links “traditional societies”310 of 
the MENA region to the failure of women to participate in early detection. This 
traditional mentality prevents Noor, a woman in her late 30s, who is diagnosed with stage 
one breast cancer, from seeking support among her friend through divulging her 
condition to them at the insistence of her family. This mentality, according to the report, 
results in 64% of the cases being diagnosed in the latter stages of the disease. The video 
                                                      
308 http://www.qatarliving.com/node/648148 
309 http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/qatar/131111-arab-women-at-risk-of-breast-cancer-studies.html 
http://m.gulfnews.com/in-focus/breast-cancer/delay-in-breast-cancer-treatment-putting-arab-women-at-
risk-1.704906  
310 http://www.qncs.org/cms/resources.html 
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concludes with the reporter’s remarks, “With an increasingly young and educated 
population and integration with Western lifestyle, it’s hope that such steps will break 
down old barriers and save lives for future generations.” The report connects the 
movement away from traditional (read: non-Western) values with hope. Al kharouf offers 
a more textured response than this modern/traditional dichotomy. She states, “Even the 
US took 20 years to bring awareness about breast cancer.”311 In other words, stigma 
related to breast cancer is not an element of the East-West divide, but a topic that 
becomes less disconcerting with increased exposure and dialogue. In the same vein, a 
doctor in Qatar claims, “education and encouragement…were often integrated with 
traditional and religious beliefs and worked together to promote breast cancer 
screening,”312 which challenges the idea that modern/traditional are mutually exclusive 
categories. Emphasizing the modern/traditional binary, on one hand, and situating early 
detection in religious beliefs, illustrated by Ms. Manal’s narrative, on the other, appear to 
be common trends in Egypt and Qatar.  
The next section will discuss breast cancer awareness in Saudi Arabia but not 
PHD because it never arrived. 
 Saudi Arabia  
A representative of Zahra, the leading breast cancer awareness initiative in Saudi 
Arabia, forwarded me information regarding its sponsored initiatives—PHD was not one 
of them.313 She sent the documentary, “A Woman’s Stand,” and information about an art 
exhibit at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C. in November 2011. “A Woman’s 
                                                      
311 http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/qatar/131111-arab-women-at-risk-of-breast-cancer-studies.html 
312 http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/qatar/131111-arab-women-at-risk-of-breast-cancer-studies.html 
313 Anonymized, email message to author, December 11, 2011. 
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Stand” was a campaign to form the largest recorded “Human Awareness Ribbon” 
comprised of 3,952 Saudi women in Jeddah.314 Saudi women were furnished with scarves 
to make the ribbon pink perhaps because pink hijabs are not garments that Saudi women 
are likely to own. The art exhibition was a display of photographs associated with the 
first anniversary of this record-breaking human formation. According to the Saudi 
embassy website, Zahra has been sponsoring breast cancer awareness since October of 
2003.315 The royal family and, by extension, the government has played an active role in 
these initiatives, including Princess Reema’s sponsorship of “A Woman’s Stand”316 and 
Princess Haifa Al-Faisal's service as a chairperson for the Zahra board of directors.317 Dr. 
Al-Amoudi, discussed below, has also honored King Abdullah as the “ultimate 
feminist”318 for his dedication to improving women’s rights. 
Apart from the Zahra initiative, Dr. Samia Al-Amoudi has been a leading 
advocate of breast cancer awareness in the KSA since 2006, which has contributed to her 
recognition as the 5th (among 100) most influential women in the Middle East.319 Her 
efforts culminated into the formation of a breast cancer center.320 Dr. Al-Amoudi had 
been screening women for breast cancer daily when she was diagnosed with late stage 
breast cancer. Just ten days after her diagnosis, she spoke to a group about her failure to 
get a mammogram. Part of Dr. Al-Amoudi’s influence stems from her willingness to 
share her personal experiences toward shattering taboos about the disease. Taboos 
                                                      
314 http://www.fainak.com/portal/Maria/blog/thousands-of-females-stand-shoulder-to-shoulder-in-jeddah-
forming-the-large-3/ 
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319 http://www.wisemuslimwomen.org/currentissues/health/ 
320 http://globalkomen.org/where-we-work/saudi-arabia/  
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associated with cancer in general have dissuaded many people from participating in 
screening and seeking treatment, which has resulted in 70% of all breast cancer cases 
being diagnosed in the latter stages of the disease.321 Saudis, like other Arabs, will not 
mention the disease by name and many families worry that a mother’s diagnosis will ruin 
her daughter’s chances of getting married.322 Thus, similar to Noor from Qatar, among 
Saudi women there is a social imperative to hide the disease.  
An additional concern for Saudi women is the possibility of being seen by male 
doctors; thus the gender of the medical practitioner is often the first question that women 
ask Al-Amoudi about the screening.323 Although Al-Amoudi recounted that a man 
removed his wife from the exam room because the technicians were male, this same 
article discussed Saudi men who were supportive of their wives’ health issues, like a 
husband who shaved his head when his wife started losing her hair due to chemotherapy 
treatments.324 This article also cites another Saudi woman whose family supported her 
but who stated that she was disappointed by the reactions of women within her 
community, who acted as if she were already on her deathbed and told her to forgo 
chemotherapy if favor of herbs.  
In the Saudi context, it appears that the government has taken the lead in 
countering social taboos and promoting breast cancer awareness. While social media 
users expressed their support of the government’s campaigns,325 some women did not 
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think PHD would be possible in the Saudi content326; since cancer is entrenched in taboos, 
wearing a pink hijab would be akin a holding a sign that reads, “I have cancer.” 
Furthermore, the strict standards of dress imposed by law would make it difficult to wear 
a pink hijab and perhaps the hijab would be an unlikely symbol for Saudi women to 
collectivize behind because they are required to wear it, similar to the rejection of the 
women-only spa due to legally imposed gender segregation (Chapter 4).    
 The next section will principally discuss a video that was produced through a 
partnership between the SGKGI and Simply Check, the leading breast cancer awareness 
organization in the UAE, and another video featuring Emirati celebrities. There was no 
official recognition of PHD by Emirati breast cancer organizations but observance of it 
has been noted among Emirati women, so perhaps it has spread organically through 
transnational network bridging. 
	  	   United Arab Emirates 
 The UAE, like Egypt, Qatar, and the KSA, has been participating in breast cancer 
awareness events since at least 2007. In that year, Dubai Healthcare City made a 29-
meter ribbon out of 105,000 pink carnations, which was entered into the Guinness Book 
of World Records as the largest ribbon ever recorded.327 Although the UAE sponsors a 
multitude of events, including the Pink Caravan Pink Bus, and a female-operated, mobile 
screening service, a representative Simply Check, a subsidiary of the Health Authority of 
Abu Dubai (HAAD), claims that these government-sponsored organizations do not 
participate in PHD.328 Though there did not appear to be any official backing of PHD, 
                                                      
326 http://archive.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=103147&d=3&m=11&y=2007 
327 http://www.beautybeyondbreast.com/breast_cancer_abu_dhabi_dubai_uae.html#nov16  
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there were articles that cited popular participation perhaps as organic manifestations of 
solidarity. The “Bedouin Princess,” an Emirati blogger, dedicated a posting to a PHD 
event that occurred on Thursday, October 30, 2008.329 A few online news articles also 
cited PHD observance in the UAE: in 2009, Wesgreen International School distributed 
pamphlets and pink ribbons and scarves to spread awareness330; and, in 2011, Raziqueh 
Hussain noted a number of women wearing pink hijabs in cafés and at the mall.331 While 
Hussain cited the date that coincides with the American campaign, another group of 
Emirati women initiated an annual PHD event on October 27 but linked to the old PHD 
website in the article.332 
 “Healing and Hope,” a documentary about breast cancer survivors in the UAE, 
was produced through a partnership between Simply Check and SGKGI. According to 
the SGKGI website, the film was meant to target populations that are not participating in 
early detection screening.333 The film features six women, of various ages and ethnic 
backgrounds. Four of the six women featured in the video, Ameena, Boshara, Maryam, 
and Nivin, appeared to be of Emirati descent and the other two were English-speaking 
expatriates, Kristin and Arlin. Although four of the six women spoke Arabic, the Arabic 
was subtitled in English but the English was not subtitled.  
 The video highlights several themes that Emirati breast cancer awareness shares 
in common with initiatives elsewhere as well as many of the constraints and taboos that 
have been noted above and others, such as hair loss. A doctor practicing in the UAE 
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claims that women will hide their condition to avoid treatment, as hair loss is an obvious 
sign of being “tainted” with cancer.334 In the video, Boshara questions, “how would I live 
without hair?” Likewise, Maryam, a police officer, says, “I can handle the chemo but my 
hair mustn’t fall out.”335 To demonstrate his support for his wife, Maryam’s husband 
shaves his head one day when they returned home from the clinic. 
 Familial support was an important element of the narratives in this video. Women 
are often concerned with the reactions of their family members, particularly their 
husbands, which may be a decisive factor in their participation in screening and treatment. 
In one article related to the responses of Emirati women to breast screening and treatment, 
they expressed fear that their husbands would not find them beautiful if they had to have 
a mastectomy and Emirati mothers articulated their anxiety about their daughter’s 
prospects for matrimony if they were diagnosed with the disease,336 similar to the 
concerns expressed by Saudi women. These fears typically result in women hiding the 
disease and waiting until the cancer is in an advanced stage before seeking treatment. The 
video was attempting to dispel the idea that families and communities will automatically 
reject women who are diagnosed with breast cancer. Boshara’s narrative, for example, 
described her husband’s, Aziz, enduring support. Before each treatment Boshara would 
say that she did not want to continue chemotherapy and Aziz would convince her to 
persevere, reminding her of her importance to their family. Aziz also claims that some 
men may consider looking for new wives when they discovered their wife’s diagnosis but 
he thought that this would be more fatal to his wife than the disease itself.  
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 While some of the issues highlighted in this discussion are more relevant to the 
region—the necessity of hiding the disease, the effects on daughters' marriageability, and 
the rejection of “Western” medicine—others are relevant to women everywhere: for 
example, any woman who is diagnosed with breast cancer may not like the idea of losing 
her hair or the possibility of her husband not finding her attractive anymore if she has to 
undergo a mastectomy. This video attempts to unpack some universal concerns related to 
breast cancer. A few more of these universal issues, or “universalism,” as Tohidi (2002) 
calls them, were framed by the experiences of the two expatriates in the video. Arlin, who 
was in her second trimester, did not want to abort the fetus because she had been trying to 
get pregnant for years but her doctor informed her that after the first trimester the fetus 
can survive exposure to chemotherapy. The other, Kristin, was quite young when she was 
diagnosed and she worried that the treatment might make her infertile so her physician 
advised her to freeze some of her eggs so that she would be able to carry her own baby. 
Highlighting these universal concerns seems much more effective than reinforcing the 
modern/traditional binary that was particularly apparent in the Al Jazeera report related to 
breast cancer in Qatar, and suggests a cosmopolitan approach to breast cancer awareness. 
However, it is difficult to determine if all the happy endings showcased in this video were 
realistic scenarios or exuberantly optimistic ones. In other words, the video did not 
include narratives of women who faced social repercussions as a result of being diagnosis 
with breast cancer yet the widespread reluctance to participate in screening and treatment 
implies that the stigmatization of cancer continues to be a very real concern of women: 
for example, some women face abandonment by their husband and/or their daughters are 
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subject to desertion by their fiancé if the latter discovers that his future wife's mother has 
breast cancer. 
 Although the “Healing and Hope” video could inform multiple contexts, another 
video on the Simply Check website specifically catered to Emiratis. It included various 
governmental and popular culture personalities (television and radio) as well as artists, 
designers, and publishers from the UAE to celebrate “Pink October.” The participants 
tied together sentences in Arabic to encourage women to get screened for breast cancer. 
Some noteworthy sound bytes consisted of “treatment is what Islam urges you to 
do…God is with you” and “there’s no shame in illness but there’s in ignoring it,”337 
demonstrating that treatment is grounded in religious values in this video as well. This 
video attempted to lay bare the shame of being diagnosed with a disease—which is 
reminiscent of Aida's co-worker's remark that disease is in Allah's hands, implying 
perhaps that people who are stricken with a disease must have somehow deserved this 
fate (although some of the "middle ground" perspective in Chapter 5 might frame illness 
as a jihad in which the affliction is not itself shameful, although certain behaviors enacted 
in response to it might be). While the “Healing and Hope” video migrated toward 
universalism, this video balanced it with its conspicuous localism. 
 The last several subsections have framed how breast cancer awareness 
organizations in the Arab region frame local and universal concerns, which will 
illuminate the next subsection's discussion on why PHD failed to gain organizational 
and/or popular support in the region. 
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 Discussion: Taboos and Weak Hubs 
 There were obvious themes threaded throughout these campaigns: women hiding 
the disease to prevent their social stigmatization or that of their daughters; forgoing 
treatment to avoid the physical manifestations of it; governments taking the lead in breast 
cancer awareness; taboos associated with Western medicine, related to the 
modern/traditional binary; and the importance of promoting treatment as Islamic. The 
American PHD campaign could only perhaps address the last issue, while the 
consequences of failing to address the first two could prove catastrophic for women who 
attempted to participate. PHD may have established contacts with BCFE in 2008 but the 
representative said that the organization only promoted it that year. Although the 
representative of Think Pink Qatar says that the organization has promoted PHD since 
2009, it is subsumed within a larger gamut of events with sparse connections to the 
American campaign. I could not find any evidence that Saudi Arabia has ever 
participated and there may have been organic participation in the UAE but PHD was not 
backed by a local organization. This discussion will attempt to elucidate why the PHD 
campaign was not more successful in the Arab region.  
 The Pink Hijab Day section comes full circle, recalling El-Buri’s statements that 
she had difficulty establishing connections will organizations in the region,338 which, as 
stated previously, has been theorized a crucial component of the mediation of collective 
action (Olson, 1965). An additional concern for collective actions that are principally 
disseminated online is mediation from online to offline spaces. Lim (2012) discusses the 
importance of the offline mediation of collective actions in an article about Egypt, 
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although she had noted its importance in her previous writings on Indonesia as well (Lim 
2003; 2006). In the case of Egypt, she notes, for example, that activists would 
purposefully “strategize” in the presence of cab drivers because they knew the drivers 
would spread the news (Lim, 2012, p. 13). Coffee houses, mosques, and soccer fields 
were also crucial venues for spreading awareness about the protest (Lim, 2012). However, 
the dynamic is much more complicated in cases of transnational collective action that 
primarily spread through the internet with little possibility of face-to-face contact with 
other supporters and no physical venues at which to mobilize and share information.  
 Klein (2000) argues that the internet is developing a novel form of protest that is 
“international, decentralized, with diverse interests but common targets” (as cited in 
Shangapour et al., 2011, p. 2). Similarly, Bennett (2005) discusses, “loosely linked 
‘‘distributed’’ networks that are minimally dependent on central coordination, leaders, or 
ideological commitment…combine online and offline relationship-building aimed at 
achieving trust, credibility, and commitment as defined at the individual rather than the 
collective level” (p. 205). These descriptions well frame PHD. Bennett (2005) 
characterizes this as an important shift away from NGO advocacy, as he calls it, or from 
the necessity of organizational backing toward direct activism. Although Bennett (2005) 
is more concerned with networks and individual dedication to and participation in 
activism, which is referred to elsewhere as “disintermediation” (della Porta & Mosca, 
2009, p. 166) and what I have cited as “organic,” he recognizes that the networks are 
“minimally” reliant on some form of organizational coordination or support through 
independent media outlets. Similarly, Lim (2012) highlights that the Egyptian Revolution 
would not have been possible without the ongoing activism of Kefaya and the April 6 
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Movement that began in 2004 and 2008, respectively (also see Aouragh 2012). Without 
physical or organizational support, one may encounter organic manifestations of support, 
as was the case with PHD in the UAE, which is a product of “virtual brokerage” (Bennett, 
2005, p. 206) through network diffusion, but these displays of individual activism are 
likely to be scarce and have little overall impact on the larger society. In contexts in 
which it is even socially acceptable for women to wear a pink hijab, few people would 
know what it means without an accompanying information campaign. In the absence of 
organizational and/or widespread popular support, the network needs to be sufficiently 
large to support individual activism through network bridging.  
 Organizational support can principally function online through a hub that 
connects various disparate but interrelated networks and/or individuals (Cardoso & Lamy, 
2011, p. 74), as was the case with the Genoa Social Forum, which connected networks to 
organize the G-8 protests in 2001 (della Porta & Mosca, 2009). According to Moraes 
(2001), virtual campaigns through hubs and nodes have “begun to make full use of their 
interconnection with the aim of sharing expertise, resources, costs, and space, and each 
node incorporates new users who potentially become producers and transmitters of 
information” (as cited in Cardoso & Lamy, 2011, p. 79). The case study in the next 
section, SlutWalk Morocco, is another good example of the hub-node dynamic. SlutWalk 
Toronto serves as a hub to disseminate information about SlutWalks throughout the 
world and to share content and resources (network linkages and supporters). SlutWalk 
Morocco has posted several of the same photos that SlutWalk Toronto shared on 
Facebook from SlutWalks in other cities around the world, which creates a type of 
continuity between campaigns that may share little else in common. For example, 
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SlutWalk Morocco and SlutWalk India both changed the name and purpose of the 
movements to conform to local norms but, at least in the case of SlutWalk Morocco, the 
posting of common content between the hub and the node allows SlutWalk Morocco to 
maintain loose connections to the hub that initially contributed to its founding.  
 However, while PHD established hub-node relationships with other countries, 
such as Bulgaria, Canada, and South Africa, and reinforced these relationships through 
listing the foreign events on its website, it failed to list the organic events that have 
occurred in the UAE, although online coverage of Emirati participation in 2011 
continued to reference the American PHD campaign.339 Perhaps the campaign's relative 
success in spreading to Muslim-minority countries can be attributed to PHD’s purpose—
curiosity about Muslim women and the hijab—which is more germane to Muslim women 
in those countries than to Muslim women elsewhere (in Muslim-majority countries). 
However, since the PHD website has not been updated in recent years, it is difficult to 
determine if the American PHD campaign has even maintained contact with the activists 
in the Muslim-minority nations. Local activists in Muslim-minority countries may 
continue to sponsor events, as they have in the UAE, considering that local activists in 
South Africa,340 for example, have started their own Facebook page related to the PHD 
campaign. However, the presence of a weak hub, in this case, the American campaign, 
appears to undermine the effectiveness of online collective action even in relation to a 
campaign that requires little commitment; after all, donning a pink hijab once a year does 
not require a lot of effort. 
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 However, in other contexts, like the Gulf States, it would require a great deal of 
effort to wear a pink hijab as it could result in social repercussions. One could say that 
PHD’s failure to maintain relationships with local breast cancer NGOs in the MENA 
region and its scarce online presence contributed to its lack of support in the region; 
however, there is another more important factor that contributed to its lack of 
mediation—local social norms. Highly visible forms protests are common in the West, 
such as NiqaBitch, although, as mentioned throughout this dissertation, resistance among 
Muslim women often takes on subtle forms. Wearing a pink hijab in some Gulf 
communities would not only violate socially and legally policed standards of dress but it 
would also connect social actors to a disease that some Arabs will not mention by name. 
In these countries, participating in screening is itself an act of protest, which the 
docudrama about Aida conveys. In most of these countries discussed here, the 
governments are taking the lead in countering social taboos that prevent early detection 
because grassroots mobilization still incurs too many risks. Thus, one of the principle 
issues with PHD in the MENA region was the tactics, which would have been too jarring 
in some of the contexts. Perhaps one further taboo should be also be explored: do 
American hijabis, like El Buri, have a firm understanding of what the symbol they choose 
to rally around, the pink hijab, signifies for women in the MENA region? I admit that I 
do not because there are too many mixed and contentious understandings of the hijab that 
determine a woman’s observance of it. For example, in Chapter 4, the opening of a 
women-only spa faced derision from Saudi women because so much of their 
opportunities are already qualified by the norms of gender segregation; likewise, they do 
not have a choice in regard to veiling. The pink hijab is perhaps less contentious in 
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environments where one can choose to veil or not and find others who subscribe to like 
interpretations of the modesty mandate but in contexts in which there is little choice the 
hijab may not be advanced as a symbol of activism.   
 The next section will discuss other taboos related to SlutWalk Morocco: 
Westernization and feminism. SlutWalk Morocco’s connection to a Western feminist 
movement delegitimized it in the eyes of several of the commenters on its Facebook page. 
SlutWalk Morocco (Woman Choufouch) 
 SlutWalk was borne out of the resistance of young Canadian women to the 
ignorant remarks of a police officer who told them they could avoid rape by not dressing 
like “sluts.” In April 2011, more than 3,000 people took to the streets in opposition to the 
pervasive belief that women are at least partially responsible for being raped due to their 
lack of modesty. Within months the movement had spread throughout the globe—the 
hundreds of Facebook pages promoting citywide SlutWalk events are indicative of the 
popularity of the movement. The objectives of the SlutWalk movement have resonated 
with youth activists throughout the world, including those in Morocco. SlutWalk appears 
to serve as a form of branding, following Harvey (2009), to express solidarity with 
transnational youth activism and to demonstrate the universality of certain women’s 
rights issues. Reactions to the Moroccan campaign on Facebook suggest that its 
connection to the Western movement through the SlutWalk branding has reduced its 
credibility among some Moroccans.  
 SlutWalks also faced a fair amount of criticism in the West but for different 
reasons that will be discussed in the next section along with a brief description of 
SlutWalk Toronto to better elucidate how SlutWalk changed when it arrived in Morocco.  
 301	  
 Origins of the Global Movement 
 According to the SlutWalk Toronto (SWTO) homepage, the movement is 
attempting to “re-appropriate” the term slut341 to dissipate its potential use as a device to 
control and bully women. SWTO also aims to counter victim-blaming, which is the 
tendency to blame women for the sexual violence they are subjected to. The contents of 
its Facebook page tends to link rape culture, which relates to the perpetuation of myths 
that explain people’s attitudes toward survivors and offenders (Burnett et al., 2009), to 
certain physical spaces and entities, like campuses, media, law enforcement, the military, 
and right-wing politicians and commentators. Since rape is an invisible crime, more so 
because it is tremendously underreported, it appears that SWTO links rape to places and 
people in an effort to make it more visible to potential SlutWalk supporters. However, 
SlutWalks are better known for their tactics than the movement’s purpose. A tactic that 
has arisen organically is the spectacle of the slut, which includes women decked out in 
lingerie, fishnets, and skimpy dresses to look the part of the stereotypical slut.  
 Although SWTO did not promote slutty forms of dress as its own tactic, the 
spectacle of the slut, which is appropriate rendered as a popular response to the 
movement, has been criticized in the West as has rallying under the slut title. O’Keefe 
(2012) argues that SlutWalk is an example of postfeminist activism, which perceives 
Second-Wave feminists as passé342 and asserts its right to conspicuous consumption, 
including “designer breasts and vaginas,” and hypersexualization (also see Nguyen, 2013; 
Carr, 2013). Though the slutty spectacle attached to SlutWalks has not travelled to other 
countries, the movement in Morocco, for example, has nonetheless capitalized on the stir 
                                                      
341 http://www.slutwalktoronto.com/ 
342 This is perhaps an unfounded claim since SWTO promotes reproductive rights and challenges the 
hypersexualization of women through media.  
 302	  
caused by the facile application of the word “slut” and the associated spectacle. As 
Harvey (2009) argues, globalized culture is not limited to commodities but also extends 
to cultural movements. The “slut” of the “body protest” has become a commodity in this 
globalized movement, one that other cultures do not need to fully embrace and act out on 
the street to profit from the shock quality of it. That being said, the global influence of 
SlutWalk entails a double form of branding: the branding a social movement with 
international implications, which unveils a specific flavor of ("radical") (post)feminism; 
and the branding of the “slut,” the sexualized female body consumed by the male gaze 
(Mulvey, 1975), which can be employed in other contexts to suggests a level of 
radicalism without necessarily reintroducing the stereotypical slut into the protest rallies. 
Consequently, the SlutWalk moniker serves as platform movement (Cammaerts, 2005), 
or a brand as I called it, under which activists take up local concerns related to sexual 
violence. The localized versions of the brand may not share the same purpose or name of 
the original movement but they sometimes receive a similar reception to the full-blown 
spectacle of the slut due to the second aspect of the branding and the concomitant 
radicalism associated with both.    
 This subsection has discussed the double branding of the SlutWalk movement, 
which includes “radical” feminism and the hypersexualized slut. The next subsection will 
describe how SlutWalk Morocco has embraced the first aspect of the brand, while 
attempting to distance itself from the second facet of it.   
 SlutWalk Morocco (SWM) 
 Majdoline Lyazidi and Layla Belmahi founded SlutWalk Morocco in August 
2011. The Facebook page came online on August 13 and, within two weeks, over 3,000 
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Facebook users had liked the page.343 The Facebook “About” page states that “le 
problème du harcèlement se pose réellement chez nous au Maroc” [“harassment is a real 
problem in Morocco”] regardless of the woman’s clothing, age, or whether or not she is 
accompanied by another (male) person. It also notes that, since the topic of harassment is 
taboo, women tend to refrain from confronting the men who harass them. The page 
expresses solidarity with the global SlutWalk movement and frames the local 
movement’s rejection of “l’abus verbal et physique que subissent les femmes et le silence 
dans lequel elles sont confines” [the verbal and physical abuse that [women] suffer in 
silence].344 Woman Choufouch boldly announces the subtitle of the SWTO campaign in 
its banner: “Because We Have Had Enough.” The “About” page demonstrates that the 
purpose of the SlutWalk Morocco campaign has shifted from a focus on rape to sexual 
harassment and, though it continues to address victim-blaming, it does so in relation to 
street harassment. The organizers also post content related to rape, some of which it 
gleans from the SWTO Facebook page, but it frames sexual harassment as the most 
pervasive form of sexual violence and, as such, the most pressing concern for Moroccan 
women.  
 Lyazidi claimed to have started with the name SlutWalk Morocco because the 
title “is catchy” and she believed that the movement would not have created the “buzz” 
that it has without the sexy name.345 However, she also expresses her desire to create a 
movement that was “100% moroccan, suiting our society, our community’s beliefs & 
values,” and she was not attempting to reproduce the same spectacle of “moitié nues !!” 
                                                      
343 http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/09/07/morocco-slutwalk-gets-a-toehold/ 
344 https://www.facebook.com/pages/SlutWalk-
Morocco/132681343491773?id=132681343491773&sk=info 
345 http://accordingtohind.wordpress.com/2011/08/20/slutwalk-morocco-the-interview/ 
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[half naked] women that had occurred elsewhere.346 Thus, even upon the initiation of the 
campaign, Lyazidi said that the name was temporary because SlutWalk may be perceived 
as un-Moroccan and face a crisis of legitimacy due to assumptions related to cultural 
colonialism. However, the popularity of the movement worked against SlutWalk 
Morocco in this regard as the page received too many likes within the first two weeks, the 
time period it took the organizers to determine a more suitable name, to change it on 
Facebook. As a result, there are now two Facebook pages related to the campaign, 
Woman Choufouch and Slutwalk Morocco, although the former was never able to 
achieve the same level of support as the latter, at 2,317 likes and 8,574 likes, respectively 
(as of February 2014). The organizers therefore post identical content on both pages.  
 This section demonstrated how the SWM movement was localized to conform to 
Moroccan social norms, in name and purpose, and, although it was interested in being 
connected to the sexiness and controversy surrounding the global SlutWalk movement, it 
was quick to distance itself from the sluttiness of SlutWalk. The next section will briefly 
frame who might be included among Moroccan sluts.    
 Framing Moroccan Sluts 
 Several commenters disagreed with changing the name: Mehdi Elf even said, 
“enfin! ..vous êtes comme on vous aime..obéissantes !” [“Finally!... you are like we want 
you..obedient !”].347 Some women claimed that the use of the word slut in the name is apt 
considering that it well describes the way that men treat women on the street. Due to the 
pervasiveness of sexual harassment and the propensity to victim-blame, if a woman is 
                                                      
346 https://www.facebook.com/pages/SlutWalk-
Morocco/132681343491773?id=132681343491773&sk=info  
347https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=142816222478285&id=132681343491773&com
ment_id=447814&offset=0&total_comments=14  
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present on the streets of Morocco, she is eligible for the title of slut. Cultural taboos also 
cast women who speak out for their rights as sluts, especially those who confront 
harassers on the street, which was a common complaint of women in the HarassMap data 
and a common thread throughout the datasets. Some of the comments on the Facebook 
page rendered Moroccan “sluts” similarly to how they are perceived in the West—
women and girls who defy societal standards of dress and sexual prowess. These 
standards include refraining from extramarital sex and wearing “traditional” clothing. 
The only attire that appeared beyond reproach in the Moroccan context was the hijab and 
djelleba, a loose fitting, ankle-length outer garments that Moroccans wear on top of their 
clothing when they go out in public. However, a picture posted on the SWM Facebook 
page disputes the idea that women who comply with “traditional” standards of dress are 
spared from harassment. The photograph shows from behind two women standing in the 
souk—a young, unveiled woman in short sleeves, standing next to a perhaps older one in 
djelleba and hijab. In the picture, a middle-aged man is grabbing the veiled woman’s 
buttocks, demonstrating that, although “traditional” clothing is often thought to deflect 
male “advances” in the street, complying with dominant social norms does not ensure 
that women will be protected from sexual violence in the street.    
 This subsection highlighted which women in Morocco are rendered as sluts—all 
of them. I am not suggesting, however, that the term slut is applied more liberally in 
Morocco than it is in the United States, especially in light of Rush Limbaugh's comment 
that women who use birth control are sluts348 and considering the pervasiveness of 
victim-blaming that suggests that if a woman is raped she is a slut “who had it coming.” 
                                                      
348 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c07V85Q_rqE&feature=related 
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The next subsection will highlight some of the qualitative themes related to the SlutWalk 
Morocco movement based on analysis of its Facebook content. 
 Reactions to SlutWalk Morocco   
 Some of the first posts offered by SWM demonstrated a few of the principal 
messages that the campaign was attempting to convey: “Me Draguer ne te donne pas le 
droit de me Harceler”349 [“Flirting with me does not give you the right to harass me”] and 
“NON CE N’EST PAS QUE JE PASSE PAR ICI QUE JE DEVRAIS AVOIR A SUBIR 
TA MISOGYNIE ET TON BESOIN DE PROUVER TA VIRILITE!”350 [“NO I AM 
NOT HERE TO SUFFER YOUR MISOGYNY OR YOUR DESIRE TO PROVE YOUR 
VIRILITY!”]. There was one comment posted to the first quote; says Abdelilah Oe, 
“Malheureusement, très peu font la différence entre la drague et le harcèlement L” 
[“Unfortunately, very few distinguish between flirting and harassing”]. In regard to the 
latter posting, one man, Yassine Bousbia, claims that both misogyny and misandry are 
learned, while virility is a characteristic, implying both that the movement leans toward 
man-hating and virility is a natural expression of masculinity, which some may employ as 
an excuse for harassment. Yasser Oudini states that harassment is not misogyny if it is 
directed at sluts. In another posting, Lyazidi avers that she is “not a body…sex 
toy…accessory…trash…slave…invisible…weak…I am not to be blamed for having a 
say. & My Life, it is My choice to make…I am not a thing.”351 In this statement, she is 
clearly rejecting the objectification of women as is the case with other SlutWalk Morocco 
                                                      
349https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=133660293393878&set=a.132896810136893.29059.132681
343491773&type=1  
350https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=133325033427404&set=a.132896810136893.29059.132681
343491773&type=1  
351 https://fr-fr.facebook.com/notes/slutwalk-morocco/i-am-a-woman-get-used-to-it-thank-
you/132805913479316  
 307	  
postings.352 Most of the comments related to this posting were supportive but Jalal Nadir 
remarks, “no matter what , women will always remain inferior beings .. that's what nature 
and reality dectate [sic].” There are multiple themes highlighted in this statement but I 
wanted to emphasize perceptions of masculinity and how men’s treatment of women is 
framed as “natural.”  
 SWM also shares a sign that was displayed at a SlutWalk march elsewhere (also 
posted on the SWTO page): “CLOTHING IS AN OPTION, RAPE ISN’T.”353 Most of 
the female commenters agreed that women should have the right to wear whatever they 
want. However, some expressed concern that the mentalities of Moroccan men would not 
change to facilitate this right. Wissal Njq claims that women dress for themselves to feel 
beautiful and that clothing does not really impact the incidence of sexual harassment. Njq 
says, “…même ma mére se fait emmerder dans la rue, et je peux t'assurer qu'elle sort pas 
en minijupe” [“…even my mother is screwed with in the street and I can assure you that 
she does not go out in a miniskirt”]. Noufissa Bentamy adds, “Meme celle en voile se 
font emmerder dans la rue, tant que tu es une femme tu te fais emmerder dans les rues” 
[“Even veiled women are screwed with in the street, if you are a women you get screwed 
within the streets”]. These women were responding to an antagonist, Ismael, whose 
comments were removed but it appears that Ismael linked the permissibility of 
harassment to Islam and the immodest dress of women. Fatil Farahate says in response to 
such claims, “L'islam est totalement CONTRE ces faits sataniques.” [“Islam is 
completely against these satanic acts”]. Souhail Oumama also refutes the connection 
                                                      
352https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=144801598946414&set=a.132896810136893.29059.132681
343491773&type=1&comment_id=116234&offset=0&total_comments=33   
353https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=133787820047792&set=a.132810690145505.29036.132681
343491773&type=1  
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between harassment and Islam by stating that the Qur’an tells believers to avert their gaze 
rather than looking at a woman’s buttock for five minutes. Oumama also asserts that real 
men, as opposed to boys, can control their sexual arousal. These comments juxtapose the 
desire of women to dress however they would like to the dominant (male?) mindset that 
this desire challenges cultural norms, which are framed as religious responsibilities.  
 Even after changing the name of the movement, several opponents continued to 
assert that SWM runs counter to the dominant religious norms and others accused it of 
tainting the image of Islam, especially when the administrators posted a graphic in which 
a stereotypical Salafi man (les barbus) tells a woman and a little girl to dress more and 
more modestly and they do so gradually until they ended up in burqas and then he tells 
them that good Muslim women should stay at home. Despite the opposition to this 
depiction of (a version of) Islam, it highlights many of qualitative themes associated with 
the movement: veiling to prevent harassment; the pervasive judgment of women by men 
and other women; the impetus for women to remain at home to avoid harassment; and the 
male control of the public sphere. In response to the criticisms of this supposedly 
inflammatory posting, SlutWalk Morocco posted the following statement: “Don't you see 
that non-bearded men have the same comments about women's clothing?…This is not 
stereotyping Islam…this is a caricature illustrating Arab men/women in the public space 
that has some truth..[to] it.” The accusations of being unIslamic perhaps relate to the 
perceived secular Westernization of the organizers, even though SWM posted very little 
content related to Islam.       
 A few postings attempt to demonstrate the universality of the issue of sexual 
violence, which is another pervasive theme in the datasets. SlutWalk Morocco shared a 
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link about a SlutWalk in India,354 with the following statement: “Ce n'est pas qu'en 
occident que ça se passe, ça se passe aussi en orient!” [“This does not only happen in the 
West, but it also happens in the East”]. The movement reiterates this point with a sign 
from another SlutWalk protest, which reads, “SEXUAL ASSAULT IS EVERYONE’S 
ISSUE!”355 Not everyone was convinced of the veracity of these statments. Several 
opponents claimed that the incidence of harassment is exaggerated by the campaign, 
especially in reaction to the picture of the man grabbing the woman’s buttocks in the 
souk.356 Several commenters argued that the photo was fake or enhanced. 
 This subsection was a general, not exhaustive, overview of the themes that I 
encountered in my analysis of SWM. The next subsection will highlight overtly 
defamatory criticisms related to the campaign’s perceived connections to the West and 
feminism. 
 Negative Reactions 
 Some, although not the majority, believe that women’s rights movements could 
result in the decline of moral values and the family, similar to what is perceived to have 
occurred in the West. “Maghribi Pour la Vie” claims that after “sluts” there will be a 
movement for queers, referencing the West as an example of progressive moral 
degradation. Others, like Kamel El Fassi, one of the most vocal antagonists on the SWM 
Facebook page, claimed that feminism has led to the decline of societies throughout the 
world. El Fassi writes, “La revolution sexuelle en France…a contribué à la disparition de 
                                                      
354 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PX_7Vpl3SHk&feature=share  
355https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=135676006525640&set=a.132896810136893.29059.132681
343491773&type=1  
356https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=153873258039248&set=a.132896810136893.29059.132681
343491773&type=1&comment_id=140112&offset=100&total_comments=183  
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la famille, de la morale et des valeurs religieuses. Resultat: un vieillissement de la 
population, une baisse du dynamisme economique” [“The sexual revolution in 
France…contributed to the disappearance of the family, moral and religious values. 
Result: aging population and a loss of economic dynamism”].357 El Fassi also states that 
women’s rights progress into female dominance, using France as an example: “Les 
femmes considerent les hommes comme des chiens!!!...si elle divorce, elle garde les 
enfants, meme si elle a plusieurs amants !!!” [women consider men as dogs!...If she 
divorces, she keeps the children, even if she has several lovers!].358 El Fassi demanded on 
several occasions that SWM articulate its position on sexual liberation and abortion 
perhaps because he had looked at the SWTO website in which there is ample discussion 
of both issues. Izz Ad-Din Ruhulessin supports El Fassi’s rejection of feminism, stating, 
“[SWM is] Just one spasm of the collapsing feminists...”359 However, one should not 
assume that anti-feminist perspectives are limited to Moroccan and/or Arab contexts, 
although it does tend to be a loaded term among some men and women in the region 
(Fernea, 1998) and among right-wing commentators in the West (Basu, 2000).360  
 Kamel El Fassi as well as a few other commenters linked SWM and feminism in 
general, to various conspiratorial designs, including Communism, Fascism, and 
                                                      
357https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=153873258039248&set=a.132896810136893.29059.132681
343491773&type=1&comment_id=140602&offset=100&total_comments=183   
358https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=153873258039248&set=a.132896810136893.29059.132681
343491773&type=1&comment_id=140999&offset=100&total_comments=183  
359https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=143704539056120&id=132681343491773&com
ment_id=580776&offset=0&total_comments=19   
360 http://www.forbes.com/sites/shenegotiates/2012/02/15/women-in-a-war-zone-republicans-betray-
survivors-of-sexual-assault-and-domestic-violence/  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/13/fox-news-liz-trotta-rape_n_1274018.html?ref=mostpopular 
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Zionism.361 Perhaps the references to these “isms” are to solidify the point that these 
ideological paradigms (including the atheism associated with Communism) have no place 
in a Muslim monarchy.362 The organizers refuted these insinuated connections to radical 
ideologies, explaining that “nous ne sommes pas un groupement de féministes 
extrémistes, chez nous les filles commencent à se faire harceler à l'âge de 10 ans ou avant 
et continue à l'être tout le long de leur vie, ce que nous dénonçons c'est cette sauvagerie 
qui confine les femmes dans la peur et la honte” [“We are not a group of radical 
feminists; in our society girls 10-year-old and younger start getting harassed and they are 
for most of their lives, this is what we denounce this savagery that confines women to 
fear and shame”]. Although Lyazidi sees herself as a “rationalist feminist,”363 some of the 
eight members of the Woman Choufouch team, four women and four men, do not self-
identify as feminists.364 One of the administrators also assures El Fassi that communism 
and Eastern Europe have nothing to do with the SWM campaign.365  
 This subsection has framed some issues associated with the legitimacy of 
women’s rights movements stemming from the MENA region that are affiliated with 
Western feminist campaigns. The final subsection will discuss why Western feminism is 
stigmatized in the region and how SWM attempts to remain neutral in the 
religious/secular debate.   
                                                      
361https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=266005260108511&id=132681343491773&com
ment_id=3670013&offset=0&total_comments=26  
362https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=255264761184070&id=132681343491773&com
ment_id=3649665&offset=0&total_comments=39  
363 http://accordingtohind.wordpress.com/2011/08/20/slutwalk-morocco-the-interview/  
364https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=159443494148891&id=132681343491773&com
ment_id=643382&offset=0&total_comments=34  
365https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=255264761184070&id=132681343491773&com
ment_id=3650240&offset=0&total_comments=39   
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 Discussion: Inclusivity and Allegiances 
 Many women’s rights activists in the Arab world dispute being labeled as 
feminists; Fernea (1998) highlights the articulated rejection of feminism on several 
occasions during her travels in the region. She claims that it is often associated with 
“imperialism, colonialism, Zionism…depravity, birth control, individualism, no family 
concerns, no morals” (Fernea, 1998, p. 388). Hassan (2013) articulates a similar response 
to the second wave of Western feminism, which also frames some of the sentiments 
highlighted in the previous subsections: 
Muslims can support wholeheartedly the legitimate issues and concerns of the early western 
feminist movement widely known as first wave feminism. However, there are good reasons for 
them to have reservations about many western feminist ideas…since the late 1960s and early 1970s 
with the emergence of the second wave of feminism…dominant western feminism has now become 
somewhat synonymous with a strong sense of individualism and with a lack of adequate concern 
for one‘s responsibilities to the family and to children. It has also contributed to creating a sense of 
rivalry between men and women, which has a bearing upon child development and is not conducive 
to a healthy family or society (p. 88). 
 
 He then frames why the problematics associated with the second wave of Western 
feminism reinforce the importance of further engagement with Islamic feminism.  
 I understand how he comes to this conclusion but it begs the question of which 
version of Islamic feminism would he consider legitimate? Certainly not the version 
promoted by Irshad Manji, which would allow women to reconcile their Muslim and 
lesbian identities (Chapter 5). What about the version advanced by “Refugee48” (Chapter 
4) who says that marriage and motherhood are not her first priority because she wants to 
use her “God-given” talents to contribute to her community, which is also an important 
objective of Muslim communities. I have no qualms with Islamic feminism but what 
about secularist approaches for Muslim women who may not readily identify with 
Islamic feminism?  
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 In dichotomous approaches to women’s rights, movements must often position 
themselves as allies or enemies. As I discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, focusing on a 
particular issue related to the lived experiences of Muslim women allows them to artfully 
sidestep affiliations. SWM attempted to play out this evasive tactic when El Fassi 
demanded to know the movement’s position on abortion and sexual liberation. The 
administrator replied that those issues were not salient to the purpose of the movement—
to rally against sexual harassment—and refused to give him a definitive response. 
However, SWM, in initiating a movement that is connected to Western feminism, 
forewent its possibilities of neutrality among the secularist push and the Islamic pull. To 
briefly offer historical foundations of this dialectic, secularism is not a new phenomenon 
in women’s rights discourses stemming from the MENA region. As Badran recounts, 
secularist approaches to women’s rights were part of the rhetoric of nation building after 
the Ottoman Empire dissolved, which tied the liberation of women to the advancement of 
the these newly-forming societies. However, the modern Islamist movement of the 1970s 
stalled (reversed?) the progression of women’s rights within secular frameworks when 
Islamists began to reframe secularism as “unIslamic” rather than nationalistic (Badran, 
2005). Since political religiosity and secularism are often played out on women’s bodies, 
Islamist movements encouraged women not seek employment outside of the home and to 
dress modestly (Badran, 2005), which was noted by one of the bloggers in Chapter 4 who 
said that women in Egypt in 1960s and 1970s wore heels and miniskirts and were 
subjected to less harassment than veiled women are currently. 
 The secular and Islamic binary has been exasperated by the economic turmoil 
wrought by globalization as well as by wars targeting MENA region countries; as such, 
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Muslims are called upon to express their affiliations as either Eastern-leaning 
(“religious”) or Westernized (“secular”) Muslims (Badran, 2005), just as Westerners, 
who are tolerant of Islam, are dismissed as “cultural relativists” (see previous section on 
hijab discrimination). Basu (2000) articulates a similar dynamic in relation to Indian 
women’s rights groups. Says Basu (2000), 
The discursive dimension centers on the charge that not only are the women who form the 
autonomous women’s movement Westernized elite but that appeals to women’s rights pit them 
against women who are primarily defined by their religious, cultural, and community identities (p. 
79).  
 
Although SWM does not itself connect women’s rights to either secularist or Islamic 
perspectives, it allows a space for different ideologies to converge; for example, Ismail’s 
belief that Islam allows harassment to police women’s modesty and Farahate’s vehement 
denial of this claim. Yet it appears that if a movement does not readily claim its 
allegiances, opponents feel the need speculate about them. SWM neither attempts to 
defame Islam, except perhaps by the name that it quickly changed, nor does it overtly 
promote any religion. Secularism among the Moroccan middle to upper middle class has 
been documented elsewhere (Robinson and Parmentier, forthcoming), which results in 
very pious to “Agnostic Muslim” Moroccans and everything in between, so why should 
the movement not cater to its intended audience rather than promote one or another 
arbitrary ideology that may not reflect the worldviews of the organizers?    
 The group could have arrived on Facebook as an autonomous anti-sexual 
harassment social movement but it would not have likely gained much attention. Many of 
the over 2,000 followers of the Woman Choufouch page likely only heard about it 
because they were already following the SWM page. The SlutWalk brand is what created 
the buzz around the movement travelling to Morocco, which Lyazidi herself 
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acknowledges. Social media networks are all about connections and the movement had a 
ready-made global base of support through its affiliation with the transnational SlutWalk 
movement. Cammaerts (2005) claims that one of the benefits of platform sites (hubs) is 
the ability of the groups to pool resources and a transnational following with bridges 
connecting overlapping networks is certainly an important resource for online collective 
actions. SWM’s success online, partially facilitated through its global SlutWalk support 
base, may have contributed to the impressive gains it has contributed to offline, including 
its contributions to the reformation of Article 475 (see Chapter 3).  
 SWM could have aligned itself with other regional anti-sexual harassment 
movements, like HarassMap or Nasawiya from Lebanon, to perhaps claim more 
respectable allies from the perspectives of its opponents, but the resources to develop a 
map or an independent website are considerable so Facebook is an attractive option for 
new campaigns. SWM not only affiliates with the global SlutWalk movement through 
sharing links posted on the SWTO hub but it also promotes regional efforts, like 
HarassMap and The uprising of women in the Arab world. As such, SWM promotes local, 
regional, and transnational movements toward ending street harassment and gender 
violence so it is neither oriented toward particularism nor universalization, which Eschle 
(2001) claims is crucial to undermining polarized visions of feminism, like 
religious/secular. According to Eschle (2001), “While theorization of the feminist 
movements has tended toward the poles of universalization or particularism, in practice, 
various movements have followed a path between these poles, thus continually 
undermining this dichotomy” (as cited in Tohidi, 2002, p. 856). SWM appears to have 
positioned itself in such a way: simultaneously, local, regional, and transnational.  
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Cosmopolitanism Praxis in the Collective Action of Muslim Women 
 I will briefly recapitulate the case studies outlined in this chapter before 
highlighting the vernacular cosmopolitan praxis associated with them. First, the hijab 
discrimination section discusses various obstacles to collective actions being taken up by 
the digital ummah network, which has demonstrated its ability to mobilize to decry 
incidents of Islamophobia and Zionism. Some women in the American hijabi fashion 
network were unsympathetic to discrimination against hijabis in the Boudlal v. Disney 
and Khan v. A&F cases, which may reflect socioeconomic divides that manifest both 
online and off. However, since hijabi fashion bloggers have rallied against other 
transnational cases of discrimination against hijabis, there is a possibility that the topic 
will eventually be taken up by the digital ummah network. The hijab discrimination case 
study also frames the difficulties in promoting collective action among women who share 
religious attachments in the same national context, difficulties that become exponentially 
more complicated when activists attempt to organize transnational collective actions 
through social media, as I discussed in the case study related to Pink Hijab Day. PHD 
faced obstacles reaching women in the MENA region because the movement lacked local 
organizational support and sufficient online presence to serve as a strong hub toward the 
promotion of individual activism. The American PHD movement also failed to consider 
local impediments to offline participation in the initiative, particularly related to taboos 
and localized standards of dress. SlutWalk Morocco, the third case study, which is a 
localized campaign that is connected to the global SlutWalk platform, is the most 
successful example of collective action among the three case studies. It was able to profit 
from the existing support base of the global movement, through partial acceptance of the 
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SlutWalk branding, but it also recontextualized the movement to conform to the 
Moroccan experience. SlutWalk Morocco has faced criticisms due to its loose 
connections with a Western feminist movement but it has refused to label itself as either a 
secularist or a religious women’s rights movement; it has instead positioned itself as 
simultaneously universal and particular. 
 Clearly, SlutWalk Morocco is in the best position to be called a cosmopolitan 
movement. It connects to transnational, regional, and local women’s rights groups toward 
addressing sexual harassment and a number of other concerns that affect women in 
Morocco as well as everywhere. It also attempts to be inclusive of all voices, including 
those of its opponents. Pink Hijab Day, on the other hand, is a transnational movement 
where it has travelled but its stated purpose lacks sufficient inclusivity to be considered 
cosmopolitan, although it could be considered as a form of Muslim cosmopolitanism. 
Hijab discrimination has the potential to become a transnational issue because it affects 
so many women throughout the world; tellingly, there have been cases that have 
encouraged mediation among localized networks, especially the el-Sherbini case. 
However, and this applies to the PHD case as well, for the hijab to become a symbol of 
activism, there needs to be more people on both sides of the hijabi/unveiled debate who 
come to accept that theirs is not the one and only true version of Islam. In the same vein, 
a truly cosmopolitan type of movement for hijabis would be for them to express solidarity 
with other movements that are against compulsory veiling. In any case, the dynamics of 
networks tend to encourage activism that attracts supporters with various identities to 
increase its chances of being heard and disseminated so perhaps activism will continue to 
move in this more cosmopolitan direction rather than toward greater homophily.  
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Conclusion 
Multiple Cosmopolitanisms? 
 
“So I was googling one thing or another when I found a post about the abject horror of a reporter 
in Saudi who was female and was therefore not permitted to stay in the men's section of Starbucks, 
umm boo hoo hoo. Now what grabbed my attention wasn’t the article itself, but the comments. 
[…] Juuuuuust so we're clear, Saudi is not a bunch of tents stuck together with roaming camels, 
men in turbans singing “Allah o akbar” raping women cause it’s their right and having a harem of 
no less then 20. Oh and we don’t circumcise our women, man that’s just nasty and wrong on too 
many levels. Women are not locked up at home and any who are is a matter of the family culture 
not the country, still with me? Good. We're not backwards you morons, we're conservative, i.e. if 
you want to go and mingle with the opposite sex you go to a specific place. […] Now my more 
important point is, since when do you get off judging people: “Close Starbucks!! They shouldn’t 
support them by opening families sections” – umm, excuse me? I ain’t complaining, and I need 
my coffee, so seriously man, GET LOST, I didn’t hire anyone to be my speaker” (“Sweet Anger,” 
Saudi blogger).366 
 
“Sweet Anger’s” discussion highlights an important issue: is it possible to come to any 
type of consensus on social norms in a global society? The reporter probably thought that 
she was supporting a woman’s ostensible right to sit anywhere she would like at 
Starbucks. “Sweet Anger’s” denial of the reporter’s “help” likely reflects her fatigue of 
being cast as a Muslimwoman (see Chapter 1) and of the suggestion of a cultural other 
that it is her place to intervene so that Saudi social norms could become more consistent 
with those of the cultural other through promoting a boycott. Cultural others may not 
object to women-only spas or gender-segregated schools, so in what venues is 
segregation acceptable and in what venues should it be rejected? Is it right for cultural 
others to interfere? Are the Saudi norms of gender segregation acceptable in the global 
society? Who decides?    
 Sweet Anger’s discussion highlights some of difficulties in locating 
cosmopolitanism in general, particularly in online spaces where people are less apt to 
maintain basic levels of civility and where people access information that was not 
                                                      
366 http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/08/29/saudi-arabia-independent-women/ 
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necessarily intended for their consumption. Throughout this dissertation, I have attempted 
to demonstrate that vernacular cosmopolitan praxis is not limited to the West; the 
likelihood of some Westerners reembedding into comfortable allegiances (Jansson, 2013) 
appears as likely as it is for cultural others of the West, as was demonstrated in the 
xenophobic responses to the hijab discrimination cases in Chapter 6 and in the 
Islamophobic discussions in the artificial hymen data (as well as the reactions to the 
NiqaBitch protest). Vernacular cosmopolitan praxis could be encountered online among 
people all over the world who create bridges between dissimilar people, engage 
disagreements in a civil manner, and articulate basic standards of behavior with which 
everyone could agree.  
 Cosmopolitanism, anti-cosmopolitanism, and distinct combinations of allegiances 
to the local and global do not appear to be limited to particular geographical regions or 
worldviews, yet the cultural hegemony of the West reinforces the assumption that 
Western values—including individualism, secularism, democracy, and capitalism—are 
natural and alternative worldviews are necessarily less so. I am not saying that non-
Westerners do not also agree with these values to varying extents but some non-
Westerners, like some Westerners, are able to understand the limitations of these 
idealistic values that typically play out through binaries (individual/collective, 
secular/religious, democratic/authoritarian, capitalist/communist) though these ideals 
rarely exist in absolute terms. For example, voters may support secular governments but 
their support of anti-abortion legislation is grounded in their religious beliefs. Since 
Western values are often assumed to be universal, vernacular cosmopolitan praxis in the 
West is limited as Westerners are not expected to justify their “universalism”—it is 
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presumed. Some Westerners who do exhibit vernacular cosmopolitan praxis are labeled 
as cultural relativists (see Chapter 6) for expressing traitorous support for non-Western 
ideals and/or practices, whereas non-Westerners who attempt to disrupt the 
incontestability of Western values are branded as anti-cosmopolitans for not subscribing 
to cosmopolitan (read: Western) norms.        
 This chapter will outline the vernacular cosmopolitan praxis that was unearthed in 
the chapters throughout this dissertation, discuss the theoretical, empirical, and 
methodological contributions of this research, and suggest how future research could 
reorient cosmopolitanism away from its Western bias in scholarly engagement with the 
concept. The first section will recapitulate the vernacular cosmopolitan praxis that was 
framed in the previous chapters. The second section will highlight the contributions of 
this research: theoretically speaking, it will discuss why praxis is a more appropriate 
analytical tool than identity for understanding cosmopolitanism and it will scrutinize 
whether or not, under the current constraints of cultural hegemony, the cosmopolitan 
praxis of Muslims is limited to alternative forms of Muslim cosmopolitanism due to the 
perceived mutual exclusivity of Muslim and Western worldviews; it will underline how 
connective content analysis can excavate dynamics of online Muslim populations that are 
often masked through analyses of authoritative, homogenous networks dedicated to 
Muslims, one example of various types of Muslim cyberpublics; and, related to both the 
theoretical and methodological contributions, it will highlight the empirical uniqueness of 
this research style and the associated findings. The third section will discuss possibilities 
for future research on vernacular cosmopolitan praxis in cyberspaces because, while I 
center my research on Muslim women, other non-Western populations are also unlikely 
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to be considered cosmopolitan but they are probably less likely than Muslim populations 
to be labeled as anti-cosmopolitan. 
Vernacular Cosmopolitan Praxis 
 The chapters of this dissertation highlighted various forms of vernacular 
cosmopolitan praxis. Some Muslims who have engaged in these praxes are not likely to 
be included in studies of cosmopolitanism but their dialogues demonstrate commitment 
to their own beliefs yet acceptance for others’ views, including other Islamic 
interpretations and practices, even though divergent religious beliefs within the same 
religion are often some of the most difficult to tolerate. Other types of vernacular 
cosmopolitan praxis that I have identified include the following: expanding the 
transnational connective memory to include the voices of Muslim women, especially the 
voices that attempt to debunk stereotypes of Muslim women or the Muslimwoman; 
dialogue and network linkages that encourage interaction between dissimilar people 
(even among Muslims with dissimilar beliefs); offering countersentences to dominant 
political and religious discourses; dialogue that encourages inclusivity and civility; and 
the articulation of basic levels of comportment online and off, iteratively developed 
through online discussions. These praxes are perhaps less likely to be presence in 
anonymous cyberspaces because interlocutors are not required to maintain civility due to 
the unlikelihood of ever meeting the people that they engage with online in face-to-face 
situations but it is clear that some interlocutors actively promote these behaviors. 
 I also analyze ways that networks and behaviors in cyberspaces facilitate and 
constrain online vernacular cosmopolitan praxis. Benedikter and Fitz (2011), for example, 
discuss how social media contribute to collective introspection and imaginings of what 
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offline communities could/should be; however, they also discuss how these spaces can be 
used as mechanisms for social policing (also see Jansson 2009; 2013). Furthermore, 
Jansson (2013) suggests that people rarely use the internet to meet “others,” due to the 
tendency to reembed fragmented postmodern subjectivities into confortable allegiances, 
but Wise (2009) suggests that there are some social media users who proactively engage 
“others” online—the “transveral enablers” (Onyx et al., 2011). Onyx et al. (2011) also 
suggest that networks can encourage cosmopolitanism through everyday interactions 
because changing perspectives within networks can contribute to far-reaching results 
through the emergence of bottom-up change and their self-organizing and reorganizing 
tendencies. Similar to the network evolutions and realignments that Onyx et al. (2011) 
discuss, Couldry (2008) posits that certain memes are more readily mediated within 
certain spaces and into others, which suggests that, while certain digital texts and 
multimedia forms will circulate in dominant transnational networks and achieve high 
degrees of notoriety, other memes will be relegated to localized networks and scarcely 
achieve even vague recognition outside of them.  
 Chapter 3, “Conversations in Cyberspaces,” discusses how the digital self-
expressions of Muslim women are not only subtle resistance against local taboos and 
stigmas but they have the potential to be mediated into and within the dominant 
transnational connective memory. I situate this expansion of the connective memory as a 
form of vernacular cosmopolitan praxis, particularly the narratives that challenge 
stereotypes of Muslim women. Alas, it appears that the narratives that comply with the 
stereotype of Muslim women as victims (cooke, 2000) are more readily mediated into the 
dominant transnational connective memory, although the narratives of empowered 
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Muslim women may have some impact on localized networks, particularly because the 
underlying issues that these Muslim women were speaking out against—silences and 
disappearances, dialogue incited by the martyrdoms of women—are universal to varying 
degrees within Muslim communities. Interestingly, the Western media showcasing of 
“safe,” pro-Western Muslim women offers stereotypically “silenced” Muslim women the 
opportunity to demonstrate their vernacular cosmopolitan praxis. A few unlikely 
cosmopolitan Muslim women in Chapter 3 were niqabis who politely asked the native 
informant spokespeople to respect their Islamic beliefs as the former respect theirs.367  
Their interactions could also be perceived as Muslim cosmopolitanism but I argue that 
they do suggest vernacular cosmopolitan praxis because their stances also challenge 
widely accepted stereotypes regarding Muslim women who would likely be framed as 
“extremists” due to their relatively “radical” approaches to the Islamic modesty mandate. 
In relation to challenging the Western bias associated with conceptualizations of 
cosmopolitanism, this chapter demonstrates some commonalities between the lived 
experiences of Muslim women in the “East” and the “West,” particularly the self-
disappearing tactic that Muslim women take up to protect themselves regardless of 
context.  
 Chapter 4, “Women’s Agency and Muslim Marriage,” highlights several forms of 
vernacular cosmopolitan praxes. The first is the articulation of counterclaims by social 
media users, especially spinsters, to the dominant political, religious, media, and socially 
privileged discourses on spinsterhood that frame it as a “crisis.” While some spinsters 
were simply attempting to normalize the status of unwed women in Muslim communities, 
                                                      
367 “Unlikely” because theoretical frameworks on cosmopolitanism would not typically classify niqabis as 
cosmopolitans. 
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others linked it to the lack of suitable prospective grooms and/or to their desire to 
contribute to their communities in ways other than producing offspring. The second form 
of praxis was linked to communal organic responses to the perceived lack of available 
men in some Muslim communities: Muslim women opting into polygynous marriages. 
Some Muslims elucidated their outright rejection to this option but another group of 
unlikely cosmopolitans, those who were not enthusiastic about second wife marriages but 
said that they would agree to them in certain circumstances, attempted to devise 
communal obligations related to ensuring that these arrangements were undertaken in a 
proper manner. Although the issue of polygyny is somewhat universal in some Muslim 
and non-Muslim communities, this is not why I consider it a form of cosmopolitan praxis. 
I suggest that it is because the Muslim women who attempted to devise communal norms 
related to polygyny were not themselves affected by polygynous arrangements but they 
were tolerant of others practicing it and they demonstrated concern for protecting the 
rights of women, first wives in particular, rather than flat rejections of the practice. This 
cosmopolitan praxis is similar to that of the niqabis who are true to their own beliefs and 
practices but accepting of dissimilar ones. This approach, expressing acceptance within 
defined basic standards, may be more effective among Muslims who believe that 
polygyny is an acceptable practice than attempting to convince them that their beliefs are 
misguided.368 Conversely, other Muslim women did articulate flat rejections of polygyny 
but they did so by grounding them in the right of Muslim women to themselves develop 
Qur’anic hermeneutics, which speaks to a form of Muslim cosmopolitan praxis. This 
                                                      
368 Similar to Fernea’s (1998) conversations with women’s right activists who were attempting to eradicate 
female genital mutilation, these activists typically found that it was more effective to educate populations 
about the effects of this tradition than to simply tell them that it was wrong. Some activists also said that the 
campaign in the West to cast FGM/FGC as anti-modern polarized local activism against the practice.    
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could also be perceived as vernacular cosmopolitan praxis more generally if these 
discussions were interpreted as speaking to this right among women in all religious 
communities. The third form of praxis is related to developing networks and bridges of 
activism that address universal issues affecting women. Challenging the stigmatization of 
spinsterhood and sexual harassment are forms of activism that were highly mediated 
within local and transnational networks, speaking to their universal salience among 
Muslim and non-Muslim women. Chapter 4 demonstrates that the online activism of 
Muslim women is often similar to non-Muslim activism, again, frustrating the dichotomy 
of East and West. On a final note, the women who were speaking out against street 
harassment and the stigmatization of spinsterhood could be promoting the cosmopolitan 
praxis of women demanding basic standards of comportment from men on the street and 
within the institution of marriage (the type of marriage in which women would not be 
relegated to subordinate positions), similar to the women who outlined basic communal 
norms in relation to polygynous marriages. 
 Chapter 5, “Communities and Ijtihad,” principally discusses cosmopolitan praxis 
related to Muslims who are able to articulate tolerance for divergent interpretations of 
Islamic practices, similar to the findings in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 was mainly interested in 
demonstrating that the methodology that scholars employ to study online Muslim 
populations could result in masking cosmopolitanism among them due to the general 
focus on homophilic networks. Homogenous networks of Muslims are not often the ripest 
cyberspaces for analyzing how Muslims engage with “other” Muslims about differing 
perspectives on beliefs and practices and with non-Muslims in efforts to normalize 
relations between the West and Islam. In the topical network related to Muslim lesbians, I 
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discovered a middle ground (not another typology) between “traditional” and “liberal” 
Muslims that accommodated both the rejection of Muslim homosexuality and acceptance 
of the right of queer Muslims to marry in order for them to avoid zina (extramarital 
sexual relations). The perspectives of “liberal” Muslims who support queer Muslim rights 
also engage in a form of cosmopolitan praxis by expanding the scope of Islamic 
knowledge through ijtihad, similar to the contributions of Muslim women in offering 
their own interpretations of the Qur’an, which advance Islamic knowledge beyond the 
typical reliance on traditional male hermeneutics. Although there were a few hijabis who 
expressed tolerance of unveiled women, the overwhelming majority tended to believe 
that unveiled women were not complying with an important Islamic mandate and that 
they were disrupting the solidarity of the (pro-hijab) ummah. Both of these networks 
were transnational, so perhaps the transnational hijabis fashion network does speak to a 
form of Muslim cosmopolitanism but the transnational topical network related to Muslim 
queerness is more illustrative of vernacular cosmopolitan praxis. This topical network is 
also an activist network related to a universal issue, similar to spinsterhood and sexual 
harassment, and, as such, it advances basic rights that everyone should enjoy. This 
chapter disputes the widely accepted truth that the West is more tolerant than the East, 
highlighting the examples of hijabis in both North America and North Africa being 
denied entrance to certain venues and opportunities because of their hijabis and Muslim 
queers forming their own communities because they are rejected among LGBTQ 
communities in the West due to their racialized religion and perhaps their skin color, just 
as they would be snubbed for not conforming to the dominant cultures of the East in 
relation to their sexuality and, in some cases, their avoidance of heterosexual marriage.       
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 Chapter 6, “Online Collective Action Case Studies,” discusses the relative 
successes of few collective actions created by and/or related to Muslim women that had 
the potential to develop into vernacular cosmopolitan praxis. Hijab discrimination is a 
universal issue among Muslim communities, which would suggest that this concern 
might stimulate Muslim activism and cosmopolitan praxis, but reactions to the plights of 
a few American hijabis who faced discrimination in the workplace did not animate the 
digital ummah network, larger Muslim communities, or even hijabis networks based in 
the United States. Despite the denial within the hijabi fashion network, this is perhaps 
related to the hijab being a contested issue within Muslim communities but it is also 
related to American hijabi fashion bloggers attempting to normalize the American hijabi 
identity through acquiescence and expressing simultaneous allegiances to the West and 
the ummah. This, at times, leads to contradictory stances—for example, encouraging the 
uniform practice of veiling yet failing to support Muslim women’s right to religious 
accommodation in the workplace—but, although these multiple allegiances could be 
considered a form of vernacular cosmopolitan identity, it is difficult to consider their 
positionalities as examples of cosmopolitan praxis. Vernacular cosmopolitan praxis is 
more appropriately rendered as activism toward ensuring that all populations, including 
those who wear religious symbols on their heads, are employable. In regard to Pink Hijab 
Day, the initial purpose of the initiative was more inline with vernacular cosmopolitan 
praxis but when it shifted its purpose from stereotypes, which is relevant to Muslim 
women everywhere (see Chapter 4), to awareness about why women wear the hijab, its 
salience for some Muslim women was compromised. The American PHD campaign was 
not perhaps sufficiently sensitive to local taboos in Muslim-majority countries but it may 
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have had greater success in the Arab region if the PHD network was large enough to 
promote personal participation in the campaign in the absence of local organizational 
support. PHD could still be considered a form of Muslim cosmopolitan praxis but its 
redefined purpose and the lack of dynamism of the associated network limited its 
translatability in some contexts. The SlutWalk Morocco campaign offered the best 
example of vernacular cosmopolitan praxis of the three case studies, but HarassMap and 
the Muslim spinsterhood campaign were also good examples of it, because it locally 
contextualized a universal issue. SlutWalk Morocco was able to develop a support base 
within Morocco, because the organizers appropriately contextualized the movement to 
comply with Moroccan norms, and among transnational supporters of the global 
SlutWalk movement. Although the movement faced some derision from commenters 
who were fearful that advances in women’s rights would lead to the deterioration of 
social of familial norms, particularly due to the movement’s connection to Western 
feminism, the organizers were able to artfully claim multiple allegiances toward the 
greatest possible inclusivity, unlike the hijabi fashion bloggers who were limited to one 
or another allegiance at a time and PHD that marked its dedication to hijabis in Muslim-
minority countries at the expense of greater inclusivity.    
Research Contributions  
 This dissertation research has attempted to address several gaps in the literature 
related to cosmopolitanism and the interactions of online Muslim populations. I will 
discuss the theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions of this thesis in the 
next three subsections. 
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 Theoretical Contributions 
 I argue that cosmopolitanism was not originally intended to advance the 
superiority of any specific culture or set of beliefs but instead referred to the shared sense 
of humanity between dissimilar people. However, beginning with the Christian Empire, 
rulers began to link cosmopolitanism with the superiority of Western cultures and the 
universalism of the Christian faith. This trend continued when cosmopolitanism was 
reintroduced into philosophical debate during the Enlightenment period and the ideal 
contributed to the normative foundations of European imperialism under the aegis of the 
“white man’s burden.” Over the centuries since the concept was first introduced, 
cosmopolitanism has become synonymous with Western localities, values, universalism, 
and/or identities. Although contemporary theoretical discussions of the concept have 
stretched its meaning to include multicultural tolerance and processes of 
interconnectedness, they continue to tacitly connect the propensity with the West by 
excluding non-Western localities, values, universalism, and/or identities from the 
purview of scholarly engagement with cosmopolitanism. In order to advance beyond the 
Western bias associated with cosmopolitanism—which should actually be conceptualized 
as Western cosmopolitanism—it is necessary to return to the foundations of the concept 
that entailed simultaneous dedication to the local and the cosmos through the theoretical 
commitment to vernacular cosmopolitanism, which has been framed elsewhere by 
Werbner (2006), Pollock et al. (2000), Appiah (1998), Cohen (1992), and so forth.  
 My contribution to this theoretical framework is that vernacular cosmopolitanism 
could be studied empirically, which I conceptualize as vernacular cosmopolitan praxis, 
through analyzing interactions between dissimilar people in transnational cyberspaces 
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rather than focusing on identities or contexts. Certainly context plays a role in 
determining the topics and collective actions that social media users discuss and 
collectivize around, but I suggest that it does not have to be the central component of the 
analysis. I also demonstrate that vernacular cosmopolitanism praxis is more likely to be 
exhibited by non-Westerners because cosmopolitanism is already presumed to be an 
element of Western consciousness. I analyze the discussions of women who subscribe to 
a common identity, Muslim woman, in transnational cyberspaces to offer a theoretical 
engagement with cosmopolitanism that is not limited to Western people and places. 
Furthermore, although there are mixed opinions as to whether or not online spaces enable 
or undermine vernacular cosmopolitanism praxis, the anonymity that online spaces 
provide may contribute to some social media users being more forthright about that their 
beliefs rather than restraining them due to concerns about political correctness and 
politeness and they may enable others to discuss social taboos that they would avoid in 
face-to-face conversations.      
 Methodological Contributions 
 Studies of online Muslim populations often focus on geographical communities 
transcribed online, Islamic discussion forums, or analyses of authoritative websites 
related to Islamic knowledge. There are also studies of Muslim communities that only 
exist online that cater to particular groups of Muslims based on locales, practices, or 
preferences regarding the consumption of religious knowledge. I introduce an innovative 
methodological approach to studying social media users based on topical and collective 
action networks rather than identity or context: connective content analysis. I collected 
data in transnational cyberspaces, rather than networks oriented specifically to Muslims, 
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because they tend to be spaces that are more conducive to studying interactions between 
Muslims of various stripes and between Muslims and non-Muslims. This methodology 
also draws attention to networks and bridges between networks, which were central to my 
data collection.  
 Yet perhaps the most interesting aspect of the connective content analysis is being 
able to put the different datasets into conversation based on network bridges and common 
qualitative themes. For example, by putting the datasets into conversation I was able to 
discuss the parallels between the silenced voices of Muslim women regardless of context. 
These conversations between the various datasets were able to elucidate the phenomenon 
of spinsterhood beyond dominant discourses and countersentences offered by spinsters. I 
was also able to compare case studies from different contexts to gauge their relative 
success through their support bases and inclusivity; ultimately, inclusivity appears to be a 
much more useful indicator than tolerance in evaluating vernacular cosmopolitanism 
praxis.    
 Empirical Contributions 
 Apart from the theoretical and methodological contributions, which overlap to a 
certain degree with the empirical contributions, part of the reason I decided to conduct 
this research is because there are few empirical scholarly analyses of the online 
participation of Muslim women in transnational cyberspaces. Since analyses of online 
populations of Muslims tend to be limited to geographical locations, the subjectivities of 
women are often underrepresented, as was the case in my Masters research (2007-2009) 
on the Francophone Moroccan blogosphere, the Blogoma, in which the network was 
comprised of very few Moroccan women. This is not the case in Saudi Arabia or Egypt, 
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for example, but often times the most influential bloggers within Arab blogospheres are 
men. Furthermore, Muslim women in traditional Muslim communities tend to be 
underrepresented because men are charged with disseminating Islamic knowledge and 
some Muslim women will not co-mingle with men online. Yet in “liberal” Muslim 
communities female Muslim scholars maintain a strong and growing presence in online 
spaces, comprising one of only a few groups of Muslim women who ostensibly deserve 
scholarly attention.  
 It is not difficult to understand why scholars would avoid analyses as messy as 
this because the data collection for particular groups based on geographical locations, like 
my study of the Blogoma, is much more straightforward but, since early on in my 
analysis I recognized parallels between the lived experiences of Muslim women in 
various contexts, I believe that these parallel are important to undermining the “Clash of 
Civilizations”369 and the stereotypes of Muslim women (often read: Arab women). Thus, 
in order to promote a feminist, antiracist, anti-imperialist research agenda, one of my 
primary motivations toward this end was challenging the East/West binary. By focusing 
on topics and collective actions, I could shy away from presenting a transnational 
analysis that reinforced this binary. Furthermore, all of the topics and collective actions 
for which I collected data are relatively unknown within academic circle. For example, I 
found 37 journal articles in the Arizona State University library database on “Muslim 
lesbians,” the most well known topic among academic circles, but I only found 3 and 4, 
respectively, for HarassMap and “artificial hymen,” the second and third most popular 
topics/collective actions. Thus my analysis has introduced issues that are perhaps 
                                                      
369 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48950/samuel-p-huntington/the-clash-of-civilizations  
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unknown outside of the networks related to these topics and collective actions within 
which Muslim women interact online.  
 One of the most complicated issues, aside from the data collection, was 
operationalizing vernacular cosmopolitan praxis because, as I discussed in Chapter 1, 
there were not any empirical studies that I could find that had measures that could be 
easily translated from surveys to online spaces. Roudometof’s (2005) local/cosmopolitan 
continuum based on perspectives related to patriotism and political and economic policies 
were not readily available, not that I am fully convinced that these measures are adequate, 
particularly in relation to discussions of women’s rights in transnational space. Mau et al. 
(2008) based their measures of cosmopolitanism on transnational contacts but they 
appeared to be mainly interested in multicultural tolerance, which I would argue is 
distinct from cosmopolitanism. Out of necessity, I devised my own measures, which I 
attempted to formulate based on their inclusivity and what I had observed in online 
dialogues among Muslim women. One of my measures, universal standards of 
comportment, for example, could be contentious—would universal standards necessarily 
reject polygyny?—but I discuss them in conjunction with truly basic standards, like a 
woman being able to walk down the street without someone grabbing her breasts. 
Although this may appear to be an insignificant measure for a grandiose ideal like 
cosmopolitanism, it is in very mundane issues that people from everywhere can agree and 
begin conversations about other more difficult topics. Certainly, a more contentious 
starting point like secularity might ostracize many people and it is not even a universal 
standard in the West where it is championed. From my perspective, it is important to 
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analyze cosmopolitanism, not just from an empirical standpoint, but also from one that is 
inclusive because, as I see it, inclusivity is a crucial component of cosmopolitanism.    
Future Research      
 As mentioned in the Chapter 1, Hoesterey (2012) framed the movements of 
Indonesian self-help gurus as “tolerance without universalism” (p. 55), but his 
characterization of them as an “alternative global discourse” is perhaps more appropriate 
than labeling them as movements that lack universalism. Although I agree that, since the 
guru movements are commodified, they lack the appeal of vernacular cosmopolitan 
praxis and can more appropriately be framed as banal cosmopolitanism, the message of 
these movements, promoting “prophetic cosmopolitanism,” is arguably relevant to 20% 
of the world population that shares the Muslim identity. The former categorization, 
“tolerance without universalism,” is problematic because Hoesterey fails to define what 
he means by universalism. If by universalism he is implying the inclusion of Western 
values, this begs the question of why this is a requisite element of establishing 
movements as cosmopolitan? I am not suggesting that Western norms should necessarily 
be excluded but why is it assumed that they should play a central role in determining 
whether a movement or worldview advances (inclusive) universalism? 
 Collective actions initiated by Muslims often engage topics that appeal to 
transnational, transcultural aspects of the lived experiences of Muslims, some of which 
include the following: rendering Muslim lifestyles in the modern era, countering 
Islamophobia, establishing rubrics on what is considered authentic religious knowledge, 
and articulating Islamic practices. These collective actions suggest an “alternative global 
discourse” more than “tolerance without universalism,” or at least no more “tolerance 
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without universalism” than one would expect to encounter among cosmopolitan 
movements stemming from the West. This is why I imply that some forms of 
cosmopolitan praxis that took shape in my analysis of the datasets could be classified as 
“Muslim cosmopolitanisms,” which are forms of universalism that are directed at 
Muslims throughout the world. These forms of “Muslim cosmopolitanism,” like the 
hijabi fashion network and women expanding the scope of Islamic knowledge through 
their hermeneutics, often express multiple allegiances but they do not so much reject 
Western populations and values by design but due to global systemic constraints related 
to their guilt by association of anti-Western sentiment and terrorism through their 
affiliation with Islam. Muslim cosmopolitanism, even forms that coincide with Western 
values, often has little choice but to sidestep the inclusion of Western worldviews and 
secure solidarity among Muslims transnationally because Muslim cosmopolitanisms are 
often automatically framed as anti-Western. There are also Muslim cosmopolitanisms 
that do reject Western cultures, such as the hypersexuality of films and television 
programming, but it should not immediately follow that Muslim cosmopolitanisms 
inherently reject individualism, democracy, secularity, and free market economics.  
 Advancing qualified versions of cosmopolitanism is part and parcel of global 
hegemony but it should not be assumed that these modified cosmopolitanisms are limited 
to Muslims or the East. The universalism of non-Western cosmopolitanism that is judged 
and found wanting is measured by the standards of another form of qualified 
cosmopolitanism: “Western cosmopolitanism” (Pollock et al., 2000). Similarly, 
universalism is not universalism, but Western universalism. To move away from the 
assumption that cosmopolitanism is an inherently Western ideal and all other forms, like 
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Muslim cosmopolitanism, are necessarily derivative and perhaps unauthentic, one must 
recognize that when scholars invoke the term cosmopolitanism they are typically 
referencing Western cosmopolitanism unless specific qualifiers are introduced. Perhaps 
this is an important starting point for future studies of cosmopolitanism.  
 This dissertation has demonstrated that vernacular cosmopolitan praxis could be 
found among Muslim women from the East and West in cyberspaces, even among the 
most unlikely cosmopolitans from the standpoint of Western cosmopolitanism, which 
tends to be a homogenizing force. While the social media use of Muslim women is not 
markedly different from the ways that other groups use these platforms—sharing political 
and religious perspectives, joining supportive communities, networking with likeminded 
people—as an underrepresented group in media and public spaces, their voices have the 
potential to balance widely accepted truths about them. Cyberspaces are as likely to foster 
as they are to constrain cosmopolitan praxis and, as such, the cosmopolitan praxes found 
therein are the result of how people use the technology, including the following: 
promoting mutual tolerance, supporting activism related to universal issues, reinforcing 
hierarchies, engaging in subtle resistance, stereotyping, trolling, bridging, and so on. 
Online spaces are channels through which everyone with sufficient means can share their 
voices yet certain voices continue to weigh in more heavily. To advance cosmopolitanism 
as a concept that truly reflects the cosmos, more research of non-Western 
cosmopolitanism should be undertaken to advance the concept beyond Western 
universalism, norms, and identities. Certainly highlighting vernacular cosmopolitan 
praxis among non-Westerners is a way to gain greater understandings of associated 
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ontologies and move toward greater global inclusivity for both the imagined East and the 
West. 
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Age: related to older women and young girls facing sexual harassment. 
 
Apathy: underscores the reaction of the Egyptian bystanders to sexual harassment on the 
street. 
 
Blame women: commenters point out that women are summarily blamed for being 
sexually harassed for some of the following reasons: for dressing immodestly, walking in 
a suggestive fashion, not covering their hair/face, being out of their homes at night (or, in 
some cases, at all), being in crowds, not having a male with them, and so on. 
 
Causes: broaches more generally the causes of sexually harassment without necessarily 
blaming women. 
 
Characteristics: while some attempt to ascribe specific traits to harassers, many 
commenters believe that Egyptian men and boys from all walks of life harass women.  
 
Class: some commenters claim that members of the lower class perpetrate harassment, 
but others assert that rich and middle class men are just as likely to harass women.          
 
Clean revolution: some interlocutors discuss how sexual harassment disappeared during 
the revolution or how some Egyptians promoted the myth that it disappeared to reinforce 
the “cleanliness” of the revolution. This theme is also linked to Western media 
highlighting the rapes and harassment of women during the uprisings (e.g. Lara Logan).   
 
Community: some believe that the lack of a sense of community contributes to the 
pervasiveness of sexual harassment, which is an attempt to explain the “apathy” of 
bystanders. This theme is also related to the past sense of community when people would 
intervene when women were harassed in the street. 
 
Consciousness: related to my argument that Egyptian women have development 
revolutionary consciousnesses through their participation in the uprisings. Women are 
rejecting all forms of subjugation, including harassment. 
 
Cool: some interlocutors suggest that men harass women to appear “cool” to their peers. 
 
Crowd: commenters suggest that women avoid crowds to prevent being harassed and/or 
discuss incidents of a woman/women being harassed by a group of men.  
 
Definition: related to how sexual harassment is defined. 
 
Double standard: related to women carrying all the blame for sexual harassment while 
men are excused for their behaviors. 
 
Education: interlocutors point out that educating Egyptians toward mutual respect and 
advancing education for women is necessary to combat sexual harassment.  
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Empower: discussions related to the empowerment of women through initiatives such as 
HarassMap, speaking out, storytelling, and so forth. 
 
Exaggeration: related to remarks that women are exaggerating the seriousness of 
incidents they encounter on the streets or/and exaggerating the pervasiveness of sexual 
harassment. 
 
Expose the pervert: one of the HarassMap interventions is to “expose the pervert” or 
speak out publically against harassers either through the interactive map or in the street. 
 
Female appropriateness: related to societal constraints on gender appropriateness for 
Egyptian women. Also related to taboos. 
 
Flirt: related to people minimizing the seriousness of sexual harassment by referring to it 
as flirting. 
 
Futile: related to suggestions that interventions against harassment are futile.  
 
Gaze: related to averting one’s gaze (also what some commenters suggest is the most 
important aspect of the Qur’anic modesty mandate). 
 
Hate: related to women’s hatred of men for being constantly harassed by them. 
 
Helpless: related to the feeling of helplessness women experience after being sexually 
harassed. 
 
Hijab or veil: related to whether or not veiling thwarts harassment.  
 
History: related to the history of sexual harassment in Egypt, including past and present 
media coverage of it.  
 
HM effectiveness: related to HarassMap’s effectiveness. 
 
HM intervention: methods by which HarassMap proposes to counter sexual harassment. 
 
Home: related to suggestions that women should stay home to avoid harassment. 
 
Inferiority: related to the perceived inferiority of women in the Egyptian society. 
 
Internalize: related to how the treatment of women begins to affect their self-perceptions 
and how they interact with society. Also related to “self-loathing.” 
 
Intervention: related to strategies that Egyptian women employ or propose to minimize 
their exposure to harassment or strategies. 
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Kids: related to children being harassed and, those as young as 7, harassing women. 
 
Law: related to governmental measures that have been introduced to address sexual 
harassment. 
 
Male protection: related to men protecting women against harassment either through their 
presence with women on the street or through intervening   
 
Male reaction: related to the possibility of men retaliating against women if women speak 
up or act out against harassment. Also related to “returning violence.” 
 
Male responsibility: related to holding men accountable for harassing women. 
 
Marriage: related to the belief of some Egyptians that the delayed age of marriage 
contributes to the pervasiveness of sexual harassment.  
 
Masculinity: related to harassment being an exhibition of virility. Also related to “power” 
and “male public.”  
 
Media: related to how media contribute to the objectification of women through internet 
pornography and graphic sexuality in film and television. 
 
Men lack control: related to the idea that men are biologically predisposed to harassment 
and cannot control their violence against women. 
 
Mixing sexes: related to the argument that the mixing of the sexes contributes to sexual 
harassment. 
 
Mubarak or rule of law: related to the general corruption of the former regime and its 
failure to protect and ensure the rights of Egyptian citizens and their subsequent 
disempowerment. 
 
Myth: related to myths that circulate related to harassment (such as the age, modesty, 
beauty, gait, etc. of the woman is what encourages harassment).  
 
New gov’t: related to the new government in terms of displacing the corruption of the old 
regime with a new way of life that addresses issues like sexual harassment. Also, 
discusses points of view of new leadership, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. 
 
Normal or norm: related to sexual harassment becoming normalized in the Egyptian 
society.  
 
Object or dehumanize: discussions related to the objectification of women. 
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Patriarchy: some discussions claim that harassment is symptomatic of patriarchy.  
 
Police: related to police officers either participating in sexual harassment or failing to 
intervene when women are harassed. 
 
Poverty: some commentators link harassment to poverty. 
 
Power and male public: related to men exerting their power over women and over the 
public sphere through sexually harassing women. 
 
Rage: related to the feelings of rage women experience for being constantly targeted by 
harassers. 
 
Ramadan: related to sexual harassment during Ramadan and Eid. 
 
Rearing: some interlocutors believe that the way men are raised to believe they are 
superior to women contributes to sexual harassment. 
 
Recognition: related to the acknowledgment that sexual harassment is a problem.  
 
Religion: related to how Islam influences perceptions of harassment. Western 
interlocutors link the prevalence of sexual harassment to the status of women in Muslim 
countries. Also, Egyptian religious leaders sometimes place the blame for harassment 
squarely on women.  
 
Return violence: related to Egyptian women returning violence against men who harass 
them. 
 
Self-loathing: related to women’s sense of self-disgust, in extreme case, escalating to 
suicide, due to their treatment by men. Also related to “internalize.” 
 
Self-control: related to men’s lack of self-control in regard to their behavior on the street. 
 
Silence: related to the failure of Egyptian women to speak out after being harassed. 
Silence is the typical reaction and the reaction that society expects and reinforces. 
 
Speak out: related to women speaking out against sexual harassment, either in the streets 
or through the map. 
 
Subverting: related to countering societal taboos related to sexuality and female 
appropriate. Also, other traditions such as marriage. 
 
Taboo: some interlocutors believe that taboos associated with sexual harassment and 
victim-blaming result in the silence of women who have been sexually harassed.  
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Tension: related to sexual tension being a cause of harassment. 
 
Typology or typologies: of harassers and forms of harassment. 
 
Victim-blaming: related to the tendency to blame women for harassment. 
 
Walk: many Egyptian women view obstacles to the simple act of walking in the streets as 
indicative of the overall status of their rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
